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The subject of
which is

~erceive~

t~is

dissertation is the resurrection of Jesus,

to be the central doctrine of the

Christi~ fait~.

This subject is treated rationally in regards to the possibility of
the resurrection being a historical event.
Research in this topic falls into the realms of three disciplines-religion, history
~ost

~nd

philosophy.

The entire question is

a~ittedly

related to Christian theology, but there has also been an

upsurge in the

of interest from contemporary history and

a~ount

philosophy as .. ell.

Sone of these trends in intellectual thought

are also investigated.
This dissertation therefore deals with the problems encountered
:in a rational approach to the resurrection.

.b.s stated above, the

main purpose is to enieavor to ascertain if this occurrence can be
de~onstrated

to be

or not.

~istorical

Ec~ever,

there are other

definite i=.plications involved ceyond this immediate purpOSQ, for
if t!le resurrectio!: actually
8~rel~T

(or if it did n-ot) t!l8re is

!!2l1cn significance for Christian faith and theology.

The
After

ha~pened

met~od

studyin~

used is first to investigate some preliminary questions.
the i=portance of the

resurTe~tion

in conte2porary

intellectual thO . . l;-ht (especi'ally in these three disciplines), the

"

relation of this eve~t (as a claimed miracle) to science and history
is examined.

Also included is a study of the philosophical problem

of reason and faith.
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The

~ain for~at

consists of an investigation of three

intellectual

app:,"~a.ches

is that this

eve~t

possibility is
as such.

to the resurrection.
occ~r

did not

t~at

The second

it did occur, but that it cannot be :'e::lonst:;:'ated
t~at

the resurrection did occur

literally and t!lat it can be demonstrated.
tl~at

~ossible

The first possibility

literally at all.

The thiTd possibility is

to note here

~abermas

the v.-ord

!!c.e~cnstrate"

for "absolute proof" in this

study~

It is e:v.tremel;y important

is not used as

2.

synonym

To believe that the l'esurrectior..

can be derr.or..stra tea. is thus a reference to probabili ties--tl:at the
resurrection is the

~ost

probable conclusion in light of the

fact~al

evidence.
The view of one primary scholar from each

o~

these three categories

will be investi;-atec., supple!;1ented by several others ...;ho ta..'k::e a
si~ilar

position

re~arding

the occurrence of this event.

O~e

historian (Javid ~uwe), one philosopher (spren Kierkega~rd) and one
t::eolu5ian C',olfhart Pannenberg) are the p::-i:nary scholars.
not the ove::-all philosophies of t!lese scholars which are

It is

st~c.ied,

but rather their approach to this occurrence.
Lastly, an evaluation of each of these three possibilities
i3 given.

";;::ic~~

The object here is to ascertain the approach

is

best supported by the facts.
The maj or findir..;-s of this study aI-e iiffiC"l.l.l t to

sU::'~:2..::-ize

briefly becaUSe the a::-gu.'l:.ent he::-e is a closely-knit one.
it is

conclude~'.

fi::."st that science ar.d history cannot rul·;:; ou.t the

::iraculous -::'i thout an investigation.
possible in

vie~

::o-;:-ever,

.'i

nriori rejectiO!l3 are not

of the modern concepts of science and

his~ory.

In
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i~

order to

ascertai~

occurred or not.

A~

if miracles such as the

~~cer~as

resurTectio~ ~ctually

inductive study of the facts based

upo~

the

proba.bili ty of the .findings is thus the proper procedure and the
one used here.
The results show that the literal resurrection of Jesus is in
all probability a historical fact.

Alternate theories are thoroughly

investigated as part of the three major possibilities

outli~ec

above.

It is fou..'"ld that t!:ere are no naturalistic vie ...;s which adeq,uately
explai~

the facts.

!n addition: there are several

facts which also :.Joint to this event.

stron~ hist~rical

Based upon such proor..cilities,

the resurrection is affirued as a historical event.
certain

i~plicatio~s

this concli.lsio_l.

for Christian faith and theo:oGY

There r..re also
bec~~se

of

ii
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APP?OACEING TEE QUESTION OF THE
RESURRECTION OF JESUS

Chapter I.

The Present State of the Question

The belief in the resurrection of Jesus has raised many questions
and provoked much thought throughout the history of the Christian
c~urch.

Is such an eveLt pcssible and in what sense, if any?

it still be believed in today or not?

Can

This "question of the

resurrection" has received an increased amount of attention,
especially in recent years.

One quite surprising fact is that the

discussion surrounding this topic is ne longer relegated just to
the field of religion alone, as various scholars from other
disciplines have also shown some interest.
No one deubts that such inquiry falls primarily into the field
of theulogy.

Therefore we

~ill

turn here first

i~

order to view

generally the present state of the question cf Jesus' resurrecticna
Later we will also deal briefly with the interest in this topic
shown in two other areas--history and philosophy_
this chapter is primarily to note some present
this question, keying on its

The purpose of
related te

t~ends

fer the Christian faith.

~pcrt~ce

For the purposes of this paper, the

resurrect~on

initially and briefly be defined in the terms of the

will

Ne~

Testament

concept.

This event thus refers to the Christian belief that

Jesus

~as

actually dead but later was literally raised to life by

Goi.

Jesus was believed to have appeared afterwards to his followers

in a sniritual body, which was neither an unchanged physical body
or a spirit.

Rather, there

~ere

qualities in this spiritual body.
res~rection

both objective and subjective
The

Christi~~

c:ncept of

therefore differs from other ideas concerning

2

3

immortality in that Jesus was not reincarnated, neither did he
simply experience the continuance of his personality beyond the
grave! nor was his soul absorbed into some type of universal soul.
T~

the contrary, Jesus was

beli~ved

to have literally been raised

from the dead, as he appeared to his followers before his
to heaven.

ret~~n

It is this Christian belief in Jesus' resurrection

which must be investigated here.

This definition will continue'

tc broaden as this work expands.
Just before we turn to our first section certain cautions are
in order.

Because we are endeavoring to look at both sides of

the :;:.:."gument and consider views that e:e "pro" &nd "con ii , we must
take as little as possible fDr granted at the outset.

For this

reason we will refrain in almost all instances from capitalizing
pronouns fer Jesus, lest we begin to decide the question

L~

advance.

Concerning the l4se of such words as !!this eve!lt" or "this occurrence;;
when referring to the

res~~ectivn,

have already decided that it has

~e

~:

!let

hap~en~d.

me~

to imply that we

Rather, theaa

xefer to what the New Testament claims has happened.
actually did or not must yet be determined.

wcr~s

Whether it

Indeed, many theologians

also refer to the resurrection as an event and still mean that it
happened in other than a literal way.

These words, then, must not

always refer to something literal and often do not, as we shall

cza.

In these ways the issue will hopefully not be prejudiced

ahead of time.

4

Theology and the Resurrection'

.8..

1.
Many

The Importance of the Resurrection

theolo~ians

today consider the resurrection of

Je~us

to

be the central clai= of Christianity, whether they interpret this
event literally or not.
~ell.

Such was often true of past

theolo;i~ns

as

In other ;.ords, even those who do not affirm the post-mortem

bodily appearances but

so~etimes

stress instead the "spiritual

p:!'e'!:;ence" or "continuing influence" of Jesus often feel that the
resurrection is still the basis of the

Christ~an

For instance, German redaction critic Y{illi

faith.
~\~arxsen

that Jesus' resur=ection plays the most decisive part of
discussion today.

believes
t~€ological

This scholar feels that its importance

~as

precisely stated by the Apostle Paul in the first century ADJ. when
he wrote "if Christ has not been raised, then our

preac~in;

vain and your faith is in vain" (I Cor. 15:14, RSV).
event is therefore linked

wit~

the very

fait~

of the

is in

For ~arxsen this
churc~.

An

l.mcertainty about questions such as those raised above :night cause
a corresponding uncertainty in cur faith today.

1

Another Ger~a~ theo1o;ian, G~nther 30rnka~m, agrees with the
ulti~ate

i~portance

of the resurrection, even if it may be

to g:-asp exactly what took "lace.

i~possible

He remarks that:

••• there ,:o:;~ld be no gospel, not one account, no letter in
the New Testament, no faith, no Church, no worsni~, no prayer
in Christendo~ to this day without the message of the
resurrection of Christ ••• 2
1

2

;;i 11i ?·,:arxsen, 'l:'he ?.e surrection of Jesus of !';azareth, tr::::.nsla ted
b~r }:argaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Fortress ?ress, 1970), p. 12. This

quote fr0ID I Cor. 15:14 and other Biblical quotes in this work are
fro~ t'l:1e Revised. Sta:ldard Version of the Bible (!;ew ~orl:; Tb.o:uas
Nelson and Sons, 1946, 1952).
G~nther Eornka~, Jesus of ~azareth, t~anslated by Irene and FTaser
},:cLuskey (KeTr York: rtarpe~ and 3.ow, Publishers, 1960), p. 181.

5
Thus we see t::.e.t for these two critical schola.:-s, theoloGica.l
theology itself finds its central aspect in the

discussio~ a~d

eve~

resurrection.

This of course does not solve the

p:-oble~ o~ ~hether

this event occurreQ or not and in what sense, as this
future conside:-ation.

Indeed, both

~tarxsen

~ust ~e

and Bornk8.!nm do not

believe ~e can prove it, but only affir~ it by faith.'
suc~

state~ents

~a.ny,

and that is the priDary

of this cha.pte:-.

Other sch01a:-s also verify these convictions.
Laurence

~:'iller

defi!:itive

7':erri 11

'~'enney

For instance,

likewise believes that the resurrection of Jesus is

very heart of "i::sn" '!esta.=::ent theology.

.....,!'!e

~o~sver,

do help serve to demonstrate how important a place

in the Ch:-istian faith it is given by
o~ject

;iven

state~ent

nrefe:-s

1;0

Like Ka:-xsen, he finds

of this belief in Paul (I Co:-. 15:12-22).

4

use the resurrection as a fra:ne-;:o::-k for

all of vhristian theology, even dealinG with so:ne of the Qoctrines
that can be inte;rEte~ under this the~e.5 Charles Anders0n, in a
section devoted entirely to the importance of the resurrection, also
speaks of some of the Christia!: doctrines that are

New Testa:nent on the basis of this event.

3

4

in the

Again I Cor. 15:14 is

believes that it is now i~nossible to nrove the :-esurrection
event (oD.cit., pp. 112-113, 119, i22), but we- can still accept
the offer of fa.i th in Jesus even if he is dead (Ibid., p~;. 128,
147). Eornka.w.ffi agrees t!-.:.at the resurrection cannot be den:onstrated.
or proven to have occurred (on.cit., pp. 180-186; especi~lly
p? 180, 18 L ). But we can still exercise faith .in Jesus apart
from a!;,y such proof (Ibid., pp. 183, 194). }!ore will be ::;a.i6. about
the logic of this type of reasoninG la.ter--how it can 8E held by
so~e ~h2t one can have faith in Jesus whethe:- or not he has risen
(
, even 1• ...
'" 'h
•
... '1'~ d ea d')
,anc.
_.e lS
S.,1
.•

~arxsen

Laurence Miller, Jesus Christ Is Alive (Boston:

19 4 9),
5

ex?lain8~

Uerri~l

p.

'TT

~

',t • •", •

'7ilde Company,

9.

C. Tenney, The Reality of the Resurrection
'Pb"-'h
79
an ,. . ;. l '!tOW,
_ U _l:::>_!ers, l Q
.I 63) ,pp.
-.

(Ne~

Yo:-k: liarper

6
used as a key.

6

Closely related views a.re held by other theologians as well.
The former Anglican Archbishop of Canterbu=y, A.M. Ramsey, believes
that the resurrection is not only the center of theology, but
that it is also the starting place for studies revolving around the
New Test.ment and its meaning. 7
is the basis of redemptiye

Fer Daniel Fuller the resurrection

hi~tory.

Events such as the cross

receive much of their redemptive meaning because they are closely
associated with the belief in a risen Jesus.

8

C=C~ Dobson asserts

that even those who oppose all accounts of the resurrection still
admit its importance as the keystone of Christianity.9
Every

o~ce

in awhile a thesis such as the importance of the

resurrection for the Christian faith iiill receive a new "twist",
further

demo~strating

its relevance.

This was achieved in recent

years by ll!arkus :Barth and Verne R. Fletcher, who postulated that
Jesus'

resurrectic~

)las also the basis for Christian

This

event was perceived to have definite implications as a foundation
for hmnan virt'... p. and justice.

In spite of its being a li ttle-

recognized theme, the authors believe that it is as relevar.t for us

6

7I

Charles Co Anderson, The Historical Jesus: A Continuin(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company,
pp. 157-159.
A.M. Ramsey,· The Resurrection of Christ (Second edition; London

and Glascc~~ C~llins: 1965), pp. 9-11.

8

Daniel P. Fuller, Easter Faith and
Eerdman's Publishing Company~ 1965

9

C.C. Dobson 7 The Em~ty Tomb and the Risen Lord (Second edition
revised; London and EdinburghJ Marshall, Morgan and Scott, Ltd.,
n.d.), pp. 24-25.

Rapids: William

1
today in these matters as it is in a strictly theological context. 10
Even though many of the theologians above differ in other
aspects of Christian belief, they all perceive that the resurrection
is the center of theology even today.
differing backgrounds,

b~t

they

~re

To be sure, they cone from

all

~~

agreement

~ith Paul~tb~t

if' this event was to be cemp1ete1y abrogated, the Christian faith
woula be in jeopardy.

As Marxsen etates, if there is uncertainty

or obscurity in the matter of belief in the resurrection, then
Christianity becomes endangered.
as

t~e

This demonstrates its importance

center of theology today_ 11

Before leaving the subject of the importance of Jesus'
res~rection,

it should be mentioned that it is not only an integral

part of teday's theology.

In New

Test~ent

times it was also the

doctrine upon which the Christian faith was built.
discussed Paul's statement to this effect aboye,

We have already

~here

he states

"if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in v&in and
your faith is in
~~~

vain~~

(I Cor. 15:14; BSV. Cf. verses 12-20).

Paul's opinion that the resurrection of Jesus and the

faith stood or fell together.

A stronger statement

It

Christia~

est~blishing

the priority and importance of this occurrence for first century

Christianity could hardly be established.
Recent theological studies have recognized this importance for
the early
~hile

~hurch~

~minent Ne~ Test~ent

schelar

P'~dclf Bult:8n~,

not personally accepting any sort of literal resurrection of

10

Markus Barth and Verne H. Fletcher, Acquittal by Resurrection
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), Foreward,
pp. V-VIII; cf. p. 3.

11

Marxsen, op.cit., p. 12.

S

Jesus, still states

tha~

for the earliest Christians this event

served the purpose of proving that God had substantiated the claims
of Jesus by raising him from the dead. 12

The early Christians alsa

believed that the resurrection prove~ Jesus' Lordship,13 his
"'!'
• h ~ h'~p 14
~ess~a

t h
th e Son
an d even thaeTas

the New Testament the

~esurrection

0f

God. 15

According to

also establishes the Christian

doctrines of repentance,16 salvation and justification by faith,17

~nd judgment. lS

James McLezan has pointed out that early Christianity

also witnesses to thebelief that God began neT dealings with mankind through the risen Jes~S.19
Now we must be quick to point out once again that these beliefs
by no means establish the fact of the resurrection.

All we have

demonstrated is that it is the center Qf Christian theology both in
New Testament times and today.

12

But this does not make it a proven

~udolf BultI:lannp "New Testament and Mythology", in Kerygma. and
Myth, edited by lians Werner Bartsch, translated by Reginald H.
Fuller (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961), p. 39
referring to Acts 17:31.

13

Uarxsen, on.cit., p. 169, referring to Acts 17:;Of.; Fuller,
on.cito, pp. 14-15, referring to Rom. 10:9.

14

Rudolf Bultmanr., Theology of the New Testament, translated by
Keudyick Grobel (New York~ Charles Scribner's Sons, n.d.), Part
p. 27, referrinb to Acts 2:;6 and Rom. 1:4. Cf. also Fuller,
op.cit., p. 15, referring to Acts 2:22-36.

15 Fuller,
16

O!l~ c::i-'.: pp.

I~

15-16!j referring to Rom. 1:4.

Marxsen, on.cit., p. 169, referring to Acts 16t30f.

17 Anderson, on.cit., pp. 158-159, referring to Rom. 4225, 10:9;
cf. also Barth and Fletcher, op.cit., p. 4 and Tenney,
18
19

o~.cit.t

Marxsen, op.cit., p. 169.
James McLeman, Resurrection Then and Now (Philadelphia and New
York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1967), p. 92; cf. 87 also.

p.S.
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fact.

':'he i:lportance of an eV'2nt does not ~ of course? estz.o:.ish

whether it has actually occurred or not.
2.

The

Conte~porary

Perhaps the

pri~ary

Theological Approach to the Resurx;ction
approach to the theological study of the

resurrection today from a critical viewpoint is the application of
the literary methoQs of form criticis:l and the related
redaction criticis::i to the New Testament texts.

20

discipli~e,

Two key ·:·;orks

dor.e on the resurrection from this standpoint are those by
-.'
21
~arxsen

. .rteglna
. . I"Q

an~

Accordins to

=11
~~
ere 22

t:r
_.

~or~an

~Jilli

Perrin, the theological application of

form critical literary techniques was insinuated in the work of
Julius :.'el:!.hausen (1544-1918) and an early form of redaction
criticis~

was first a?plied to theology in the writings of ·::ilhelm

...·,rec.e
. (181:;0

.,.1 ...... -

rejuvenater..
for~

10"
.... )
........... 0 .

After the First

~orld ~ar

Instead of a fe"!: theologians

these stUdies

si~ply

~ere

suggestin,:; the

critical literary approach to Scripture studies, it became

the con=.on interest and a major emphasis of such scholars as
Z.L. Sch:idt (lS91-1?56), ~artin Jibelius (1983-1947) and ~udolf
20

21

22

It should ~e n~tec that neither foxID or reda~tion criticism is
actually theolo5j-. ?ather, these are literary methods that have
been used in diverse endeavors, such as in studying classical
literature. 1n~7 are +'~exefoTe utilized here as liter~ry
approaches "hich are presently being applied to the Ne~ Testament.
These methods are thus referred to as the current theological
approach to t~s resurrection because they are employe~ by
theologians and not because these disciplir.es are IDist~~enly
~eing referred as theology themselv8s. For the relationship
be't7o"een fO::':::1 and redaction criticis::J., see gorman Perrin's ~at
is ?edaction::ri ticis:::.?, e:H ted by Dan 0" Via (Philaa.e1phia;-?ortress ?::'ess, 1971), p. 13 for instance.
rhe afore:nen"tionec. The

Resur~ectio::1

of Jesus of

Ful~er, The Foroation of the
(Xe7i Yor!':: The Macoillan Compan:r, 1971).

~egin~ld ~.

!~azareth.

~esu~rection ~arratives

10

Eult~ann (born 1884).2;
known for popularizing

Eult~ann is probably the one who is best
for~

criticis~,

applying it especially to

the synoptic gospels anc publishing the results in such

ess~ys

as

"mh
..: e st u dy O.l. th e ...<::' ;;.rnop t·:LC r.Jospe 1"
s • 24
.Z'

Briefly, according to this theory of interpretation, the
s~"'::;.optic

gospels were the products of the fai t!1 of the es.rliest

first century Christian church.

In otter

words~

after years of

orally spreadinz the gospel of Jesus Ctrist (and perhaps also by
some written records which we no longer have, such as the Quelle
document), the earliest church decided to write down what it could
recall of t:h.e life of Jesus.

:But since the first Christians were

not given a complete historical narrative of his life, their
recollections cou.1d only be of inde'Oe:::dent occurrences.-

'::he

gospels, then, can be broken down into these separate occurrences
'T."hich in turn correspond to certain forDs.

When all of

the~e

occurrer.ces a:::-e d.i vided. up into these fOr:!ls, Bul tr:lann notes the. t Vie
:!'lave

se~ieral

classifications such as miracle stories, para:;:;:!..es and

Since the

c~u:::-~~ ~as

interested in a cODplete

these events had to be connected into a day by day
life.

One can find. a

one story to anotber.
has

c~me

to be

use~

~ood

biosrap~y,
acco~t

many of these editorial links

however,

of Jesus'

th~t

tie

This is how t!1e likeness to "beads on a string"

for the

fo:::-~

critical approach.

A main object

23

Perrin, o'O.cit., PI'. 13-15. SODe of 3ultma~~'s conclusions on the
importa::;.ce of the resurrection in the early chuZ'ch hav~ already
been noted above.

24

Rud.olf Bul tTl.a.n::-.., liThe Study of the Synoptic Gos-oels" i!: Form
Criticism, tra~slated by Frederick C. G:::-a~t (Ne~ York: Earper
and Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 11-76.

25

~ultmann, ~.,

pp. 36-6;.

11

for theologians "ho employ this approach is to ascertain

·::~;.ic!:

~

oJ..

....wile

accounts (or parts of accounts) in the gospels are "".ctua.ll~c ::istorical
26
stories and which 7.'ere "constructed" by the fai tn of the e2.rly church.
~edaction

criticisE relies heavily on tte procedures of form

critici~~

and builds

.
tnese

.
be seen as b eing two stages 0 f tne

~ay

upo~

its

pre~ises.

In fact, Perrin notes that
sa~e

d"1SC11' 1"1ne. 27

Redaction criticism has developed significantly since the work
done by

~ilhelm ~rede

at the end of the nineteenth and

the twentieth centuries.

be;ir~ing

Today more positive attention iz

the gospel authors, as they are seen as having more of an

~iven

of
to

i~tegral

and original role to play in the choosing of material ani in the
written portrayal of it.

Critics today also feel

that a. ?::'i::!ary

gcs.}. i,; to be able to trace the ::la terial through the vario:.:.s phrases
of

i~:l~cnce,

t~rcu~h

the

va~ious

additions by redactors and then

as closely as possible to the source(s).

This

~ill

enable them to

detern:ine, a:!long other things, wher-e the facts originated aIld what
is at the basis of the reports.

The object is, of

course~

to

ascertain the reliability of tte data as ouch as possible, to see
~
~
28
is historical and what has been added to t!1.e original lac",s.

Three of the leading redaction critics today, at

le2s~

i~

a

chronological sense, are G~~ther 50rnka=~,29 nans Conzel=a~: and
They worked

in~ependently

26

Ibid., 1'. 25.

27

Ferrin, on.cit., 1'1'. 1-3, 13.

28

Ibid., 1'1'. 3, 12-13.

29

~ornkamm's

Christian

30

on the

belief in the importance of the
has been noted above.

sy~optic

resurrectio~

gospels

for

theolc~~

Some of Marxsen's contributions to the current study of the
resurrection have also been noted above.

12
of Matthew, Luke and Mark, respectively.

In a sense they have
-1

paved the way for similar stu~ies today.~·
We have briefly investigated
two main reasons.

for~

and redaction

criti~ism

for

First, its importance as the currently accepted

literary approach to Eiblical studies should not be underrated.
We have noted above that some
have

~een

en~ire

works and portions of others

devoted to studies on the resurrection by scholars who

favor these two disciplines. 52

Thus farm and redaction criticism

will provide a basis fer much of what will be said

hereafte~.

Seconds although this writer does not embrace many of the facets
and conclusions of either form criticism or redaction criticism,
we will adopt many of its procedures here as the most comwonly
accepted "rules of the trade".

With this ba(;kgrou::ld and. theological

foundation, it is advantageous to proceed now to two other fields
of study which have also given recent attention

~o

the subject of

the resurrection.
E.

History, Philosophy and the Resurrection

We have already stated that one interesting aspect of current
study on the resurrection of Jesus is that several scholars in other
fields of study besid.es religion have also become interested in

31

Perrin, on.cit., ppo 25-39.

32

See, for instance, Marxsen's and R. Fuller's work above, footnotes
21 and. 22 respectively, which are entirely devoted to the
resurrection. Portions of many works have also dealt with this
subject, like those of Bultmann and Bor~~amm cited above,
footnotes 12 a-~d two, respectively.

13

.

.
These men have applied their various 2n"er-

this question.

disciplinary back;rounds and educations to the problem and have
u~derstandably

co~e

to various conclusions.

Although these trends

a.re probably :nost observable in the disciplines of history and
philosophy, they are no means confined to these two areas.

Other

scholars (and their fields) who have shown as interest in this
event include C.S. Lewis, the late Cambridge University professor
c::.
__ , 33
of ~n-l;s~ l;·e~~tu~~

J.X.D. Anderson, a lawyer and the University
!.or.do!l's director of Advanced Legal Studies, 34 Peter L. 3ergers
.o...J

f)"

~

~

pro f essor

__

. . '"

0f

..

- 1 ogy a t
S oc~o

jcurnalist and late

':::l
t
.;1.U

colu~nist

and scientist ~enry ~orris.37

. ~ 35
gers u·
:uvers~wy,
for

~nited

Press

L,ou~s
- Casse.lS,
~

.

Internat~o~&l

36

Let us turn now specifically to the

fields of history and philosophy to observe some of the current
interest in the question of the resurrection.
1.

3istor~r

and the Resurrection

It is t:-ue that most ::ode::-n historia.."1s do :-.0: she,;,; an extraordinary acount of interest in the resurrection.
33

Neither ere they

c.s.

Lewis' ~ork ~iracles (~ew York: The Uacmillan C02?ar.y, 1965)
deals with the resurrectior. on pp. 148-155.

J.~.J. Anderson has at least two writings dealing with the
resurrectior.. See Christianity: The ~itness of 3istory (London:
Tyndale Press, 1969), p~. 84-108 and the boo~let The 3vidence
for the ?esurrectior:. (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Pres;:;, 1966).

35

3er5er's ~or~, A Runor of Ansels (New York: Doubleday?ublishing
CO!:lpan;y-, 1970) does not deal directly -,-:i th the re surrac"Gion, but
rather with ths possibility of ~iracles and Supernatural events
occuri!'l0'.
Cassels has ~ritten at least two books which deal with the
question of the resurrection. See This Fellow Jesus (New York:
?;\rra::lid Public2.tions, 1973) ~ pp. S~-90 and Ch:,istian ?rimer
(NeT. ~ork: ~ou~leday and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 23-26.

37

One of ~orris! books !!any Infallible ?roofs (San Die~o: CreationLife Publishers 7 1974), devotes a chapter to the resurrection,
pp. 82-97.
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usually concerned over whether it was a historical event or not.
Generally the attitude taken in historical works towards this
occurrence is one either of skepticism 3S or one that relates the
Biblical accounts of the death

~,d

resurrection of Jesus only,

after a short preface which states tithe

~ible

claims, ••• ~, or:'ea:rly

Christians believed that ••• ", or another s~milar e~pression.39
This general non-interest in the resurrection by historians is
understandable in view of the fact that many feel that this event
is an item of faith, even if they believe that it actually occurred.
Yet there are

historians who have investigated this

so~e

event to some extext.

It is not our purpose here in this chapter

to cover all areas of historical inquiry, but rather to briefly
survey a sample of a few historians who have shown interest in the
subject of the resurrection.

Later the position of historian

David Hume will be discussed in much more detail, as his viewS
were extremely

influen~ial

on the question of miracles.

Ancient historian Paul Maier has recently published a book
entitled

Fir~t. ~aster.4e

This work is concerned to a large

extent with the first Easter Sunday and the question
ha'O'Oen at d.a.wn on Sunday morning?,,4l

'~hat

did

His purpose is to try and

E.G. Wells, The Outline of History, (Two yol~e2; Garde:::J. City:
Garden City Books, 1949), vol. It pp. 539-540.

39

Shepard E. Clough, Nina G. Garsoian and navid L. Ricks, A Eistory
of the Ancient World (Three volumes; Boston: D.C. ~eath and
Co:pany, 1967), vol. I, Ancient and Medieval, p. 127.

40

Paul L. Maier, First Easter (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1973).

41

Ibid., p. 93.

The italics are Maier's.
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42
ascertain if history can tell us what really happened that day.
His method is first to investigate the original sources, comparing
the VRrious accounts of the early church which claim that Jesus
rose from the dead.

Alternate theories are then proposed and

Lastly, some interesting but seldom mentioned historical
43
evidence that bears directly on this issue is studied.

examined.

Maier has also contributed other scholarly articles concerning
the death and resurrection of Jesus. 44 One, entitled "The: Empty
Tomb as History", further examines the historical facts surrounding
t~s event. 45 The conclusion to the article is concerned with
whether or not the resurrection can be said to be an actual datum
of history.46 We will return to some of Maier's conclusions later.
Another ancient historian, Edwin Yamauchi, has also written of
the resurrection.

His investigation is found in the two-part

article entitled "Easter--Myth, Hallucination or Hi story? ,,47 He
explores carefully each of the possibilities named in the tit1e-the resurrection seen as an ancient myth, as an hallucination and
as actual history.

Yamauchi concludes first that the Christian

concept of Jesus' resurrection could not have been derived from the
myths in ancient cultures such as those of the Sumerians, Babylonians
or Egyptians, which appear to espouse a belief in dying and rising

42 "Can history tell us what actually happened on that crucial
dawn?" (Ibid., p. 114. The italics are Maier's).
43 Ibid., cf. especially pp. 93-122.

44 See, for instance, Paul L. Maier, "Who Was Responsible for the
Trial and Death of Jesus?" Christianity Today, April 12, 1974,
pp. 8-11.
45 Paul L. Maier, "The Empty Tomb as History", Christianity Today,
March 28, 1975, pp. 4-6
46 Ibid.
47 Edwin M. Yamauchi, "Easter--Myth, Hallucination or History?",
Christianity Today, two parts, March 15, 1975, pp. 4-7 and
March 29, 1975, pp. 12-16.
u
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vegetation gods.

These latter myths reveal both far too superficial

resemblances and even very questionable. evidence concerning this.
belief in a "resUrrection" to have been the basis of belief for
,..
48
J esus rl.Sl.ng.
Yamauchi's second conclusion is that the hypothesis of
hallucination is likewise not a strong enough
the resurrection of Jesus.

im~etus

·for.belief

None of the needed psy.chological pre-

requisites for visions are found in the New Testament accounts.

For

instance, the disciples were very despondent at the death of Jesus
and failed to believe even after

percei~ing

that he had risen,

whereas hallucinations occur when individuals imagine beforehand
that a certain thing has, in
when people think so

fact~

~ositively

happened.

Visions are produced

that they actually visualize what

they desire and the disciples were certainly not in this frame of
mind after Jesus' death.
for this theory at all.

The facts simply do not provide support
The conditions

nee~ed

fer hallucinations

were plainly laCking. 49
The final conclusion reached by

Ya~&uchi

of Jesus is a historical event .nd must

~e

is that the resurrection

dealt with as such.

It

simply cannot be termed as an existential occurrence and neither can
it be forgotten about as a simple myth or

delusio~.5C

We will at this point just quickly mention two other scholars
in this field who also have dealt with the resurrection in their
~crks.

48

~istorian

llll.,

and theologian John Warwick Montgomery has dealt

ll:arch 15, 1914: pp .. 4-6.

Ibid., pp. 6-7. We will turn to this theory in greater depth
later in this paper.

50

~.9

p.

7 and Harch 29, pp. 12-16.
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with this question in several works
with historical methodology. 51

~hich

are directly concerned

Church historian William Wand has

:::"'

alsc fit the resurrection into an explicit historical framework. J
Rather thall explore the

vie~s

of these two men at this point, we

will return to them much more fully in the chapter on histo=y and
miracles.

S~ffice

it to say at this time that while historians

as a whole have not been overly concerned with Jesus'
it has been dealt with by several in this field.

resuxre~tion,

Thus it is the

opinion of these scholars (and others) that this question is a
Maier, 5;

historical one, to be decided by historical inquiry.

Yamau.chi;5 4 montgomer),55 and wand 5' all agree that the question
of the occurrence of the resurrection should be decided by the
historical process of carefully weighing the evidence both for
and against this event before a decision is made.
2.

Philosophy and the Resurrection

As with most of the historians, so we also

fin~

that most

contemporary philosophers are not often concerned with the question
of Jesus' resurrection.

But we find that several of these scholars

51 For instance, see John Warwick Montgomery's, .The Shane of the
Past: An !~troduction to Philoso hical.HistoriogranhY (Ann Arbor:
Edwards Brothers, Ince: 1962 and Where is History Goin~ . (Grand
Rapidsz Zondervan Publishing House, 196~).

52

William Wand, Christianity, A Historical Religion? (Valley Forge:
Judson Press, 1972).

5; Maier, "The Empty Tomb as History", on.cit., p. 6.
Yamauchi, op.cit., March 29, 1974, p. 16.

55 Montgomery, Where i8 History Going?, op.cit., pp. 71, 93.
56 Wand, op.cit. t pp. 9;-94; cf. also pp. 51-52, 70-710
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have also dealt with it as a part of their system of thought.

As

with the theologians, these philosophers ofter a variety of approaches
and answers to this· event.

Similar to the preceding short section

on history, it is not our object in this chapter to treat every
field of philosophy.

To the contrary, the purpose here is simply

to present a sample 'of

a few philosophers who have dealt uith

the resurrection in their works.

Later the positions of David

Rume and Spren Kierkegaard ~ill be examined in depth.
especially is recognized even by conservative

Hume

theologi~s

as

offering a challenge to the belief in a literal resurrection and
Kierkegaard also develcps a popular philosophical view of this
event.

Eut at present it is our desire only to state the interest

shown by a few philosophers of various intellectual inclinations.
Probably the best known philosopher who has .investigated
this occurrence is john Hick.

In his essay "Theology and

Verificatio!1.,,57 he approaches the ancient topic of the possibility
of verifying the existence of God.
and novel (if

so~e~hat

This is done in an interesting

questionable) manner.

For Eick, one cannot prove God's existence beyond

~~y

doubt.

Eowever, the author believes that one can reason logically to the
nrobability of Godts existence

~y

the use of what he terms

"eschatologica.l" (or fu.ture) verification.

58

The Christian faith (and various others as well) teach the
reality of life after death.

57

58

For Eick this concept of continued

John Hick, "Theology and Verification", in Re.ligious Language.
and the Proble~ of Reli-ious Knowled e, edited by Ronald E.
Santoni Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968). This
article first appeared in Theology ~oday, volume 17, 196Q, pp. 12-31.
Ibid., pp. 367, 376.
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survi vfI.l is one whi ch wi 11 ultimately be verified after dee. tho

In

other words, the future resurrection of mankind can be verified
cAp.ari~:ntially

The

by each individual after his own personal dea.th.

knowledge one gains would prove that life does

post-morte~

survive death. 59
Concerning this odd-scunding apologetic for life. after death,
Hick attempts to explain how this is possible by the introduction
. t eres t'~ng ~. 11us~ra
. t·~ons. 6u
of severa 1 ~n

the question of

i~ortality

the road of life.

ulti~ately

ma.y be likened to two men walking down

One says that there is life after death at the

end of the road, the other disagrees.
experiential question.

Eut for them it is an

Sooner or later they will each turn the

last bend in life and die.
and one wrong.

He feels that

Then one will have been proven right

This is eschatological verification of immortality.6l

Even verification of the existence of God is to be found by
the same future experience.
Jesus plays.

Rere

~ick

appropriates the role .that

As we experience the risen Jesus and his reign in the

Kingdom of God,

~nd

finally receive eschatological corroboration

for this, we then also receive indirect verification of God.

Thus

the individual's own resurrection is the ultimate, experiential
proof both of life after death and of God's existence.
are thu.s perceived as realities.

These truths

Everyone will eventually prove

the validity of these facts for themselv;es, howev·er, because all
will achieve this salvation and subsequent state of verificationQ62

59

6Q
61
62

~.,

p.

375.

Ibid., pp. 371-375.

ill.2:. , pp. 368-369.
lli~.

, pp. 576- 381.
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Unfortunately, Hick;s perception of the ability of one's own
resurrection to verify such key tenets of theology raises more
questions than it answers.

It is interesting, to say the least, but

it fails to logically reason out (and even presupposes) too

m~ny

beliefs such as life after death and the ability to verify something
such as God's existence even if the first was proven to be true. 6;
Hick realizes that his hypotheses and those of Ian Crombie who also
accepts eschatological verifica.tion, have both been met 'by
disapproval from other philosophers and from theologians, but still
feels that this is the best alternative in establishing the truth
of theism.

64 Thus, while we must conclude that none of these

doctrines can really be proven in this way, it does show the
interest of a certain segment of philosophy in the question of the
resurrection.
nut it is ~ct vuly in the writings of Rick (and those who a~ee
with him) that we find an interest in the subject of the resurrection.
The recent popularity of process thought has apparently opened up
a new area of interest in the formulating, among other things, of
a Christology based on process philosophy.
Ogden's prospects for the

de~elopment ~f

&

For
~ew

inst~ce,

Schubert

Theism have led him

to a reinterpretation of the resurrection based on the love of GOd. 65

Cf. ~., pp. 375-37' for instance., where Hick admits that it
would be easy to conceive of after-life experiences that would
E21 at ·all verify theism, but he does not entertain the objections.

...Co;..,.•

Ibid., pp. 367-368.

65 Schubert M. Ogden, "Toward a New Theism", in Process Philosophy.
and Christian Thought, edited by Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr.
and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1971), p. 183. Cf. also Ogden's examination of a modern approach
to the resurrection in his work The Reality of God and Other
Essays (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1,66)~ pp. 215-220.
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Another example is Bernard Loomer's attempt to explain the Christian.

~ "th ,~nc
" 1u d"~ng th e resurrec t~on,
" "~n t erms

.a~

~

f process

~"l osoph y. 66

p~~

In the work Precess Philosophy and Christian Thought, Peter
Hamilton proposes a modern Christology with a special emphasis
upon the resurrection.

For Eamilton, process philosophy offers the

proper framework within which one can more properly view and
formulate theology.

This philosophy is perceived to "e especially

helpful in dealing with the resurrection. 67
The key term that

H~ilton

adopts from process philosophy here

is "immanence", which refers to the possibility of one reality being
immanent or indwelt by another.

This is illustrated by the way we

often refer to the experiences of one individual "living on" in
another's memory.

68

When applied to the relationship between God and the world, immanence is a reference both to God's indwelling mankind and mankind!s indwelling God.

As liamilton applies this concept to

Christology, we may now speak of the chief example of God's
indwelling mankind as having occurred in the incarnation.
indwelt Jesuso

Here God

We can also perceive that the primary example of

mankind's indwelling God is to be found in the resurrection.

Here

66

Bernard M. Loomer, "Christian Faith and PrOCesS Philosoph3''' in
Process Philoso~hy and Christian Thought, Ibid., pp. 91, 95 for
his treatment of the ~esurrection.

67

Peter N. Hamilton, "Some Proposals for a Modern Christology"in
Process Phi1osonhy and Christian Thought, Ibid., pp. 371, 376,
379, 381.

68

lE.,ti., p. 379.
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Jesus is said to "live on" in God. 69

By "live on" it is meant

that it is Jesus' experiences, ideas and actions that were raised
into God.

'iie a.re therefore to il.."lderstand tha.t his resurrection is

the most outstanding instance of God's desire and purpose to raise
into Himself everything else that compliments His own character as
well. 70
It is obvious here that the resurrection is not
literally.

For Hamilton, the disciples had

~

inte~preted

~cd-given

awareness

(E£! self-generated, it is emphasized) that Jesus was somehow still
both alive and present with them.
Easter experience.

This was the beginning of the

But they did not ha.ve an actual encounter with

the risen Lord as portra.yed in th~ N~w Testament gospels. 7l
Hamilton rea.lizes, however, that
c=iticisms regarding his views.

t~ere

are some serious

One is that the uniqueness of

Jesus' resurrection has not been properly maintained.

Rather, this

occurrence is only a model for other such actions of God. 12
Another criticism (which is admitted by liamilton to be a
stronger one) is that, according to this interpretation, the "risen"
Jesus is not really alive although the disciples believed that he
was because of the aforementioned

69
70

Ibid., pp. 319-380.
~.,

pp. 378, 381.

71

Ibid., pp. 371, 375, 380.

72

ng.,

pp. 377-378.

God-5~ven

awareness of this fact.
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In other words, the New

Tes~~ent

writers witness to a risen Jesus

who was really alive and the author agrees with this conviction as
well.

Otherwise there would be no origin for the Easter faith.

Yet, this thesis does not allow for the type of resurrecti.on that
would give rise to such a belief.

Hamilton admits that this

criticism is a valid one to a certain extent. 1 ;
The last scholar to be dealt with briefly at this time is
Swiss philosopher Francis Schaeffer.

Formerly an agnostic?

Schaeffer became convinced through personal research that belief in
God was rational. 14 Afterwards he became concerned to a large
extent that rationality must be kept in

~eligious

belief and that

knowledge must precede faith (but certainly not to the exclusion
of faith).1;
Exploring this concept of rationality in Christian belief,
Schaeffer came to espouse the view that Godls revelation occurred
in history and is thus open to verification. 16

An event "hich is

reported to have happened can be examined and found to be either
a valid claim or to be some sort of falsehood.
of historical revelation.

13 Ibid. '.

For

Schaeffer~

This is the nature

the death and resurrection

p. 378~

14- Francis Schaeffer, Esca~e from Reason (Downers Grover InterVarsity Press, 1968), see pp~ 84-85 for instance.

15 Francis Schaeffer, The God Who is There, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1968), pp. 112, 142.
16

Schaeffer, The God Who is There, ~., p. 92; see also Schaeffer's
Escane from Reason, on.cit., p. 17.
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of Jesus are both verifiable in this way.

They are referred to as

actual historical facts which literally occurred in our space-time
world. 77

We have in this chapter investigated both the

importanc~

of

the resurrection of Jesus and the current theological approach to
it as a religious occurrence.

In addition, we have examined the

views of several scholars from various other fields
history and

ph~losophy)

who have also

shc~

(especi~lly

varying degreeS of

interest in this event.
We have found that the resurrection is the central event in
the Christian faith and thus of eentral importance in theology.
Therefore the questions raised here concerning its character are
both valid and consequential ones.
The contemporary theological approach to the resurrection was
found to be one that utilizes the literary methodology inherent in
form and redaction criticism.

liopefully through a study of this

Event, =sking use of these disciplines, we will be able to make a
judgment as to its credibility.
We have also seen that there appears to be a surprising interest
in the resurrection by scholars in ether fields besides religion.
This especially appears to be the case in history and philosophy.
The purpose fer cur investigation of several views in these two
specific fields is threefold.

First, it enables us to understand

that this question is not one that is isolated to the

77 Schaeffer, Escape from Reason,

fiel~

of

~., pp. 79, 90 and Schaeffer's
The Church Before the Watching World (Downer's Grove: InterYersity Press, 1971), pp. 98-99.
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religion and theology alone.

Second, it serves to familiarize us

with some views of the resurrection that are surprisingly close to
those proposed by some theologians which
constantly.

~ill

be refeTred to

Third, this previous discussion prepares the way for

our later investigation of three scholars (one theologian, one
historian and one philosopher) who deal with these questions
concerning the resurrection in much more depth, thus relating all
three fields together in a "search for the truth" on this issue.

Chapter II.

The Possibility of Miracles

To~ay

The question of whether or not miracles have occur.redin the
past (or whether they are possible today) is one that has farreaching consequences much beyond the field of theology.

We will

turn now to an examination of some major possibilities.
A.

1.

Mira.cle and Myth

A Definition of Miracle

In searching for a possible definition for "miracle", one
encounters many approaches and conclusions.
sevc~al

However, there are

similarities and poiuts concerning which most appear to be

in agreement.

We must realize, though, that the definition we

arri ve a. t actually has nothing to do with the prob.lem of whether
the events that are defined thusly really do occuro
many scholars who do not believe ttat

~iracles

For example,

happen at all still

define them as occurrences which are not caused by nature and which
~ust

be performed by God.

ever take place.

They simply believe that no such events

Therefore we see that the definition does not mean

that a certain type of phenomenon nas happened.
Eultmann is just suoh a

schola~

who believes that our modern

world is enough to make us reject all miracles.

The ancient view

of the world is obsolete and we no longer rely on its cosmology or
mythological language.

1

1

Even so, it is recognized that at least

Bul tmann, "New Testament and Mythology", in Kerygma. a.nd
on.cit., pp. 1-5.

26

Myth 9

27
the New Testament

de~ines

miracles as events which occur due to

the Supernatural intervention of God rather than by the

po~er

of

nature.

For Eultmann, the purpose of miracles is to express
2
spiritual truths that may otherwise be unexplainable.
Bistorian and philosopher David Hume, who also rejects the

miraculous, relates that:
A miracle may be accurately

define~a tr~~gression of a
law of nature by a ~articular volition of t~~ Deity. or
by the inter~osition of some invisible agent. (The italics
are Hume's.);

Once again we find that while Rume clearly rejects the miraculous
(as we shall pe=ceive in more detail later), he defines these
occurrences as the intervention of God or of another invisible
agent.

Philosopher Richard Swinburne accepts essentially the

same definition, realizing that in

.

v~ew.

80

doing he is close to Rume's

4
English scholar C.S. Lewis defines miracles as follows:
I use the word Miracle to mean ~~ interfe=ence with Nature
by supernatural power. Unless there exists, in addition
to Nature, something else which we may call the sunernatural; there can be no mira~les. (The italics ar~ Lewis'.)5

Like the other definitions, here Lewis also conceives of miracles
as having a direct affect on nature.

2

~.,

Eut the

mi~acles

are seen as

pp. 34-35, 39~

3 David Rume, Essential Works of David Hume, edited by Ralph Cohen
(New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1965), p. 128, footnote 3.
4 Richard Swinburne, The Concent of Miracle (London: Macmillan and
st. Martin's Press, 1970), p. ll~

5 Lewis,

on~cit.,

p. 10.
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being brought less forcefully into the world.

Lewis perceives of

nature as an entity which can receive such extraordinary occurrences
into its own pattern of events when they are

caus~d

by Supernatural

power.

Thus they do interfere with the laws of nature, but do not
6
break them.
These miracles are not taken fOT gr~~ted by the author,
however, but are investigated to ascertain if they actually did
occur.1
The last definition of miracles which we will state is that of
theologian John McNaugher, who agrees with Lewis in asserting that
these occurrences are out of the normal sequence of events in
nature.

They cannot be explained by natural processes, but are due

to the agency of God.

They are obvious to the senses and designed

for the purpose of authenticating a message.

8

In these five definitions of miracles there are obviously
several similarities (as well as same differences).

For instance,

all five scholars are agreed (to varying extents) that real miracles
require Supernatural interveution and are not to be explained
naturallYo9

All five also believe that these occurrences have a

direct relation to the laws of nature, requiring some sort of
interference.

1

Some think that miracles

h~ve

a purpose.

Eut all

47, 60.

~.,

pp.

~.,

pp. 148-169 for instance.

8

John McNaugher, Jesus Christ. the Same
(New York: Fleming H. Revell Company,

9

In the case of Eultmann we are referring to this scholar's
references to what "miracle" meant in the New Testament, as mentioned
above. Like Hume he does not believe they occur, but ~ants
that this was still believed to be the definition of the word in
first century Christian thought.

Forever
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are not agreed, for instance, as to whether these miracles actually
occur or not.

In other words, it is possible in this case to

describe what an occurrence
~hile

~ould

entail if it were io happen,

not actually believing that there are such events.

Nevertheless,

there is a surprising amount of similarity in these definitions
for scholars who disagree on this last pOint.
In this paper, the writer will refer to a miracle as an event
which interferes with the laws of nature, but does not violate them.
They cannot be explained by any natural causes (including man's
power) and thus must be accomplished by some type of
activity.

Supernat~al

They are effected for a purpose and may be perceived by

man's senses.

The

~uestion

now is to ascertain if there really are

such events.
2.

A discussion of

A Definition

mi~acles

into the meaning of myth.

should ideally also include an inquiry

We will attempt to explore a couple of

earlier meanings of the word and some modern

definition~

of it.

We

would thus endeavor to disoover .hat myth is and what function it
plays in society.
Originally,lOmyths were generally defined by scholars as
fictitious narratives containing very little or no factual content.

lQ

For a very brief introduction to the question of some older
theories concerning the origins of myth? see Daniel Dodson'S
introductory essay "What is 'Myth'?" in Thomas Eulfinch's The
Age of Fable (Greenwich: F~~cett Publications, Inc., 1961),
pp. VI, IX. For an examination of the origins of myth according
to many historians of religion, see Burton E. Throckmorton's
The Kew Testament and l.~vtholo
(Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1959 , pp. 81-85.
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They were mainly concerned with stories of gods, goddesses and
questions about the cosmos.

11

judged to be simply fiction.

Because of such content, myths were
The definition was one which implied

the essential contradiction between myth and history.12
Later, the word also came to mean a fictitious story revolving
around a historical personage, circumstance or event, but one which
was not really factual. 13

Perhaps an e%ample of this type of

popular myth would be the narrative of how George Washington chopped
down a cherry tree and chose the subsequent punishment rather than
tell a lie concerning his actions.
There is much disagreement as to a suitable definition of myth
todayo

14

This is made even more difficult by the variations in the

definition utilized by scholars from different disciplines. 15
popular

11

12

pract~ce

One

is. to define myth as being the opposite of

Wand, op.cit., p. 40; see also James K. Feibleman's article
"Myth" in the J);ctionary of Philoso-ohy, edited by Dagobert Runes
(Totowa: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1967), p~ 203.
Wand,

llli.

13 Runes, on.cit.,

p. 203.

14

For instance, see Mircea Eliade! The Quest: History and ii.eani:lg
in Religion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969j,
p. 72f. See alse Throckmorton, o-o.cit., p. 80.

15

Victor Turner's article "Myth and Symbol" in the International
clo edia of the Social Sciences~ edited by ~avid L. Sills
no city: The Macmillan Co~pa.ny and The Free Press, 1968),
vol. 10, pp. 576-582. For the definition of "myth!! employed in
Ii terature, for example, see James F. Knapp, ''Myth in the Powerhouse of Change", The Centennial Review, Winter, 1976, P1'o 56-74.
Cf. Wesley Barnes, The Philoso-ohy and Literature of Existentialism
(Woodbury: Barron's Educational Series, 1968), pp. 34-40.
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history, thereby signifying that i t is almost
16
a factual sense.

completely untrue in

As used by most contemporary theologians and religious scholars,
myth is not usually taken to be so
clearly placed most often on the

ur~ealistic.

f~~ction

The emphasis is

of the myth

such a concept is supposed to accomplish in

socie~y.

a~d

on what

Thus,

theologians are more interested in studying the message which the
myth is meant to convey.
For nineteenth century

theologia.~

David Strauss,

clothing for the expression of religious truths.
one must endeavor to ascertain the societal
givenLo

C:i

my

~h,

is the

For this reason,

f~~ction

and meaning

trying to understand the religious message being

communicated by means of this imagery.
view of

n~h

time this concept was either not
"
. ~ 17
completely recognized or not applied consls~en~~y.
IDJ~b

is that before

The importance of Strauss'

r~s

Rudolf Bul tTIlaJ.lll believes that Hev: Testament lI'.;)rth is essentially
~~storical,

but that its

pri~ry

purpose is to express existentia:

...vrliths
abo''''
~
u." rnan. 18
q~G3tic~

16

17

18

10
~/

,,+,

Thus, this scholar also agrees that thi.s
19
the mytl':! S pu.rpose is the key one.
Bul tmann freE:;:l.j

See S. H. Hooke, Ivuddle Eastern M'fthology ( Baltimore: Penguin Books,
1966), who lists this view as one w~ich is still employed in
current treatments of this subject (p. 11). See also Wand, op. cit.,
p. 40.
See Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, translated by W. Montgomery ( New York: The Ma.cmillan Company, 1968),
pp. 78-79; cf. D~v'id Str:!U88 I '-'fork The Old Faith and the i~ew,
tra."1s1ated from the sixth edition by Uathilde Blind (New York:
Heru:J Holt and Company, 1874), pp. 56-59 for instance.
Bultmmm, llNew Testamer.t a"1d Ylfchology:' in Kerygma and 1'.1yth
op.cit., especially pp. 1-11. Cf. Schubert Ogden, Christ Without
:Myth ,New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961), pp. 39-40.
TJ:1.rockmortcn, op. cit., p. 23; cf. Jor.n Macq,uarrie, An Existentia::::"ist
Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 172-17:3.
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admits that the actual imagery of the myth is not the most important
part of mythology.

Rather, the recovery of its message about

human existence is the most essential thing. 20

The stress here is

also on understanding what the myth was intended to accomplish.
Few scholars have done more research on the idea of myth than
has Mircea Eliade.

For Eliaae, myths are accounts of deeds which

are always acts of creation, in that they speak of some reality
coming into existence.

Myths are very complex

cul~~ral

Jactors

whose main function is to serve as models for the rites and other
important activities of humans.

Taus myths present religious

explanations for what is believed to have occurred.

For this reason,

a myth is perceived to be an actual reality in that it always
' ....

depicts something that has happened, such as the beginning of the
world or the fact of death.

2l

Eliade stresses the symbolic character of such myths.

They

are capable of revealing something which is deeper than known
reality.

Such symbols point to various facets of human existence.

Perhaps the most important aspect of mythical symbolism is that
truths can be expressed by this mode which can
in no other way.
message of the

~e

expressed coherently

It is therefore very important to study the

my~h.

Scholars who de not discover this function of

myth fail in their endeavor to understand this concept. 22

20

",
......
22

Bu.l t!!!ann~ JlNew Testamer. . t and Mythology" in Ke:!'ygma and Myt'h;
op.cit., pp. 10-11.
Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality, translated by William ~. Task
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 5-14.
Mircea Eliade, Me~histonheles and the Andro
Reli:xious l~;vth and Svmbol, transla.ted by J .!,~o
Sheed and Ward, 1965), pp. 201-208.

in
11'ew Yorks
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For S.H. Hooke, myth is

~till

viewed as being essentially

nonhistorical, but it nevertheless is & result of a particular
circumstance and therefore it does have a purpose.

Thus the

proper approach is not to try to determine how much actual truth it
contains, but rather to determine what the real function of the
myth is--what it is supposed to accomplish.

As with

Eliade~

Hooke

stresses that the function of a myth 'is to use imagery to express

tr~ths that otherwise could not be explained. 23
These definitions of myth have pointed to at least a few
general conclusions with which many theologians seem to oe in
agreement, at least to a certain extent.

Myths can be identified

as the use of various types of imagery to portray different aspects
of life (real or imaginary), including one's beliefs, customs or
folklore.

Mytns are essentially nonhistorical, but they may

reflect actual occurrences and teach religious or moral truths.
My th soave
d h
a

"

soc~e t

a 1 f unc t"1on. 24

They are often the devices

by which one can express what otherwise would be inexpressible,
~hether

it concerns cosmology, man's existence, the Divine or one's

religious and moral beliefs.

In other words, myths serve the

function of allowing various societies tc speak of treasured
beliefs, mysteries and customs in a way that ordinary language

2;
24

Hooke, op.cit., pp. 11, 16.
For Paul Ricoeur's understanding of the inte~ingling of
theology and culture, see his work History and Truth, translated
by Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston, Northwestern University
Press, 1965), pp. 177-179 for example.
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might not

~uite

be able to duplicate.

This could be either

because of a lack of proper words or a lack of

th~

knowledge needed to explain these things.

instance, mythical

Fo~

necessary

imagery could easily have been employed to explain certain cosmic
e7ents such as eclipses.

In this way societies could pass on

verbal or written accounts of their experiences.

That this was an

important function of myth is witnessed by the discoveries throughout various parts of the world pointing to this usage. 25
These general conclusions will be the basis for the definition
of myth that will be used in this paper.
be utilized to refer to the essentially

Briefly, myth will mainly
non~istorical

use of imagery

by societies in order to express certain beliefs, customs or events.
They allow people to speak of realities that might be much harder
to express apart

fro~

the use of this imagery.

The distinction between miracle and myth is

a~ i~portant

one.

It will be the purpose of the remainder of this paper to investigate
the resurrection of Jesus in light of these definitions.

Was this

occurrence a myth voicing the beliefs of early Christendom, or was
it a literal event

re~uiring

Supernatural action?

Our investigation

will thus view the evidence of each possibility in order to ascertain
where it peints in regard to this question.

We agree with Wand in

the assertion that it is very important to distinguish myth from
history.

The purpose of the myth must be determined and real history

must not be confused with the myth.

25 Hooke, on.cit., pp. 19-32.
26

Wand, op.cit., p. 42.

26

Therefore, each has its own

35
purpose and it will be our task not to let the two become
indiscriminately mixed.
E.

Twentieth Century Science and Miracles
1.

Introduction

It is a common practice today to conceive of science and the
miraculcus as being totally opposed.

Bultmann, for instance, rejects

early Christian cosmology on the grounds that it is opposed to
modern science.

All of our contemporary knowledge is based on

science and this includes an application of its laws to the study
of the New Testament. 27

Thus Bultmann speaks of the relationship

between science and miracles:
It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless and
to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries,
and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world
of spirits and miracles.28
Thus this scholar believes that we live in too modern an age to
believe in miracles.

The world is closed to such occurrences. 29

The Supernatural simply does not occur and is therefore quickly
dismissed, often arbitrarily. 30

Others also agree with Bultmann's'

approach. 31

27

Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and: Uyth,
on.cit., pp. 1-10.

28

ill.£.,

29

;0

p.

5.

pp. 4-5; cf. Montgomery, Where is History Going?, op.cit.,
p. 194, especially footnote number 37.

~.,

Eultmann,

~.,

p. 38; cf. Macquarrie, op.cit., pp. 185-186.

;1 Cf. for examnle John A.T. Robinson's Honest to God \ Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1963), pp. 1;-18.
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This line of reasoning is not very recent, however.

For a

couple of hundred years prior to t!'!e twentieth century ma!:y have
also held

~hat

science ruled

mi~acles

out.

The universe was

usually seen as being a closed system, meaning aEong other things,
that it could not be interferred with by the Supernatural.

James

Jauncey deiines it this nay:
The standpoint of science was that nature was a (closed
universe'. This meant that everything within the -(.l..'1iverse
was governed by an ~'1varying sequence of cause and effect.
The universe was closed to any occurrences which deviated
f~o::l this pattern •••• Whenever you had a certain co~bination
of factors operating, the ~esult was always the sa~e and
could not be different. Miracles, on the other hand, could
not be fitted into this framework of cause and"effect.52
This view of
thought.

~e ne~d

~iracles

is actually found very early in critical

not wait

~til

the eiehteenth and nineteenth

centuries to find this opinion expressed against the possibility of
For instance, seventeenth

::li~acles.

Spinoza (1632-1677) also opposed

centu~y

::;i~aculous

philosophe~

38nedict

events which ..;e::.'e

said to b~eak the law~ of nature. 33
Since the

be;i~ing

of the

t~entieth

century, however, science

has begu:l to chan;e theSe former ;:oz1ce;:.tions about the
nature.

In

~an;s

revolutions. 34

wo~kines

of

past history there have been many scientific

In the opinion of most, we are living today in the

32

James H. Jauncey, Science Returns to God (Grand ~apids: Zo~derY~~
Publishing House, 1966), p. 37. Cf. also philosopher Gordon
Clark's statements about the mechanism of the nineteenth century
in his essay "Eultmann's Three-Storied Universe" in Christianity
TodaY9 edited by FTank E. Gaebelein (Westwood: Fleming E. Revell
Company, 1968), pp. 218-219.

33

5enedict Sninoza, The Chief Works of :Benedict De S~inoza,
t~anslated-by 3.E.~. Elwes (Two volumes; New York: Dover
?ub1ications, Inc., 1951), vol. I, p. 87.
See Tho~as S. Kuh~, The structure of Scientific Revolutions,
Volu:!Ie II, Xu::ber 2 of the Inter:1.ational E:1.cyclo-oedia of Unified
Science, edited by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris
(Chicago: University of Chicago P~ess, 1971).
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revc..:...ui:~.on.

r:rl.dst cf jL..,t such a
err:.i tl.;.-·

1:'~'1e

Jauncy states in his Introd\:::!tion

Scien+.i fic Revolution!!:

~ .~~ are ~iling up that we are in the midst of the
greatest: ":. ..;.or.. in human living since the Renaissance.
This is due .~ ... t;'.e tremendous explosion in scientific
kncwledge which has been occurring within the last few years.
:C:ven for thoSE:: of u;:; who ::;,ave been close to the frontiers
vf 3cizn~c ~l cf O~ lives, it is hard to believe what
is happeni.Tlg. 35

':i.l:,' ev...J.. ..... · •

".re the

\'JI1a':~

:::-esu:;':~s

of these changes a...Tld how do they affect

the possibility of m:.rQ;:J.·:s?
::.'.;is::~l ~:i.fic revol'J:tic·~·~

...·h.b

iIDi verse is rej ecte:i.,

Jaunc:; relates that one result of

is that today the idea of a closed

Sciertific research :has replaced this other

.;i,~. ...., y;i th a new iIDdersta....Tlding of nature. 36 Clark also notes that
"he ldea of causality was dropped by science about one hundred
y~~rs

ago and the belief in a

T.h~ resu~ :.ing

::nd.er at.tE:!k, 37
.r'eferred

~.0

j:0

universe has

~lso

come

ne','; view of nature is sonetimes

by sue;: ti-cles :..;.s the ITEinsteinian-relativistic inter-

""J:::'et,G. ti c:-, of :na tU:r'8 'j. 2-d....... ! IT
opposed

me~~~~stic

::""'lJ

perceived as being essentially

lithe YlOrld of NpTItonia-r:. absol'.ltes TT ..

38

Thomas S. Kuhn

., i ~;.. ) believe:.; +.'''at the t)1.:nr'ies I)f Einstein are incompatible VIi th
tl18 oJ.d.e..:' ones fOrill1..!lated b:r Ne·w-con.

In fact, we can only accept

tn:.s '::ins-ceinia.'1 s~f:3~en: after recognizing that the theories of
•

..L

~n~orrev·~

.

10

." /

::;I!li::e::t German -physicist Werner Schaaffs
describinc these comparatively recent trends

'1.-

:/

36 _..... ,
::..::..:2..)
37

39

37 - .-IV.
">0

Cl[;.rk, TTBu1tma..Tln! s Three-St:,ried Universe TT in Gaebe1ein, op.cit.,

:..::p.
38

pp.

~'''Ollc.-:,

21~-219.

Warwick I. .bntgo!TIe~:'Y, The S~ of Christian Theology
(;-!:.inl"!€3.polis: Bethany ::!ellowship, Inc., 1970), pp. 320:263.
Kulm, op.cit., pp. 98ff.
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physics and in dealing with the resultant influence on the

possibility of miracles.

Schaaffs informs us that the rejection

of a closed universe by modern science took place about the turn of
the

In fact! the year 1900 is seen as being the turning

~entury.

point for modern Physies.

40

Therefore we can no longer scientifically

hold to the belief in a closed universe as was the case in the
nineteenth century.41
Schaaffs refers to the replacing of the closed universe view
with the present view of physics as "dou'ble negation ll •

This is

because older opinions which were once used to negate all miracles
are, in turn, negated themselves.

42

The old law of causation has

been replaced by statistical description and thus the law of

4-

probability. '
remark

tr.~t

To this we will turn directly.

But we must first

new theories in physics usually build upon older ideas

and thus appear at least somewhat to be a process of development
(rather than a case of total displacement).

The old views are
44
thus expanded and corrected by the modern ones.
We will now
take a closer look at some important develcpments in physics that
have led to these conclusions.

40 Werner Scha&ffs, Theology, Ph~sics and Miracles, translated by
Richard L. Renfield tWashington, D.C.: Canon Press, 1974)
pp. 26, 31, 37-38. cr. Jauncey, op.cit., p. 37.

41
1,.2

43

~o,

cf. pp. 25-26.

~.,

pp. 24-26.

Ibid., pp. 63-64; cf. pp. 44-45.

44 Kuhn,

o~.cit.,

pp. 67, 149; cf. Schaa.ffs, Ibid., p. 64.
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2.

Some Principles of Physics

We have been speaking of the modern view of physics and its
negation of the eighteenth and nineteenth century belief in a
closed universe 'Where no outside intervention was believed to ·De
possible.

It should be

~entioned

in all fairness that not all

scholars in these two centuries accepted this view of cause and
46
effect in a mechanistic world~5 although it was very pOPular.
Therefore, before the twentieth century thA world was, for the
most

~art,

conceived to be one of mechanical cause and

effect~

Any events which did not fit into this pattern, such as miracles,
were often rejected immediately.
la.w'" in which it was imagined

It was the "reign of 'unalterable

'~ha t

one could be sure of events

and in which miracles were simply not possibilities. 47
With the emergence of the twentieth century

exp~rimentation

in physics it was found that, contrary to the then
scientific belief, there was much

u.~certainty

could not be predicted with complete accuracy
would occur.

There were

fou.~d

accepte~

in our universe.
ho~

It

a particular event

variations and differences in

principles that were once thought to be

invariable~

Jt was

beginning to be appa.rent that the universe could not be expected

~5

46
~7

For instance, navid Hume firmly rejected cause and effect. See
o.W. Reiok, Ristor of Protestant Theola ,Volume 2 of A History
of Christian Thought by J.1. Neve Two volumes; Philadelphiat
The Muhlenberg Press, 19~6), p. 65 and also J. Bronowski and
Bruce Mazlish, The ~estern Intellectual Tradition (New York:
Harper a.nd Row, P'.lblishers, 1962), p. 474.
...
Schaaffs, on.cit., pp. 65-64 and Cla.rk, "Bultmann's Three-Storied
Universe" in Gaebelein, 0pecit., p. 218.
Jauncey,

o~.cit.,

pp. 37-38.
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to behave anyone certain way all of the time. 48
Even though we have been

~iscussing

the field of physics, it

should be pointe.d out that this information definitely has had an
affect on other fields of knowledge as well.

This was obvious

because, if these facts were true, then other studies also had to
adjust to them.

Later, for example, the affect of these discoveries

on the discipline of history will be shown

0

Schaaffsnotes, for

instance, that few actually understand that the significance of
these findings extend far beyond the field of Physics. 49
Some may object that these principles affect only

~uestions

which deal with the microcosm and therefore have no bearing on the
topic of miracles.

Schaaffs deals with this very problem, concluding

that one can work from any of three directions 50 to demonstrate
that occurrences in the microcosm have a great bearing on eventsin
the macrocosm.

These reasons show that chain reactions can be

caused by deviations in individual atoms which eventually have
macroscopic results.

4s

Thus, minute· and unpredictable changes in

p. 38; for this principle as it is
see Schaaffs, o~.cit~, pp. 57-61 end Otto
Denison Elder Princi-oles a.nd A't)'olications
Interscience Publishers, Inc., 1955 , pp.

~.,

applied to physics,
BIUh and Jose~h
of Ph sics (!~ew York:
760ff.

Schaaffs, Ibid., p. 61.
-~

50 Schaaffs mentions three approaches in noting the affect of the
microcosm on the macrocosm. One way would be to work from the
microscopic elements to the macroscopic ones, noting the affect
single atoms can have on whole processes or events. Or one
might work in the opposite direction, beginning with the macrocosm
and endeavoring to find the minute particles that affect it.
Lastly, Schaaffs has experimented with de Broglie's eq~tion
of the matter-wave demonstrating that it can also be applied
to the macrocosm, just as it can be applied to the microcosm
(Ibid., pp. SO-S1).
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atomic processes cause major events to also become somewhat
indeterminate and unpredictable.

In fact, the uncertain pairing

of microscopic transactions can either cause a macroscopic event
to occur or keep it from occurring.

Thus the macroscopic event

itself becomes unpredictable and it is not within the reach of
science to control it.5 1
It is

tr~e

that microscopic events are more unpredictsble

than macroscopic ones, but both are often found to be Unexplainable. 52
For these reasons,

~

microscopic and macroscopic events "can be

interpreted only as a law of probability.n53

This means that a

"statement in science is seldom now considered true in itself, but
only wi tL.n a certain lind t of probability •••• II 5"~

In other words,

we can no longer consider a scientific statement as being absolute,
but only probable to one extent or another.

Statistical

probabilities must be given to events according

~o

the degree to

which they can be expected to occur and not viewed as being positively
certain as might be the case in a closed universe.
One use of statistics that is perhaps not at first oevious is
that they "have enabled us to appreciate the extreme casee= ••• ,,55

51 Ibid., pp. 52-53, 71, 79-81.

This last point is

il:~strated

SChaaffs (pp. 52-53).

52

Cf. Bl~ and Elder, o~.cit., pp. 806-607,

Ibid., pp. 16, 71.

80;.
53

Schaaffs, on. cit., p. 64.

54 Jauncey,
55

o~.cit.,

p.

Schaaffs, on.cit., p.

;8.
55.

by
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because "the rarer an event, the harder it is to determine a
precise time for its occurrance.
to it. ,,56

One can only assign a probability

Therefore more common events receive a higher probability

and rarer ones a lower prooability.
lower chances of occurring.

Unique

event~

are given still

But this is intriguing in the case of

these Y:<:ry rare events because "even the greatest probability

~..a.nnot

rule out the possibility that the event will occur tomorrow.,,51
There is an infinite number of possibilities for such events to
occur daily and thus they cannot be thought to be impossible.
Can giving a probability to rare events, as described

a~cve,

have any relevance to the possibility of miracles occurring?
Schaaffs answers in the affirmative:
Though a miracle is a rare, or perhaps even unique, event
or experience, quite out of the ordinary, it can with
comparative ease, as ~~ example shows, be placed in a
statistical frame~ork. It has no intrinsic peculiarity
requiring that it be placed outside that framcftorko Thus,
a miracle, though a rarity to be sure, is a phenomenon of
natura,l law, for statistics are the essence of natural la.w.58
Therefore we see that for this Germa.n physicist miracles are
nossibleo
with this

We will also note here that Montgomery, for one, agrees
~bove

analysis and insists that the only way that an

account of a miracle can 'be verified is 'by an flu.np:;:"43j'l1dicf?d
confrontation" with the sourcp.s which claim that
actually occurred.

su.~h

an event

We need not try to ascertain a priori what is

able to occur today (as was done in a closed universe), since almost
anything is possible according to its statistical

56

~.,

p. 56.

£;7

'"
58

~.
~.,

p. 45.

probability~

In
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other words, the "question is no longer what
~

~

happen, but what

happened" because lithe universe since Einstein has opened up to

the possibility of any event tt (the italics are Montgomery t s).59
Therefore, we can only determine what has happened by investigating
the sources in order to ascertain which events probably are and
which events probably are not a part of history.
,.

Miracles

Few understand how far-reaching these results in physics are
and "how far beyond physics their significance extends.,,60

The

knowledge thus gained surpasses the bound& of physics and affects
other fields such as theology.6l

We have found that the belief in

a mechanistic, closed universe is no longer valid
be used to

~~le

an~

out miracles a priori, as in the past.

only find out if an event has occurred
sources thoroughly.

o~

thus cannot
We can

not by invest.igating the

This could lead to either a positive or to a

negative conclusion.

A key point we want to stress in this chapter is that these
fo~er

world views can no longer be used, as

often does,

62 against the
+'h;
"" •• _9

occ'~r-ence

contemp~rary

of miracles.

point that miracles do occur.

59 Uontgomery, Where is History gOing?,

o~.cit.t

theology

We are certainly
But they can only

p.

93; cf. 1'p. 13,

168-169.
60

Schaaffs,

o~.cit.,

p. 61.

61
62

Schaaffs directs some of his criticisms against ]ultmann (Ibid.,
pp. 13, 24-25) and other theologians who insist on using these
outdated world views (~., pp. 8, 15, 31, 60, 64).
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be disbelieved today on the merits of each.
last point home in the following words,

Montgomery drives this

~sing

the resurrection of

Jesus as an example of a miracle:
To oppose the resurrection on the ground that miracles do
not occur is, as we have noted earlier, both philosophically
and scientifically irresponsible: philosophically, because
no one below the status of a god could know the univars~ so
well as to eliminate miracles a priori; and scientific~llYt
because in the age of Einsteiriianphysics (so different
from the world of Newtonian absolutes in which liume
formulated his classic anti-miraculous argume~t) the universe
has opened up to all possibilities ••• "6;
This is surely not to affirm that Einstein said that miracles
would happen but only that

ther~

is always the possibility that they

Concerning the conception of nature with which we have been
working, we must mention that the results described above do not
invalidate the idea of essential lawful order in nature.

All are

agreed that such s general order does exist, even though it must
£1.

only be described statistically.~

In addition, as McNaugher

explains, where there is no regularity in nature we cannot speak
of any departure from itc 65

In other words, if nature were

disorderly, it would be impossible to know if something had occurred
that could be described as irregular.
Thus, along with all recent studies, we also affirm the beiiei
in the regularity of nature.

A true miracle, then (if there is

such an occurrence), must interfere with this regularity, according

Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op.cit., pp. 262-

26;.

64 See Schaaffs, on.citw, pp. 64, 71; cf. alse Swinburne, on.cit.,
pp. 2;-26 ..
65

McNaugher, on.cit., p. 92;

cr.

Swinburne,

~.,

pp. 26-29.

to our definition.

Therefore, if miracles are to happen, nature

cannot be the cause of them, but can only be open to their
occurrence.

66

Thus we hold that modern scholarship can no longer deny miracles
~imply

by referring to a closed universe and to our civilization

as being "too

a.dvanced"~

They can only be denied on the grounds of

historical and philosophical (logical) research.
It may appear that there is too much reliance here on a
current scientific world view that may change again in the futuxe
to yet another understanding of nature.

To this there are at least

two valid responses.
First and most important, it must be pointed out that an
investigation into the possibility of miracles does not require
the contemporary relativistic view of nature in order to arrive at
valid conclusions.

It is true that this modern view of science

does help considerably both in negating the old closed universe
hypothesis and in allowing for the possibility that miracles do
occur.

However, it must be asserted that the procedure we will

deal with later, namely, investigating an event first before

~y

judgment is given concerning the probability of its occurring, does
not depend on science.

We cannot overstate this enough.

If we

were to rest upon an existing view of nature we would always be in
danger of having our system upset because of new ideas
need not be the case.

whc~

this

Regardless of the contemporary state of

physics, we hold that an account of a miracle (as defined above)

66

Note that we are showing the result on nature if miracles were
to occur. We have not yet established if they actually do or
not.
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should be investigated inductively to ascertain if it has
occurred

a~art

from any other world view of what can or

happen.

Such is a much more logical and scholarly approach than

beginninG with presuppositions as to what is possible.

c~~ot

These

conclusions could thus be maintained even if physics was not in
the state in which we find it. 67

Thus the conclusions to be

reached do not depend solely upon our modern understanding of
science, but are rather based upon this aforementioned investigation
of the

report~d

facts.

68

Second, Schaaffs answers this very

~uestion

by asserting that

physics is unlike other disciplines in that it does not regress
back~a.rdSe

"Accurate kn.owledge and the results of earlier research

are

~~

simply discarded; ratheI:, they serve as building blocks

for

fU1."tb~r advances.,,69 He adds later that "the knowledge

discovered in the present century will remain valid within the
framework in which it was obta1ned.,,7 0

67

68

Present concepts in physics

We w~sh to make it plain, hOY."ever, that our study of contemporary
physics is an extremely important one and not simply a IInice
addi tion" to this \,i"ork. Although this study is based on an
investi~tion of the facts to determine if an event has occurred
and not upon a current scientific world view, this chapter has
still provided some insight into the question of what is possible
in today's world. Understanding the current scientific outlook
has demonstrated at least that our beliefs must not exclude
milt~les a ~=iori.
Also, it makes us realize that there is a
scie~tific basis for our historical approach to investigating a
purpDrted event.
See Bernhard Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences (Chicago:
Press, 1953), pp. 146~149.

M~~dy

69

Schaaffs, on.cit., p. 14.

70

Ibid., p. 67.

The italics are Schaaffso
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may even be b::-oc:.c..ene'i, but they do not disappear.
kno~ledge

in this discipline is not discarded in order to return

to older ideas. 7l
re~ain

This is 'Jecause

valid.

As mentioned, the truths discovered in :physics

Therefore, even if we did rest our conclusions on

the current scientific world view (although we do not, as stated
above), they would still appear safe.
~efore

procee~ing

to the next chapter, it must be

in

~entioned

all fairness that most men of science do not hold that this current
view of physics gives any preference to miracles. 72

There~ore we

will conclude this chapter with the assertion of philosopher Gordon
Clark, who is cautious in his evaluation of the relationship
between miracles

an~

sodern physics.

Be feels that while some

theological conservatives have bone too far in their application
of scientific

pri~ciples

to the Supernatural, others have gone too

far in the opposite cirection by presenting science as beinc
totally opposec. to anything which is really miraculous.

Clark

believes that we can at least minimally conclude that the cncepopular theories of a closec and mechanistic
be used to invalidate miracles.
theories or

~niverse

can no longer

In addition, neither these older

scientific ones can be used as objections

conte~porary

against the Supernatural.

While we cannot agree with thOSe TIho

believe that science gives preference to oiracles, neither can we
agree with those ~ho believe that it fo::-bids them. 73

71 .::..::2:.:::...
T ...
, p. 14.
72 Cf. ~rnst Cassirer,
·~

~eter:ninis~

ics, translated by O. Theodor
Press), p. 193 for instance.

73

and

in Modern Ph s,tew Haven: Yale University

:ndeter~inis~

~enfrey

Clark, "Eultmann's Three-Storied universe", in
pp. 218-219.

Gaebelei::-~,

0"0.

ci t.,
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In other words, Clark's conclusion is stated in negative terms.
Rather than holding that the universe allows for the miraculous,
Clark simply states that we can no longer appropriate a scientific
world view that rules out the miraculous.

Thus he speaks not abcut

what is nos sible in nature, as do many of the scholars we have
dealt with above, but about what we cannot say about it.

We cannot

hold that science gives preferential treatment to miracles, but
~either

can the scientific

-4

cannot occur. {

~orld

view be used to show that they

This, then, is the conclusion we will work with,

one which directly favors neither opinion.
left with the

co~clusion

Therefore we are also

which we reached earlier--that

concerning the probability of certain miracles (SUCh as the
resurrection of Jesus) must be determined by a thorough investigation
of the reported facts in order tc ascertain if they actually
happened.

Ibid.

Chapter III.

History and Miracles

As stated above, this study is not based upon the findings of
modern physics, but rather upon the idea that any accounts which
claim that a miracle has occurred must be historically investigated
in order for its veracity tc .be determined.

Therefore we will

look first at the concept of history that will be used in this work
and then view the method of this investigation.
A.

A Concept of History

The term nhistory" is used in various ways by diffe:l"'ent
scholars.

There is no uniform definition which is agreed to by all

SCholars, as numerous approaches

~d

,

utilized. 4

interpretations are commonly

Therefore it is not our purpose here to give a complete

or exhaustive t:l"'eatment of the contemporary definitions of history.
However, it seems that there is at least some general agreement
concerning the content of history.
Most historians are agreed that history includes at least
two major factors--the actual events in particular and also the
recording of these events.

Thus this discipline is mainly concerned

nith what has happened and how these occurrences have been annotatedo
It is this conception which will form the core understanding of
history as it will be usad in this work.
involved, as will now be

1

Other elements are surely

But the inclusion of these two

note~.

See Patrick Gardiner's article "The Philosophy of History" in the
International Encyclo~edia of the Social SCiences, edited by
David L. Sills, OPe oi t., vol. 6, pp. 428-433 fCJ ..· some of these
interpretations.

49

50
major ideas are

esse~tial

andare thus the foundation of this concept

as it will be used here. 2
Now we surely do not mean to affirm that the presence of these
two elements is all that is involved in a definition of history.
Rather, these are the ones which seem to reoccur most

ofte~.

However,

a few other factors that are part of this discussion should also
be mentioned-quickly.
First, there is always a subjective factor involved in the
writing of history.

For instance, the historian must select the

material which he will (and will not) coveT.
is obviously objective.

The historical event

It is the recording of the event that

introduces subjective factors.

For W.R. Walsh, the subjectivity

of the writer is present, but it is not a real serious roadblock
to the

obtaini~g

of objective history.

This subjectivity can be

allowed for its efforts can be overcome.;

Wand agrees with Walsh

in asserting that the best approach to take towards history is one
~
o~

."

~

caU~1on,

~

as we should try and recognize this subjective bias

2 Most historians also recognize-these two factors--the events
themselves and the records of these events--as being an
essential part of historyo For such relQted views, see Carl
L. Becker, The Heavenl Cit of Ei hteenth-Centur Philcso~hers
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969 , pp. 17-18; Bronowski
and Mazlish, o~.cit., pp. XI-XII; Clough, Garsoian and Ricks,
op.cit., vol. I, p. 1; ~~eo, op.cit., p. 127; Wand, o~.cit.,
p. 220
3

W.R. Walsh, Philosonhy of History (New York: Harper and Srothers,
Publishers, 1960)~ pp. lOI! 103.

4 Wand,

o~.cit.,

pp. 29, 42.
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and then make the proper allowance for it. 5
We will also endeavor to allow for
our investigation of the resurrection.

t~is

subjective factor in

This occurrence has

bee~

reported as an objective historical event and we must ascertain if
it is the best explanation for the known facts.
Second, we find that history cannot reach the point
is totally 'Positive of its findings in all instances.
physics, so there is also a certain
probability in history as well.

amou.~t

w~ere

As with

of dependence on

6

For instance, Ernest Nagel, who accepts e deterministic
of history, admits

t~at

it

vie~

he does so in spite of the convictions of

contemporary physicists who almost unanimously hold the opposite
viewpoint. 7

The conclusions of these scientists have had an affect

on historians, for the accepted scientific view against a
deterministic universe has also helped to turn

histori~~s

against

a deterministic view of history.8
Nagel lists five main reasons why historical
generally rejected by so many historians today.
argument from the
in history.

~bsence

dete~minism

is

First is the

of any developmental laws or patterns

Second is the argument based on the inability to

explain and predict events in human history.

The third argument

concerns the appearance of the novel in historical occurrences.

5 Ibid., n. 31. See also Patrick Gardiner's article "The Philosophy
of Hist~ry" in Sills, editor, o"O.cit., pp. 432-433.

6

Wand. on.cit., pp. 51-520

7

Ernest Nagel, ItDeterminis.;!l in History" in Dra.y, on.cit., p. 355.

8

-Ibid.
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Fourth is the argument from the chance events which are also a part
of history.

The fifth argument concerns the conflicting results when

one attempts to make the concept of a deterministic world compatible
with the freedoD and moral duty of human beings. 9
It is because of these and other similar findings that so many
historians have rejected the deterministic view of history.
further states (to reiterate the point), that the findings

Nagel
~f

modern

physics, which also oppose determinism, have been a key factor
that has exercised. a direct influence on asimi1ar rejection of this
t
cQncep~

· tor~ans.
·
10
b y mas t h ~s

. thO~s -oe 1·2e f
mon t gomery concurs ~n

U'

that contemporary science has made it impossible for historians to

"
accept a closed system of natural causes.··
The appearance of these chance and novel events mentioned
above t together with the aforementioned inability to explain or
predict many other occurrences, has helped to further the use of
probabilities in historical stUdies (as well as in scientific

.
t~gaw20n
. . . . . ) • 12
2nves

Eistorians both recognize and utilize this

concept of probability.

For instance, Montgomery observes that

historical studies can never reach the one hundred percentile level
in certainty.l;

9

Ror~ld VanderMolen agrees completely with l~ontgomery's

~.

10

Ibid.

11

Montgomery,

12

See Schaaffs, on.cit., cf. pp.

~nere

is History Going?, on.cit., p. 71.

52-5;, 64 for instance.

13 Montgomery, Where is History Going?, on.cit., pp. 168-169.
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assessment and thus accepts the belief that historical scholarship
is not completely positive of its findings.

In fact, historians

must not fail to allow for this amount of uncertaj.nty.14

For

this reason Montgomery opts for a critical investigation of the
sources in question, with the decision about the occurrence of any
specific event being based upon the probability of the evidence.
In fact, probability is referred to as the only sufficient guide
for a historian. 15

Wand also not~s that we cannot be as sure of

historical investigation as was thought possible in the past.

16

However, we must make our judgments as to which facts are most
probable according to the historical evidence. 17
These elements, then, are to be included in a contemporary
treatment of history.

While it has not been our purpose to deal

with this subject exhaustively, we have come to some conclusions
on the concept of history as it will be used in this work.

We will

refer to history as both the occurrence of past events and the
recording of them.

Realizing that there is always a

ee~tain ~o~~t

of the subjective in this recording, allowance must be made for it
as much as is possible in order for objective data to be obtained.
Realizing also that in speaking of history we are dealing with
probabil~ties,

it will be our desire to ascertain as nearly as is

possible which facts best fit the evidence.

With these probabilities

Ronald. VanderMolen, 11 'Where is History Going?' and liistor:i !!al
Scholarship: A Response" in Fides et liistoria, Pall, 1972 and
Spring, 1973, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, p. 110.
15

Montgomery, Where is History Going?, o"O.cit., pp. 71-74.

16 Wand, o"O.cit., pp. 25-27.

17
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and uncertainties there is always room for the possibility of any
event, however high the probability may be against it. 18

Events

can therefore not be ruled out (either scientifically or historically)
before they are researched.

The only answer is a thorough

investigation of the evidence.
B.

Investigating the Historical Events

1.

Historical Research and Investigation

It is the

opi~ion

of most historians today that the veracity

of past events can be discovered (within a certain probability) by
a careful investigation of the facts. 19

Walsh notes that since

these events have occurred in the past, they are only accessible
by a study of the historical evidence.

Although the historian

himself will not be able to participate in the event that has
already occurred (unless he was originally there), he is able to
inspect the relevant data such as written documents and various
other records, structures or archeological finds.

Upon such

confirmation as this the historian must obtain his evidence.

This

is what Walsh feels is the working principle of historical research.

18

Schaaffs, op.cit., p. 56.

19 Wand,
20

20

0'0.

cit •. , p. 5.

Walsh, op.cit., p. 18. For a good example of such an investigation
with regard to ancient historical events, see DelbrUck's methods
of determining how ancient battles had been fought in the times
of the Greek and Roman empires. It is fascinating to perceive
how this scholaI' was able to arrive at historical facts concerning how large the opposing armies were, how they maneuvered and
other such facets of specific battles in ancient times by
examining the ancient historical records. For instance, see
Edward M. Earle, edito~Hakers of Modern strate
(Princetonz
Princeton University Press, 194; , especially pp. 264-268 ~ith
regard to Delbruck's historical methodo
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Of course, what the existing data and written sources reveal
is not usually automatically accepted as being true.

It is therefore

the job of the historian to critically investigate the available
claims in order to ascertain as closely as possible what has
happened.

This includes the procedure of determining if 7he sources

best support the claims that are made in them.
CeI!

'be

·~bt.ai..."'led

The proper results

even though there exists this need to determine

which facts best

fit the evidence.

Then it is the duty of the
21
historian to formulate the facts based upcn this groundwor~.
One is therefore to decide upon the evidence at hand--that which
is shown to be the most probable conclusion.
3ven clains of miracles must be investigated in this way, since

they cannot be

out

~uled

~

priori,

~s

noted above.

On

this sutject

i.fontgomerJ-- asserts:
3ut can the modern man accp.~t a !miracle: such as the
resv.!':r-ectio!l? .•. For us, u..'1like people of the lJewtonian
epoch, the universa is no lo~~er a tight, safe, predictable
playing-field in which we kn·:." all tnE: rules. Since
Einstein no modern man has had the right to rule out the
possibility of events because of prior knowledge of
!natural law! ... The problem of!miracle!, then, must be
solved in the realffi of historical investigation .•.• 22
As l:lOntgomery cOIlcludes, sill-.;e we cannot decide in advance what
can happen, v.'e

~ust

determine, by historical research, who.7. :'.-::a1].:;

has happened al:r-eady.
~He

23

must quickly point out here that miracles are not to be

believed simply because they are Supernatural.

21

In fact,

WA

would

Ibid., pp. 18-19; cf. Daniel Fuller, op.cit., p. 22 for these

same conclusions.
22

23

•
k Cilon
Of
t gomery, ..
. t ory and Cl...lr~S
. t'1.an1.. ...vy ( .:.JU'.'.'IleJ
T""\~
.,...c:, G
o.hrn '0,i.ar.nc.ras
~ rove:
InterVarsi ty Press, 1972), p. 75. Cf. also :i\Iontgome~! s "'!here
. .tus
.. t ory 0
'?
• t
71_.
1.S
\.j()lng.,
op~., p.
T

u

Ibid., cf. also Where is History Going, pp. 168-169.

desire to be the more careful before
as a historical event.

accepti~g

a miraole-claim

But, on the other hand, we must also guard

against the presupposition that miracles cannot occur at all.

There

is no real basis, eithar scientific or historical, for this
presupposition.

24

Although many are skeptical about the reality of

miracles, it may be that a Supernatural explanation fits the facts
best and is the most probable solution. 25
On this last point of skepticism Wand has made a very pertinent
point.

His words were specifically directed at the historical

skepticism of theologian Van Harvey, but Wand points out that the
same can also be applied to others of this persuasion as well.
Harvey argued that we cannot accept the New Testament accounts of
the empty tomb e7en though there is much historical evidence in
favor of them and no convincing evidence contrary to them.

To

this Wand responds:
We may well ask Ear~ey how a critical historian can do
anything else than decide on the evidence before him--unless
indeed he already holds some secret which will invali~te
in advance any evidence that csn be brought in favour of
the phenomenon in que~tion? The plain fact is that in this
kind of argument the skeptic is not fUnctinning as a historian
at all. lie starts with the assumption that there could be
no corporeal resurrection since tha'~ would be against
nature •••• That is to say, he rejects the evidence because
he does not like a conclusion that it may be used to support.26
It appears that Wand's point is well taken here.

~~~t z~:s

the r.istorian do except investigate the available evidence

24

Wand, °E·cit., pp .. 30, 101.

25

Ibid. , pp. 51-52.

26

Ibid ••
'

pp. 70-7l.

a.~d

can

make
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a decision based on it?

Since this is the way that other historical

facts must be decided (as we have seen above) it seems that we do
not have the right to demand different criteria simply because, as
Wand notes, we do not like or agree with the conclusions.

We must

therefore approach this subject with an open mind, endeavoring to
ascertain which explanation is the most probable. 27
Now some may judge that Wand's conclusions are those of the
theological "fundamentalist" who endeavors to prove every word of
Scripture as being true.

To this it should be remarked that not
.

only does this Oxford scholar object to such beliefs,

28

he holds

to the quite "contemporary" theological opinion that while
of the

Ne~

SOiiie

Testament is historical and trustworthy, some is also

simply propaganda which was written without any claims to being
objectively historical.

Thus he cannot accept the view that the

Bible itself is the guarantee and proof that all of Christianity
was completely historical. 29

Because of this, Wand believes that

we should inquire into whatever mythical elements could possibly
be present in the texts.

But, at the same time, we cannct allow

the portions that evidence indicates are historical to be labelled
as myth. 30
W~d's

conclusion in these matters is that we must approach

these ancient documents cautiously.

27
28

Ibid. , pp. 29-310

55.

~.,

p.

29

Ibid.

pp. 17-18.

30

Ibid. , p. 42.

9

Bias and subjective factcrg
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must be allowed for and dealt with accordingly.

B~tt

in spite of

all of this, we may find that the Supernatural explanation is more
historically probable than- the natural one.

In this case we must

be prepared to accept the miraculous conclusion.;l
2.

The Resurrection and Historical Investigation

According to Wand, the resurrection is the central claim of
New Testament Christianity and as such it cannut s~mply be ignored.;2
Neither should we be content to leave the

~uestion

simply

b,y

affirm-

ing that the original disciples believed that Jesus had risen.
Since it is the center of the Christian faith it should be carefully
investigated.

We must inquire into thi5 belief in order to ascertain

whether or not it is valid.;;
other historians also agree to the need for such research.
Ancient historian Paul Maier also believes that the historical
evidence for th·2 resurrection must be investigated.

Then we can

better judge whether it can be referred to as an actual part of
history.;4

Another ancient historian, Edwin Yamauchi, agrees that

we must investigate this occurrence in order to conclude if it is
best explained as myth or as history.;5

We have already ~iscussed

;1 Ibid., pp. 29-;1.
32

;;
34

Ibid.

7

~.,

pp. 80, 114.
pp. 90-94.

Maier, First Easter, op.cit., pp. 105-122 and "The Empty Tomb
as History", 0'0. ci t. t pp. 4-6.

35 Yamauchi, o'Occit., March 15, 1974 pp. 4-7
pp. 12-16.

~;d

March 29, 1974,
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Xontgo::nery's preference to historically investigate this event as
'WelL 36
Therefore, after dealing with the problem of faith

an~

in the next chapter, we nill tur~ to this investigation. 37

reason

~he

New Testament authors certainly clai::tec. thf'.t Jesus rose fro::l the
dead, meaning literally that he appeared to many of the early
Christians after having actually died.
what the accounts report.

No one doubts that this is

It remains for us to endeavor to

determine the facticity of these claims.

We have in this chapter explained the concept of history that
is to be used in this work.

We have also determined that history,

like science, cannot rule out the possibility of miracles a nriori;
that is, without investigating the available evidence ana deciding
upon it.

To this end we have briefly described the approaches

taken by several historians as to historical research and investiga+.ior..
Procedures such as these will be used in our own investi;ation of
the resurrection of Jesus.

36 i'Eontgomery, Where is History Going'?, on.cit., pp. 71-73, 93,
168-169 for instance.
37

It is i~portant to note that historical studies have also been
:::lade about other miracle-claims in e.n~ient history= :,:=10 .F1.nley:
for insiance, investigates Romer and his claims of miraculous
intervention into early history, such as with the Troj~~ war.
Or for another example, various scholars have examined claims
of tongue-speaking, or glossolalia, in ancient history. For
Finley's work, see The ~orld of Odysseus (New York: The Viking
Press, 1954), especially pp. 10-19. For a historical discussion
of speaking in ton~Jes~ see George Barton Cutten, Snecl:in~ with
Ton~es Eistcr:'cally and Psychologically Exa:nined (l~e':1' ::.~ven:
Yale University Press, 1927), pp. 36-47 for instance. For another
example, see :5'rank Stagg, 3. Glenn Ei!lton and ';'!ayne E. 02 tes,
Glossolalia: Tonr,:-ue Sneakin~ in Eiblical, Eistorical and Psychological
Perspective, (1~a.shville: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 48-57.

Cbapter IT.

Reason

a~d F~itb

It bas been said that Cbristian history and thought is a history
of the opposition between faith and reason.

This is a reference to

the continual conflict between these two aspects of the Christian
life--the spiritual and the rationale l There has always seemed to
be a variety of views on this subject, often intermingled and overlapping.

Historian of philosophy Etienne Gilson has dealt with

several of these opinions in his work Reason and Revelation in the
Middle Ages. 2

For instance, early church theologian Tertullian

believed not only that faith was primary, but that all reference
to human philosophy or other teachings should be excluded.'

Passing

to the twelfth century, we find Saint Bernard voicing a similar
opinion in
A

favQ~

of faith alone.

4

second view was that of Augustine, who held that one's reason

and understanding do playa part, but a secondary one since faith
is to precede them.

Therefore we must exercise faith first before
".

we can understand. 5 Another exponent of this' view was Anselm.o
Gilson finds that a third important view was voiced by the
twelfth century Arabian philosopher Averroes.

Although his was not

1

See Manfred T. B~>auch, "Head and Heart Go to Seminary", Christianity
Today, June 20, 1975, pp. 11-12.

2

Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle A es (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966 •

,

ill§;.. , pp. 9-10.

4

ng.,

pp. 12-1,.

5

ng.,

pp. 17-19.

6

Ibid.

'0 pp. 23-26.
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a Christian system of thought, it did influence Christianity.

For

Averroes, reason was primary and faith was subordinated to it.7
The fourth view was that of Thomas Aquinas, who endeavored to
find harmony between faith

~~d

reason.

He believed that some

truths could be known only by revelation while others could be
8
attained by reason.
This is just a sample of some of the possibilities when one
views the
~~d

~~story

reason.

of opinions on the relationship between faith

Some favor the use of either faith or reason exclusively.

Some give a place to both, while subordinating one to the other.
Eithe~

reason is seen as being subordinate to faith or vica versa.

Others try to find a balance between the two methods.

In this work

a system will be set forth which is both a workable one and one
that is justified by the facts.
A.

Reason and Faith: Definitions

In order to lay a groundwork for our discussion on this
topic, this study will begin with a look at the dictionary
9
defL~itions of these two terms.
The _~eric~~ Dictionary of the
7

s
9

Ibid., pp. 37-62.

See especially pp. 42-43.

Ibid., see especially pp. 32-83.
This

realizes that pr~losoDhical conclusions such as these
be based soley on dlctionars definitions. Since dictionaries
only show how a word is used by most intelligent people, we
would be epistemologically naive if we were to assume that such
definitions are capable of settling these philosophical issues.
Nevertheless, such an approach can be very valuable as a ground
work for later conclusions and tr~s is how these definitions are
to be used here. They serve as guidelines for the more
sophisticated schola.rly yiews which will be presented aftenrards
to ~~ther corroborate these ~sages. The definitions themselves
C~~ point
to a consensus of opinion as they reveal how these words
are often defined. HOYlever:_ this will be corroborated by later
references to scholars who verify these statements.
v~iter

c~~ot
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~n~lish Langu~ge

defines reason as follows:

The basis or ~otive for an action, decision, or conviction ••••
A declaration made to explain or justify an action, decision,
or conviction •••• The capacity for rational thought, inference
or discri~ination •••• To ••• think 10gically •••• Tv taL~ or argue
logically or persuasively •••• To persuade or dissuade (someone)
with reasons.lO
According to this definition,
concepts.
even to

reaso~

includes at least

t~o

First, reason is the ca"Oacity to infer, discri::i:::ate or
rationally.

Second, reason is the explanation or out-

working of this capacity.

This second concept include~ (a~ong other

t~ings)

thir~

several co~ponent parts.

Reason is defined as bein~ the

basis or motive :or one's decisions or convictions, or a

st~tement

explaining or justifying these decisions or convictions.

Reason is

also the ability to thin..iI: logically or to argue persuasively,
including persuadin~ (or dissuading) someone one Tray or another. 11
If this definition was shown to be a valid one,
could be drawn

f~o~

these

t~o

othe~

concepts of reason as well.

conclusions
Fc=

instance, reaso!:. ';:ould be at the very "':lasis of all of our k::oi71ed.ge,
for one cannot

eV8Y..

'\.::
.. ~on ) •
Ib" d e f"~n~"."

bave the ca"Oacity to

".:i thout

thir~

apart

reason the ex-olana tion or

fro~

reason

out'.'~or::ir.g

of

this capaci t:. ":;ould also fail to be accounted for because rational
r

thought is defined as being at the basis of all actions, iecisions
or convictions.

In fact, we cannot even formulate these convictions

or make these decisions (intellectual or otherwise) except by
utilizing reason.

10

11

Therefore reason is the

begin..~ing

of knowledge

'.'!illiam :lor:;:-is, editor, The American Heri ta.;:;e :!)ictio:a.ary of the
EnSlish 1angua;e (new York: American Eeri taf,"e ?ublis!:i!:Z Company,
Inc. and the :-:ouGhton Zifflin Company, 1970), p. 1086.
~.

since it becomes obvious that we could not even think in the sense
which we are accustomed to, except by reason.

Considering the

definition, we would have to think without formulating

~~y

convictions,

making any decisions or coming to any conclusions in order to do
so apart from a rational process.

Finally, any attempt to counter-

act these conclusions or argue otherwise is also reason, again by
definition.
However, as we have stated above, dictionary definitions cannot
in themselves solve philosophical problems such as this one.
Therefore, after faith is defined, the views of those who argue in
favor of these definitions will later be investigated.
The American Eeritage Dictionary of the English Language defines
faith as:
A confident belief in the truth, value, or trustworthiness

of a person, idea, or thing •••• A system of religious beliefs.12
Faith, then, is trust or belief in a person, thing, idea, value or
truth.

Belief itself is defined as mental

conviction that is thought to be valid. 13

~~

centered in a

We have· already determined

in our previous definition that the basis for such actions and
convictio:~

.

~s

reason.

14

In addition, belief generally involves

thinking of some sort, even if it is only the elemental thought that

12

13

~., p.

Cf.

~.,

471.
p. 121 •

., I.

~~

Ibid., p. 1086.
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what one is told to believe is "gOOd".15
of thinking about one's faith, along

~itb

Both of these prccedures
the convictions and

decisions that often accompany them, are grounded in reason, by
definition.

Even the capacity to understand these beliefs is part

of the cognitive process and has its basis in reason. 16
There are two general reasons why faith is usually exercised.
Some believe by intuitive conviction y while others require reasonable
persuasion and rational argument (indeed, some claim an interest in
acquire~

both).

But the capacity for both is

by reason, as defined

above.

This is because the ability even to hold convictions and

the ability to reason concerning,them is rationa1. 11
Our study has thus far shown that faith must rely upon reason
as its basis.

However, this discussion has not so far been one of

finding which of the two is the most important and it should not be
construed as such.

Therefore we will look briefly at this

~uestion

now.
Even though reason composes the groundwork t we still hold that
faith is the most important element of religious belief for two main
reasons.

First, it is not possible to logically and reasonably

15

One may object that many have exercised religious faith because
they were told to do so or for other reasons which require DO
real contemplation. But we would ho1~ t~t if ~~e ?ez capable
of understanding his faith he would have been required to have
thought about it at some time, if only in a naive and simple way.
This is because faith would even involve affirmation of what
others have dictated. However simple, it would be an acceptance
of the existence of God or some SUcn belief. Real faith involves
at least some thinking as apart of this conviction or it could
not be B~id to be such. For this reason, if one has never thought
about his belief in any way it can only be because real faith
was never exercised in the first place.

16

Korris, on.cit., p. 1086.

11

lli.£.
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nrove everything in the Christian faith.

Thus faith extends beyond

the reaches of this reason, which is more limited.

Since we can

only speak of varying degrees of probabilitys as stated above, any
religious system which places such research at the ape: of achievement will find that it is very limited in what is presented for
belief.

The realm of faith and hope would be narrowed quite

Second, although reason can yield true data from a logical
investigation of the facts, faith is capable of transcending the
~ational

when one puts trust in these facts.

Therefore, one

exercises faith based on the reasonable probabilities.
such belief one could not speak of the Christian faith.

Without
God cannot

be known by reasonable processes (beyond the knowledge that Ee

exist~),

but rather a faith is needed which appropriates and trusts the
evidence, with deiinite ethical implications for one's life.

Without

this primary importance of faith and these accompanying ethical
implications, Christianity would not be a faith system.

This is

almost the unanimous witness of Christianity through the centuries,
and it has a sound basis.

While reason and knowledge are very

important, especially as a basis fer belief, faith is more so.
Reason is thus not the ultimate.
in this work.

This position is also accepted

Faith should remain in this pre-eminent position,

being careful to note that this is a reasonable faith based on

18

18

efe the New Testament's primary emphasis on faith in such
verses as In. 20:29; Eph. 2:8; Heb. 11:1, 6.
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the facts and not a leap in the dark.

More will be said

i~

favor

of this opinion below.
So we now reach our conclusion pertinent to the results of
these definitions and the roles they play in the issue between
faith and reason.

We have so far concluded that whilp. reason is

temporally primary, faith is the most important.

Neither should be

excluded and both should be used in its proper place.

These

definitions, however, will not be regarded as the final word in
this discussion, nor
the issues.

~ill

it be assumed that they can totally solve

Therefore it is advantageous to turn now to those who

also hold to some of the results arrived at here.
B.

Reason and Faith: Scholarly Views

A study of definitions has revealed that reason must be the
basis of all
faith.

thir~ing

processes, including the mental activity of

While reason is thus temporally first, when speakinb in the

context of Christian theology, faith is the most important.
Several

conte~porary

scholars have come to similar conclusions

based upon personal studies of the evidence.

Secular theologian

Paul Van Buren believes that faith always requires a thinking
process.

This is because faith usually includes both logical

contemplation and a consideration of historical sources, and these,
in turn, involve reasoning.

Any type of Christian faith that

neglects these processes is quite

inade~uate.19

19 Paul M. Van Buren, The Secular I-:Ieaning of the Gospel (New York,
The !,:acmillan Compa."'l.Y, 1963), pp. 174--175.

Theologian John R. stott also believes that faith is not
irrational.

It is neither credulity or optimism. 20

a trust based upon reason--a rational belief.

Rather, it is

As such faith does

not contradict or oppose reason9 but rather it is essentially
complimented by it. 2l
For philosopher Francis Schaeffer, rationality, knowledge and
faith are all related.

Rationality is very important, but not to

the exclusion of the other elements.
each.

A balance must be kept between

Nevertheless, we cannot expect faith to be exercisei prior

to a rational investigation of the evidence, or before a proper
knowledge and understanding of the truth has first been achieved.
Th ese

·-t-~ons prece d e f a1-th • 22

cond~

Theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg stresses the need for grounding
faith on an objective, rational basis.
;:Insight and Faith" g,r..d..

~'Fa.i th ~d

rationale for this belief.

In two essays entitled

Ree..so:l" he sets forth his

Faith cannot stand alone and be its

own criteria and proof for belief.

This is because the subjective

qualities of one's own faith alone provide no solid
why it is also good for another individual.
as to whether the

~ounds

re~sons

as to

The original question

of this faith are solid is never answered.

There is no logical reason to accept it.

Therefore a knowledge

20

John R.W. stott, Your Mind Matters: The Place of the 1~ind in the
Christian Life (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1973),
pp. 33- 36.

21

Ibid., pp. 34, 36, 49-52.

22

Schaeffer, The God Who is There, op.cit., pp. 112-1139 141-143.
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based upon reason must precede faith~2;
As pointed out earlier,

Montgo~ery

also holds that there must

be an objective, historical basis for faith.

Faith that is not

based on some such reasonable evidence can give no logical reason
as to why it should be accepted over other alternatives.

Faith

cannot verify itself and neither can an "experience" demonstrate
its own validity in and of itself.

Therefore we have no reason

to accept any faith as being valid if there are no grounds upon
which to base this claim. 24
We

h~ve

briefly investigated the views of five scholars on the

question of the relationship between

reas~n

and faith.

We will turn

now to the rationale behind these views, as to why reason is held
to precede faith.

The general conviction seems to be, first, that

faith must 06 based upon knowledge and that, secoud, reason begins
the entire process and provides the basis for this knowledge.

We

will examine these premises more closely.
First, faith must be based upon a knowledge 'of certain facts
which are at

le~t

believedto be true.

In order for one to have a

23 These two essays are found in one of Pannenberg's collections
of other such works entitled Basic uestions in Theolo ,
translated by George R. Kehm Two volumes; Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1972), see vol. II, pp. 28-35, 53-54 for instance. We
will further elaborate on Pannenberg~s theories on reason and
faith below.

24 See the appendix of History and Christianity, op.cit., pp. 99-101,

cr.

106-108.
also Montgomery's debate with "God is dead"
theologian Thomas Altizer, where Montgomery charges that Altizer's
irrational faith provides no reason for others to believe him
because it is based on no objective evidence. This debate is
recorded in The Altizer-Mont ome. Dialo e (Chicago: InterVarsity Press, 1967. See pp. 26, 59-60, 72, 76 and others where
this charge is made. As with Pannenberg, so we will return to
this reasoning below.

faith-conviction there must ideally be this basis for belief.

At

the very least (in the absence of any intellectual or rational
investigation), religious faith is trust in the existence of God
or a reliance upon certain believed tru~hs.25

Therefore, religious

faith must be grounded on some sort of knowledge, even if it is
only the belief that God does (or does not, in the case of atheism)
26
exist.
When we perceive that the Christian faith is thus based
upon knowledge, we can then view this knowledge as preceding the
faith. 21

Even some of the end results of faith, such as various

25

Even the case of atheism is no exemption here. If one
designates atheism as a "religious faith!!, then it still must
Ibe acknonledged that it is also based on the knowledge of
certain facts which are believed to be true. In this case this
would be the non-existence of God.

26

Cf. Van Burer.., ou.cit~: pp~ 114-175; stott, ·ou.cit., p. 51;
Schaeffer, The God ~ho is There, ou.cit., pp. 143-145; Pannenberg,
on. cit., vol. II, pp. 31, 45; ~ontgomery, History and Christianity,
ou.cit., pp. 106-108. It is extremely important to note here,
in addition, that the reason or knowledge upon whic1: faith is
based is not always a very sophisticated one. As asserted in
footnote number 15 above, faith must be based on some k.Lowledge,
even if it is an uncomplicated and simple belief in what one is
told. Eut even in this case acceptance of belief in God (or
whatever it is that one is told to believe) still involves the
acceptance of the knowledge that these beliefs a~e true. Anything short of this is not real faith. At no point in this
work is the assertion ever made that one must be capable of a
logical investigation of the facts before one can believe.
Such is clearly not the case. A reasonable faith can be shown
to be more valuable, but a faith based upon a less sophisticated
knowledge is not thereby invalid. If the Christian faith can
be shown to be based on a lcgical investigation of the facts,
then faith in these facts is valid even if one is not capable
of demonstrating the evidence for oneself.

21

Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 32, footnote and also Wolfhart Pannenberg,
editor, Revelation as History, tr~~slated by David Granskou
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), pp. 139~ 151, note 15.
Cf. Schaeffer, Ibid.
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kinds of action or ethical involvement, are due at least partially
to the attainment of this prior understanding. 28
Second, reason begins the process and provides the basis for
this knowledge.

We have seen that faith-conviction relies on

knowledge and that this
rudimentary level.

m~st

involve some thinking, if only at the

Indeed, Van Euren states that real faith is

only possible when one thinks 29 and Stott asserts that one cannot
have faith at all apart from such cogitation.'O

But thi~~ing is

a rational process which requires the use of reason.,l

Therefore,

.
"'"h'
' d es the framework _f'or 1." t.
reason b ow"'"h b eg1.ns
w loS process an d
prov1.
In addition, faith must have an objective basis.
e foundation, one would never know if
were solid or not.

~he

j2

Without such

grounds for one's belief

Apart from a foundation of reasonable knowledge,

faith is not capable of substantiating itself.

Its subjective

qualities provide no rational basis or crite=ia according to which
its trustworthiness may be ascertained.

For

iust~ce;

one

can~ot

appeal to one's personal spiritual experiences for the needed
authority factor.

Montgomery notes that an appeal to such private

experiences is an unconvincing testimony, since it is sometimes
hard to tell if the heart-felt experiences of another amount to

26

See stott,

29

Van Buren, on.cit., p.

;0

Stott,

,1
,2

OPe

0;').

"
C1." "'w.

cit. , p.

,

p.

57.
1740

,7.

See Scha.effer. The God Who is There, on.cit., pp. 141-143·
~.~

pp. 112-11,.
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anything more than heartburnt 33

At first this appears to be simply

a humorous illustration, but upon closer examination it is found
to contain much truth.

Row can we even hope to differentiate

between real experiences or beliefs and false ones if there is no
factual criteria which gives us at least some idea as to what may
be most trustworthy?

A faith which is grounded upon rational facts

and which rests upon an objective basis is in a much better position
to ascertain its trustworthiness than is a faith which is admittedly
irrational and subjective in its approach.

It is true that one

may prefer the latter, but this does not answer the question of
how one might

~erify

this faith even for oneself$ let alone for

others.
It is also true that the rational approach does not always
lead to a valid faith.

But 5t appears that it would be much

better off in view of this question of verification than would a
faith which does not (or cannot) utilize any rational method at
all.

Indeed, an ilitel1.igent investor does not often risk funds

on an enterprise which gives no valid ::-easons to make such an
investment seem worthwhile.

Even hunches and premonitions are

usually based on some sort of knowledge or reason, even if it is
"secret information".

In a silililar way, faith shou.ld also be

based upon a rational groundwork.
Apart from an objectiv2 faith which is based upon a logical
examination of the facts, there is no way to ascertain if such

33 Montgomery, History and Christianity, op.cit., p. 101; cf.
pp. 99, 107.
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beliefs are valid or r.ot.
the facts any
one

can~ot

No amount of wishful

~ore tr~thful.

thia~ing c~n

make

No matter'hor. intense one's faith is,

make this faith any more valid.

Faith must therefore

have an objective basis or else one would not be able to ascertain
if it is simply spurious.
Pannenberg also believes that we must reject a subjective
Christian faith which is based on one!s personal experiences.
does so for at least two reasons.

First~

He

such private experiences,

cannot be obligatory for others because they lack factual, objective
evidence and therefore are usually only capable, at the most, cf
..

conv~nc~ng

onese If • 34

Second, this subjectivism disregaras the

fact that the very center of Christianity is based on Divine
initiative.

:,:en everywhere are able to investigate the fou.::dations

of this religion in

or~er

to ascertain as closely as possible if

events such as the resurrection have actually occurred.
opport1L~ity

to

i~vesti6~te

The

the claims of Christianity is open to

anyone who wants to study them and is r.ot relegated to the perusal
of a select few. 35

Therefore, the Christian faith is Dost properly

.,.1,

::r~

It might be objected that p;erhaps one does not care to ::lake his
faith obligatory for others, thus keeping it simply on the
subjectiv.e level. But here we must remember, first, t::1at
Christ,iani ty claims to be a propagating faith interes-:ec. in
bringing others to accept this same grace of God that it has
received. It therefore qoes not thrive on one's keeping faith
to oneself. Second, we have reasoned here that Christianity is
most properly based on one's exercising faith as a result of
facts which are believed to be true and not upon irrational
explanations or private experiences apart from these fac~s.
Thus this aforementioned objection falls prey :~th to the idc~
that the Christian faith is to be propagated and to the conviction
that faith is based upon objective facts as opposed to subjective
feelings. For so~e of these ideas see Pannenberg's 3asic
Questions in TheolOgy, o~.cit., vol. II, espec~ally pp. 5)-54;
cf. pp. 28, 30-32.

35 Pannenoer3, nevelation as History,

op.ci~.,

p~.

135-139.
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objective, open to a rational confrontation with the facts and not
subjective or irrational. 36
The same conclusion that was reached with regard to trying to
subst~~tiate

Christianity by one's personal, subjective experience

also applies to those who endeavor to point to the proclaimed
message as the basis for the faith.

ihis approach also fails in

that the obvious question concerns whether there is a real reason
to accept it or not.

If the reason is unconvincing, it would seem

that we would lack a sound basis for accepting it.

Further, the

message apart from any rational coercion cannot show why it

shoul~

be accepted over another alternative, or even over a contrary view.
In other words, the message is not self-authenticating but must
also provide objective reasons to back up its claim to truth=37
By "objective reason" we are referring to the need for faith
to investigate the historical (or other) evidence and make its
decision upon which facts best fit the case.

For Schaeffer, faith

is bas€d upon just such an examinatioh of the events v.hich Christianity
claims have already occurred in history, such as the resurrection.
One cannot be asked to

exe~cise

faith in the Christian message until

the evidence has been investigated. 38

Montgomery agrees that faith

begins in an investigation of the objective, historicale7ents and

Ibid., especially p. 138. See also Basic Questions in Theology,
op.cit., vol. II, pp. 30, 53-54.

37

;8

See Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology, Ibid., vol. II,
pp. 33- 34.
Schaeffer, The God Who is There, op.cit.,

p~

141~

cf. p. 92.
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rests in the probability of the findings. 39

But we must re~ember

that faith is based on the events and not vice versa. 40

In other

words, faith is not formulated apart from the facts, hoping that
there is some evidence to support this venture.
beca~se

the facts appear reasonable.

Rather, one believes

Pannenberg also stresses

this last point, asserting that an individual does not bring en
already existing faith to the events, but exercises this faith-only
after

~~

open-minded look at the events. 41

As for the question of importance, we

fo~d

earlier that reason

was temporally primary while faith was -1re important in a
theological context.

We found this to be

t~~e

for two main reasons.

First, the whole of Christian teachings and belief cannot be explained
com~letely
i

in terms of reason.

Second, when we speak in a

theological context belief takes on a central importance, as it
transcends reason.

Faith must personally appropriate the factS i which

involves ethical implications for one's life.

This is chiefly

because we are dealing with the existence and teachiug of God (the
Greek Theos, root word of theology), a doctrine which cannot be
dealt with adequately in the realm of reason alone.

The importance

of faith is primary here, as witnessed by centuries of Christian
thought.

39 Montgomery, Eistory and Christianity,
, n7_ ,ns:\_
--,
---.

40

o~.cit.g

pp. 75-76, 79-80,

Ibid., p. l07s

41 Pannenberg, Revelation as History, on.cit., p. 157.-
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Does contemporary thought offer similar reasons for giving
faith the place of primary importance while placing' reason first
temporally?

We must answer here in the affirmative.

It is especially

noteworthy that the same scholars who we have been dealing with in
our previous

dis~ussion,

those who hold that reason and knowledge

are the foundation for belief, also place faith in the place of
prime importance in the

end~

E~~n

the same two reasons used above

(or very similar 'ones) are employed.

First, Pannenberg notes that

the doctrines of Christianity can never be explained completely in
terms of reason.

There will always be a remainder.

42

Second,

Pannenberg further relates that no one can come to know God strictly
by his own reason.

A good

concerning salvation.

ex~ple h~re

is

t~e

Ch~isti~~ te~~hings

Even though reason provides the original

basis, knowledge is still not capable of securing salvation because
it depends finally upon the appropriation of faith and reliance in

4

Gcd and personal surrender to Him. ;

Thus faith is based upon

rational probabilities, but the final

express~on

l

of it transcends

the rational.
Montgome~y

also comes to similar conclusions.

Faith is based

upon the probabilities which emerge from an investigation of the
objective facts and the final step of salvation
of this fact by means of faith.

42

is an appropriation

As such, faith and commitment to

Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology,

o~.cit.,

vol. II, p. 48.

Ibid., p. 57 and Revelation as History, op.cit., pp. 137-139.
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God through Jesus Christ is the final step of

s~lvation,

accomplishes something which reason could never do.
Wand adds an interesting point here.

as it

44

While faith is dependent

upon reason and builds upon its more conclusive basis, faith is
still more important in that it is more intimate and personal than
knowledge.

Thus it makes use of the framework of reason and then

goes beyond the rational. 45
It may become apparent at this point that reason and faith, when
properly understood, actually compliment each other.
their own roles to play and each are very important.

Both have

46

These roles,

as we have shown above, consist of faith operating on the basis of
reeson. 47

However, the two are not in competition with each other,

but rather cooperate together. In this way they are found to be
48
The result is that head and heart should
quite compatible.
ideally work with, and not against each other. 49

The conclusion which we have reached in this chapter lis that
faith can only be built upon reason, meaning that reason is temporally
first in this process.

~

Montgomery, liistory and Christianity,

45 Wand,
46 Ibid.

47

This has been found to be the case both

o~.cit.,

p.

o~.cit.,

pp. 79-80, 107.

,4.

Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology7
pp. 36-,7.

48

Ibid., pp. 34-35, 47.

49

Brauch, on. cit., p. 12.

on~cit.:

vol. II,
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from

~~

investigation of definitions

o? the evidence.

from a logical examination

~~d

From the first study we

fo~~d

that we

CCL~ot

even

think in the way we are accustomed to, let alone exercise faith, apart
from a rational process.

For instance, real faith involves

convictions and mental action.

These can only be held by some

variety of thinking and they also require reason, however naive.
One can exercise valid faith, however, even if one is not able to
personally investigate the facts, as mentioned above.

From the

latter study we have not only verified this, but we have concluded
in addition that a subjective, irrational faith can provide no
logical grounds as to why it should be accepted.

If there is no

rationale for this faith, there can be no objective criteria on
which its claim to truth

cCL~

be based.

Therefore one cannot ascertain

if the message based on such a faith should be accepted or not.
Without any criteria or objective data on which to ,judge its contents,
there is no logical way to distinguish one faith-message from a
rival one.

In fact, one is hard pressed for any evidence on which

one's religious experience may be

distL~guished

from any other human

emotion, unless it is grounded in logical reason and investigation.
Even an intense faith apart from such
faith

~~v

more valid.

CL~

objective basis cannot make

Therefore, we hola that for faith to be

intelligible it must be based on a rational knowledge.
We must be careful to point out once again that a rational
approach to faith may not solve every last problem, but it does
provide the best grounds on which to base faith, as shovm above.
Without this approach there would be no real way that one could
verify these conclusions with any confidence.

We thus encounter

historical probabilities once again, as it appears that arguing
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from objective, Listorical data and logical evidence seems to
provide the best way of arriving at the most probable results.
while the rational

approac~

So

is not infallible, it does provide

the best means of gaining a testable and verifiable foundation for
faith.

If we abandon the rational, we

~ust

also abandon our hopes

of gaining such objective and ve~ifiable results. 50
An irrational or strictly subjective faith is not capable of
providing such answers.
own validity.

It cannot verify itself or demonstrate its

Neither can it answer the question of whether its

grounds for faith are solid or not.

Because of this lack of

evidence it cannot show why it should be accepted over other
possibilities.

Such a faith

ca~~ot

provide a logical reason as to

why it should be accepted, since there are no testable grounds on
which to base this claim.
more truthful a

Neither can such belief make faith any

There is no logical reason to accept this faith.

Although reason is temporally first, faith was found to be the
most important as an end result.

This is because, first, all of

Christian belief cannot be accounted for rationally.

Second, in

the context of theology, faith can do what reason cannot quite
accomplish in dealing with the existence and teachings of God.
Although based upon reason, faith transcends the rational in
providing a means by which one can trust in the reasonable findings
of one's aforementioned investigation, applying the results to one's
life.

50

Schaeffer, The God Who is There, op.cit., p. 113 and Pannenb~rg,
Basic Questions in Theology, op.cit., vol. II, p. 28.
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Lastly, we discussed the need to
together.

bri~g

reason and faith

We must present them henceforth as being entirely

compatible and not in competition with each other, recognizing
that each has a role to play.

Reason forms the basis 'and is

temporally first while faith is more essential and

im~ortant.

In the historical and logical investigation which will now
follow, we will endeavor to combine the essentials of our last
three chapterso

The scientific world view can no longer be used

to rule out the miraculous.

Rather we must speak in terms of

probabilities and investigate each miracle-claim.
plays a part.

utilizing the

cvnc~pt

Here history also

of historical investigation

outlined aoove, we will examine the possibilities of belief and
nonbelief in the resurrection of Jesus.

Again we must decide upon

historical probability and accept as factual th&t explanation which
best fits the facts.

The philosophical discussion just concluded

will also be utilized here.

We must maintain throughout this
-1

relationship between reason and faith.'

It is advantageous to turn now to our historical and logical
investigation of three key possibilities (and several related ones)
concerning pe1ief and nonbe1ief in the resurrection of Jesus •. The

51 Notice that in all three instances we have concluded that
probabilities playa decisive part. Science has demonstrated
the need to explain issues statistically, thus relying on
probabilities. As we have shown above, history has also ~dopted
this procedure as the best method of discerning facts about the
past. Even in the philosouhical treatment of reason and !aith
we spoke of the importance of faith making its decision on the
probability of the rational investigation. Thus faith acts
upon the most probable solution as well. ·,'ie have here a striking
confirmation of this belief.
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findings in the fields of physics, history and philosophy will
be combined in an effort to ascertain
the facts.

~hich

possibility best fits

PART 2
POSSI~LE

SOLUTIONS TO TEE QUESTION

OF THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS

Chapter V.

Possibility Number One: That the Resurrection Did Not Occur
A.

David iume: An Introduction

The first possibility to be dealt with here is that the
resurrection did not literally occur.

We will begin by investigating

the views of one very important scholar who held this opinion,
turning later to several other related views.

l

The scholar we will

use as a representative exam:le is historian and philosopher David
E~e

(1711-1776)c
This choice of Eume as the primary scholar to be dealt with

here is one based on several closely-related reasons.

It is quite

doubtful that an author could be chosen who has had more influence
on this question of miracles.

Rumets essay "Of Miracles" has been

so influential that one can hardly even deal with this question at
all without' discussing his
~iting

~o:rk.

2

The importance of this short

has been reflected by its enormous affect upon contemporary

theology and philosophy.;

Even conservative theologian Wilbur

m.

Smith admits that this essay contains the strongest argument ever

1

In each of the three possible approaches to the resurrection
which are covered in this work, we will likewise concentrate on
one major scholar who we think is a representative example of
that view. In the introductions to each chapter we will also
outline the reasons for such choices. However, we will not be
confined to just these three single opinions but in all three
instances we will also entertain other similar views in the
next chapter.

2

See, for example, McNaugher's treatment of miracles, which also
deals with Eume's essay, on.cit., pp. 91-118.

;

~ontgomery,

The Suicide 'of Christian Theology, on.cit., p. ;8.
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·1.

presented against the belief in miracles ......

Therefore Hume is an

excellent example of one yho rejects belief in any miracle such as
the resurrection.

The popularity and high repute of hig essay among

other scholars who hold similar views further reflects the trustworthiness of this choice. 5
In order to more correctly understand Hume's contribution to
the question of miracles, it is important to look briefly at some
of the intellectual trends of the time in which he lived.

According

to Heick, English deism is a movement which may arbitrarily be said
to have covered the century and a half from Herbert of Cherbury in

1624 to Rume in 1776.

Deistic trends were

int~insically

in agree-

ment with similar proclivities in French and German thought.

6

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England we
find thepppularity of various types of deism that sometimes allowed
for varying amounts of Divine revelation.
~eism

However, these brands of

were generally not of the variety which is often referred to

today as "the clockmaker's theory", whereby God was said to have
made the world and later abandoned it to its own existence without
any guidance whatsoever.

This is a later definition of the word,

Wilbur M. Smith, The Su'Oernaturalness of Christ .. (Boston: W.A.
Wilde Company, 1954), p. 142.

5 Later we

~ill deal more fully with Hume's influence on theology,
specifically viewing other scholars who also reject all miraculous
events and who believe that Hume's essay is the apex of critical
thought on t~is subject.

6 Eeick, o'O.cit., p. 52. Heick does note, however, that Bume
differed from deism at several points, such as the reliance
upon reason and the desire to prove the existence of God. By
turning from such notions, Hume contributed to the demise of
deism by taking this stance in favor of empiricism (~.,
pp. 65-66).
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formulated when it became necessary to differentiate between
ath~ism,

theism and pantheism.

In eighteenth century England,

therefore, the word was not often used as a conscious attempt to
differentiate between deism and theism, as it is today.

Rather,

the word was used to describe scholars who were opposed to atheism. 7
In defending religion, the deists of this period depended upon
reason to justify faith.

In fact, reasor. was usually perceived to

be the most important part of one's belief.
dogmas were attacked as

~ct

Traditional Christian

confDrming to the application of this

reason.

Some of the emerging views were quite radical for these

times.

For instance, the results included doubts of traditional

revelation and authority, and an opposition to Supernatural miracles
and wonders.

There was a growing conviction that the search for a

natural religion was valid and that a "common ground" should be
fo~d ~mong

God. 8

other religions, sinoe all were believed to be ways to

Attempts at formulating such a natural approach to faith

based upon the different religions were developed in works such as
Herbert of Cherbury's "Common Notions Concerning Religion tt • 9
One major development of a large portion of English deism was

7
8

Ibid., pp. 51-52; cf. also Vergilius
Runes, o~.cit., p. 75,

9 This

Ferm~s

article "Deism" in

e~say can be found in Owen C. Thomas, editor, Attitudes
Toward Other Religions (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969),
pp. ;2-46. Of course, not all scholars of this period held to
all of these more radical beliefs. For instance, see John Locke'S
The Reasonableness of Christianit , edited by I.T. Ramsey (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958. Cf. here also Ferm, "Deism",
in Runes. Ibid.
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the emerging emphasis on empiricism, culminating in Hume.

Experience

was believed to be the criterion for obtaining knowledge.

Even a

very brief survey of some of these trends reveals this emphasis.
An early empiricist, Francis Bacon, based his experiments and other
observations upon the experience arrived at by the senses.

This

experience was gained by an application of the inductive method
ascertaining truth.

Thomas Hobbes also sought to base all knowledge

upon the criteria of sense experience.
ideas by experience.
b Y reason an d

of

For Jchn Locke, men acquire

In fact, even Divine revelation is perceived

"

exper~ence.

10

Hume also follo?!'e,d the emphasis on experience.

He believed

that this experience was the foundation for all knowledge.

11

Although this method is not infallible, postulates were "to be
judged according to the probability of the experience.
" f orms th e cen t er
see b e 1 ow, th ~s

0 ....co '."
!!::..::

1"
;0_em~c

As we shall

"t"
m~rac 1 es. 12

aga~ns

Eume's work is by no means limited to this field of philosophy.
He is well known in this area, but in the middle of his scholarly
career he turned away from such studies to other interests like
history and ethics. 13

In fact, his best known work is very probably

his multi-volumed masterpiece entitled The History of England.

10

Heick,

-.

O"O.Cl-l..,

14

pp. 53-58, 65.

11

Ibid., pp. 64-66.

12

See Hume's position in his work edited by Cohen, o"O.cit., pp. 124-125.

13

Becker, ou.cit., pp. 38-39; cf. pp. 33-35.

14 David Hume, The Histoxy of Enflana (Six volumes; London: Gilbert
and Revington, Printers, 1848 •
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It was poorly received by the public in the initial stages, but
soon

bec~e

a well-recognized and very popular work.

It was

considered a classic for many years. 15
Earlier several reasons were observed for choosing David
Hume as a representative example of one who holds that the
resurrection, as a miracle, could not occur.

Also just completed

was a brief look at the background of the period in which he lived.
It is desirable now to turn our attention to his extremely
influential essay, "Of Miracles".
B.

David Hume's Argument and a Critique

In his essay "Of
convinced is

Miracles~:,

m~nkind's

David Eume argues from what he is

experience against all real miraculous events.

At the outset, miracles are defined as events which violate nature's
laws.

Eume postulates further that such events, if proven to have

occurred, must be caused by some Supernatural power or other such
agency.
In

16
u~deT

to determine if such events have actually happened,

one must test the available data empirically.

This consists of

viewing the experiential evidence for the miracle-claim on the one

15

E.W.F. Tomlin, The Western Philoso~hers (New York: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1967), pp. 194-195.
.
Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Bume, op.cit.,
p. 128. See the discussion of Hume's definition of miracle above.
We will also return to this topic in the critique below. It is
important to note here that this is not an obscure essay by Hume.
This well known essay on miracles is Section X of his roark An
Enouiry Conce~ning Ellman Understanding. See Ibid., pp. 123-142.
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hand and the experience of the reliability of the laws of nature
on the other.
attested.

Then one can ascertain which is more ,strongly

This test is therefore one based, once again, on the

testimony of exnerience.

The experience of miracles is pitted

against the experience supporting the uniformity of nature.

Here

Rume concludes that it is more probable that the experience favoring
the laws of nature is more reliable and the miracle is therefore
rejected.

Since each case of miracle comes against similar

experiential data 9 these occurrences are rejected as a whole. 17
An important note here, however, is that Hume realized that his
18

argument had not disproved the existence of God.-

Thus we perceive that for this scholar, the e'xperience of
miracles is to be rejected in favor of the experience of the
of nature.

l~~s

In addition to the reasoning given above, Hume also

makes use of four supportive points.

First, there are no historical

accounts of miracles which are attested by enough reputable men so
as to make the event probable.

Second, people are inclined to want

to speak of extraordinary experiences, even to the point of
fabricating the miraculous in order to spread religious truths.
Third, miracles are cited as having occurred mainly in areas of
ignorance or even barbarism.

Fourth, the miraculous events in one

religion destroy the probability that those of another faith are
also true and vica versa.

Therefore, accounts of such Supernatural

events in different religions nullify each othero

17

18

Thus, all are

Ibid., pp. 125-129. See Edwin A. Burtt, !zpes of Religious
Philosonhj[ (Revised edition; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1939), pp. 222-2160 cr. Swinburne, op.cit., pp. 13-14.

-

Burtt, Ibid., n. 258.

-
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eliminated by the others. 19
Now at the outset we must agree that this appears to be quite
a reliable system in which to test relevant data.

Hume seems to

have found a valuable method and one can easily see how it has
appealed to scholars.

But in order to ascertain if these first

impressions are correct ones, let us proceed to the text itself.
It is the conviction of this writer that there are at least four
major problems with Rume's approach to miracles--four chief criticisms
which endanger the very heart of his polemic.·

The first major criticism of Hume's essay is that he incorrectly
defines both the essence of a miracle and the nature of the evidence
for and against it.

He states:

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a
fim. and unalterable experience has established these laiis,
the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the
fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can
possibly be imagined.20
As in the actual definition of miracles ·stated by Rume above,
we again observe that these events are perceived to contradict and
violate nature's laws.

They are said to do so because the totality

of experience relates that these laws cannot be interferred with or
broken.

This experience is "firm and unalterable".

Later

H~e

describes it as liuniforI:l experience 1.1. 21

19
20

21

Hume "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, on.cit.,
pp. 129-134; cf. Swinburne, on.cit., pp. 15-18.
Hume,

~.,

p. 128.
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Immediately we can perceive a logical error in
~ume

~easoning he~e.

fails to begin the investigation with an impartial look at

the :acts.

Rather, his very definition rules miracles out because

of an arbitrary and unproven assumption and it is therefor'2 not a
valid one.

~is

definition is basec upon the idea that the totality

of experience rests abainst the
There definitely are
but these are

b~usted

mi~acle,

~iracle-clai~s

aside by the

varieties of ex?erience.

when such is far

fro~

proven.

that are experientially based,
superiority of

assu~ed

But 3u=e cannot know if the

otbe~

clai~s

made by

supernaturalists are able to invalidate the claims.5ade against
miracles apart from an investigation of the facts.

An

exa~ple

of this could readily De providec.

thinking at least

Burne is definitely

so~ewhat in terms of the miracles of Jesus. 22

But rather than speaking specifically concerning the chief Eiracleclaim of the Christian faith, which is the resurrection of Jesus,
he speaks only senerally of the resurrection of any dead indiviQual
and t!:en promptly infor:ns his reariers t:!1at such an
never
facts.

happene~ ~hen

has

occurre~lc.e

he has not presented any examination of the

Ee cas no evidence that this has never occurred.

:::~e

further

concludes fro~ this (without any new evidence) that in a similar
way all experience opposes' every miracle.

23

here a good example of circular reasoning.

Therefore we have
Dead men are assUEed

never to rise, and because all experience is arbitrarily perceived
to stand against such an event, all
other
out.
22
23

~iracles

as well.

expe~ience

The evidence for

also must oppose

~iracles

is simply ruled

But this can only logically be done after an investisation
Ibid., p. 124.
Ibid., p. 125.
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of the evidence.

Thus Hume assumes that which he must demonstrate.

Oxford scholar

C~S.

Lewis also recognizes this weakness and

develops it into a trenchant criticism of Hume's position.

Lewis

relates:
Now of course we must agree with Hume that if there is
absolutely 'uniform experience' against miracles, if in
other words they have never happened, why then they never
have. Unfortunately we know the experience against them
to be uniform only if we ~~ow that all reports of them
are false. And we can know all the reports to be false
only if we know already that miracles have never occurred.
In fact, we are arguing in a circle.24
Lewis has clearly perceived the problem here.

Hume can

o~ly

claim that all experience supports his view if he has first
ascertained that all other experience is false.

But since he

has not investigated the other evidence, he can only state that
it is false by assuming that miracles cannot occur.

Thus he reasons

circularly.
It goes without saying that one cannot disallow miracles simply
by defining them so that they cannot happen.
are clearly unsatisfactory.25

Circular definitions

But, as we have seen, Hume defines

miracles to be impossible in light of the experience which testifies
to the existence of laws in nature.

This is done without

~~

real

investigation to determine if the experience on behalf of miracles
can establish their validity.

He must somehow know this latter

experience to be false and he can only know that it is so by assuming
that miracl€s cannot occur in the first place, as Lewis explains.

24
25

Lewis, on.cit., p. 105.

w.

Edgar Moore, Creative and Critical Thinkin
Mifflin Company, 1967 , p. 188 for inst~~ce.

(Boston: Houghton
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It may be that one agrees with Hume's conclusions that nature
does

~le

out miracles.

But the point here is that one cannot

define this to be the case or arrange the "facts" in such an order
that this assumption is supported.

It is a matter of philosophical

and historical debate. 26
A'further issue here is the place that should be given to
experience for the laws of nature.

We mentioned above in chapter

two that we also agree with Rume in asserting that nature behaves
by certain laws.
apart

fro~

We could not speak of miracles as being abnormalities

recognizing e normal pattern. 27

But Hume asserts that

the existence of these laws is sufficient to disprove all experience
·
1es. 28
o f m1rac

disagree. 29

At this point there are many scholars who would

Just because there are laws in nature, this does not

mean that occasional abnormalities cannot occur.
the inner workings of nature
system is left to itself.

~nd

Such laws regulate

describe what will happen if the

But these laws do not dictate the

possible results of Supernatural interference from the outside.
Now we have not as yet established if such Supernatural influence
is possible.

Eut the point here is that Hume is simply begging

the question when he assumes that the experience for the laws of
nature is $uperior to experience (if established) for the miraculous. 30

26

Cf. Swinburne, on.cit., p.

27

See McNaugher,

28
29

,0

on~cit.,

15 and

Ramm~

onocit.; pp. 126-128.

p. 92.

Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Eume, on.cit.,
see pp. 127-129, 133, 139.
Cf. Lewis, on.cit., p. 60, McNaugher, on. cit., pp. 99-10; and
Ramm, on.cit., p. 128, for instance.
Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, o'O.cit.,
see the obvious examples of this attitude on pp. 127-128, 139.
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This is so in that the very experience which he dismisses as nonexistent or as inferior, if established to be probable, would
overrule the supposedly stronger experience for the laws of nature.
This is because miracles involve the Supernatural intervention
into nature, and if such intervention was shown to be probable
via a miracle, it would show that the laws of nature could be
temporarily suspended.

Thus, valid

e~perience

actually be superior to experience for the

la~s

for a miracle would
of nature.

Yet

Rume fails to sufficiently investigate this experience for the
miraculouso

Therefore Hume cannot use the laws of nature as an

absolute rule which cannot ever be broken.;l
C.S. Lewis also accepts this
one.

la~t

criticism of Hume as a valid

He points out:
Probabilities of the kind that Bume is concerned with hold
inside the framework of an assumed Uniformity of Nature.
When the question of miracles is raised we are asking about
the validity or perfection of the frame itself. No study
of probabilities in~id~ a giveu frame can ever tell us how
probable it is that the frame itself can be violated. 32

In other words, Lewis charges Hume with only answering questions
which fall into the framework of his assumed view of a completely
uniform nature, when in reality we should be asking whether the
frame itself can be violated.

Thus Hume is concerned with things

;1 See Lewis' essay "The Laws of Nature", contained in a collection
of some of his other works of this type entitled God in the
edited by Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Willi~ B. Eerdman's
Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 76-79, especially po 77.

~,

;2

Lewis,

~iracles,

on.cit., p.

106.
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which might or might not occur within a limited system when he
should rather be concerned with the system outside of this restricted
area.

Is it possible that this little system of nature, as

tr~st-

worthy as it might be in and of itself, could be interrupted from
the outside (as with a miracle)?

Burtt levels a similar criticism

at liume. 33
It is now easier to understand why experience in favor of
miracles, if found to be probable, is so important here.
was found to

~e

If such

the case, it would demonstrate that the laws of

nature could be temporarily

suspended~

thus making the empirical

claims in favor of the miracle dominant over the empirical claims
for nature's laws.

But by refusing to investigate such

~iracle-

claims, flume thereby rejects evidence that could easily disrupt his
assumptions and show a miracle to be probable.
Therefore we see that Eume is guilty both of formulating a
circular definition and of begging the question with regard to the
importance of experience concerning the laws of nature.

But these

two errors are in turn used improperly as the heart of his polemic.
Eume further states about miracles:
There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against
every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not
merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts
to a proof, there is here a direct and full uroof, from the
nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle •••
(Italics are Bume:s).34

33

See Burtt, ou.cit., p. 213, footnote 5 where it is also asserted
that Hume fails to entertain 'this view which allows God to
interfere with nature's pa~tern from outside the system.
Eume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David liume, ou.cit.,
p. 128.
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Here we see three more obvious errors of logic.

First, Eume

persists in formulating a circular definition of miracles, assuming
that they cannot occur from the very outset.

As we have said above,

he can only know that there is uniform experience against
if he has investigated all of the serious claims.

~ll

miracles

Since he has

not done so, he can only know that all experience opposes miracles
by ruling that they cannot happen in the first place.

This is

clearly circular and has already been adequately shown to be an
incorrect procedure.

In

~ddition,

he still is working only within

the framework of the laws of nature and thus does not take account
of possible interferences from the outside.

This, likewise, has

been shown to be incorrect.
Second, we perceive an additional misuse of experience.
Experience is now uniformly allied against all miraculous events.
As we mentioned above, the reason all experience is assumed to
agree with Rume's first prohibition against miracles is that these
eVents

h~ve

already

bee~

determined not to take place, by definition.

Therefore, all reliable experience will indeed coincide with this
since the opposite is defined as an impossibilityo
not possible to assume an important

statemen~

But it is clearly

like this.

It is not

logically correct to argue circularly in order to answer supernaturalists
who cite experience for miracles

simp~y

by defining all experience

so that it opposes or even eliminates miracles.

But this is exactly

what Eume does, as experience is explicitly defined so that if it
does not provide evidence a.gainst

".CIt events, then the said

occurrence "would not merit that a.ppellation~tl35

35

Ibid.

This is a new
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prohibitive placed against miracles by experience.

In other words p

unless all experience stands against an event, it cannot be
referred tO$ a miracle.

In order for a miracle to be claimed as

such, its existence must immediately be opposed by all experience.
This is done without proof or investigation of the miracles.
this a proper approach?

Is

Thus a second circular definition and

subsequent begging of the question is introduced and the problem is
further compounded.

First, experience of nature and second, the

uniformity of experience are both placed egainst miracles in such
a way (without any evidence) that these events are said to be
impossible.

The burden of the second (uniformity of experience)

rests on the solidity of the first (experience of nature), uhich
solidity has all but been proven.

The moment an event becomes

designated as a miracle, it is snuffed out of existence arbitrarily.
Third, and in spite of all of this lack of proper evidence,
3:ume insists on stating that this constitu.tes a proof--"a direct
and full nroof" against any brand vf ... irac\llous event.;6

The

argument thus moves from a first circular definition and begging of
the question to a second of the same and on to th.e concluding
"proof" •
But this "proof" turns out to be nothing more than an assumed
conclusion.
assertion.;?

;6
37

Ibi~.

See

It is a good example of an inse dixit or an unsupported
But if one premise of a syllogism breaks down, the

The italics are Hume's.

~cNaugher,

on.cit., p. 101 for a similar charge against Eume.
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whole is invalidated. 38

One can demonstrate anything if definitions

are allowed to be all-inclusive
to be proven as a. given.
fails.

~~d

cor-tain the conclusion

is

~hich

Therefore we perceive that Hume's "proof"

It indeed relies on the previously given definition of a

miracle.

It is a solid example of circular rcasoning. 39

It is easier now to see why many scholars have objected to
various aspects of :S:ume's approach to miracles.

He asumes here that

.
t·l.gs. t e d • 40
which he wishes to prove, but which he has not l.nves

In

spite of claiming to deal with the miracles of the ·Christian faith,4l
he refuses to deal with any specific New Testament miracles, but
simply rules them out as being impossib1e.

42

In fact, one scholar

notes that Hume felt so strongly about the impossibility of miracles
which are part of the basis of faith for religious systems that
claims to the contrary did not even have to be examined specifically.4 3
This

like anything but an honest attewpt to arrive at the

so~ds

proper facts concerning opinions which disagree with one's own!

It

is indeed an intellectually secure person who can know that these
events can never occur without any investigation whatsoever.

But

. judging from the work in question, this appears'to be the attitude
of this scholar.

38

Moore,

39

Montgomery agrees that Hume's a ~riori and circular argument
obligates no one to accept such a view of experience (Suicide
of Christian Theology, op.cit., p. 38).

40

Smith,

41

Eume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, on.cit.,

o~.cit.,

o~.cit.,

pp. 13-20.

p. 147; McNaugher, op.cit., pp. 101-103.

p. 124.

42

Smith,

o~.cit.,

p. 146.

Burtt,

o~.cit.,

p. 215.
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Again, C.S. Lewis points to yet another example of circular
reasoning in this essay on miracles.

For

~ume

the two questions

"Do miracles occur ll and "Is the course of nature absolutely uniform?"
are one and the same, simply asked differently.

But "by sleight of

hand i ; liume answers "Yes" to the second question and then uses if for
answering "No" to the first question.

The real issue which he

endeavors to answer is never really dealt with at all.

We still

do not know if nature's patterns can be interrupted or not and thus
we do not really know if miracles occur.

Therefore Rume "gets the

answer to one form of the question by assuming the answer to another
form of the same question.,,44-

Again we find an

ex~p1e of circular

reasoning.
We have

fo~~d,

logical errors.

first of all, that flume commits a series of

In particular, these usually consist of arguing

circularly .(especial1y with regard to a definition of miracles) a.nd
by

begging the question in using unproven and unsupported assumptions

(especially in reference to the believed absolute authority of the
laws of nature and the negligible value of any experience of miracles).
These arguments alone are enough to invalidate Eume's entire thesis
against miracles.

We could also "prove" that miraculous events

~

occur by definition and by accepting all experience for miracles,
while rejecting all experience for the laws of nature.

Then we

could conclude that all other experience must agree with this.
do so would of course prove nothing.

Lewi~,

Miracles, on.cit., p. 106.

But it could be made as

To
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logically valid as flume's argument.

However, there are yet three

other points of attack that we must make with regards to flume's
work on miracles.

The second major criticism of Hume's essay concerns his use of
the four supportive points which appear to expand his beliefs against
miracles. 45

It is our contention that he then ignores a series of

miracles which he even admits fulfills these four "conditions",
leaving the way open to the possibility that other miracles also
fulfill them.

The case in question concerns a series of reputed

miracles performei among the Jansenists in seventeenth-century
France.

Hume's own investigation of these occurrences prove very

interesting indeed, in light of his four supportive points.
Pertaining to the first point, Hume admits that these miracles
were "proved upon the spot:- before judges of unquestioned integrity,
attested by witnesses of credit and distinction ••• 1f and lists
several very reputable persons who were reported either to have
witnessed them personally or who investigated the cases later.
include such persons as a

wel~-known

and respected

lieuter~t

These
of

police, a number of physicians, a duke, a well-respected cardinal,
120 witnesses who were quite influential in Paris and even a list

-------------------45

Hume asserts that these four supportive points, which are
summarized above, prove all miracles to be untr~stworthy. We
will briefly restate these four here. First, no historical
accounts of miracles are attested by enough reputable witnesses.
Second, p~ople deli~~t in telling miraculous stories, even lying
in order to spread these teachings. Third, miracles are found
mostly among people of backward nations. Fourthly, accounts of
miracles in one religion nullify the accounts of those in other
belief systems. See Hume's essay "Of Miracles" in Essential
Works of David ~ume, op.cit., pp. 129-1)4.
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of several famous scholars (including Pascal and Racine).46

Surely

these can be counted as a satisfactory number of reputable witnesses.
As for the second point, Hume also admits that these reported
miracles were investigated by the

Jes~its

and other groups who

were enemies of these teachings.

This group included the previously

mentioned lieutenant of police, whose job it was to expose or
suppress the reported miracles.

His attempt was unsuccessful.

The

Molinist party also tried to discredit these occurrences and ended
up attributing the miracles to the
occurred.

d~vi1,

thus admitting that they

In another instance, the acting queen o'f France also

wished to expose these miracles.

She sent her personal physician

to investigate them, only to have him return as a Jansenist convert.
In fact, none of the antagonists who were sent to investigate this
situation were apparently able to uncover any falsehoods at a1l. 47
We are not making any judgments as to what mayor may not have
happened here.

48

But it is plain to see that these many enemies

of these reports were not lying to make the miracles appear plausible.
Nor were they trying to delight in the spreading of these reports.
for it was their own desire to expose these facts.
had a private interest in disproving them.

46
47

48

Indeed, they

Even Hume admits to

Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Rume, op.cit.,
pp. 135-137, especially footnote number two.
~.

Our purpose here is by no means to determine if these Jansenist
miracles actually occurred or not. Rather, we p~pose to
determine exactly what Hume's own reaction is when a miracle
admittedly fulfills his four conditions. This we will perceive
later.
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the fact that many of the witnesses were reliable. 49

Thexefore

we can assert that these witnesses have not upheld the second point.
Concerning the third supportive point, neither can we hold that
these events occurred among ignorant and backward peoples.

Not

only did they occur in one of the more advanced countries of the
world not long before Eume's own time, but Hume
that all of this happened "in a learned age".

explicit~y

states

Once again he admits

that the conditions stated in one of his pOints do not pertain to
t "nese

C:;O

"1

m~rac_es.-

Hume's fourth supportive 'point also fails as an
explanation here.

ade~uate

Even if the miracles purported to have occurred

in some religions were able to "cancel" those in other faiths (which
is a dubious assertion), the logical procedure would be fi~st to
investigate instances of these reports.

If there were some instances

which appear to be better documented than others, as in the case cited
here, it would not be logical to abrogate the.se because of the
existence of "lesser" miracles which are also reported in other
religions.

It would be more reasona.ble to uphold the events which

best fit the facts, as outlined above.
that flume adopts a similar procedure.

Here it is.curious to note
lie investigates what he

feels are two such tllesser" mira.cles before discussing the Jansenist
reports.

The first two are clearly found to be falsehoods.

51

Hume, "Of ?Eiracles" in Essential Works of David flume, on.cit.,
pp. 135-137.
~.,

51

p. 1;6.

~., pp.

134-135.
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Later he recognizes that the Jansenist reports fit the facts
better.

But he apparently does not endeavor to rule out the latter

accou.~ts

by usL.g the former two, and logically so.

52

Hume's fourth point would only be plausible if one assumed
that all accounts of miracles were true, thereby causing some to
believe that there was a possible conflict of ideologies.

But

since all are clearly not factual, we are left most logically ylith
the need to investigate each case on its
rule out

~~

event

w~ch

0~n

merits.

Thus we

is well-attested simply because other

accounts of miracles also exist, for we

ca..TL~ot

know but that the

latter ones are the falsehoods and the former one factual.
can

or~y

c~~~ot

Tp~s

be determined oy an investigation of the miracle-claims.

Therefore the last point is also

fou.~d

not to be applicable here as

a critique of these miracles.
For these reasons we can perceive that Hume's four supportive
points do not succeed as a valid critique of the miracles in the
case of the Jansenist re:ports.
testimonies.

In other ":lords, these four !:prerequisites ll for !tiracles

have all been fulfilled.
his assertion.

[Jor have they disproved the

The

In fact, Hume seems

follo~-llg

willL~g

to admit

statement could be construed as

~~s

acknmvledgment that the first three in particular meet the
requirements.

Spea~ing

of the Jansenist claims he states:

But uhat is more extraordina~J; ~~ of the miracles were
~~ediately proved upon the spot~ before judges of
unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit
~~d distinction, in a learned age, a..~d on the most eminent
theatre that is noV! in the world.53

52

Ibid.: p. 137. However, Hurne seems to believe that just because
the fourth point does not hold in this instance because of the
su?erior testirr0r~ of the authorities involved (Ibid.), it still
may appl~ in other insta..~ces (Ibid., pp. 137-138~

53

Bume, ~., pp. 135-136.
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Here Hume informs us that there were reputable witnesses of these
occurrences (point one), men of sufficient integrity and unquestioned
character so as to militate against the charges both of lying (or
forgery) and of the unscrupulous speading of tales in oi-tler to
"tickle the ears" of men (point two).

In addition, these reports

were proclaimed to have happened in an intellectual age in one of
the most advanced countries of the world (point three).

We have

already shown above that the fourth point also cannot be used here
because we cannot rule out a well-attested event a uriori simply
because of the testimony of other similar events which often do
not fit any of the facts at all.
at hando

We can only judge on the evidence

Neither does Rume specifically assert that the fourth

point applies here.
We have now established that Rume felt that the
miracles were well-attested cases.

Janse~ist

The human testimony in favor

of these occurrences is impressive, especially in view of the fact
that it concerns claims of Supernatural events. 54

Therefore it

would be very valuable to see how Eume responded to the question
of whether these were valid claims to the mirculous or not.
this suggestion

E~e

To

responded concerning these events:

Where shall we find suoh a number of ciroumstances, agreeing
to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose
such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or
miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And
this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone
be regarded as a sufficient refutation.55

We must state here once again that we are not ourselves ooncerned
as to whether these Jansenist claims are valid or not.
55

Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, o'O.cit.,
p. 137.
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It appears that Humets dismissal of the miraculous'is here a very
arbitrary one.

Even when all of the information adds up

~n

support

of a fact, it cannot be maintained to be true if it is Supernatural
in origin.

Even if it is one of the most corroborated facts in

terms of human testimony and experience, Hume says we must reject
it simply because miracles are impossible.

A more blatant case of

circular reasoning may be difficult to produce.

When evidence is

found for a miracle, it is held not to apply simply because such
events do not occur when this may be the very evidence capable of
demonstrating that they do occur.

One would just naturally assume

that Hume was really interested in exploring the possibility of
miracles in an essay of this scope.

Rather, we find that his

belief is that miracles do not occur and that no examination of
experience for them can establish that they even probably do. 56
Thus we hold that Hume first assumes that miracles could never
occur and then disregards the evidence on behalf of them. 57
Even if one could show that Eume did have an adequate reason
to distrust these reported Jansenist miracles, the former charge

56
57

Ibid., p. 139 for instance.
Philosopher Swinburne arrives at similar conclusions about this
exact passage in Hume's work. He also realizes that flume dismisses
the Jansenist miracles not because the evidence is not adequate,
but because such evidence is seen to be
irrelevant (on.cit.,
p. 16). We might wonder just how H~e is able to disregard such
an admittedly adequate amount of experience for these events when
such examination and research is the foundation of history. The
acceptance of past events as having actually occurred is based
upon the existence of an adequate amount of historical evidence~
But even though Eume realizes that such as been produced he still
rejects the miracle, as Swinburne alse notes. Such a double
standard of rejecting miracles when they are evidenced oy the ,
same (or an even greater) amount of experience which is viewed
as being adequate in other instances of establishing historical
fact certainly seems unscholarly. It is such circular reasoning
that invalidates his argument.
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that he arbitrarily dismisses possible evidence in favor of miracles
for faulty reasons can still be maintained for two reasons.

First,

he makes a similar statement earlier in the essay which is not
related to the Jansenist issue.

After his

cir~ular

defini+.ion of

miracles which is dealt with above, he remarks thata
••• no testimony is sufficient to establish "a miracle, unless
the testimony be of such a kind~ that its falsehood would be
more miraculous, than the facts, which it endeavors to
establish •••• always reject the greater miracle. 58
Again we perceive that Bume is convinced that no amount of testimony
can establish a miracle.

Even when his criteria (the presence of

sufficient experience of the event) has been satisfied he holds that
miracles are impossible.

Therefore, as explained in the first major

objection to Bume's essay given above, Eume is also guilty of
employing unsupported assumptions.

Miracles are rejected just

because they are Supernatural even when they are found to have adequate
experience supporting their reality.
Second, even if Eume continued to rely on other conclusions
(SUCh as the miracles in other religions) to oppose the miraculous
in the instance of the

J~~senist

reports, he disregards the fact that

the available evidence might be sufficient to establish this
experience as miraculous even if no other miracles had over occurred.
In other words, the evidence that is dismissed might be enougxLtc

demonstrate the reality of these events as the supreme
the Supernatural

~hether

ex~ple

other such claims were valid or not.

of
If

an event has occurred it is made no less realistic because there

58 Bume, nOf

!I~iraclesn

pp. 128-129.

in Essential Works of David Bume,

0'0.

cit.,
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are other claims to similar occurrences in existence.
Therefore we find that this second major
essay is also valid.

c~iticism

of liume1s

His four supportive points are hi,ghly

objectionable in the first place, mainly because a large portion
of our currently accepted history would be subject to much doubt if
these were viewed as the norm by which facts are to be judged as
being correct.

For~instancet ho~

much of our accepted world history

is made up of events which were not attested by a goodly number of
unquestionably intelligent and educated men who in themselves are
sufficient to guard against all kinds of error and delusion?

One

might indeed question large amounts of history because of a lack
of conformity tc this rule.

Or how much of our history is prejudiced

by the fact that the person reporting stood to gain much by the
acceptance of these events, such as Julius Caesar's reports of his
victories over the barbarians?

And surely many other events took

place among ignorant or backward nations?
Greek and Roman

civili~ations

Since flume includes the

as falling into this category (because

miracles were reported by them),59 are we to doubt the history of
these entire

perio~s,

to say nothing of ancient Babylon, for instance?

One begins to note the many problems involved in such an application
of these four criteria to history.

Yet this history is accepted as

being quite reputable and trustworthy.

As Richard Whately once so

aptly noted, the same method which Rume employed to dismiss the
miracles from

t~e

life of Jesus would also remove the unique elements

from the life of Napoleon.

59 1£i£.,

pp.

132, 134.

Such reconstructing of history is correctly
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seen as being self-condemning and very problematical. oO ..
But as we have also found, nume fails to do justice to miraculous
events even when they have attained a high level of credibility
because of the

wei~~t

of the experiential testimony in their favor.

Such evidence would most likely be sufficient to corroborate other
historical events.

Therefore it appears that we would be impelled

to grant probability to certain miracles if they best account for
the available evidence.

And if

3~e

errs in his evaluation in

cases such as the above, it is also reasonable to hold that other
well-docU2ented

~iracles

can be held to be probable events if they
r.,

are found to be the best explanations fer what occurred..

The third major criticism of Hume's essay revolves

OJ.

arou.~d

the

fact that this Entire work depends "'.!pon an assumed unifor:li t;y i"
nature.

~ume

uniformity.

rejects miracles because of man's experience
3ut

i~

0:

order to do this one must hold to the validity

of cause and ef':'ect by assuming that the course of nature

~.·!ill

continue (and that it always has continued) exactly as it is
perceived.

~owever,

this

no~

the fact is that we know only a small part of

nature and cannot be sure that what we do

~now

will continue to be

the same in the future (or that it has continued this way throughout
the past).

60
61

The Suicide of Christian Theology, op.cit., pp. 43-44,
note 13.
If such miracles can be shonn to exist, of course. ',';e are still
not making any judgment about the facticity of the Jansenist
miracles, or saying that they are probable. This is because we
have relied on F.une's presentation of the evidence and therefore
have not investigated the evidence for ourselves. As ~entioned
above, the main object here was to perceive how 3ume viewed
occurrences ;7hicn he 'thouP.:'ht were well-documented. This was
accomplishe~ here.
~~ontgomery,
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~at

himself

makes this argument all the more persuasive is that Eume

recogni~ed

as being valid. 62

the fact that we cannot accept cause and effect
This is especially evident in his little work

.An Abstract of a. Treatise of Ruman Nature,6 3 where Humeexplains
why we

c~~ot

reasonably accept this notion.

It is customary to

expect an effect to follow a cause, but there are no reasonable or
64
logical grounds for it.
Since cause and effect are no longer held to be valid, 65 there
is really no logical reason for believing that the uniformity of
the laws of nature can rule out the miraculous.

Neither can we assert

that the state of nature has ruled out miracles in the past, because
the uniformity needed for such as assertion also cannot be demonstrated.
In other words, liume's contention that the experience of mankind
does not know of any valid cases of miracles because of the uniformity
of nature is not only invalid, but it contradicts his own statements
to the contrary.
This is actually a very powerful argument against 3ume's entire
essay, which relies on man's supposed experience of the uniformity

62

For Hume's rejection of cause and effect g see, for instance, his
work entitled A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby~igge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964), Book I, Part III,
Section II, pp. 73-78, especially p. 76. Cf. also Heick, o~.cit.,
p.

65.

63 David liume, An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature (Cambridge:
The University Press, 1938). For a perceptive discussion
concerning the author of this work, see the Introduction by J.M.
Keynes and Po Spaffa, pp. V-XXXI; cf. Bronowski and mazlish,
o~. ci t., p. 47'+, footnote number three •.
64

Hume, Ibid., especially p. 16. Cf. Bronowski and
pp. 474-475.

65

Cf. Bronowski and Mazlish, Ibid.

Mazlish~ ~.,

See chapter two above.
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of the laws of nature.

66

This experience, based upon the reliableness

of nature's laws, is the very center of his
as shown above. 67

pole~ic

.against miracles,

It is so central that it is held that no miracle

could have occurred, simply because of this· uniformity.

Rume holds

that even if one could find- a probability or proof for a miracle,
it 'Would then run up against the "proof" of this uniform conception
of nature, meaning that it could never occur anyway.

68

But now we find that this method can no longer be used as a
basis for this rejection of miracles.

There is not only a lack of

proof that nature must act in this way, but we have even found that
we

can-~ot

speak of this type of causality in nature because it is

no longer a valid concept (see especially chapter two above).

This

means that the entire basis of Hume's system as it now stands must
be abandoned.

If such a probability for a miracle were found to

exist, as postulated above, there is therefore no "proof" from
nature left to oppose it.

This would also apply to

.

inst~~ces

of

miracle-claims in past history, if they.were shown to be prcbable,
because these new concepts of nature would have applied then, as
well.

Once again we perceive that miracles cannot be opposed by

a uniform, causal view of nature.

Eume's objection to mi=ac1es

is therefore quite defective.

c.s.

Lewis agrees in this critique of Rume.

He states in a

66

Eume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, op.cit.,
p. 128.

67

Ibid.

68

~.,

p. 139.
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similar vein of thought:
The whole idea of Probability (as Rume understands it)
depends on the principle of the Uniformity of Nature •••• We
observe many regularities in Nature. But of course all the
observations that men have made or ~ill make ~hile the race
lasts cover only a minute fraction of the events that actually
go on. Our observations would therefore be of no use unless
we felt sure that Nature when we are not watching her behaves
in the same way as when we are: in other words, unless we
believed in the uniformity of Nature. Experience therefore
cannot prove uniformity, because uniformity has to be assumed
before experience proves anything •••• The odd thing is that
no man knew this better than Rume. His Essay on Miracles
is quite inconsistent with the more radical, and honourable,
scepticism of his main work (Italics are Lewis').69
Here Lewis also recognizes that Hume's entire argument depends
on the uniformity of nature.
less prove, this belief.

But there is no way we can know, much

We observe nature by our senses and

incorporate it into our experience.

J,J"""w
'0
•• +

0~"
__

mankind is but a small part of the whole.
acts completely uniformly with
would be to know all of nature.
because,

~s

~

v_
"f'

v __
+l->o

exp=~ience

of

In order to say that nature

interruptions (as

Hume

asserts)

This is once again circular reasoning

Lewis points out, one must assume uniformity in all of

nature in order to say that we experience the same when we do not
know the whole of it.

We must simply believe it is the

sane~

In

other words, one must already have assumed that nature· is completely
uniform Qud acting

i~

a causal way when the evidence indicates

otherwise.

Lewis also notes that Rume accepted similar arguments

against the

caus~lity

of nature in his other works.

Our two former conclusions must therefore stand in light of this
knowledge.

69

First, Eume's basis for rejecting miracles is not valid.

Lewis, Miracles,

o~.cit.,

pp. 105-106.
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One cannot reject a miraculous event if it best fits the evidence
simply because of an assumed uniformity in nature, especially when
such uniformity has been shovm not to exist.
have to be in operation before Hume's
be asserted.

But even

H~~e

Cause and effect would

argQ~ents

could even begin to

himself rejects this view of nature.

Thus nothing is left but to abandon the very basis of his reasoning.
Second, this means that the question now concerns which facts best
fit the evidence, turning
f'
.
~ ac'ts.

~s

once again to an investigation of these

If a miracle in past history is found to offer the best

eA~lanation

of the

evida~ce,

it can no longer be op?osed because of

the belief that these things simply do not happen or because nature
opposes such an event.

Our fourth major criticism of

second and third

criti~isms.

H~~e's

essay arises from the

A positive aspect of Burne's phi10sopr~

is that he relies heavily upon probabilities, which has been
above to be the conviction of modern thought.

sho~T.

In addition, Hurne

rejected many of the then-popular theories concerning cause and
effec~

and the accompanying implications based upon a closed un::'verse.

In an age when it was popular to accept a mechanistic view of the
lL."1iverse, Hume insisted that i t remain open.
least, his thougnts may be viewed as a

70

In this sense, at

fore~w"1ner

of

SOffie

of the

modern theories which also postulate an open universe.
However, a problem arises when we try to reconcile Hume's
belief in

70

~"1

open universe with his previous rejection of miracles.

Hume's rejection of cause and effect has been noted above. For his
emphasis on probability, see, for instance, his ~ork Essays,
Literar::r, Moral and Political (London: Ward, Lock and Bowden,
Limited, n. d. ), pp. 341-343 a.."1d also the essa;y nOf Miracles!! in
Essential Works of David Hume, op.cit., pp. 125-129.
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Rather than allowing the evidence to speak for itself (since
evidence for miracles cannot be ruled out a priori or by animpr9per
~iew

of nature), as might be expected when one holds the above

positions with regard to nature, Hume transgresses his own position
to rule out miracles.

He does not allow the miraculous even when

the evidence is sufficient to point to a probability (criticism two)
and then he dismisses the miraculous as a whole by accepting a view
of nature which he himself has already dismissed (criticism three).
Therefcre a fourth major criticism is arrived at here.

While

he accepts quite a modern view of the universe in many senses, he
becomes a pre-modern in his treatment of miracles.
he

i~

not self-consistent in his philosophy.

In other words,

His treatment of

miracles shows signs of a pre-modern critical consciousness, fcr he
proposes to accept an open universe but rejects miracles because
of a closed view of nature,7l and he proposes to base his ~ork on
probabilities, but arbitrarily rules out a probable miracle.

Thus

he is internally inconsistent as well as reverting to this pre-modern
consciousness.
We therefore hold that all four of these major criticisms of
Hume are valid.

71

lie is first guilty of committing a series of

Montgomery also feels that Hume's argument against miracles is
based on a closed view of the universe. See Montgomery's Suicide
of Christian Theology, on.cit., pp. 262-263, 351, note 15. Once
again, we also believe that. there are laws in nature, as pointed
out above. To speak of miracles as out of the ordinary there
must be an ordinary course of nature. The question is not if
these laws exist, but if they can be temporarily suspended.

112
logical blunders~

lie argues circularly7 2 several times~ usually

with regard to his

~efinition

of miracles and often begs the question

by using unsupported assumptions, such
BrLy

experience of miracles.

~3

the negligible value of

He also fails here in refusing to

investigate any of these events when this very inves.tigation could
reveal a valid miracle.

Second, Rume fails to accept miraculous

events even when they are found to be well-attested by human
experience.

He still rejects them for arbitrary reascns even after

he admits the high credibility of this attestation.

Third, Hume

rejects miracles because of a view of nature that not only was false,
but that he even rejected himself.

Yet the belief in this

of nature is the center of his polemic against miracles.

unifo~ity

Therefore

the very apex of his polemic against miracles must be rejected.
Fourth, while Eume is modern in many of his conceptions of nature
(opting for the use of probabilities and rejecting cause and effect
and the subsequent uniform 'iiti:w of nature), he reverts 'to a premodern stage in his attempt to prove that no actual miracles have
ever occurred.

In arguing against miracles he gives little weight

to miraculous probabilities and employs an incorrect view of nature
which he even rejected.

Thus he is both pre-modern and self-

inconsistent here.
It is obvious that these criticisms invalidate Eume's treatment
of miracles.

These errors and improper conclusions in

were not as readily detected in the

72

~ighteenth

century

E~e's

work

be~~~~~

Even William Hordern, a scholar sympathetic to certaill tr~nds in
contemporary, critical theology, states that Hume argues circularly
in this essay. See his work A Layman's Guide to Protestant
Theology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 37.
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Enlightenment intellect continued to prevail

in scholarly circles.

As will become even more apparent in chapter six, the desire was
usually to reject miracles in the first place and Hume's essay
provided the needed authority for such a venture.
It thus goes without saying that Hume's polemic against miracles,
while appearing to be a strong argument at the outset, fails when
closely investigated.

This system cannot therefore be used at all

to invalidate or rule out miracle-claims.

A more proper approach

may have been to define miracles without any inherent
to the possibility of their occurringo

state~ent

as

Then it would"have been

possible to investigate the ayailable experience in order to
determine the extent of its agreement.

We are thus confronted

once again with the need to investigate the evidence to better
ascertain what has occurred.

Such a historical investigation of the

documents making such miracle-claims is therefore needed, as
concluded in chapter four above.

In the specific case of the

resurrection of Jesus, empirical claims have been made which report
experiential evidence for the appearances of the risen Lord.

These

are the accounts which must be examined in order to ascertain if
this event is the best explanation for the facts.

Chapter VI.

Possibility Number One: Other Similar Views

It is hard to estimate exactly the influence that Bume's essay
ItOf Miracles" has had upon the intellectual world since its appearance in 1748.

However, we may most assuredly determine that its

affect upon theoloGY

~as

been extremely great.

Many scholars have

viewed it as the determining argument against the existence of any
miraculous event.

This is true both of the older nineteenth century

liberal theologians and of the more
theologians.

conte~porary

twentieth century

Some refer directly to flume as the source for this

rejection of miracles while others make anonymous references to
their dismissal of the miracu*ous as being due to the belief that
our experience of nature completely opposes any such violation of
its laws.

It is important to look briefly at both this direct and

indirect evidence for Eume's influence.
We are informed by John Hermann Randall, Jr. that since the
appearance of Eune's essay, religious liberals have rejected any
belief in miracles.

Nineteenth century

,

liberalism~

as a whole

became convinced by this work that there could be no interference

1

Briefly, we will refer to religious liberalism in this ~ork as
the predomina..~t trend of theological thought in the nineteenth
century (cf. Daniel Fuller, op.cit., chapter three). ~ore
specifically we might date this movement's prominence from the
publishing of Schleiermacher's work On Religion: Speeches to its
Cultured Des~isers in 1799 to Karl Barth's The Epistle to the Romans
which appeared in 1918. Cf. here this work by Schleiermacher,
translated by John Oman (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers,
1958). See the Introduction by Rudolf otto, especially pp. IX,
XII. Cf. also Burtt, op.cit., p. 284 and William Hordern, Introduction, Volume I of New Directions in Theology Today, edited by
William Hordern (Seven volumes; Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1966), p. 15.
114
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~ith nature from any miraculous events. 2 Montgomery agrees with
this assertion that nineteenth century liberal theology followed
Hume's rejection of miracles.'

An excellent example of this rejection is seen in the works
of German theologian David strauss, one of the most vigorous critics
of the New Testament who ever lived.
tra~slated

Life of Jesus (first

In his two-volumed work A New

into English in 1865; shortly after

the German edition), Strauss specifically asserted that Hume's
essay was so conclusive in disproving miracles that the question
had now been settled.

4 Miracles simply could not be allowed to

contradict nature. 5
strauss' stance on this question, one which follows Rume's
critique, is a typical one taken by nineteenth century liberalism.
Friedrich Schleiermacher was also of the opinion that a real miracle
would involve the suspension of the laws of nature.
occur

~ost

Such miracles

often where there is little knowledge of these laws.

We

should abandon such miracles as being superfluous, for they are not
able to bring us closer to a recognition of Christ.

Eesides, science

and religion agree here that there are no absolute instances of such

2

John Herman Randall, .Jr. ~ The Making of the Modern Mind. (Revised
edition; Eoston: Houghton Mifflin Comp~~y, 1940), pp. 553-554.
Concerning Randall's statement that liberalism rejected miracles
because of the influence of Rume's essay, it appears that Randall
is also spe~~ing of liberalism as a predominately nineteenth
century movement (Ibid.).
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op.cit., pp. 27-28.

4

David Friedrich Strauss, A New Life of Jesus, no translator given
(Second edition; two volum~~; London: Williams and Norgate, 1879),
vol. I, p. 199.

5 Ibid., pp •. 199-201.
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an event.

A more perfect view of God, one requiring man!s absolute

dependence, needs no such miracles to support its cause. 6

For this

reason, Schleiermacher preferred to see all events as being miraculous,
including the most common and natural ones.

In fact, events such

as those which were supposed to have broken the laws of nature by
Supernatural intervention are really not miracles at all. 7
Other

inst~~ces

such as these are common in liberal theology.

Eruno Baur followed Strauss in strongly insisting that we can admit
of no events which deny the laws of nature.
are upheld by religion and not insulted by
.
1 es. 8
ml.rac

Rathe~

o~currences

Ernst Renan postulated that Jesus

there were any laws in nature at all.

nature's laws

wa~

such as

not aware that

Because of this lack of

knowledge about the lawful pattern of nature, Jesus believed that
miracles were very common occurrences and uothing
should be surprised. 9

~bout ~hichone

Adolf Harnack also held that ancient peoples

had no concept of the strict.ures of the laws of nature.

But today

we realize that no events can occur which interrupt nature.

As a

6

Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, edited b~ H.R.
Mackintcsh and J.S. stewart (Two volumes; New York: Harper and
Row, Publishe=s, 1963), vol. I, pp. 71, 178-184; vol. II, pp. 448-449.

7

Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Desnisers,
ou.cit., pp. 88-89, 113-114, explanation number 16.

8

Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, translated
from the 1906 German edition,.on.cit., p. 154.

9

Ernst Renan, Life of Jesus, volume one of The History of the Origins
of Christianity, no translator given (London: Mathieson and
Company, n.d.),·pp. 147-155, especially p. 148.

117
result, miracles do not happen and we cannot believe in the accounts
lO
of them.
This rejection of the miraculous, revealing a dependence upon
Hume's thesis, is not relegatedonly to nineteenth century theology,
11
however.
As shown above, contemporary twentieth century critical
theology has pursued a similar pattern of thought.

It usually

espouses either the belief that miracles cannot (and should not)
be validated, or, often relying directly on Hume's arguments, that
all miracles should simply be dismissed as impossibleo1 2
For instance, Paul Tillich holds that miracles cannot interfere
with the laws of nature.

Any theology attempting to make them do

such is distorting the Biblical view of God. 13
that our modern conception of nature

ha~

Bultmann believes

rendered

miracle~

impossible.

The natural laws are such that they make the world a reality that
is closed to the miraculous.
in the New Tes t

·

a~ent

accoun t s

We are thus too advanced to helieve
0f

such

.

~

, .

Superna~u~a~ worK~ngs.

14

John A.T. Robinson likewise believes that miracles such as Jesus'
incarnation can only be described as myths because in our scientific

10

11
12

Adolf Harnack, What is Christianitv~, translated by Thomas Bailey
Saunders (Third and revised edition? London: Williams and Norgate,
1912), pp. 25-31.
Randall asserts that from Hume's time until today few learned men
have ~uestioned his conclusions against miracles (on.cit., p.293).
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, on.·ci t., pp. 3738; cf. p. 28.

13 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Three volumes; Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1971), vol. I, pp. 115-117. Cf.
Alexander J. ~cKelway, The s~stematic Theolo
of Paul Tillich
(New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1964 , pp. 81-83.
14

Bul tmann, "New Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and I.!yth,
op.cit., pp. 4-5.
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age we realize that natural processes cannot be interrupted by
Supernatural intervention.

The entire New Testament cosmology

must be ruled out for these reasons. 15

We have briefly explored

some major theories proposed by those who follow Bume in ar'guing
against the occurrence of all miraculous events.

Many scholars

utilized these and similar views which opposed all miracles in
deducing from them specific hypotheses against the belief in a
literal resurrection of Jesus.
To be sure, the milieu of the eighteenth century, in which
~ume

formulated his anti-miraculous argument, was different from

the milieu of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which
these religious liberals applied Hume's views.

In the nineteenth

century there were the philosophical systems of Immanuel Kant,
stressing morality and Friedrich Heeel, who emphasized a theology
of reason and development. 16

In the later half of the nineteenth

and on into the twentieth centuries, Darwinism extended its
influence.

Historical events such as the Frencn Revolution and the

two World Wars also added to this climate of change.

The secularity

of the twentieth century affected still more world views.

In spite

of these differences, however, on t.he question of miracles these
liberal theologians ever since the eighteenth" century continued to
follow Rume, believing that such events were impossible.

15

John A.T. Robinson, Honest to God (Philadelphia: The ~estminster
Press, 1963), pp. 11-18, 64-68.

16 Heick, on.c;t=.

pp~

92-102, 119-127; especially p. 92.

l~

A.

Heinrich Paulus

Very possibly the most noteworthy scholar who endeavored to
apply Immanuel Kant's thought to
Paulus. 11

Ne~

Testament studies was Heinrich

This German theologian also rejected miracles fo= reasons

which were quite similar to those listed above.

The Biblical

witnesses are believed to have had a deficient knowledge of the
laws of nature, especially in not knowing of nature's secondary
causes.

Therefore they wrongly believed that Supernatural events

actually occurred.

However, when we discover the true workings of

nature, we are said to find that the events which were once considered
-

to be mi=aculous can no longer be consideIed as such.

This is

becau3e these occurrences are found to proceed according to natural
law.

Thus ?aulus proceeded to employ naturalistic explanations fOI

the New Testament accounts of miracles.

18

The resurrection of Jesus was also given such a natural
explanation.

For ?aulus 9 Christ did not die on the cross.

lie was

taken down before death overcame him and later resuscitated gradually
in the grave.

The spear wound in the side had not immediately

killed him, but had merely served as a blood-letting devioe and
encouraged his recovery.

Later an earthquake was additionally

helpful in rolling away the very large stone from the front· of the
grave, thus enabling Jesus'escape.

He obtained the apparel of a

gardener and then proceeded to arrange for a

~eeting

with his

11

]aniel Fuller, op.cit., p. 38; cf. Schweitzer, on.cit., pp. 51, 53.

18

Schweitzer, Ibid., pp. 49,

5l-53~
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disciples.

After several visits with them, he realized that he

was dying.

He then held one last meeting on the Mount of Olives.

As he moved away from them, he was obscured from their sight by
a cloud and was not seen by them again.

Jesus died, but in a

place unknown. to the twelve, who referred to this event as an
"ascension". 19
According to this conjecture, usually

referr~d

to as the

::swoon theory" of the resurrection, Paulus plainly conceived. of
this event as one operating by natural processes.
supernatural intervention involved.

There

W~5 ~o

Thus Jesus was not believed

to have risen from the dead.
The

s~oou

theory did not originate with Paulus, but was quite

popular with several other scholars throughout the first half of
the nineteenth century.

It was an especially common interpretation

of the resurrection found. in the so-called fictitious accounts of
20
the life of Jesuswnich appeared during this same period of time.
These works were imaginative portrayals of the .life of Jesus, often
very similar to novels.

The use of fiction was quite apparent, as

the author weaved various plots and counter-plots into an attempt
to portray Jesus' life in a certain light.
ingenuity of the writer was usually quite

The non-historical
noti~eable.

As a result,

these works were seen as having little credibility or esteem.

19

Ibid., pp.

20

For some of those who held this view, see
161-166; cf. pp. 43, 60.

21

21

53-55.
~.,

pp.

~6-47,

64,
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Paulus' work differed in that it was not one of the above imaginative
lives.

His work was both more logical and more respectable than

the fictitious lives and thus he was a more reputable exponent of
this theory.22
Strangely enough, various liberal theologians were some of
the most ardent

cr~tics

of the swoon theory.

famous critique was given by David Strauss

By far the most

hims~lf.

He pointed

out that in order for this theory to be true, Jesus would have come
forth from the grave half dead, one who was quite visibly ill and
weak, badly in need of medical help and care, later even succumbing
to death because of these wounds.

But Strauss persuasively argues

that it would be impossible for such an individual to have convinced
the disciples that he was the Conqueror of death, the Victor over
the grave or the Prince of life.

If Jesus did not die on the cross,

he could only have convinced his followers that he was someone to
be ;itied and cared for by them.

They would have immediately

perceived the facts as they were in reality.

At any rate, Jesus'

condition could not have changed the disciples' sorrow into happiness.
Nor would it have convinced them to worship Jesus as the Messiah.
Strauss' criticism is a very pointed and accurate one.

23

As we noted

above, Paulus did indeed conceive of Jesus as a victim of bloodletting, one whose appearance was changed due to tremendous suffering
?~

and who still felt weak and sickly, finally dying of the wounds.-·
And this is just how a survivor of a crucifixion would appear.

22

Cf. Ibid., pp. 48-50.

23

Strauss, on.cit., vol. I, p. 412.

24

Schweitzer, on.cit., p.

54.

But
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could such a limping, bleeding, stoop-shouldered individual convince
even his loved ones that he had conquered de~th forever?

The

answer is obviously a negative one.
Most theologians have therefore agreed that strauss' critique
has settled the issue for good.

2~

~

Indeed, Schweitzer even judged

that Strauss' reasoning was the absolute death stroke to the swoon
26
theory.
Renan was al&~ careful to point out the assurance we
have of Jesus' death on the cross.27
The

Ne~

Testament records claim that Jesus was nailed to the

cross (Luke 24:39-40; John 20:25-27).

If this could be shown to
26
be valid, Strauss' view would be strenghtened all the more.
And
we do find, in fact, that strauss' critique has received striking
archaeological confirmation in recent years.

Paul Maier reports the

following~

••• in the summer of 1968, archaeologist V. Tzaferis excavated
some stone ossuaries in East Jerusalem dating from the first
centuIJ" A.D. These were chests in which bones of the de~d
were reburied after the flesh had decomposed following
original burial in a cave. One of the ossuaries, inscribed
with the name Yohanan Ben Ha'galgol, contained the bones of
a man who had obviously been crucified, the first such
victim ever discovered. A large, rusty iron spike, seve~
inches long, had been driven through both heel bones after

25
26

Cf., for instance, McNaugher, op.cit., p. 148; Smith, on.cit.,
p. 208; Miller, on.cit., pp. 37-38.
Schweitzer f on.cit., p. 56.

27

Renan, op.cit., pp. 244-245.

28

Anyone who has had the misfortune of even stepping on ~ nail
knows the discomfort and pain so cause~, including the forced
limp! This writer has done so several times. Once only a small
nail was enough to incapacitate him for three days, making it
impossible to recover completely until the four±hand fifth day.
Imagine the results of crucifixion with a spike bearing one's
weight fer several hours! We could not a~oid Strauss' illustration
of the condition in which a wounded crucifixion victi~ would
emerge from the grave. Considering the feet only (even if we

123
first penetrating an acacia wood wedge or plaque that held
the ankles firmly to the cross. The nail must have encountered
a knot on being driven into the cross, for the poi~t of the
spike had been bent directly backward. Slivers still clinging
to it show that the cross was made of olive wood •••• In
addition to the iron spike, evidence of crucifixion included
a deep scratch on the right radius bone, showing that a
nail had penetrated between the two bones of his lower forearm just above the wrist, which abraded the: as the victim
writhed in agony •••• Yohanan, at any rate, had his lower
arms pierced with nails ••• 29
This is indeed important evidence bearing on this question.
Maier further corroborates this evidence with three photographs
which plainly show the affected bones of thisvicti::n.

One displays

a hind vie" of the heel bones as they were found, pierced by a
large iron spike.

The end of the spike is curved upwards.

A second

photograph reveals the portion of the right arm where the radius
bene was

sca~ed

by another

. .,

na.~.l..

m .... _

third photograph displays a

,,-ut::

side view of the left heel bone after the spike had been removed,
clearly showing the very large hole thu::. creatad 'OJ the

W'O'!.l!ld.;3

0

strauss' critique of the swoon theory therefore appears to be
even stronger.

There is no reason to doubt the New Testament

accounts of the nail wounds inflicted upon Jesus, especially in
light of this archaeological evidence.
It is possible to adduce other considerations against the
swoon theory as well.

For

inst~nce,

secondly, there is

stro~gevidence

were to momentarily disregard the other wounds), it would not
be possible to walk so soon afterwards. Detection of such a
wounded victL~ would indeed be both inescapable and inevitable.
He would not pass for someone who was resurrected, at any rate.
29

This ~ortion is quoted from Maier's The First Easter, ou.cit.,
pp. 78, 80. Page 79 contains three photographs of the abovementioned crucified victim's bones which were affected by the
pierCing of the nails.

30

ill,£., p. 79.
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to demonstrate that Jesus was dead prior to the burial.

We are

told in John 19:31-35 that the legs of the other two crucified men
were broken in order to hasten their deaths. 3l

But since Jesus

was found to be already dead, his legs were not broken.

Rather

a Roman soldier pierced his chest with a spear in order to make
sure that he was not simply feigning it.

This portion has both

long and often been recognized as a proof that Jesus was dead by
many scholars of

d~ffering

theological positions.

The general

tendency by those who prefer this approach is to perceive this
spear wound and the subsequent appearance of blood and water as
signifying one of two medical explanations.

It is thought either

that the spear punctured the heart via the pericardium (a thin sac
surrounding the heart, which contains a watery liquid) or that the
heart had ruptured (in which
with blood and fluid).

Ca5~ th~ pe~icardium

would be filled

In either case the presence of botn blood

and water is medically explained and Jesus would have been dead.,2
The question here concerns whether this account in John is a
reliable

test~mony

as to crucifixion procedure.

Again we find some corroboration of these facts in the
archaeological evidence

al~eady

supplied by Maier.

The bones of

the crucified victim bring evidence to bear that this account of
the spear wound and breaking of the legs is also based on historical

31

,2

For the most likely reasoning behind the breaking of these men's
legs in order to speed up their deaths, see Jim Bishop's analysis
in The Day Christ Died (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1965), cf. p. 280 with pp. 289-290.
For a few of those who hold one of these views, see Renan, op.cit. 9
p. 244-245; McNaugner, op.cit., p. 148; Miller, op.cit., pp. 38-39;
Charles C. ~nderson, on.cit., p. 168; Maier, on.cit., p. 112.
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information (as claimed in John 19:35).

Maier relates that:

Even the detail of the two criminals having their legs
broken at the close of Good Friday to induce death--the
crurifragrium has an exact parallel here: Yohanan's right
tibia and the left tibia and fibula were all broken in
their lowest third segment at the same level, indicating
a common crushing blow, probably from a mallet or sledge
(Italics are Maier's),33
Now it is true that this evidence does not.mention a spear
wound.
has been

Eut once the custom of breaking the legs of the criminals
est~_blish-=d.,

it is a short step to this next point.

all, the object of each was to insure the victim's death.

After

If one

was found to be already dead, the logical thing to do would be to
make sure.

The spear, being a natural part of the

repertoire, would be the most likely weapon.

Rom~~

military

And where could one

more likely kill a person with a spear than by piercing his heart?
The Ro,mans were responsible for

!!!8...1dng

sure that the victiI:J. was

dead, as he had been sentenced by a Roman official, and they were
very efficient in such tasks. 34
In addition, since at least this first portion of this gospel
statement has been verified, there is no suffici.ent reason to assert
that the interrelated item of the spear wound was not also historical.
The two belong together, because if Jesus had not been pierced, he
would most likely have had his ankles smashed as well.
that he diad.

Eoth meant

The best conclusion is that both are fact.

A third great difficulty for this theory is that Jesus would
have to have been an impostor of one sort or another.

He would

33

Maier, The First Easter, on.cit., p. SO.

34

For this last point, see Charles C. Anderson, op.cit., p. l6s.
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haVA been guilty of proclaiming his resurrection when such would
clearly not LtiVe been the CaSe.
+'
...
. . .ne .1.ac
. . s. 35
know ....

He, of all people,

~ould

certainly

To honestly ignore them would be to make himself

worse than an imposter, as it would then most likely entail some
sort of mental insa.TJ.i ty.

Yet, the world almost unanimously views

Jesus at least as a great moral teacher, in all probability
incapable of such a gra..TJ.d example of deceiving others.

Irnatever

else might be postualated, he cannot be found to be such an impostor.
Thus the swoon theory
facts.

fa~ls

as an adequate expla..TJ.ation of the

Other points could also be made against it.

36

But suffice

it to say that there is very little doubt among scholars today that

" 37
Jesus was actually deaa.

First, as pointed out by Strauss, he

could not have convinced his disciples that he had conquered death
and was victor over the grave in
would have
he was

}rnOi'm

ia~ortal.

~is

physical ccnditicn.

immediately that :!1e needed medical help, not that
Second, the facts point strongly to

~is

actual

physical death on the cross, which occurred no later than the time
of the spear ",'loli..TJ.d (and act uall:r before this time).

Third, Jesus

was certainly not an impostor of this sort.
It is therefore no wonder that the swoon theory appeared shortlived in its popularity.
1
cou~

d

By 1908 Scottish theologian James Orr

. no one "ne~a
l"
remar-k "'"h
v a~

...v hsiVlew
·

a..TJ.Y 1anger. 38

Similarly,

35 Cf. Iviiller, op.cit., p. 38.
36 'Nhat of Jesus! embalmed body? Could he move the stone in front
of the tomb? How and where did he actually die? Q~estions such
as these are most difficult for this theory. Cf. Charles C.
Anderson, op.cit., p. 168.
37 ?.fcNaugher, op.cit., p. 149.
James Orr, The Resurrection of Jesus (Grcilld Rapids: Zondervfu!
Publishing House, 1908 edition reprinted in 1965), p. 92.
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today this view is also rejected as being outdated and insufficient
to account for the facts at hand. 39

Frank Morison could even

assert that the swoon theory is today best regarded as a theological
curiousity of the past. 40
B.
As noted above9 strauss

David Strauss
~as

one of nineteenth century

liberalism's most ardent New Testament critics.

His Life of Jesus

appeared in 1835 and occasioned a great theological furor.

One

result of this work was the immediate signaling of a raging battle concerning

t~

nature of myth in the New Testament accounts.

41

A

second result was strauss' dismissal from his teaching post at
Tnbingen because of the radical nature of his work.

Large amounts

of criticism directed towards his theories were to follow, as much
printed material opposed his effortso

One book even humorously

° d Davl.°d st rauss hJ.°~selft.42
d emy th 0 1 ogl.ze
~

39

Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Volume IV, Part One
of Church DOgmatics, edited by G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance
(13 volumes; Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1961), pp. 340-341.

40

Frank liiorison, Who l~ioved the stone'? (London: Faber and. Fa"ber
Limited, 1962), p. 96. It is true that this theory reappears
from time to time, almost always establishing many of the older
presupposi tions and often, 'once again, in the form of a novel.
One such modern attempt is Hugh Schonfield·f·s The Passover Plot
{Ne* York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1967). That such attempts to
revive this theory are generally met with scholarly disdain
(see, for instance, Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theolo~,
o~.cit., p. 39 and especially note number 44 on p. 46 and J.N.D.
Anderson, oPccit., pp. 63-65; cf. pp. 93-94) is easily conceivable
since this theory still has to adequately answer the objections
raised here and other similar problems.

41

42

Schweitzer, on.cit., pp. 71-72, 96-120. Cf. Charles C. Anderson,
Cri tical QU&sts of Jesus (Grand. Rapids; Williar:: :::. Eerrl!!lp~n' s
~~blishing Company, 1969), po 18.
Schweitzer, Ibid., pp. 70-72, 96-97, 111.
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One element of the

l~ew

Testament which was clearly ·rejected

by Strauss was the accounts of miracles.

Ever since David Hume's

essay on miracles, these occurrences could no longer be thought to

be

possible.

lriracles cannot break the laws of nature.

::::xplanations

other than the Biblical ones must be found. 4 ,
Concerning the resurrection of Jesus, Strauss is most explicit.
Jesus was definitely dead and thus the swoon theory is inapplicable
here.

44 Rather, Strauss preferred and popularized the subjective

vision theory of the resurrection.

According to this·view hlary

Magdalene was probably the first to perceive psychological visions
of the risen Christ.

Next the apostles also had subjective visions

convincing them that Jesus was indeed alive. 45
However, strauss explains, the disciples were not in the proper
frame of mind to be open to visions immediately after the death of
Jesus or for even days afterwards.
any hope at all so soon.

They were too despondent to have

Therefore both a change of locality is

needed (away from Jer.lsalem) and a period of "recovery" before the
visions could begin.

Strauss thus transfers the disciples' first

apparitions to Galilee in the north.

The time which passed before

the first "appearance" is also expanded to a much longer period than
is stated in the New Testament narratives.

46

Strauss, o~.cit.~ vol. I, pp. 199-201; vol. II, pp. 149-280.
Cf. Schweitzer, Ibid., pp. 82-83.

44

strauss, Ibid., vol. I, pp. 408-412.
~.,

vel. I, pp. 421-429; cf. also Strauss' work The Old Faith
and the New, on.cit., vol. I, pp. 81-82.

46 Strauss, The New !.ife of Jesus Ibid.!' vol. I, pp. 430-437 and
i
I'

The Old Faith and the New,

~ •.

129
The result was ih:ernal visions which occurred because of the
presence

0f

f erven t

·

.

".

~mag~nat~on

this deception on the

pa~t

an d rouc.h

·t em en t • 47

exc~

:Because of

of the disciples when they mistook their

subjective experiences for objective reality,

St~auss esse~ts

that

the resurrection itself has therefore become a ;orld-wide illusion.
This theory which strauss developed gained popularity in
nineteenth century.

Scholars such as ?enan and Ghillany,

prefe~red

it as

Jesus. 49

Its popularity has di!!l.inished in the

t~e

most probable explanation

fo~

48

~he

~ong

others,

the appearances of

twe~tieth

century.5

0

47
48

Strauss, The Few Life of Jesus, Ibid., vol. I, p. 440.

49

Renan, on.cit., pp. 249, 309-310; Schweitzer, on.cit., pp.170, 187.
Renan's work has already been cited above. Ghillany, writing an
imaginative life of Jesus under the pseudonym of Richard von der Alm,
also preferred this view. Other'liberals accepted this theory as well.

50

Comparatively few schola~s hold the vision theo~y today. hlo~e
com=on are views which are based upon so~e personal experience
of the disciples which convinced them that Jesus was so~ehow still
alive. The exact details vary from one view to the next. Charles
Anderson (The ~istorical Jesus: The Continuin~ uest, onocit.,
pp. 169-171 and Paul ~~aie~ ,First 3aster, on.cit., p. 107)
rightly include such views in the same category ~ith t~e vision
theory because, even though hallucinations are rejected here, a
subjective eAperience of one sort or another is generally perceived
to be based upon some form of pre-existent faith on the part of
the disciples. :hus it is still a case of these believers becoming
convinced of the resu.!.'.r"ection because of their own projected
faith issuing forth into a belief in objective ~eality. P~obably
the best-kno;~ theo~y of this type is Paul Tillich' s "rcsti t'J.tion
theory". For Tillich, the resurrection is not be be"conceiv-ed
of in terms of the Teappea~ance of eithe~ a person or a spirit.
In fact it is not any ty~e of literal appearance of any kind.
Rather, the cisciples experienced the spiritual presence of jesus.
Like Strauss, Tillich feels that it was actually an ecstatic
experience which convinced the~ ~hat Jesus was the New ~eing. It
is possible for belieye~s to~ay to have this same expe~ience
(Tillich, on.cit., vol. II~ pp. 156-158. For a simila~ interpretation
of Tillich's view, see ~cKelway, on.cit., pp. 170-171, 181-182).
Theories suc~ as Tillich's will also be included in this treatment
of visions (as Charles Ande~son and Paul ~aier also do). Most
of the proble~s involved in postulating a pre-existent faith and
in the subse~uent application of subjective criteria to objective
co~viction also apply here and ~ende~ such an expe~ience ~uite
izpossible, as will be shown below.

Strauss, The Old Faith and the New',

0'0.

cit., vol. I, p. S 3.
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However, several of the nineteenth century liberals opposed
this view as well.

Schleiermacher asserted that any version of the

vision theory was entirely unacceptable because its suppositions do
not fit the facts. 51

Another rejection of this theory was given by

Paulus, whose own views we have discussed above.

He likewise felt

that visions were not possible in view of the available facts, for
there was sufficient evidence to prove that Jesus was actually alive
end present with the apost1es. 52
theory.

Therefore he preferred the swoon

This rejection of visions by Paulus is a very iuteresting

one, because we have already pointed out that Strauss had likewise
ruled out Paulus' theory.

Thus we see that each attempted to negate

the theory of the other.
The most noteworthy nineteenth century criticism of Strauss'
vision theory came from another liberal theologian, Theodor Keim.
Schweitzer notes that Keim's study of Jesus' life, which was published
in three volumes from 1867-1672, was the most important critical
work on this subject that had appeared in many years. 53
presented a substantial

criti~ue

In it he

of all hypotheses which made subjective

visions and inner experiences the basis for the disciples' belief in
objective, outward appearances of

Je6us~

Keim rejected the vision theory for several key reasons.

First,

the over-abundance of self-generated emotion and excitement which
Strauss felt had to be present 54 to produce these visions is not

51

5chleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ou.cit., vol. II, p •. 420.

52

Schweitzer, on.cll., pp.

53

Ibid., pp. 193, 211.

54

See, for instance, Strauss' The New Life of Jesus, on.cit., vol. I,
p. 440.

54-55.
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found in the early church.

Other inward experiences and visions

found in the early texts are likewise not characterized by this
extreme excitement.
numerous.

Second, visions in the New Testament are

But these are never confused with the resurrection

appearances, so as to ad1llit the difference between them.
the

appear~~ces

Those

involve~

of Jesus are characterized by calmness and reticence.
are usually reserved and not at first ready to accept

Jesus with joy and exuberance.
multiply

~~d

Thj.rd,

grow more numerous.

to a sudden cessation.

Fourth, religious visions tend to
But the appearances of Jesus come

For these and similar reasons, this theory

is rejected as not adequately explaining how the appearances of
Jesus could possibly have been subjective visions. 55

55

So~e of Keim's

W.J. Sparrow-Simpson, The Resurrection and the Christ~an Faith
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan PublishL~g House, 1911 edition reprinted
in 1965), pp. 113-115. The theory popularized by Keim is commonly
referred. to as the "telegram theory". According to this hypothesis,
Jesus rose spiritually from the dead (not bodily) and :returned
to God. Afterwards he com~unicated the knowledge of his spiritual
existence to the apostles"by means of "telegrams" or messages
from heaven. The appearances of Jesus recorded in the Hew Testament
were therefore not subjective visions or hallucinations but
oOJec~~ve impressions sent by both Jesus and God.
Keim admits
that this commtL~ication to the disciples of the truth that Jesus
had risen required Divine intervention (ill£., pp. 117, 119;
McNaugher, oD.cit~, pp. 155-156). But such a theory falls prey
to at least four major criticisms. First, is this view any less
a miracle than the view Tecorded in the New Testament? The
miraculous is admittedly involved here as well and ~e still have
the teaching that Jesus actuall~ rose and is alive (although in
spiritual form). Secoud, would God and the: risen Jesus seu~
messages and reveal appearances which would deceive the disciples
into th~nking that Jesus was physically there with then? Such
deception has moral (or amoral!, implications and fails to explain
why Jes~s did not actually appear instead of sending the impression
that he had actually done so. Third, these impressions would not
be objective enough to make them think that Jesus had actually
risen bodily. Fourth, it fails to explain the empty tonb. (For
these and similar criticisms, see Tillich, on.cit., vol. II, p. 156;
McNaugher," Ibid..; Lewis, Miracles, on. cit., pp. 152-153; Smith,
o~.cit., pp:-2I9-220; Tenney, on.cit., pp. 189-192.)
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points are well-taken and are still employed today as negative
evidence that opposes this theory, as we will perceive presently.
At any rate, many scholars believe that Xeim dealt the death-blow
to strauss' theory of visions, just as strauss had earlier done the
same to Paulus' hypothesis. 56
Today there are at least four major reasons why the subjective
vision theory is rejected.

First, the apostles were not in the

proper frame of mind to presuppose visions.

There is a needed

psychological precondition for such halluCinations, this being the
ex~ectation

happen.

of the event in question and a strong belief that it will

Otherwise there would be no impetus for the mind to produce

such subjective projections. 57
a state of mind.

But the disciples were not in such

They were very despondent and did not have such

faith and expectation that Jesus would rise.

Pannenberg expresses

this point as follows:
To maintain, first, that the appearances were produced by
the enthusiastically excited imagination of the disciples
does not hold, at least for the first and most fundamentsl
appearances. The Easter appearances are not to be explained
from the Easter faith of the disciples; rather, conversely,
the Easter faith of the disciples is to be explained from
the appearances. All the attempted constructions as to how
the faith of the disciples could have survived the crisis
of Jesus' death remain problematic precisely in psychological
terms, even when one takes into account the firm expectation
of the imminent end of the world with which Jesus presumably
died and in which his disciples lived. It cannot be disputed
that, in spite of all this, Jesus' death exposed the faith
of the disciples to the most severe stress. One could hardly

Sparrow-Simpson, ~., pp. 113-115; Orr, on.cit., p. 219;
McNaugher 9 Ibid., p. 155.

51 McNaugher, Ibid., p. 152.

See especially George E. Ladd, I Believe
in the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids: William E. Eerdman's
Publishing Company, 1915), p. 138.
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expect the production of confirmatory experiences from the
faith of the disciples that stood under such a burden.
Certainly such psycholcgic~l considerations by themselves
are as little suited to support any conclusions as to support
the criticism of the New Testament traditions.58
As Pannenberg clearly states here, it is psychologically
problematical to endeavor to explain how the disciples' faith could
have withstood the stress placed upon it by the death of Jesus.
could not expect the collectively forlorn faith of these

~e~

We

to

respond positively by producing visions which, by their nature, require
enthusiasm, excitement and especially belief.

Therefore ue find

that the annearances of Jesus gave rise to the post-Easter faith and
were not produced by an already-existing faith. 59
This position is well-attested by various others as well.

Eminent

Scripture scholar Raymond E. Brown notes that most theologians also
agree that faith in the resurrection of Jesus arose because of the
appearances rather than the appearances being caused by a pre-existing
faith. 60

An examination of the facts will show that this is the

case, thus making visions an impossibility.
The disciples were

si~ply

too despondent to have produced such

hallucinations, especially in so short of a

t~ ..

EV2~

Marxsen

realizes that the disciples' faith was a result of extcrnal experiences
and not inward impulses, thus making the vision theory untenable.

61

William Barclay agrees that the disciples could not contemplate

56 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, translated by Lewis L.
Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1968), p. 96.

59

Ibid.

60 Raymond E. Brown, The Vir °nal Concention ,and Eodil
of Jesus (New York: Paulist Press, 1913 , p. 84.
61

Marxsen, op_cit., p. 116.

rtesurreotion

themselves into a situation where visions would be possible so soon.
Therefore this theory itself is perceived to be unreasonable. 62
Ramsey likewise asserts that any theory which proclaims that the
resurrection appearances arose because of a prior belief of the
disciples, as this theory does, can be dismissed because of the
problems involved. 63
It is not overly difficult to comprehend this criticism raised
against strauss' subjective vision theory.

The disciples had expected

Jesus to redeem Israel and bring in the heavenly Kingdom of God
(see Luke 24:21).

They had followed him for a few years, expecting

this result.

Eut now his death was unexpected and caused must

despondency.

Such a reaction is a natural psychological response

when so much was at stake and believed to be dependent upon Jesus'
remaining alive.
to pieces.

Their long-awaited hopes and dreams were dashed

To expect an ecstatic, enthusiastic

faith-affi~ation

capable of producing inward visions from these men is therefore
not very possible.
An interesting concession here was made by Strauss, who also
realized that, as the facts stand, visions would not have occurredo
The disciples could not have escaped such despondency in such a
short period of time.

Thus, unless one rearranged the available

data, the theory would fall.

62

64

William Earclay, The Mind of Jesus (New York: liarper and Row,
Publishers, 1961), pp. 304-305.

63

Ramsey, on.cit., p. 41.

64

Strauss, The New Life of Jesus, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 430-431.
Cf$ also Sparrow-Simpson, on.cit., pp. 111-112.

135
Therefore we find that the disciples were too despondent to
have been subject to such excited visions entailing a believing
frame of mind.

As Marxsen concludes, we must reject the vision

theory because it does not agree with the textual facts. 65

McNaugher

reminds us that such hallucinations have psychological rules and
these had not been fulfilled.

66

In addition, we find that the disciples did not expect Jesus
to rise from the dead. 61

Ramsey notes that they were not able to

anticipate this event at all because of their aforementioned doubt
t 68
an d ·oew~old ermen.

In fact, the disciples did not believe immediately even aftgr
the appearances, but doubted the i;vidence. 69
this doubt on the part of the

~isciples

portion of the resurrection records. 10

Orr believes that

is the most historical
Reginald Fuller finds this

doubt to be a part of the earliest tradition and a very natural inclination
for these early witnesses. 71

65
66

Both Marxse~12 a~d Ramsey73 note the

Marxsen, ou.cit., p. 116.
McNaugher, op.cit., p. 152.

67

The narratives sufficiently establish this point. See Yuke 24;12; 21;
In. 20:9, 19; cf. the Markan appendix, 16:10. Cf. also Brown,
o~.cit., p. 106, footnote number 176.

68

Ramsey,

69

The witness to this is even greater than that of the previous
point. See Matt. 28:11; Luke 24:11, 22-24, 27; In. 20;25; 21:4;
Cf. the Markan appendix, Mk. 16:11, 1;, 14. Cf. also Erown, op.cit.,
p. 106, footnote number 176.

70

Orr, op.cit., p. 225.

71

Reginald Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 81-82; cf. pp. 100-101.

o~.cit.,

p. 41.

72
73

Ramsey, ou.cit., p. 41.
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affect of this doubt on the disciples.

It is important to realize

here that if the vision theory were true, such persistent doubt
could not exist, because the supposed presence of the pre-existent
faith would
as genuine.

me~~

that the appearances would have already been regarded

In other words, if the disciples' faith in a risen Jesus

had produced visions, this same faith would automatically accept
the resulting visions as true.
case.

But we find that such was not the

The doubt was both genuine and persistent.
Thus we see that, first, the disciples were not

frame of mind for visions to occur.

~~d

the proper

They were too despondent to

have had hallucinations in so short a time. 74
not expect Jesus to rise

L~

In addition, they

did not readily believe the

appearances even after they occurred.
The second main reason that the vision

theo~,

is rejected is

because of the problems involyed concerning the number of people who
claimed to

~2ve

seen Jesus after his death and the different places

and times in which these appearances were believed to have taken place.

It is true that visions can be experienced by more thfu~ one person
.
75 But we haVe been speaking of a theory which proposes
at a t lme.

74 Even C-ordon Kaufman, one of the compara"lvely few scholars who
still hold the yision theory today, realizes that a prior belief
must exist before visions can be produced. However, he fails
to show what positive factors there were that would be sufficient
to give rise to this optimistic faith, a faith which would
absolutely have to be present before the events themselves. This
is quite damaging to his viewpoint, especially in view' of the
fact, t!:2:t he admits that the disciples were quite disillusioned
at Jesus' death and were therefore subject to despair. He realizes
that their hope had disappeared. But we may wonder what
spontaneous factors caused such a reversal of thought and made
the disciples believe that Jesus was alive before they received
any confirmation of the fact. See these adm~ssicns in Kaufman!s
Systematic Theology: A Historic:tst Perspective (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1968), especially pp. 415, 422.
75

Ibid., p. 421; footnote 20; Orr, op.cit., p. 219.
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subjective hallucinations--visions with no real objective stimulus.
Therefore if one of the disciples (or others who claimed to have
experienced the resurrection appearances) actually did hallucinate,
it would not by any means be automatic that others would also
experience the same vision.

Rather, each would also have to go

through the process of developing a prior faithmd of being
psychologi~ally

ready for such an experience.

This is because

hallucinations are essentially private events and are experienced
by more
for

th~~

~

one person only when these above conditions "are present

indivdual.

76

But, as Pannenberg notes, the narratives

record se7eral different appearances which occur under many different
circumstances and

time~

and even include different participants.

This invalidates this theory which relies upon a mental reaction
which spread from one individual to the next.

The various conditions

simply do not support such a view. 77
The above objections are persuasive especially when one remembers
that in order for this theory to be valid, each individual would
have to have responded to personal stimuli at each of these various
times and places.

The different personalities involved would mean

that many would not be in the proper state of mind, especially when
all the records indicate that exactly the opposite reaction prevailed,
as shown above.

76 Edwin G. Boring, Herbert S. Langfield and Harry P. Weld, editors,
Foundations of Fs cholo
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1956 , p. 216; Yamauchi, op.cit •• March 15, 1974, p. 6; McNaugher,
op.cit., p. 153; Smith, oD.cit., p. 217.

77

Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, op.cit., pp. 96-97.
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Surely some of tr.e participants would not have experienced
these appearances at all if they were due to visions, for they would
not all be in the correct state of mind.
case.

But such was not the

Even New Testament critics are agreed that all the disciples

genuinely believed that Jesus had appeared to them after his death.
In other words, whatever may have been the cause of the appearances,
the disciples believed that Jesus had been raised from the dead. 78
In fact, Johannes Weiss pointed out that the early

procl~ation

of

the resurrection would not have been possible at all had the disciples
experienced even the simplest doubt in an objective resurrection. 79
This undoubting belief would hardly be the consequence if ve were
to rely on visions tc
in the narratives.

s~ch

As

large numbers of people as are recorded

~e~tioned ~bove~

all would not be prepared

for such visions.
AIl

i:;:. . ste.nce where this would be true occurs in the oldest

resurrection narrative.

~ere

Paul relates that on one occasion

Jesus appeared to over 500 people at once (I Cor. 15:6).
cites this as a proof of Jesus'

resurrect~~n

That Paul

is evident from his

further explanation that most of these 500 witnesses were still
alive at the

ti~e

of his writing (and thus available to testify of

the reality of this, event). 80

As Brown asserts 1 it is hardly possible

78

Bul tmann, "New Testament and t':ythology" in Kerygma and llyth, Ope ci t. ,
p. 42. See Orr 9 o~.cit., p. 115, with regards to this admission
by critic Kirsopp Lake.

79

Johannes Weiss, Earliest Christianit : A Histor of the Period
A.D. 30-150, edited by Frederick C. Grant Two volumes; Magnolia:
Peter Smith, Publishers, 1959), vol. I, p. 28.

80

Bultmann, KerYgma and Myth, o~.cit., p. 39; cr. Reginald Fuller,
o~.cit., p. 29.
See also Archibald T. Robertson, Word Pictures in
tneNew Testament (Six volumes; Nashville: Broadman Press, 1931),
vol. IV, po 188.
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to imagine a synchronized but personal experience which
convince each that Jesus had objectively risen. 81

wo~ld

A collective

hallucination in which all saw visions would be to ignore the abovementioned evidence to the contrary.
Another instance wherG the vision theory appears especially
improbable is

L~~els

This narrative,

recording-of the walk to Emmaus (Luke 24s13-33)o

co~plete

with proper names (such as C1eopas, Emmaus

and Jerusalem), convinced Martin Dibelius that the pure form of the
event had been preserved at this point.

82

This incident has received

much respect from critics who have rejected other aspects of the
resurrection accounts. 83

Here we find that the shifting scenes,

continual conversation and the time element involved all militate
strongly against the reality of visions.

84

Paul's list of appearances

in I Cor. 15:1-8 is also quite problematical for this viewpoint as
we11. 85
It would be advantageous here to recall two of Keim's criticisms
ma~last

century which were discussed above.

First, the New Testament

writers distinguish between the resurrection appearances of Jesus
and visions which occur

a~ la~er

times (such as II Cor. 12:2-4; Acts

81

Brown, on.cit., p. 91.

82

See Ramsey, on.cit., pp. 61-62.

83

Orr, on.cit., p. 176. Cf. Reginald Fuller, on.cit., p. 107.

84

This conclusion was verjfied for the writer by a discussion with
a psychology professor on Dec. 18, 1969, who spoke of the various
impossibilities of relying on visions in this instance.

85

Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, on.cit., p. 97.
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7:55-56; 18:9; 23:11; 27:23).86 This would not be the case ff the
resurrection appearances were of the

sa~e

variety as the later

visions, as all would be viewed as being of the'· :same type.
an acute point because it

d~monstrates

This is

that the resurrection experiences

were regarded as being unique and were therefore not of a subjective
visional character. 87

Second, if tnese appearacnes of the risen Jesus

had not been perceived to be unique, then one would not expect them
to have ceased so suddenly.
related to the later visions.

Rather, they would tend to have been
That they did stop indicates that the

early church did not want them to be confused with spiritual visions.

88

Therefore we perceive once again the second chief criticism of
the vision theory.

l'l!any factors have contributed to this

pr~babili ty

that the number of visions, the number of people who saw them and
the way in which these occurred simply do not correspond to the required
data for the disciples to have experienced such manifestations.
The third major criticism of this theory is that real subjective
hallucinations are comparatively rare, as proper causes are usually
lacking.

They are, by definition, experiences in which something is

perceived to be present, but for which there is

~

objective reality.

Thus they differ from illusions, where a reality is mistakely
identified. 89

Thus it can be ascertained that such occurrences are

86 Sparrow-Simpson, on.cit., p. 114.
87 See Reginald ?uller, on.cit., pp. 32, 170.
88 Sparrow-Simpson, on.cit., p. 114.
89

See, for instance, William James, The Princinles of Psychology
(Two volumes; Dover Publications, Inc., 1950), vol. II, pp. 114115. Cf. also Yamauchi, on.cit., March 15, 1974, p. 6 and
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, op.cit., p. 95.
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generally rare.

The perception of something that not only is not

present but for which there is no objective reality at all therefore
requires an explanation.

Usually such

halluci~ations

are caused

by mental illness of some kin.d, dru.gs or extreme methods of bodily
deprivation. 90

To suppose that all of the witnesses of the resurrection

appearances were in such a state of mind

th~s

becomes nonfactual.

We can now bette:understand how an extreme pre-conditioned ho.pe and
expectation must exist, combined with· other factors.

Such conditions

as the a"ooveclearly did not exist in order for all of the disciples
to imagine something that was only "thin air tl • 9l

Therefore Pannenberg

rightly concludes that to describe the resurrection

appeara~Ces

as

hailucinations or subjective visions is completely unsatisfactory.9 2
The fourth major reason why the vision theory is rejected today
(and the last which we will deal with specifically) is that cautions
were actually
"ere

t~~en

in order to demonstrate that the

hallucinations.

appe~rances

We have already mentioned the theme of

doubt in the gospels and the consequential conviction of contemporary
scholars that the disciples were convinced that Jesus was
alive only after the appearances and not before. 93

act~lly

We have likewise

90

Yamauchi, Ibid.; Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 94-95, footnote nUmber 93.

91

Kaufman admits that the objection that the vision theory is too
subjective to account for such objective appearances of Jesus is
a stror.gane. He also notes that his work had. thus far (on.cit.,
pp. 426-427) not sufficiently handled this problema

92

Pannenberg,

93

Marxsen, on.cit., p. 67; Reginald Fuller, op.cit., pp. 81-82; cf.
pp. 100-101; Brown, on.cit., pp. 84, 106, footnote 176.

-

-

~.,

pp. 95-970
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. spoken of the conviction of the New Testament authors that the
appearances of the risen Jesus were different from later visions.
Reginald

Fulle~

especially notes here that Paul did not confuse

these appearances with the subjective visions which were experienced
later. 94
In addition, we find that other steps were also taken to
disprove visions as the origin of the appearances.
"safeguards" in

~

with this subject.

We find these

the ea.rliel" and the later narratives ".7hich deal

The emphasis in

Xatthe~,

Luke-Acts and John on

Jesus' resurTected body being both spiritual and material is wellQr::

known. 7J

We find an emphasis on being able to see and handle the

body of Jesus.

In Luke especially it is related that it occurred

to the disciples that they were seeing just such a spiritual
hallucination--a bodiless apparition. 96

Although these gospels

were written later than Paul's description of the resurrection
appearances, it is recognized by many scholars that the description of
Jesus' body in the gospels may have been derived, at least in part,
from the same source as Paul's conception of a "spiritual body"o
In other words, it is often recognized that both Paul and the gospels

94 Reginald Fuller,
95

~.,

pp. 32, 170. Cf.

See, for example, Orr, op.cit., p. 197.
Ibid., pp. 71-154.

~Larxsen,

Ibid., pp. 100-102.

See

Reginald Fuller,

a~so

96 Luke 24:;6-4; relates this scene.

The disciples though that they
were viewing a bodiless apparition or spirit (Greek uneuma; cf.
Matt. 14:26, 27). Jesus had to convince them otherwise by presenting his body for observation. We are told that they only believed
that they were not see:ing "ghosts" when it was thus proven to
the:_

See Robertsonj op.cit., ~ol. II, p. 296.

Other verses

where it is either stated or implied that Jesus' body was handled
include Matt. 28:9; John 20:17, 26-28; of. Acts 1:;.

speak of a resurrected body composed of both spiritual and mr

~.r'ial

qualities (with varying emphases) and that these concepts r.ere in
turn based on the reports of the original eyewitnesses. 97
What is often not realized is that Paul's list of appearances
in I Cor. 15:1-8 also contains a polemic against theories such as
that of subjective visions.

-

As Brown properly notes, Paul's reference

to 500 people having seen Jesus at one t1me means that Paul conceived
of the appearances as being other than

p~~ely

internal experiences.

Thus hallucinations were not possible in view of his testimony.9 8
This is especially true when we remember tha.t Paul adds that most
of these witnesses

~ere

still alive and thus could be questioned.

Therefore, this testimony in I Cor. 15:6 is regarded by Paul himself
as proof against subjective visions. 99
Thus we see that there were precautions taken in both Paul'e
account and in the gospels to guard against the view that the
appearances were due to subjective visions and therefore not genuine.
This motif is more developed in the gospels, where we are told that
Jesus' body was touched on various occasions, demonstrating its
rea l 1Ot y. 100

97

98

But we have seen how Paul also includes a proof against

Cf. Robert }'·i. Grant ~ lliracle and l~a tural Law (Amsterda.I!l.: NorthHolland Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 229-230; Brown, on.cit.,
pp. 85-89; Charles Anderson, on.cit., pp. 161, 163-166; Smith,
op.cit., pp. 194-195. Concerning Paul's list being based upon
eyewitness testimony, see BTOW'n! ~., p. 92 and Reginald Fuller,
on.cit., pp. 28-29.
'\"\ -

.r:- -

99
100

Q
1~
, -,

l~t3t3~

on.cit., p. 138; cf. p. 105.

Cf. Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythologyll in Kerysa and Myth,
op.cit., p. 59 and Reginald Fuller, op.cit., p. 29.
This is also reported by Ignatius in section three of his Epistle
to the Smj7neanSe See J.B. Lightfoot, editor and translator, ~
Apostolic Fathers (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1971), p. 83;
cf. p. 85.
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such a theory as well.
is only natural

~hen

101

That this is the case in the New Testament

we consider man's psychological impulse to

investigate both strange occurrences and the testimony of others who
claim to have experienced such. 102

Therefore we perceive that the vision theory cannot account for'
the resurrection appearances of Jesus.
against such a view.
frame of mind.

Several major points militate

The disciples were not in the correct psychological

There is also a problem concerning the number who

claimed to have seen Jesus and the time and place factors involved.
In addition, real hallucinations and vision's are rare and do not fit
the facts.

Lastly, the early sources explain that various cautions

were taken to prove that visicns were

no·~

applicable in these instances.

Many minor points could also be mentioned against this theory.l03
Most of these objections can also be applied to theories relying upon
other subjective experiences of the apostles as well.

101
102
103

104

l04

See Sparrow-Simpson, on.cit., p. 110.
Orr, on.cit., p. 180.
Fer instance, if the vision theory were true, the empty tomb
would be left unexplained. And what happened to Jesus' body?
In addition, this writer has complied a list of 34 total reasons
why this theory is inadequate.
Theories like those of Tillich (op.cito, vol. II, pp. 156-158)
and Van Euren (on.cit., pp. 132-133) which rely on some unexplained
subjective experience of the disciples face practically all of
the same difficulties. For instance, the disciples' despondency
and doubt must still be changed to faith before the experience
itself in order for these to occur in the first place, which
encounters the Qifficu1ties raised above. There is likewise the
same proble~ of how many would have been convinced in this manner,
as well as with the various time and place factors. Even more
acute, is the disciples' mistaking such subjective experiences
for objective ones and how they became convinced that Jesus had
literally risen from the dead. The disciples knew the difference
between the resurrection appearances and later experiences, as

We thus conclude that the visional 'theory simply does not fit
the narratives.

For hallucinations to have occurred, all of the

facts must be changed around.

There are psychological laws which

these hallucinations must abide by and these were not present. 105
No

~Btter

how inviting a theory may appear, if it fails to account

for the evidence, it must be rejected.

106

Today the vision theory is held by comparatively few scholars.
Brown notes that this nineteenth century view is not flven respectable
any longer.

10'"

(

Based upon the fear and dejection of the disciples,

Eornkamm asserts that we cannot resort to any explanation which
depends

upon the inner, subjective experience of these men. lOS

McLeman agrees that the nineteenth century vision theorists such as
strauss and Renan presented views which were quite extravagant in
their claims. 109
the evidence.

Even Schonfield rejects this theory as not fitting

Vnatever~~eorymay

be proposed, it cannot validly

110
b e "-hO
w loS one.

explained above. We also find psychological causes lacking
here. ~at would give rise to such experiences? As with visions,
there is also the objection that cautions were deliberately
taken in the narratives to pro~e that the experiences were
objective and ~ot subjectiveo These are a few of the key objections to these subjective theories. As we have observed, they
are practically the same as those listed above. See IEcKelway
(ou.cit., pp. 170-17lf lel-1S,), Charles Anderson (ou.cit.,
pp. 169-173) and Maier (The First Easter, on.cit., pp. 112-11,)
for similar criticisms and other objections to this theory.
105
106
107

Orr, ou.cit., pp. 27, 222.
Brown, on.cit., p. 75, footnote number 127.
Raymond E. Brol'm, liThe Resurrection and Biblical C.,..-i +; ,,; "'Tr."
Commonweal, l~ovember 24, 1967, pp. 233, 235.
--------

108
109
110

Bornkamm, on.cit., pp. 184-185.
l~cLeman,

on. ci t., pp. 212-21;.

Schonfie1d, on.cit., p. 152.
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C.

otto Pfleiderer

In the last portion of the nineteenth century a movement
appeared from within the ranks of Protestant liberalism.

It became

designated as the Eistory of Religions school of thought.

It opposed

several of liberalism's suppositions, such as trying to find a
"Jesus of histor-.f".

In fact, it was believed that very little

historical information could be

gather~d

about the life of Jesus.

III

This was mainly due to the legendary growth which was said to have
built up around the life of Christ.

These legends were believed

to have accumulated in stages until the embellished material became
qUl.·t e d e t al.'1 e d • 112
The History of Religions school
terms of the other religions.

sou~~t

to study Christianity in

The Chzistian faith came to be seen

as being syncretistic and therefore it was not unique in the sense
that it did borrow from the other faiths.

It was

n~

postulated by

these scholars that Christianity borrowed quite freely from Judaism
and from other systems of belief such as the Eabylonian,
·
an d PerSl.an
re 1"l.~ons~ 11;

It was postulated that

E~~tian

Christia~ity

was

especially influenced by the Old Testament and by the teachings of
these other faiths.

]':yths were believed to be extremely p=-evalent

at this time and were perceived to be spreading from one reGion and
religion to another.

III

112
11;

Each then accepted ideas from the other that

~narles

C. Anderson, Critical Quests of Jesus (Grand Rapids:
William E. Eerdman:s Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 55-57.
McNaugher, on.cit.,

p~

157.

Anderson, Critical Quests of Jesus, op.cit., pp.
op.cit., p. 2;5~

55-56; Orr,
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were advantageousto its own purposes.

As a result, these scholars

constantly compared almost every individual category of the Christian
o l ar l.a.eas
o~
fa 1.oth t0oSl.ml.
whOl.Ch were a. par t

0f

0 th er

°
114
re 1°l.gl.ons.

One scholar who had many beliefs in common with this emerging
school of thought was German theologian otto Pfleiderer.

For

instance, he also postulated that there were many affinities between
Christianity and other ancient religions.
JUdaism was also noteworthy.

The influence from

Myths were said to be present in all

of these faiths and there were similarities, especially in the
transmission of events

re~uiring

Supernatural intervention.

Especially

noticeable is Pfleiderer's tendency to compare different aspects of
the Christian faith with similar ideas and occurrences in these
other religions.

Parallels are found, for instance, in

relationship t.o Satan, in the miracles of

Jesus~

Jes~s'

and in the accounts

of the resurrection. II5
Pfleiderer also believed tha.t very little cOi;..ld be known about
the beginnings of the Christian faith.

He likewise based this

conclusion upon the thesis that legends grew profusely around the
life of Jesus in the early church.

It is now too difficult to

know for sure which reported events actually occurred and which
Od no"t.
. 116

d l.

114 Ancierson
f

Ibid~,

p. 56;· Orr; Ibid., p. 238; McNaugher,

Ope

cit.,

p. 157.

115

Cf. for instance, Pfleiderer's work The Earl Christian Conce~tion
of Christ (London: Williams and Norgate, 1905 , see pp. 63-83
for his account of some of the similarities between Jesus'
miracles and those found in other ancient religions.

116

Otto Pfleiderer,
Primitive Christianity,
translated by W.
I
--..,..
.
Montgomery \FOUI volumes; Clifton: Reference Book Publishers,
1965), see vol. I, pp. 1, ;, 23-25 for instance.
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The History of Religions school rejected any belief in the
resurrection of Jesus.

Rather, they popularized the view that the

narratives of this occurrence were later additions to the bospel,
ones which grew mainly from the influence of stories of other such
events found in other religions.

At any rate, the resurrection was

considered to be a legend which was added to the story

~f Jesus' ~ife.111

Pfleiderer follows this pattern and also views the resurrection
of Jesus as myth that did not occur literally.
two main reasons.

But he does so for

First, the resurrection is believed to be legend

added to the story· of Jesus' life by his earliest

followers~

It

nas not a real occurrence at all, for Jesus never actually rose
from the dead.

Rather, the narratives were added by the disciples,

who were convinced that Jesus must be alive.

The legends continued

to grow until they were detailed accounts of a victory over death.
In addition, stories of resurrected gods in other religions served
as a basis for the rise of the Christian legends about Jesus.

These

more ancient myths provided the impetus for the formulation of the
New Testament accounts of Jesus rising from the dead.
Seco~d,

ll8

Pfleiderer believes that this theory based upon the

formation of legends must also be supplemented by the subjective
vision theory of the resurrection. 119

Visions apparently account

111

Orr,

118

Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 5-6,
24-25; vol. II, pp. 186, 311-312; vol. IV, p. 16. See also The
Early Christian Conception of Christ, op.cit., pp. 84-133.

119

Friedrich Ghillany was another nineteenth century scholar who
likewise combined visions with legends which were influenced by
myths from other ancient religions (Schweitzer, op.cit., pp. 161,
110).

~!!.,

pp. 235-261; McNaugher, op.cit., p. l57.

1.49

for the source of the conviction that Jesus was alive, while the
subsequent legends explain the present form of the narratives. 120
We have already dismissed the vision theory above, and we will
turn presently to the possibility that the narratives are due to
legends.

TIe will henceforth refer to this hypothesis as the

mythical or legendary theory of the resurrection.
Even in the twentieth

c~ntury

of-the resurrection can be found.

the mythical ·or legendary theory

12l

Probably the best-known

theologian today who advocates a somewhat related form of this theory
122
is Rudolf 3ultmanrl.
He freely recognizes his indebtness to the
History of Religicns school of thought, especially in his understanding
of the meaning of myth.

For

Eultma~~,

New Testament mythology is

made up of elements quite similar to concepts found in both Jewish
apocalypticism and the redemption myths of gnosticism.1 23
several features in common.

All have

As a result, we find that many of the

gospel miracles, for instance, are close to those in the Hellenistic

120

121

Pfleiderer, The Early Christian Concention of Christ, on.cit.,
p. 157-158; Primitive Christianity, on.cit., vol. I, pp. 10-14;
vol. II, pp. 115-116, 125.
For instance, Rooke favors the uartial use of this view.
his work used above (on.cit.,
173-179).

PP.

122

123

See

Eultmann does not actually offer much rationalization for the
resurrection. Neither does he appear very interested in developing
theories as to why it did net occur. Therefore it is hard to
"label" him at this point. However, he does believe that this
occurrence is a myth, in some ways similar to other ancient myths,
as will be perceived below. Because his treatment is nevertheless
quite similar in several ways to these we have been discussing,
we will include him here. The critique of this theory also applys
to his views about this event.
Eul tmann, "New Testament and Mythology" in Keryp.!ls a~d
on.cit., p. 10, footnote number two, and pp. 15-16.

!~yth9

150
narratives.

3ult~ann

draws parallels between some of these guBpel

miracles and those of other ancient peoples in a way much reminiscent
of Pfleiderer's attempt spoken of above.

124

Also similar to Pfleiderer is Bu1tmann's twofold treatment of
the resurrection.

First, there is a stress on the presence of

legendary material in the New Testament accounts.

For instance, this

event is viewed as being a myth which was constructed by imagination
and 1egend~125
Bu1tmann

la~d

Eut second: while in his discussion of the resurrection
much more emphasis on the part played by this legendary

growth, it is noteworthy that he also felt that the vision theory
was also a very possible explanaticn, at least in part.

126

While

the narratives of Jesus' rising from the dead do have significance
when we view them as being pointers to the

~~iqueness

of Jesus' death,

the resurrection is nonetheless a myth devoid of historical reality
and thus net an actual historical event.
For

Eultmar_~,

the New

Test~ent

and Jewish (Old Testament) mythology.

127

church combined and mingled Greek
128

It is no surprise, therefore,

124

:Sultmann, "The Study of the Synoptic Gospels'in
on.cit., pp. 36-39.

125

See, for instance, Ibid., pp. 66, 72.

126

Bu1 tmann, "l;ew Testament and Mythology" in KerYgma and. I,:yth,
on. cit., p. 42.

127
, .,,'
.L.~O

~.,
~.,

Fo~

Criticism,

pp. 34, 38, 42.

pp. 15-16; see also Bultmann's History and Eschatology
,New York: Harper and.Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 7~
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that this scholar postulated that the resurrection also had
similarities to beliefs in other religions and systems of thought.
The affect of such beliefs upon this Christian doctrine of a risen
Jesus might partially be realized, for instance, in Paul's speaking
of the resurrection in gnostic terms. 129

The gnostic influence

on such narratives is also found in oth~r portion~ of the New Testament. 150
Bultmann holds that Jewish sources also influenced the faith that
the early church had in Jesus'

resurrection~

Old Testament verses

were reinterpreted as predictions of this event.

In fact, one of

the early proofs of th::",; Gccurrence was what the Christians felt was
just such Jewish Scriptural support. 13l ,We therefore find that
certain aspects of the New Testament's teaching about the resurrection
were influenced by other ancient faith systems.

As a result of

these and other legendary features involved in the Christian

faith~

little can actually be known about the historical Jesus with any
degree of 'certainty. 132
Earlier

we

saw how

ni~eteenth

century liberal theology as a

whole followed Hume in its rejection of miracles. 135 "We shou.ld also
note that Pfleiderer was no exception here.

lie likewise

~ccepted

the

129

Bul tman.'"l, "New Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and 1I1yth, Ibid.,
p. 40 and Theology of the New Testament9 op.cit~, vol. I, p. 345;
vol. II, p. 155.

150

Cf. the references in footnote 129 with History and Eschatology,
op.cit., pp. 54-55.

151

Eultmann, Theology of the New Testament, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 31, 82.

132

Bul tmann, "The Study of 'the Synoptic Gospels" in Form Criticism,
o~.cit., pp. 60-61.

135

Randall,

o~$cit.,

pp. 555-554; cf. p. 293.
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view that science had discovered the laws of nature which were so
regular that they could not be violated.
century this view was accepted

1-

j4

Even in the twentieth

by Bu1 tmann (as shovm above), who

rejected the miraculous both because it was perceived to contradict
the laws of nature and because we live in too modern of an age to
accept such: occurrences as fact. 135
It is apparent that there are several similarities between
BultmapJ1 and Pfleiderer on the concept of mythology, especially
with regard to the treatment of the resurrection.
position vall also-be included in the discussion

Therefore Bultmann's
~~d

critique in

this section.
We "'"ill turn now to an examination of Vlhat we will term the
·
1_egenaary

1 t heory
........
or mjvD1Ca

~ the resurreCulon
+•
0 f J esus. 136 lmcient

o~

mythology relates various tales concerning tlvegetation zods".

In

their earlier forms these stories, in other words, celebrated the
ye8.:::.'ly death of vegetation duriI"..g the fall season and the birth of
t£G vegetation in the spring season.

These

oj~hs

originally dealt:

only with an expression of ma..'1 t s observances of t:bis yearly cycle of
vegetation.

Later they were

tra~sformed

religious beliefs about the gods.

134

135

into narratives expressing

137

Otto Pfleiderer, Philosophy and ~evelopment of Religion (Two
voltunes; Edinburgh: William Blackwood a~d Sons, 1394), vol. I,
pp. 5-6.
Bultman.~, IlNew Testa':lent and :,.trthology" in Kerj"gIDa and Myth,
op.cit., pp. 4-5.

136 We note here once again that sir.:ce the vision theory has been
perceived above to be an inadequate explanation to account for the
resurrection, we l'.'i11 not reopen the subject here even though
both Pfleiderer and Bultmann se~il to also prefer this theory
along with the mythical or legendary theory.
137
Pfleiderer, Early Christian Conception of Cr~ist, op.cit., pp. 91-93.
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Various
world.

ve~sions

of such-myths circulated around the ancient

The details vary from culture to culture, but they do appear

to have the

mos~ p~ominent

features more-or-less in

co~on,

revolve mainly around the death of a vegetation gOQ.

as they

The god is in

love with a goddess but becomes separated from his lover, often by
death.

~he

usually mourns for him and sometimes receives him back

into the land of the living.

138

The Summerian form of this

concerns the god Dumuzi and the goddess Inanna. 139
version is about Tammuz and Ishtar. 140
speaks of Osiris and Isis.

14l

presen~s

Other cultures depict

Adonis and

The Babylonian

The Egyptian rendering

goddesses directly patterned upon these major
Phoenician mythology

~y~~

thei~

ve~sions.

Astar~and

gods and

For instance,

Phrygian mythology

concerns Attis and Cybele, both of which are the equivaJ.8nt of the
142

Babylonian Tammuz and Istar.-

The Greek equivalent to the Egyptian

- - ~s
- D-~onysus. 143
go d 0 s~r~s

It is generally asserted by those who hold the legend theory
that these myths concerning the vegetation gods not only permeated
Christian circles, but that they formed the basis for the Christian
belief in the

resur~ection

of Jesus.

The foundation thus laid by

the influence of these ancient myths then is believed to have provided

138

Cf. Orr, ou.cit., p. 231.

139

Hooke, ou.cit.: pp. 20-23.

140

Ibid. , pp. 39-41.

141
142

Ibid., pp. 61-10.
Pfleiderer, Early Christian Conceution of Christ, on.cit., pp. 9495; Orr, on.cit., p. 231; Yamauchi, on.cit., ~arch 15, 1914, p. 4.
Pfleiderer, Ibid., p. 97.
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the framework for later legendary accumulations, which continued
to grow.

144

There are at least four major reasons land several addition
minor ones) as tO,why the legend theory of the

resurrectio~

the attention of comparatively few scholars today.

attracts

First, there is

ample proof from contemporary theological studies that Jesus'
resurrection lies at the very roots of New Testament belief.

In

other words, it is not simply a flattering tale added to the origins
of Christianity years after the death of Jesus.
It is agreed by all that Paul's account of the resurrection in
I Cor. 15:3-8 is the earliest witness to this occurrence.

It is also

a.lmost entirely t:...'1animous that Paul is not passing on material which
he has formulated himself, but rather is citing a much earlier
tra d :l' t':lone 145

In other words, the earliest account of the resurrection

appearances was for3ulated before Paul actually wrote this book and
thus it is earlier than the composition of the book in which it
appears.

146

The key question is how near this ancient formulation of these
appearances is to the actual events.

Pannenberg believes that the

creed is Quite close to the original appearances of Jesus. 147 . Most
others agree r;ith him for several reasons.

First, Paul's words "I

144 Orr, on.cit., p. 235 and Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity,
vol. I, pp. 5, 23-25 for instance.
145

Reginald Fuller, on.cit., p. 10; ~arxsen, on.cit., p. SO.Even
Bultmann recognizes this (Theology of the New Testament, on.cit.,
vol. I, p. 45).

146 See, for exa::ple, lrarxsen, Ibid., pp. 52,

80; cf. p. 86; Brown
The Virginal Concention and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op.cit.,
p. 81; Reginald Fuller, Ibid., pp. 10-14, 28.

147

Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, op.cit., p. 900
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delivered" and "I received" are technical jargon referring to the
Jewish custom of the transmission of ancient data. 148
are words in this

po~tion

Second, there

which are non-Pauline, pointing to an

earlier formulation by others. 149

Third, at least Jeremias believes

that the origin of these words is Aramaic and net Greek, thus dating
back to the earliest sources. 150
For these

a~~

other similar reasons, it is the belief of most

theologians today that this formulation reported by Paul is about
as close to the ori6:na1 appearances as is possible for such a

formalized creed.

This is because a little time would be required

for this process of formalization into a list of appearances.

We

do not know if Paul preserved the list exactly in its original form
or if he added to it or modified it, but the core material concerning
the appearances of Jesus dates to just a short time after Jesus'
death. 151
In all likelihood, Paul received this information about Jesus'
resurrection from Peter and

James when he visited Jerusalem after

his con7ersion (Gal. 1:18_19).15
~e

2

This is especially likely when

reIDember that there are single appearances of Jesus to both Peter

148

Brown, The Virginal Conce~tion and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus,
op.cit., p. 81; Reginald Fuller, £n.cit., p. 10; Pannenberg,
Jesus--GoQ. and I.:an, op.cit., p. 90; Ladd, op.cit., ppo 104-105.

149

Reginald Fuller, I!&£c. Fuller lists some of 'these phrases which
are foreign to Faul's speech patterns in footnote number one,
chapter two, p. 199.

150

For an evaluation of this conclusion see Erown, The VirFinal
Conception and Eodily Resurrection of Jesus, p. 81, footnote
number 140 and Reginald Fuller, ~., pp. 10-11.

151

Reginald Fuller, OE.cit., p. 10; Ladd, op.cit., p. 105.
Ibid., pp. 14, 28; Erown, The Virginal Conception and Eodily
Resurrection of Jesus, op.cit., p. 92; Pan.~enberg, Jesus--God
and Man, OPe cit., p. 90; Ladd, o~. ci t., p. 105.

152

156
and James in this early traditional formulation (I Cor. 15:5, 7).
Therefore, Reginald Fuller states that the very latest that this
list could have been formulated would be five years after the
original appearances, or about 35
to Jerusalem. 153

A.~.

when Paul made this visit

Pannenberg dates this visit and the subse~uent

receiving of this information as occurring six to eight years after
these events. 154

Eut Fuller rightly notes that this is the latest

that the tradition could have been formulated (so that Paul could
have received it at that time).

It very well could have

c~rstallized

much earlier.
Therefore,

~e

find that the disciples taught the resurrection

of Jesus from the very beginning.

There was no period of inactivity

when this was not their central theme for preaching. 155
formulation cited by

Pa~l

The early

demonstrates that the proclamation of the

resurrection rests upon the testimollY of the original eyewitnesses
and not upon a legendary process.

Therefore this carefully-worded

tradition in I Cor. 15:3-8 reveals explicitly that the appearances
of Christ were experienced by groups of early Christians
invented as a part of later legendary development.

an~

not

This early date

caused Pannenberg to conclude that:
Under suc~ circumstances it is an idle venture to oake
parallels in the history of religions responsible for the
emergence of the primitive Christian message about Jesus'
resurrection (Italics are Pa~~enberg's).156

153

Reginald Fuller, on.cit.,

154

Pannen"berg, Jesus--God and Xan, op.cit., p. 90.

155

Reginald Fuller, on.cit., p. 48; Morison, on.cit., p. 107.

156

:Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, Ope ci t., p. 91.

pp~

48-49, 70.

157
Thus we see, first of all, that myths in ancient religions in all
probability
Jesus'

ca~not

be made to

resurrectio~ fro~

acco~~t

for the rise of the belief in

the dead because

t~e ~ew

Testament accounts

are simply too close to the events themselves to be

lese~ds,

as we

have seen here. 157
The second reason that the legend or myth theory is rejected
is in some ways similar to the first.

In addition to the very early

date given to the earliest tradition F.hich reports the appearances
of the resurrected Jesus, we are also informed that we have the
testimony of e3ewitnesses to this fact.

Above we discussed the

probability that two of the original persons to wbom Jesus appeared,
Peter and
Paul.

were the ones who hgd passed this information to

Jam~s,

But there is additional New Testament evidence that must now

be discussed which

de~onstrates

that the original eyewitnesses agreed

with Paul in teaching that Jesus both rose from the dead andthat
he 8?peared to them.
and

taug~t

that

t~is

To show that such eyewitnesses also believed
event occurred after Jesus' death and that they

witnessed the appearances would of course be an
point against the

le~end

theory.

extre~ely

strong

We will deal more with this below,

showing why this point is so acute.
In I Cor. 15 we have not only the earliest testiffiony concerning
Jesus' resurrection appearances to the apostles and to others (vs.1-8),
but we also have ?aul!s
preached these

sa~e

state~ent

facts.

that these same apostles also

Paul thereby asserts that the lliessage

Tihich he was preaching about the resurrection appearances was the
same as that to which the other apostles were also testifying (I Cor.

15:11).15 8
157
158

Orr,

Later he ~entions three ti~es that these ori5inal
o~.cit.,

p. 246.

J.N.D. Anderson, op.cit., pp. 90-91.

158
eyewitnesses to

t~e

appearances were also preaching of their

experiences with the risen Jesus (I Cor. 15:14, 15).

Even the

critics admit that Paul is here witnessing to the content of the
early disciples'

~essage--that ~

Paul and these other eyewitnesses

were proclaiming a risen Lord who had appeared to the~.159

In other

words, those who had seen the risen Lord were now relating this to
others.

And they did so immediately after the events occurred.

Paul

additionally ex?lains that the 500 who had also beheld an appearance
of the Lord, while they perhaps were not themselves actively preaching
about their ex?erience, were still available for questioning, as most
of them were still living (I Cor. 15:6).

Therefore we see that a

number of eyewitnesses were either preaching or were available for
questioning concerping their experiencing of various appearances of
the risen Jesus.

This testimony did not take place only years later,

but immediately after the original manifestations.
We also recejve confirmation of Paul's testimony in the gospels
and the book of Acts.

Although some

critica~

scholars do not believe

that any eyewitnesses were the authors of any of the four gospels,
most believe that at the very least some can be traced to eyewitness
testimony.

hlark

Therefore we can at least say that, in all probability,

recei~ea

much

~aterial

from the apostle Peter, Matthew from

the apostle Matthew, Luke-Acts from various eyewitnesses (Luke 1:1-4)
and John from the apostle JOhn.

160

These, then, also point to

159

Reginald

160

It is not r.ithin the scope of this paper to thoroughly exa~ine
the question of the authorship of the four gospels. -3ut suffice
it to say t~at ~ost critical scholars recognize at least some
eyewitness testi~ony behind these four Dooks. Matthew is often
taken to be the author of the Q document ~~d thus is an eyewitness

~~ller,

on.cit., pp. 29-30; Marxsen, on.cit., p. 61.

159
eyewitness
The

testi~or.y

iIDportan~e

to over-estimate.

concerning the resurrection appearances of Jesus.
of eyewitness testimony such as this is hard

':Ie have .seen ho;;" virtually all agree tnat ihe

earliest church, including those who were the original observers,
proclaimed Jesus' resurrection from the dead.

161

That these first

witnesses did not simply fraudulently invent the narratives, fully
believing that Jesus was still dead, is evident and admitted' by all.
Men do not risk their lives and even

~ie162 for what they know to be

testimcr:y fc::- o!!e of the major sources of the first gospel. The
author of the second gospel is usually asse~ted to be John Mark,
who is believed to have recorded the testimony of Peter, another
eyewitness an~ apostle. Xost scholars believe that Luke is the
author of the third gospel and the book. of Acts, with many
recognizing that Luke claims to have collected his information
from eyewitnesses (L~~e 1:1-4). Part of the reason for the new
resurgence of interest in the authority of the fourth gospel is
that it is often recognized that this book is very close to the
eyewitness testi~ony of the apostle John. For these an~ similar
conclusions, see Archibald M. Hunter, Introducing the I'e..
Testament (Seccn~ editio!!; Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1957), pp. 41-43, 49-50, 55-56, 61-63; Ladd, ou.cit., pp~ 74-78;
Robert Ii:. Grant, An Historical Introduction to the !~ew Testament
(London: Collins, 1963), pp. 119, 127-129, 134-135, 160; George
A. Buttrick, editor, The Interurete::-'s Bible (Twelve volumes;
!~ew York and Kashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1951-1956)
vol. 7, p. 242 and ~ol. 8, pp. 9-10, 440-441; Raymond ~. 3rown,
New Testament Essays (Milwa~~eet The Bruce Publishing Company"
1965), pp. 129-131; William Hamilton, The Modern Reader:s Guide
to Joh.'1 (~(ew York: Association Press, 1959), pp. 13-15; Daniel
Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 188-194.
161
162

See Fuller, Ibid., p. 48.
For the traditions concerning the martyr's deaths suffered by
all of the twelve apostles (except John) and other early prominent
Christians like Mark and Luke, see Marie Gentert King, editor,
Foxe's Book of 11art rs (Westwood: Fleming H. Revell Company,
1968 , pp. 11-13 for instance. cr. also the witness of Eusebius'
Ecclesiastical Eistory, translated by Christian Frederick Cruse
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1969), pp. 58, 75-80.
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only a fabricated falsehood.

Also, as J.N.D. Anderson

poi~ts

out,

the quality of the ethical teaching of th€ early disciples and the
fact that none ever recanted under the threat of losing their lives
further repudiates any theory based upon such fraud.

In addition,

the psychological transformation of the disciples is left unaccounted
for if they invented the stories. 163

Thus they actually believed

that Jesus had risen from the dead. 164
But under these conditions the legend theorJ is impossible.
This is obvious not only because those who witnessed the appearances
proclaimed the exact opposite.

Of course, proclaiming something does

not neoessarily make it true.

But since we have ruled out any chances

of a fabricated story or lie on the part of the disciples,16 5 there

163

J.N.D. Anderson,

164

Even Eultmann admits this, as we saw above ("New Testar:lent and
K erygma an d !:.?,
,~ th , 0'0. cJ.
. t • ~ p. 42'). m'
•
l:_'le:-e:loS
a
difference between saying that the resUI'rection was a legend v~
myth and that it was fraud. The former, which is the theory we
are discussing here, advocates that the disciples and other early
Christians fo~ulated the stories because they really believed
Jesus was alive (such as the view of Pfleiderer and bultmann).
The second theory advocates that the discinles sim'Ol:-,~ invented
the story in spite of believing that Jesus-was d4aa.' Some still
hold the former theory (legends or myths). But it is obvious
why the latter (fraud) is rejected. The psychological
improbabilities of someone dying only for a known fraud, as well
as the other reasons against this theory as listed above, therefore
make it impossible.
.

o~.cit.,

p. 90.

•• t."'
tLy
u!lO_og-'y " .
::.n

165

This theory, usua.lly referred to as the "fraud theory", is not
held today among theologians to the knowledge of this ~ritere
This is because of the reasons given above. This also includes
theories of the disciples stealing the dead body of Christ r for
this would once again involve their lying about the appearances
when they would have known that Jesus nas not a.liv~. ~~en do
not die for a known lie. For these and the other objections
already given, this expansion of the fraud theory is also unanimously
rejected.

161
has to be a reason why these men would come to believe that Jesus
had risen from the dead.

The other leading theories (the swoon and

the vision theories) have also failed as adequate solutions, as ShO~l
above.

Therefore these cannot be used as the impetus for this faith.

So the legend theory also fails because some event had to have happened
at the

~.rery

besinning to convict the disciples that a resurrection

had actually occurred.

There could have been no gradual

b~ild-up

of

legends because these events ~ere reported from the very first to be
true.

Neither do other naturalistic theories help to e"xplain this

conviction and unquestioning belief on the part of the earliest
witnesses.
To proclaim that other ancient myths are the basis fer these
appearances merely begs the question.

To proclaim that Jesus rose

because ancient mythology relates such a scheme for the so-called
"vegetation gods" does not solve the problem of the origin of faith
which convinced the disciples that this event had actually occurred.
It also fails to account for the need of the disciples to fabricate
appearances of the risen Jesus as narrated in the early

fo~ulations.

They would obviously know that Jesus had not risen"unless they were
otherwise deceived (as by a swoon, or by visions).

But

t~e

conditions

for such deception are obviously lacking and this therefore renders
such suppositions useless.

We are thus caught in a hopeless bind.

The third major criticism of the legend or myth theory (as well
as the fourth) even challenges the supposition that any parallels at
all can be drawn between the New Testament proclamation of Jesus'
resurrection and the resurrection claimed for the vegetation gods of
other ancient

relisions~

The main difference between

Christi~~ity

and the myths of the vegetation gods centers in the fact that Jesus

162
o , person, b u t these gods and heros were not.
was a ~o
~~~s t
or~ca_

11"1"
00

The

person of Jesus is historically accessible, whereas those of the
mythical characters such as Dumuzi, TaID3uz, Osiris and the others
live only in the tales spread about them.
to have seen the
f

o

~gures.

res~rrected

For instance, many claimed

Jesus, but not so with these

~ythica1

167

Therefore we perceive that there are no historical grounds upon
which we can compare the two types of resurrection stories.

I~either

are there any historical grounds upon which to compare even the lives
of Jesus and of these other gods and heros.
con."lec t

o

~ons.

168

Here we find no close

In fact, in none of these mythical characters do we

find belief in a historical resurrection from the dead as is presented
in the New Testament concerning Jesus.

This is an important point

because it means that, far from having so many resurrection tales
Ci.fter which the disciples could have "patterned" Jesus' resurrection
as some of these theorists would have us believe, there were no
previous stories of a historical person among these vegetation gods
beUng raised.

Jesus' story is therefore tnique.

The fourth major criticism against the legend or myth theory is
that there is considerable doubt about just how much the teaching of
resurrection is found in this ancient mythology at all.

Therefore

the question yet remains as to the extent that the New Testament was

166

This point is admitted by both Pfleiderer (The Early Christian
Concention of Christ,.o-p.cit., pp. 157-158) and by Eu1tmann
( "New Testament and 7Eytho1ogy" in Kerygma and !t.yth, Ope ci t.., p. 34).

167

Orr, on.cit., p. 236; Pfleiderer, Ibid., p. 102.

168

Orr,

o

~

on.c~".,

p. 246;

l~cNaugher,

on. cit., p. 157.

163
"inspired" by the resurrection myths of other religio:J.s.

For instance,

Orr feels that these ancient myths are too vague and fluctuating to
determine the amount of their influence.

Their lack of historical

reality adds to this confusion. 169
In addition, the assumed diffusion of ideas of the resurrection
of gods into

Judais~ ~~d

Christianity has anything but been proven.

Even the critic Kirsopp Lake bel::':-ved

that the difficulty ...ith the

legend theory was in ascertaining how much was·based upon real fact
' t 0 overzea.1 ous
an d h ow muc h was nue

.

guess~ng.

that this diffusion has not been proven.

170

Pannenberg agrees

In first-century Palestine

there are almost no traces whatsoever of any influence

fro~

these

ancient cults of resurrected gods. 17l
It was this last point that once baffled Oxford scholar C.S. Lewis
when he was an atheist.

After coming to accept the dependence of

the New Testament upon ancient mythology, he was nonplussed by the
so few

ti~es

that any reference was made to any death and rebirth

patterns similar to those ir. ancient mythologies.

He also found

that such eleme:J.ts were essentially absent from Jesus' teachings as
well, which was hard to comprehend if the aforementioned influence
was so great.

172

Orr also.believes that the legend theory is too arbitrary, as
well.

It desires to choose points of similarity while disregarding

169

Orr, Ibid., p. 2;6.

170

-Ibid.,

171
172

-D.

247, footnote number one.

Pannenberg, Jesus--God and !lan, Ope ci t., p. 91.
Lewis, Miracles, on.cit., pp. 117-118, 120.

164
differences.

feels that it is not hard to use the imagination

in order to find isolated areas of agreement. 17 ;

Pfleiderer agrees

that the mistake is often made where points of difference are
neglected in order to bring about a connection between the facts which
are more similar. 174

An example here is appropriate.

Pfleiderer

himself seems to lay a certain e:nphasis on the myths which present
the resurrection of a god on the third day.175

Eut he fails to

stress as much the celebration of Adonis' acclaimed resurrection on
the first day after the period of mourning176 or Attis' acclaimed
resurrection on the fourth day.177
But even after all of these doubts, the key matter

the

co~cerns

problem of the extent to which a resurrection from the dead is really
found in any of these myths.

the Sumerian

~u~uzi-Inanna

fore contain

n~

For instance, the key manuscripts in

myth break off before the ending

account of a resurrection at all.

to the underuorld rather than rescuing him

the dead. 178

Orr,

there-

In fact, a recent

discovery of one fragment reveals that Inanna allows
t~~en

~~d

fro~

D~uzi

to be

this realm of

In the 3ablylonian myth of T?m~uz-Ishtar there is also

o~.cit.~

pp. 249-250.

174

Pfleiderer, The Early Christian Concention of Christ, on.cit.,
pp. 155-154, 159.

175

Ibid., pp. 155-155; cf. p. 103.

176

Ibid., p. 94.

177

Ibid., p. 103; cf. p. 155; Orr, on.cit., p. 252.

178

Hooke, on.cit., pp. 21-22; Yama.uchi, on.cit.,
p. 4.

J.~arch

15, 1974,

165
no RPecific mention of a resurrection.

Rather, Tammuz is only

inferentially (not explicitly) thought to have been raised,179
t"'
some even ques+'
'J~on
m.s. 180

there is no sign of

~~

In addition, it has been shown that

resurrection in the early

aCCCQ~ts

The texts which refer to such an event date from no
the second

cent~~

of Adonis.

e~rlier th&~

A.D. and thus after the time of Christ's resurrection.

Lik~ffise,

the god Attis is not presented as being resurrected until
182
after the middle of the second century A.D.
One early critic who

preferred the legend or myth theory, P. Jensen, cited the

Gilgam~sh

myths as providing a packground for Jesus' resurrection, when these
myths say nothing at all about such an occurrence.

183

For these reasons, it is doubted just how much the idea of
resurrection

c~~

be found in such ancient religion.

The references

that we do fi.1'1d are fewer than expected, somewhat ambiguous, and not
enough to account for the prominence that this belief supposedly
181..
reached. . Therefore Yamauchi asserts that the only goo. forYilucl-l

we

~2ve bo~h

clear and early evidence (before

resurrection is the Egyptian Osiris.

179

Cr~ist's

life) of a

However, this god provides no

Hooke, Ibid., p' 40; Pfleiderer, The Early Christian Conception
°9
" •

' - "op.c~
' - ' t ., p.
Ol~,....
vnI'J..Sv,

130

181

182
183
184

:anauchi, op.cit., I·larch 15, 1974, p. 4: Orr, op.cit., p. 250
Yamauchi, Ibid., p. 5. See also J.N.D.' Anderson, Christianity
and ComparatI;e Religion (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press,
1974 ), p. 39.
Yamauchi, Ibid. ; _l\nderson, Ibid. , p. 38.
Orr;

....

op,CJ..v.:

pp. 242-243, 25l.

See, fpr instance, Ibid. , p. 257

lSl
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inspiration for the Christian concept of resurrection, especially
since Osiris is always pictured as a mummy.

~e

did not stay on

earth 8.fter nis return to life, but rather descended to rule the
underworld.

This is a far cry from Jesus'.appearances to his

followers in this

~orld.

We must. look elsewhere to find any

inspiration for the narratives of Jesus' resurrection as depicted in
the New Testament. 185
Therefore we perceive that there is actually much less of a
basis for the ancient belief in the resurrection of gods than was
originally thought.

A few questionable references to such occurrences

do not provide the needed proof.

There is especially little basis

for the theory that these beliefs in othe:- cultures were just "floating
around" and that tney are the foundation and background for the

. t·~an t eac hO~ngs. 186
C·nr~s

Thus we see here a converging negative result when the legendary
or mythical theory of Jesus' resurrection is examined.

First, the

earliest narratives concerning this occurrence are too close to the
events themselves to allow any
all.

ti~s

legends to

1.... _ _ _

J:' _ _ _ ,:

.1..:.c::..vo:

..!..u~

..... c;u

_.
0.\1

This is especially true of Paul's list of appearances in I Cor.

15:;-8.

There was no gradual build-up of legends here.

direct and indirect

testi~cny

objection to this vie".

Secon~

the

from eyewitnesses is a very strong

That these witnesses were not lying is

185

Yamauchi, on.cit., ll!l:arch 15,1974, p. 5.; Cf.

186

Orr, on.cit., pp. 247, 256-257. Cf. also Pannenberg, Jesus--God
and Man, on. cit., p. 91. For some of the general disbelief·in
the Judaeo-Christian concept of resurrection, note the Hebrew
and Greek responses to the idea in ~'::k. 12: 18; Acts 17: 31- 32;

26:8.

~ooke,

on.cit., p. 68.
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agreed by all,

men do not suffer tremendous diSCOffifort and

fo~

even death for what is known to be a lie.

It·is also

agree~

all that they at least actually believed that they had really
something.

by
~

The.refore it is i::npossi ble to assume that they reported

a legend or ancient myth as having actually occurred, for they would
both know that they were lying when they narrated literal appearances
of Jesus and they could not have actually believed that they had
really seen hi::l.
that Jesus

the~

Some event had to have occurred which convinced
~as

risen, otherwise there would have

to invent the narratives.
with another.

bee~

the need

This is why this theory is usually coupled

A legend does not provide such realistic impetus.
t~eories

But the other key

(swoon and Visionary) were also

io~~d

to

be inadequate.
Third, there are some pri=.ary differences between the
resurrection of ve:etation gods and
person.

The paral181$

little in COffimon.

bet~een

~he

nonhisto~ical

resurrection of a historical

the two types of beliefs have very

?ourth, a comparison of the New Testament narratives

1\-i th the stories of these vegetation gods reyeals further t:':a t the

supposedly
the~e

simila~

is rep-l

do~bt

characteristics are usually missing.
as to the

p~esence

In addition,

of real resurrection stories

in ancient mytholOQr and the extent to which they appear.

~here

is

certainly no actual basis to believe that these myths were siTIply
"floating around" in Jesus' ti::le.

For these and other reasons, this

theory must be rejected as being inadequate to explain Jesus'
187
·
resurrec t lone
187

As Orr asserts, it simply lacks any historical

ot!'ler reasons could also be given against the legendary or
mythical theory. For instance, we are left without any adequate
explanation for the be6innings of the church or for the belief
in the e~pty tomb if this theory ~ere correct. This ~riter has
for~ulated a list of 33 total reasons (revolving arounu points
such as those enumerated i~ the four ~ajor criticis~s above) for
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foundation and relies too much on highly questionable com?arisons.
We

can-~ot

dismiss facts just by pointing to artificial mythical

..
188
orl.gl.ns.
Eultmann's mOQification of this theory also fails for
reasons.

s~ilar

First, his reliance on gnostic influences upon the

resurrection of Jesus must be rejected for almost the same reasons
as those raised above for rejecting the influences from other ancient
mythologies.

The comparisons are not as close as might be expected

with regards to the resurrection and these myths surely could not
have given rise to the belief in this event, as already explained.
Bultmann must have realized this himself,

howeve~~

because he does

not try to make gnostic sources account for the basic foundation of
the New

Testa~ent

resurrection nar.ratives.

Rather, we have noted

above that he utilizes these myths to explain ueriuhery Dortions of
the resurrection such as Jesus' exaltation over all cosmic powers.
This does not explain the core proclamation of a

rise~

Jesus at all

anQ thus cannot be the basis of these claims in the earliest church.
Second,

Bultma~~~ls

scientific world view is outdated.

~e

can

no longer rule out miracles a priori because of a belief in a
mechanistic, closed universe that rejects the miraculous from the
outset (as pointed out in chapter three above).
Eultmann dces, as we have already seen. 189

Yet, this is what

Physicist Werner

rejecting this theory.
188 Orr; ou.cit., pp. 2~5-2~
/
. 6 , 253.
189

Eul tmann, "Ne;-; Testa.m.ent and. !i!ythologyll in Kerygma and l.:yth,
ou.cit., pp. 4-5 for instance.
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Schaaffs,19
cri ticism.

0

and philosopher Gordon Clark 19l both agree in this

I~iracles

cannot be excluded in this way because of the

modern scientific world in which we live today.

Such an approach

is not valid.
Third, theologian John Macquarrie also criticizes

Bult~ann

for

his arbitrary diszissal of the resurrection without any investigation
whatsoever,19

2 due to his lack of studying the historical evidence.

As with Eurne, just such an investigation may have revealed the
resurrection to be a probable event.

Kacquarrie also notes the

defective scientific view involved. 193
These second and third criticisms are very substantial ones
indeed.

They aTe some of the strongest arguments against Eultmann,

who is seen as using an

o~tdated

and ineffective view of science,

as well as ne;lecting any historical investigation at

The

resurrection of Jesus can no longer be rejected for these reasons.
In order to ascertain if this event has actually occurred, it must
be investigated.

It cannot be ruled out a priori as done by Eultmann,

In addition, Eultmann's view still fallsprey especially to the
first and second major criticisms listed above.

190

, Q1

-" -

The eaY"liest

Schaaffs often directs his attack specifically at Bultmann for
using an outdated scientific world view, a criticis~ ~hich
nullifies 3ultmann's rejection of the miraculous. It is not
possible to handle miracles in such a way, as if they -uere
strictly impossible from the start. See Schaaffs, op.cit.,
pp. 13, 15, 24-25, 31, 60, 64.
Clark also realizes that Bultmann's defective scientific understanding cannot be used to rule out miracles today. See Clark,
"Eul tmann' s Three-Storied Universe" in Gae-oelein, OPe ci t. ,
pp. 218- 219.

192
193

Eul tmal"..n, "Hew Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and
op.cit., p. 38 for example.
Macquarrie, OPe cit., pp. 185-186.

l~yth,
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narratives are too close to the events to refer to them
myths.

si~ply

Also, the eyewitness testimony rules out this theory.

as
As

mentioned above, to refer to the resurrection as a myth does not
explain why the original disciples came to relate their experiences
with the risen

Jesus~

Even Bultmann admits that they

that Jesus rose from the dead.

194

r~ally

believed

But something had to cause this

:b::yths in other religions or the de v e3:opment of later legends

belief.

cannot account for the begin..'"ling of thi"s belief because this is no
basis from which to project the original resurrection appearances,
which would otherwise be pure lies.

The disciples would not have

actually believed that they had seen Jesus, no matter how prominent
other such stories may have been (and we have seen that they were
com~on).

not that

They could not therefore have believed that Jesus

had actually appeared to them nersonally unless they had been otherwise deceived.
the answerc

19'

This is probably why

Bultmannsug~ests

visions as

But, as we have seen, this and other such theories

of deception are also quite inadequate.

But legends or myths are

especially inept at providing the needed impetus.

Therefore Eultmann

also fails in his attempt to explain away the literal resurrection
of Jesus.
~s

pointed out by :Brown, this legend or myth theory is rejected

196
theologial:S "'0""--I.
u.a.~.

Eornkap,m points out that there is a

decisive lack of comnon ground between this theory and the Kew Testament

194

Bul tmann, "Xew Testament and 2.1ythology" in Kerygma and
on.cit., p. 42.

195

Ibid.

196

Brown, "The Resurrection and Eiblical Criticism", on.cit., p. 233.

I;~yth,
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narratives. 197

Pannenberg likewise asserts that such 1eGencs cannot

account for Jesus' resurrection. 198

197
198

Bor~~amm,

on.cit., p. 185.

Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man,

on.cit.~

pp. 90-91.

Chapter VII.

Possibility Number Two: That the Resurrection TIid
Occur, But That it Cannot be Demonstrated
A.

Spren Kierkegaard: An Introduction

The second major possibility to

ce

dealt with is that the

resurrection of Jesus did occur, but that this
demonstrated.

occu~rence

canr.ot be

1;7e will first examine the views of a very significant

scholar who held this opinion.

This theologian and

philosopher~

Spren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), is probably the best-known representative
of this viewpoint.
Although Kierkegaard was not the first scholar to formulate a
hypothesis such as this, he popularized this view in a way ,'[hich has
influenced twentieth century theology immensely.

He has been chosen

here as the primarJ representative of this view because of the affect
which his work has exerted on many contemporary theologians.
influence is especially apparent, for instance, in this
treat~ent

of

~iracles.

p._omans~n,
.
1918,1

.

var~ous

Eeginning with Karl Earth's
th eo 1 og~ca
. 1 sc h 00 1 s

0f

This

scho~ar's

E~ist1e

to the

th
~ ought"nave f 0 11 owe d

Kierkegaard in postulating that the miraculous cannot be demonstrated
to have occurred in any way_
resurrection.

1

This is especially true of the
event is often affirmed in various

The occurrence

For the relation between Earth and the nineteenth century liberal
theology which his thought was to replace, see the brief summation
in Chapter Six, footnote number one. Earth's neo-orthodox theology
as a whole was indebted to Kierkegaard for much of its framework
and foundation, alid for many of its key facets. See, for instance,
Bernard Ramm, A Randbook of Contemnorar Theolo
(Grand Rapids:
William. E. Eerd1Ilan's Publishing Company, 1966 , pp. 89-92.
172

113

...

ways, with the understanding that there is no way that it can be
verified or proven.

2

In fact, it is probable that even

theologians since Barth who reject any belief

i~

~ost

of the

a real resurrection

of Jesus still manifest the influence of Kierkegaard in their belief
that this event was not meant to be proven anyway.
are simply not open to objective verification.'

Such miracles

We will deal with

the reasoning behind such assertions ·below.
It is mainly for these reasons that.Xierkegaard has been chosen
here as the representative of this viewpoint.
has exercised mu.ch

influe:l~c

on

twe~tieth

This Denish scholar

century theology.

view of miracles was especially influential.

As will be

His

sho~

in

the next chapter, a very large portion of contemporary theology has
followed Kierkegaard in holding that miracles cannot be

de~onstrated,

whether these occurrences are accepted as really happening or not.
He is thus an excellent example of one who believes that miracles
such as the resurrection did occur but that any attempts at
demonstrating their validity are fruitless and misleading.
Before we proceed to en examination of Kierkegaard's views
concerning miracles, it will be advantageous to look briefly at some
of the intellectual background fo= his polemic.
with most other well-known

thia~ers,

Perhaps more than

muoh of this scholar's thought

is derived from personal experiences, such as his observation of the

2

See Daniel ~ller, on.cit., pp. 80-84; cf. Ramm, Ibid.,
19-80, 89-92. In the next chapter we will discuss some
theologians ~ho were influenced by Kierkegaard in their
of the resurrection with the stipulation that it cannot

3

See, for example, Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ a.nd :.rytholo
(New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958 , pp. 61-62, 11-12, 80, 84.

pp. 14-16,
of these
acceptance
be demonstrated.
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conditions in his native land of Denmark.
Kierkegaar~

experienced a difficult boyhood.

Apparently because

of family problems and also because of a physical deformity (his
back was crooked and he limped), he endured acute periods of melancholy
which 3eemed to be continually present in his life.
admission he

suffe~ed

4 By his own

greatly from this daily depression, which was

complicated by the conviction that he had been singled out in order
to suffer for others.

These emotions

cau~ed

him a great amount of

consternation and kept him from the real joy in life which oight
otherwise have been a~tainable.5
It was at least partially due to this intense melancholy and
conviction that he must suffer for others that Kierkegaard encountered
two other experiences which had a tremendous affect upon his life.
First, he felt obliged to break off his engagement to his lover,
Regina Olson.

Although both loved each other very ::uch: Kj.erkegaard

felt that somehow the break was God's guidance and will for his life.
Eut because he still loved her, he struggled much with his feelings.
Ris writings reveal this battle which he waged with himself.

His

action seemed to be attributable to the melancholy. from which he
still suffered.

3ut nonetheless, this broken engagement led to an

immense amount on writing on his part.

Ris

t;~e

was now spent in

4 Nartin J. Reinecken,

'~pren Kierkegaard", in A Handbook of Christian
Theolo.Q:'ians, edited by Martin C. Marty and Dean G. Peerman
(Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 125-126.

5

S~ren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for 1::y Work as an Author,

edi ted by Eenjamin nelson, translated by Walter Lowrie (I;ew York:
and Ro~, ~~blishers, 1962) pp. 76-80. Cf. also ~einecken,
lbid., p. 125.
~arper
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publishing his views on

vari~us

subjects, especially

theolo~

and

philosophy.Eis rate of production over the coming years has rarely
been

especially in the diversity of the subjects

e~ualled,

were covered.

~hich

6

Second, Kierkegaard attacked a weekly news sheet

n~ed

the Corsair.

This publication openly denounced many public figures, embarrassing
them in the process.

Kierkegaard had hoped to eypose this literary

tirade with the help of other prominent men of Copenhagen who also
disliked the methods of this paper.

Eut he received no help and

thus suffered all of the brunt of the return attack upon himself.
And the Corsair was quite vicious in its presentations of this
Danish thinker, deriding him because of his physical deformity.

For

instance, it made light of the unequal lenght of his two legs.

This

procedure continued in the paper for approximately one year and seon
he was looked upon 7.ith much derision by the public.
accepted this
for him.

treat~ent

But Kierkegaard

as part of the suffering which was ordained

It caused him to become even more withdrawn fron society

and resolved to continue the work he had begun.1 .
One

convictio~

that Kierkegaard continued to act upon

~as

his

polemic against the presence of Hegelian-influenced theoloo,y in
Denmark.

The Hegelian version of Christianity encouraged people to

reason clearly, as if this was all there was involved in becoming a
Christian.

The popular belief in Denmark was that being a good Danish

6 Kierkegaard, Ibid., see Appendix A, written by the

tr~~slator,

pp. 162-163; Heinecken, Ibid., pp. 126-121.

1 Kierkegaard, Ibid., see

A~pendix ~ written by the translator,
pp. 163-165; cf. Kierkega~rd's own assessment, pp. 94-95. Cf. also
Heinecken, Ibid., p. 128.
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citizen and being a Christian were almost synonymous.

8

Kierkegaard

attacked these ,resu?positions, pointing out that Christianity is
much more than a life of easy living.

Rather, it is a total

transformation of the individual, based upon the personal recognition
of one's being a sinner.

It involves a commitment to God through

faith in the death of Christ to pay fer one's sins.
the imitation of Christ. 9

The result is

In fact, the chief 'theme of all of his

Wl'i tings ".as to speak to those living in "Christendom" to inform
them about ho~ they could become t~~c New Testament Christians. lO
This brief background
Kierkegaard's

ar6~ents

~ill

make the proceeding

more comprehensible.

prese~tation

of

After endeavo=ing to

understand the reasoning behind his treatment of

~iracles,

a critique

of these views will then be presented in order to ascertain their
ability to support Kierkegaard' s arguments.'
before passing, however, that the two

~ain

It should be mentioned

texts which will be used

here are Kierkegaard's Concludin~ Unscientific Postscrint
Philosonhical Fragments. 12

8

a

1l

and his

This is for a few very important reasonsw

Kierkegaard's polemic against the IlChristianJ.ty" of his day is
especially strong in his work Attack U'Oon "Christ'endom", translated
by Walter Lowrie (Princetont Princeton University Press, 1972).
For hi's evaluation of Danish C~ristianity such as spoken of here,
compare pp. 132-133i 139, 145, 149, 164-165 for 'instance, or see
the essay "";'iha t Christ's Judgment is About Official Christiani tyll,
Ibid., p,. 117-124. For a brief discussion of Kierkegaard's
attack against the influence of Hegelianism upon Danish Christianity
as mentioned above: see also Eeinecken, Ibid., pp. 127-128, 134-135.

/For Kierkegaard's own evaluation of what a real Christian is, including
these points just mentioned, see Ibid., p,. 23, 149, 210, 21;, 221,
268, 280, 287, 290 for exam,le. 5einecken agrees with this summary,
Ibid., pp. 131, 134.
10
neinecken, Ibid., p. 127.

11 This work is translated by David Swenson (Princeton: Pri::2ceton
University Press, 1974).
12

This work is also translated by David Swenson (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1974).
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The Danish scholar himself relates to us that the former

vol~e

is both the turning point of his work as an author and the transition
l
between nis aesthetic works and his religious ones. ;

In addition,

quite a large portion of this work concerns one of the main topics
which is to be discussed here and other related thoughts.

14-

On the

other hand, the primary problem treated by the latter work concerns
whether or not the Christian faith can be based.on historical events 15
and this is the key question to be dealt with in this chapter.
t~us

After

perceiving these introductory facts, it is now possible to

proceed to our presentation of Kierkegaard's views.
B.

Spren Kierkegaard's Argument and a Critique

As a theologian and philosopher, Kierkegaard's writin6s were not
overly popular beyond Scandinavia and Germany until the twentieth
century. 16

As pointed out above, he often reacted against both the

"official Christianity" of his day, which was very defective in terms

13 Kierkegaard, The Point of View for :r~y Work as an Author, on. ci t.,
pp. 13-14, 53, 97.
14 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscrint, on.cit., pp. 8697, 115-343 for example.

15 Ibid., p. 323.

For instance, see Philosophical Fragments, on.cit.,
pp. 93-110< For the importance of these two texts as the writiugs
of Kierkegaard which most influenced contemporary theology and
philosophy, see Eeinecken's "Spren Kierkegaard", in :darty and
Peerman, on.cit., pp. 131-132.

16 Runes, on.cit., p. 160.
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of the New

Testa~e~t

Eegelianism.

17

Christianity.

definition, and against the philosophy of

30th trends were leading people away

It was at least partially as a result of his bold

stand taken against these ideas that he was not very
his own time.

fro~ real

Eowever, his works were revived in this

both secular and reliSious
Martin

existentialis~,

~eidegger

Rnd

Je~n-Pa~l

in

popul~r

ce~tury

by

by such scholars as
Sartre.

18

Today

or~e

cannot even deal adequately with existentialism without noting
the

in~luence

of Kierkegaard and the

i~petus

which he gave to

the begin~ings of this ~hiloso~hy.19
. Kierkegaard for=ulated and defended the well-known philosophical
state::ent t!1at IITruth is Subjectivity".20

Therefore, while several

forms of philosophy teach that the way to knowledge is to seek
objective truth in one form or another, this is viewed as being
i~possible.

We can only achieve the truth by subjectivity.

fact, a 1 1 eterna 1 trut.h and va 1 ues are based upon t.1S
h " Sllb"Jec t"1V1"t y. 2l
:Do objective approaches have a..'1Y validity at all?

For I:ierkega.ara.,

ob jecti ve reflection can yield objective truth, sucb as mat21er::a tics

17

18

In addition to the references listed above, see Ja~es Collins,
'?ai th ani !-'.ei'lection in !<ierkegaard" in A Kierkeg-aarc. Cri tiaue,
edi tee. by rtoi7arc. A. Johnson and l';iels Thulstrup ( Chicag-o: Henry
~egnery Company, 1962), pp. 141-142, 147-148. Cf. Lev Shestov,
Athens and Jerllsale~, translated by Bernard Martin (No city:
Ohio University Press, 1966), p. 242.
:Daniel Fu11e::', on.cit., pp. 80-81, 84; Heinecken, "S¢'ren
in ~arty and Peerma!l, on.cit., pp. 127, 142. Cf.
~unes, on.cit., p. 124.

Kierkegaard"~

19

See, for example, Wesley Barnes, The Philso-ohy and Literature of
Existentialis:J., on. ci t., pp. 48, 56- 57, 100-102; ?.a.m:n, 1:. Eandbook
of Conte~Do:rar? Tbeology, on.cit., pp. 46-47.

20

Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscrint, on.cit., title
of Part Two, Cha~ter II, p. 169.

21

Ibiri., p. 173.
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and history.

. an
1n

'-'

o~Jec

In other words, objective facts can be true, especially

t 1ve
.
. t'l...
sense as W1!l

t'-!!e

2
. ht
a b ove d"1SC1P l'lnes. 2 . ~·Ie :llg.

phrase it this ':i2.y: c ra tior.al, objective approach to reality can
yield

~

facts, but it cannot lead to eternal truth, which is a

An example which is introduced here by this Danish.thinker will
serve to illustrate this point.

A patient from an insane asylum

succeeded in escaping from the institution.
have to express

hi~self

He knew that he would

sanely when he arrived in a nearby city, lest

someone perceive the truth of the matter and send hi= back.
walked along he picked up a ball and
coat.

p~t

it into the pocket of his

This continually bounced against his body with every step

that he took.

Inspired by this, the patient began repeatin: to

hi:::self each ti:r"e it happened, ":Bang, the earth is round ".
.....,

As he

i7hen he

,

reac .. ec. the city he attempted to convince one of his friends that
he was sane by speaking objectively.
the earth is

roun~".

the doctor that he

So he again repea:te:i, 113ang,

Eut, alas, instead of being able to convince
sane, he only impressed upon him thst he was

~as

still sick and ir: need of medical assistance. 23
The point that Kierkegaard thus expresses is the questionableness
of objective truths.
~ade

was

~uite

is round).

The state::!lent which the patient .from t:i1e asylum

true and

espe~ially

objectively true

3ut it was of little consequence.

see that, while such objective statements
do not lead us to

et~rnal

"Truth is Subjectivity".

22

Ibid., pp. 173-174.

23

Ibid., p. 17 L •

truth.

c~~

(that the earth

Therefore

~e

are to

indeed be true, they

In this respect they fail, because

160

?or Kierkesaard, this subjective factor finds its culmination
in the idea termed "passion".
· ....
.. ~s
. !a~
~ 'th
sub Jec
. . ~v~'ty
.• 24
of this scholar.

The highE'st of the passions of human

This concept is a central one in the thou;ht

It opposed that portion of

~estern

philosophy which

reached its apex in Eesel, a tradition which stresseCl the i:J.portance
. f or .Know 1 e d gee 25
o f reason as "'h
~.e b as~s

This understanding of faith (as the highest of the passions) as
the basis of knowlecge is an

import~~t

of Kierkegaard's approach to God.

factor when we are speaking

Since subjectivity is the way to

truth and faith is the highest expression of subjectivity, it follows
that

~e

can only

inward faith.
we cooe t

0

co~e

to know the truth about God by this subjective,

It is an inner p::-ocess, a faith-experience, 'oy '"hic!1

.
t
k no~ aoou

'0'

_~~.

26

Since God can only be known by subjectivity such as is expressed
in faith, it is tr!erefore plain that we cannot gain such kr..olo'ledge by
any for:ns of objecti vi ty, such as by reason.
to approach God by reason we find that

~e

In fact, when ""e try

is inaccessible.

It is

plainly i~possible to discover truth about ~oa Objectively.2 7
~he

s~e

is true of the Ch::-istian faith as a whole, because

Christianity also opposes all objectivity.

Kierkegaard even goes

" ...~ obJectl."ve
"
.
.. ....
28
",".....
... rJ..s +.
_J..anJ... t
y '~s paganJ..s
~J.c.
an far as to say ';;,'28.

24

25

Ibid., pp. 11::"

I"cid., "0. 17S and
on.cit., p. 97.
Y.ie::-ke;aard~

27
28

177-178.
3.a:n~,

Ibid.~

A

~andbook

of Conte:n'Oorary Theolory,

pp. 117-118, 178-179.

Ibid., p. 178 and Y.ier:<egaard' s Philosonhical Frag':!J.ents,
0'0. ci t., pp. 55-57.
Kierkegaard, Conc1udinF.:' Unscientific Postscri'Ot, Ibid., ?p. 42, 116.
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The culmination of these thoughts is in Kierkegaard's convictions
that since God is a Subject, He can therefore only be knoun
subjectively.

Thus we cannot attempt any proofs for His existence,

nor can we conjure up any
reason.

argumen~s

concerning God by the use of

It is little wonder that Kierkegaard does not try to

.. t e H"~s
d emonsvra

" t ence. 29

ex~s

This brings us to the crux of this presentation.

It has been

shown that Kierkegaard rejected verification and proof for the
existence of God and for the, Christian faith as a whole.
objective approach is clearly improper.

Such an

Christian truth is achieved

by subjectivity.
For these same reasons, Kierkegaard also rejected any attempts
to base the truth of the Christian faith on historical knowledge. 30
In this he followed his predecessor, Gotthold E. Lessing (1729-1781),
who postulated that "accidental truths of history can never become
the proof of necessary truths of reason. ,,;1

By this Lessing explains

his conviction and belief that one cannot support Christian doctrines
by referring to historical events such as the resurrection.
words, while Lessing asserts that he has no historical

In other

groa~ds

on

which to deny the resurrection of Jesus, this is no reason to believe

29

;0
;1

Ibid., p. 178 and Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fra~ ents, on.cit.,
ppo 49, 55; cf. Robert L. Perk.ins, S ren Kierkegaard Richmond;
John Knox Press, 1969), p. 17.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Ibid., pp. 86-97.
See also James 3rown, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber and Barth
(New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 51-60.
Gotthold E. Lessing, Lessing's Theologi~~: Wr~t~n~s, ed~~ed by
Henry Chadwick (London: A. 3.nd C..Black ~"to.., 1.9,6), p. ".
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other doctrines of the Christian faith as a result.

One aay, indeed,

affirm the other doctrinal beliefs of Christianity (as Lessing claims
that he does), but this must be on another basis other
of the historicity of certain events.

th~~ t~~t

To argue from such events

would be to reason from accidental historical facts to the necessary

tr~ths of one's faith, and this is not al:owable. 32
L2ssiilg adds that this division between historical facts and
religious faith "is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across,
however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap.,,33
Thus we perceive that the gap between these two categories is what
comprises the barrier over which Lessing cannot find a way.

There

is no means he can discover which will allow one to proceed from an
argument in the first category to a belief in the second category.
It is doubtful,

ho~ever,

if Lessing actually believed in a

historical resurrection like he appears to affirm (as noted above).
For instance, when writing in another essay about eighteenth century
rationalist Hermann ?eimarus' rejection of the resurrection, he admits
that even if the objections which were raised were valid oues,
Christianity would still exist because the acceptance of Christian
doctrines depends u,on faith and not upon historical events. 54
Kierkegaard realized

32
33

~.,

pp.

Ibid., p.

Even

that Lessing's affirmations about events such

53-55.

55.

Ibid., this essay.about Reim~rus appears on pp. 9-29.
Daniel Fuller, on.cit., p. 32.

Cf.

183
as the

resurrectio~

were actually only concessions made by him to

highlight the point he was making. 35
In addition, Lessing relates that historical truths cannot be
proven anyway.

Thus, even if it is held that events have occurred,

it canrLot be uroven that they did.

In a similar way, just because

the resurrection is believed to have actually occurred, it
be nrcven to

ca~~ot

h~7e been historical, but only accepte~ by faith. 56

We can therefore better perceive how Lessing could

see~ingly

accept

an event even when it could not be demonstrated to have happened and
when it could not be the basis for other beliefs.
Lessing's formulation, whereby history is divorced fro= faith,
has exercised much influence since his tioe.
Kant borrowed from

hi~

For example, Tmmanuel

in making a similar distinction between the

truths of God and historical fact.

Separating these two categories

is "a mighty chasm, the overleaping of which ••• leads at once to
anthropomorphism.,,37
of faith

ca~not b~

Thus we find once again that religious truths

supported by history.

And, as with Lessing,

neither can events of history such as the resurrection be proven.
In fact, ttis event cannot be demonstrated to have occurred literally
because as such it is an offense to reason.

38

55 Kierkegaard, Concluding unscientific Postscript, on.cit., p. 88.
Cf. Fuller, ~., pp. 34:35.
Lessing, on.cit., p.

53; cf. p. 54.

See Fuller,

Ibi~.,

p. 34.

Immanuel Kant, Reli~ion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated
by Theodore ~. Greene and Hoyt E. Hudson (New Ycrk: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1960), pp. 58-59, note. Cf. Fuller, Ibidaj p. 57.
38

Kant, Ibid., p. 119, note.

Cf. Fuller, Ibid., pp. 37-38.
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Kierkegaard also followed Lessing in this belief that cccurrences
in history could

~ot

support religious truths of faith.

Kierkegaard

expressly states that "there can in all eternity be no direct
transition from the historical to the eternal ••• ,,39" This is the "case
both for the eyewitnesses to the facts and for those who are removed
by generations.

~T.~ether

the believer was a contemporary of Jesus or

not, he is not able to base faith on reason or

~istory.40

This stance by Kierkegaard is actually the key to this discussion.
Since truth is subjective, then objective approaches such as the
historicity of certain events cannot lead one to a decisi.ve faith or
41
to eternal happiness.
To be sure, this scholar believes that Jesus
was a historical person in that he entered the time sequence of this
world as a man.
rose again. 42
comprise the

It

~as

also in history that Jesus lived, died and

But even though these events actually occurred, they
supre~e

paradox of the Christian faith because the

doctrine of the incarnation is seemingly inexplicable and difficult
to grasp logically.

Such events are contradictory because they

assert that God has become man, contrary to all reason.

Even though

this incarnation really did take place in history, one cannot
historically (or otherwise) demonstrate such events in Jesus' life

39
40
41

42

Kierkegaa.rd Concluding Unscientific Fostscrint,on.cit., p. 89;
cf. p. 47.
See Ibid., pp~ 38, 89, 190 and Kierkegaard's Philoso~~ical Fragments,
on.cit., pp. 108-109 for instance. See footnote number 46 below.
j

Kierkegaard, Conc 1 uding Unscientific Postscrint, Ibid., p. 33, 42,
45. On Kierkegaard's belief that history is an objective approach,
compare Ibid., p. 173 for instance, in addition to the discussion
a.bove.
Ibid., pp. 188~ 194. See also Eeinecken, IIS~ren Kierkegaard", in
Marty and Peerman, op.cit., p. 131; cf. p. 138 and :Erc";';""!!., o"Dscit.,
p. 59.
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like the resurrection because it is impossible tc demonstrate a
contradiction (even one that really occurred).

Historical proofs

cannot make such eyents any less of a contradiction or paradox. 4 ;
Therefore, Kierkegaard postulated that these events cannot be
the basis of faith, as mentioned above.

But, in

addition~

they are

to be believed even though it is not possible to demonstrate that
they have occurred.

Thus it is not only impossible to base one's

fai th on objective, historical events (since fai t'h is subjectivity),
but it is also impcssible to prove these events.
of Jesus' incarnation are an enigma to history

~~d

The various facets
the objective

discipline of history is too suspect and inexact to yield such

/'4

proof.~

For this reason! Kierkegaard discouraged arguing anc debating about
the truths of faitho45
The direct result of this emphasis upon theology is the very
important concept termed

the~.

Kierkegaard, inspired here by

Lessing, makes much use of this idea.

46

For Kierkegaard, God carJlot

·be determined to exist by "proofs", as mentioned earl:i.ero

!:-ei ther

can His existence be demonstrated by pointing to events

history

4;

i~

Ibid.! pp" 199-190; cfo p~ 30. Cf. Ramm, A Eandbook
of Contemnorary Theology, on.cit., pp. 7, 94-95 • .

Kierkegaa!'d.~

44

Kierkegaard, ~., pp. 42-43.and Kierkegaard's Philosonhical
Fragments, on.cit., p. 108. Cf. Brown, op.cit., p. 59.

45

Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscrint,

46

See Brown, on.cit., pp. 57-59; Perkins, on.cit., p. 17; Ramm, !
Handbook of Contemporary Theology~ on.cit., p. 79 and Schaeffer,
The God ';Tho is There, on. ci t., p. 21. Kierkegaard does no·t accept
this idea exactly as it appears in Lessing, however. For Lessing
the leap is made by persons who are removed from the historical
events by time (perhaps by hundreds of years), but who still wish
to exercise faith. The leap from history to faith would not be
needed if we had all been contemporaries of the event in question.
But for Kierkegaard, the leap from historical events in the life

~.,

pp. 46-47.
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such as the incarnation, as we have just seen.

As long as we hold

to such objective methods of verification, we will never understand
God's existence.

It is only when we let go of such proofs

~~d

accept God by faith that we will realize that God does indeed exist. 47
This

~ct

of abandoning all of our proofs and all of our attempts to

reach God by reason, however brief a moment it may' be, is termed a
48
lean.
This leap takes place when we let go ?f all of these objective
attempts to prove God by our reason and accept Him by faith.
So it is very clear that, for Kierkegaard, the resurrect,ion of
Jesus provides no basis for faith.

Although this event is believed to

be true, it cannot be demonstrated to be such.

It must

accepted by faith apart from any historical logic.

si~ply

be

Once again we

are required to reject this proof and perceive God without such a
crutch.

Thus,

~e

are to take the leap to God's existence by faith,

without any reliance upon historical fact.

Lessing's ditch is

bridged by faith, as one leaps from the facts of Jesus' life to
faith in him apart from any verification.

So far, Kierkegaard's position concerning subjectivity has been
investigated.

~o

repeat briefly, this concept is viewei as being the

proper way to finding the truth.

A very clear statement to this effect
,
40
is "Subjectivity is truth, subjectivity is reality .. " '" This inward

of Jesus tc faith in these events must be made by all believers
because there is no benefit in being a contemporary (see
Kierkegaard, Ibid., p. 89; cf. ~rown, Ibid., pp. 58-59).

47
48

49

Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, on.cit., p. 53.
Ibid.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscrint,

o~.cit.,

p. 306.
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ap~x

quality of transforlnation reaches its

in passion.

In fact,

passion itself is strictly a subjective factor which cannot be
objective at all. 50
This obviously leaves very little room for objectivity.
Christianity is opposed to all that is objective.

Indeed,

If we rely on an

objective faith we are said to be reverting to paganism. 51

There is

actually even a lind t placed on reason, dicta.ting its boundaries.
This is because Kierkegaard believes that reason can only advance
to a certain point, beyond which it is not operative.
it cannot proye God.

For instance,

:Sut even when reason is taken to its limit in

relation to God, Be is still no closer than before. 52
We should also mention the
believes in God even though

t~is

~ersonal

i~s

One

exercise of faith is not based upon

any logical or other objective grounds.
attempt to prove

quality of this faith.

own validity.

Neither does this faith

Rather, the decision to act in

fai th involves the le2.1' and one's subsequent embracing of subjective
inwardness, which ultimately leads to a no!t.rational passion. 53
It now remains for us to
these views.

~e

atte~pt

to ascertain the accuracy of

concluded above (in chapter four) that in theological

investigations, reason is temporally first while faith is more
important, especially as an end result.

But here we have seen that

50 Ibid., pp. 51, 111, 177.
51

Ibid., pp. 42, 116.

52 Kierkegaard, ?hiloso~hical Fragments, op.cit., pp. 53, 55, 57.
53 Ibid., pp. 53-55 and Kierkegaard's Concludin~ Unscientific
?ostscrint,

o~.cit.,

pp. 118, 209 for instance.
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Kierkegaard gives no essential place to reason at all, while beginning
and

en~ing

the theological process with faith.

This leads to three

major criticisms of Kierkegaard's approach, all of which are directed
at the very heart of his polemic.

One criticism concerns his

exclusive use of faith and the other two revolve around his resultant
denial of any essential place being give to objective, reasonable
approaches to Christianity.
The first major criticism concerns this scholar'S

inte~nal

consistency, as it questions the very point of whether Kie:::-kegaard
was successful in his
Christianity out of

O'7n

attempt to leave the objective

ap~roach

to

~is view of faith. 54 It was concluded earlier

(in chapter four) that :::-eason. by definition,55 was the grou.~ds for
all convictions and decisions.
reason.

Any defense of a belief is also

Even the ability to think coherently is

~eason.

This

definition clearly shons, in full opposition to Kierkegaard's
teaching, that

~ational

thought (as

is the very basis of our knowledge.

oppose~

to subjective thought)

In other words, Kierkegaard

himself could not aven provide such a polemic in defense of faith
without relyin; on reason.

This is because reason must be the basis

To be sure, Kierkegaard did not assert that there were no
objective truths. He did allow for such. However"objective
approaches s~?ly cannot lead to eternal truth and neither can
the objective be the basis for faith. See Heinecken's "Spren
Kierkegaard" , in ?:arty and Peer:nan, op. cij;., pp. 139-l4l.
55

We also found scholarly support of this definition as well, so
as not to attempt to settle such philosophical issues simply by
referring to definitions.
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of his conviction that faith is primary.

Reason must likewise

have compelled his uecision to act through such a faith-comwitment.
Kierkegaard even

m~~es

use of logic and reason in his polemic

in favor of the way of faith,5 6 even though such an objective process
also finds its basis in the rational.
a defense of the
process.

pri~acy

Thus there could not even be

of faith apart from

Even though Kierkegaard does see

so~e

som~

sort of rational

value in the objective,

as noted above, he does not believe that it occupies a place of
importance in reaching God.
temporally primary.

Neither does he accept reason as being

The objection here is not that he gives no

place at all to the objective, but that he does not realize that he
is making use of such reasonable approaches in his own approach to
God.

Therefore, even in his system, reason must be temporally first

in order ,for Kierkegaard to assert the importance of faith.
This can be demonstrated more clearly when we remember how
Kierkegaard postulated that truth is. found in subjectivity ar.d that
objectivity was not the way to God.

=e could assert this, for

instance, either by reasonable persuasion and rational
by intuitive convictior. and knowledge.

ar~ent

or

But now it is plain to see

that reason, and not passion, is the origin of each.

All processes

of reasonable persuasion and rational argument obviously involve
reason.

But we have also seen that even the basis of such intuitive

conviction or knowledge is reason.

Should he try to demonstrate

that this is not the case, this persuasion also becomes rational.
One

can.~ot

show how subjectivity is central without utilizing reason.

56 For Kierkegaard's use of logic and reason in his polemic, see
Reinecken's IISpren Kierkegaard" in Marty and Peerman, on.cit.,
p. 132; cf. pp. 127-128.
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Indeed, it
in the sense

~ould

th~t

even be impossible for Kierkegaard to think

he was accustooed to atall, except by reason.

lie

would be required to thin.1{ through his position apart fron the
formulating of any convictions 9 without the formulating of any
conclusions or without ·making any decisions in order to theorize
apart from a

ratio~al

process.

It is therefore obvious that

Kierkegaard did begin the process with reason, as he was not able
to simply start with faith.
It is

the~efore

somewhat ironical that the very element which

Kierkegaard sought to separate from faith (namely, objectivity) was
the basis upon which faith was built.

His very arguments aGainst

this conclusion proved raason to be an essential element, since the
very polemic ,'ras

r~tional.

Thus, however subjective or irrational

the entire system may be, this subjectivity has been formulated upon
a rational process, albeit a

disguise~

one.

Otherwise sucn

~

theoretical construction would not have been possible.
It is because of these factors that subjectivity, passion and
faith cannot be held to be temporally first.

This position belongs

to reason, even though faith is more important, especially in the end.
The second major criticism of Kierkegaard's system is that he
does away with all logical grounds which might support his thesis.
Even though it has been shown that Kierkegaard himself relies on an
objective foundation in spite of his protests to the cO'.1".:rary, he
still insists that there be no objective verification of faith.
is, of course, this scholar's express intention to do

~way ~ith

It
these

gTow""lds, but in so doing there is no objective criteria on i.hich his
claims may be based.

in other words, Kierkegaard is in error by

first denying a place to any objective basis for faith even when he
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unknowingly utilizes such a reasonable basis himself (criticism
number oIeabove).

Eut second, he continues to insist that faith

cannot be verifieo. a.t all.

Therefore, even though it is his

intention not to base faith on any o"i:>jective found2.tion, it i"s
because of this that one cannot ascertain if the
should be

accep'~ed

or not.

subse~uent

message

Since such faith is a personal, subjective

experience, ther'e is no reason someone else should likewise be
co~pelled

to accept it.

Or further, how would it be possible for one to know whether
the Christian fait!l Y[as the right religion?
urge faith in another system of belief.
exists, how

co~ld

One" could likewise

If no reasonable persuasion

Kierkegaard differentiate

~~d

choose between these

options?
As stat.ed earlier, since this faith which Kierkegaard proposes
is so subjective, it is even hard to differentiate between it and
human emotions such as elation, love

o~

even heartburn.

I~

other

words, Kierkegaard's subjectiveness is not capable of answering
these

~uestions

and those raised above because it cannot

de~onstrate

its own validity or tell if its own foundaticns are solid.

In the

end there is no real way to ascertain if such a faith has been
exercised in the proper way.
Even if Kierkegaard prefers a subjective faith, this does not
answer the

~uestion

of how he might be sure that this faith is valid

even for himself, let alone for others.

Just because this scholar

is n"ot interested. in any objective demonstration of the Christian
faith, it is nevertheless very important to be able to know if the
fai ~;h-commi tment which he is expounding is valid or not.

After all,
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faith is not

si~~ly

a cerebral exercise devoid of consequences if

it just happened to be false.

!~uch

is at risk for those

W!lO plac~

high value (indeed, eternal value) in their faith if it is fou-~d
to be illegitimate.
Kierkegaard speaks much of eternal truth, but it is hard to
distinguish between real beliefs and false ones if there is no
fac~ual

criteria.

is probable.

It

It is therefore essential to know if his system
beco~es

more obvious here that an objective, logical

faith would thus be in a much better position to ascertain its
trustworthiness than an irrational, subjective one

0

For these reasons, for faith to be intelligible it must have
some sort of objective groundwork.

If the objective is rejected, as

Kierkegaard does, then we must also abandon all hope of arr.iv.ing at
testable data about our beliefs.

It is true that Kierkegaard was

opposed to all such testing and demonstration, but without some
criteria such as this, it would be almost impossible to know if
such a faith was spurious or not.

Therefore we see that Kierkegaard's

system of positing a faith which culminates in passion and inwardness
is simply too subjective.

There must be some reasonable basis upon

which to build this faith.
There is also the problem that Kierkegaard claims that his
method of faith is the only way that a Christian can find eternal
happiness.

But we

s~bmit

that to abandon a rational basis for faith

and to disregard intellectual demonstration can lead to eternal
happiness only if one simply ignores any faith-related questions
that might arise, such as these which have been raised here.

One

would have to wear earmuffs and blinders of irrationality in order
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to

fo~sake

all needs and desires to rationalize just so

t~at

one

might achieve a te.:rporary and fleeting "eternal happiness ll "."I'hich
lasts only until the next doubt arises.

And the

~uestions

raised

here would still remain unanswered--one would never know if one's
faith-commitI!le~t

was valid or even if it was warranted in the first

place.
These first two criticisms alone are. enough to provide an
ade~uate

criti~ue

of Kierkegaard's view of the Christian faith.

Eut it is now possible to apply these two to his system with regards
to his rejection of proofs

demonstrations as the

~~d histori~al

basis of his nay to God.
The third major criticism of Kierkegaard is that his rejection
of any objective approach to the

Chr~stian

faith, including historical

verification, is no longer warranted in view of the preceding
criticisms.
primary.

t~o

It has been shown that reason must remain temporally

Subjective factors such as faith and passion are unquestionably

important, but these are to be based on reason.
some objective grounds for faith.

There must also be

There are some definite icplications

in these conclusions.
It was stated earlier that the resurrection of jesus was held
by Kierkegaard as not being a valid basis upon which to rest the
theological truths of faith.

The reason for this was that the

subjective was thought to be the true basis
events were believed to be of a

differen~

fo~

belief.

Such objective

category and are thus

rejected. 57

57

Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscier.tific Postscrint, on.c~~., p. 89.
See also Brown, on.cit., pp. 38-39 and Daniel Fuller, on.cit.,
pp. 34- 35.
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But all of these convictions must

cha~ge

when it is held

1) that reason is temporally first and 2} that faith should be
objectively verified, both of which were concluded above.
instance, since

reaso~

~or

is held to be temporally primary (criticism

number one here and chapter four above), one can no longer hold
that the subjective stands alone and apart from this objective basis
and neither can one negate the effectiveness of objective historical
events as a result.

In other words, with the former.basis for

religious truths dissolved (namely, subjective fa.ith), the

form~r

reason for rejecting historical events must also disappear.

This

is because it can no longer be maintained that historical verification
is

opp~sed

to an exculusively subjective faith, because it nas been

found that this faith is already based on an objective element,
namely reason.

And since this is the case, it must be realized that

this reason can be historical reason, logic, or another means of
reasonable verification.

At any rate, one could not be opposed to

such reasonable historical demonstrations

~hen

the objective element

of reaSO!l is alread:r inherent in the concept of faith, thereby
requiring some such objective approach.

In fact, the way is opened

for faith to be verified by any reasonable

app~oach

(or even several

at once).
It was also postulated above that faith must have some objective
criteria on

~hich

to base its claims so that it can be verified

(criticism number two here and chapter four above).

The use of

historical research provides an excellent means by which such
verification can be

Therefore, we perceive once again

tha t Kierkegaard I s thesis of subjectivity cannot stand.

·,T.nen this
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scholar's emphasis on the exclusiveness of subjectivity fails, so
does his

pol~~ic a;ci~st

such proofs as are shown to be probacle.

It has been shoion that faith must be confirmed as being the proper
approach to God.

Thus we can no longer rule out the confirmation

which is provided by verification, such as that from past events
which are found to be probable.

Such objectivedemenstration is

in fact demanded by the very nature of the two conclusions which we
have reached here, as faith must be shown to be

val~d.

For these reasouS, an exact inverse of Kierkegaard's
ships has therefore occurred.

rela~ion

Wnereas it was formerly not possible

to accept historical events as pointing to eternal truths (according
to this scholar), ..... e now understand that this is no longer true.
£istorical verification (and other such objecti~e demonstrations)
now becomes a help rather than a hindrance, as it serves to validate
and strengthen faith.

In this way both the subjective

fait~

and the

objective demonstration are perceived to compliment eaoh other.
These three criticisms against Kierkegaard must therefore be
accepted as being valid, as they apply to all stages of his polemic.
It was found that 2:is starting point was not subjective faith but
reason (criticism number one).

Thus Kierkegaard is internally

inconsistent frem the outset by postulating faith as the initial
starting point, but not realizing that he failed in this task himself.
Since the main body of his work is predominantly subjective, this
leads to another problem, namely that there is no way to ascertain
if his system is valid or not (criticism number two).
objective criteria

~ith

Wit~

no

which to test these views, one cannot know

if subjectivity is the best approach to God.

From these first two
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criticisms a third was deduced, that subjectivity is not solely
the right approach to God, sin.ce we must start with reason and mu.st
utilize so::ne objectiv-e criteria to verify faith.

Thus it was found

that one possible approach would be to use history to investi'gate
the Christian faith (ana the resurrection in particular) to see if
it offers a solid basis for faith.
Suffice it to say that the way has thus

be~n

opened

fo~

historical examination of events such as the resurrection.
occurrence is

fo~~d

,the
If this

to be historical, it could be used as a more

rational basis for Christian faith.
Although Eierkegaard's exclusively subjective basis for his
system fails, his eophasis on a fai th-co!ll!lli tment for sal'iration still
remains valid.

This is especially so if historical (or

is found to verify such belief.

ot~er)

evidence

This is because Kierkegaard is

correct in establishinG this as the central component of

Cr~istianity.

The same conclusion was also reached in chapter four above, where
it was

fo~d

the ::nost

that even though reason was temporally first, faith was

~mporta.::t

and essential element.

Therefore we shoul'd still

accept this conclusion as authoritative, especially with an objective
foundation.

Rierkegaard's concept of the faith that leads to

salvation and an authentic Christian life involves an individual:s
realizing that he is a sinner in need of repentance (a complete
change of his life).
surrender to God in

This repentance is achieved by a complete
fait~,

trusting the death of Jesus Christ on the

cross to pay for all personal sins.

The result is a total commitment

of the individual to God for a life of obedience, based upon the
death of the Son of God.

This total transformation of the person,

if genuine,

lea~s

to the joy of the Christian life.

This is real

faith. 58
This definition of faith set forth by Kierkegaard, as presented
here, is

~uite

a well-stated view.

It also accurately portrys the

New Testament teachings on this subject.

We agree with this scholar

that the summary just presented is the most important part of the
reason-faith relationship and as such it is essential for the
Christian belief in salvation.
in our concept of Christianity:

These teachings must therefore remain
But we also believe that there

are reasonable·evidences which help to validate these teachings.

58

For this definition of faith by Kierkegaard, see his Attack U"Oon
"Christena.oml~, on.cit., pp. 149, 210, 215, 221, 280, 287, for
in.stance. See especially Heinecken, "Spren Kierkegap..rd" in
!i~arty and Peerr:J.a.n, 0"0. ci t., pp. 151, 135, 154, 158. for the same
sU!lUllary.

Chapter VIII.

Possibility Number Two: Other Similar
11.

Vie~s

Kar 1 Barth

We dealt above with some of the immense influence that Spren
Kierkegaard's thought has had upon contemporary theology.

His ideas

were not very popular in his own day and did not become overly
popular even in theological circles until the

twentiet=:-~'?-r:-b~ry=

At this time his views were revived by Karl Barth in particular
and by those who follOwed him (usually referred to as Barthians or
neo-orthodox theologians).l

Especially influential was Kierkegaard's

emphasis on the subjective approach to God which was discussed in
the last chapter.

1:~ost

of the neo-orthodox theologians agreed with

him that God could not be approached by any rational means such as
by proofs, historical demonstrations or other means of verification.
!,:any also e..cce:pted tb.e belief that faith entailed an irrational "leap".
It is in the works of Barth which one can probably see the
strongest influence of Kierkegaard on this last point.

3arth also

believed that God must be approached by faith and not cy objective
means.

In fact, his methodology revolves around the analogy of

faith.

This concept was perhaps developed most consistently

1

See the introduction to Kierkegaard in chapter seven for ~any
of these details. Cf. also ::ieinecken, "Spren Kierkegaard",
in Uarty and Peerman, Ibid., p. 136.

2

Ramm, A Handbook of Contemnorary Theology, on.cit., pp.

79 .. 80, 89-92.
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74-76~

2
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in Earth's work Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum,3 where this
theologian concluded that Anselm's ontological

arg~ent

for the

existence of God was not a philosophical proof formulated to induce
. or der t 0 .oe l'~eve. 4
f a~. th , f or Anse 1m nee d e d no suc h'~pe t us ~n
It is argued that Anselm admitted that the existence of

~od

was

known by faith and not by such demonstrations of Ris existence.
This is true, Barth asserts, because it is impossible to learn of
God by any kind of proof.

We believe in Rim not because He is

known to exist by various procedures of verification, but because
He has revealed Himself to us, especially by faith. 5
For this reason, Barth rejects the analogy of being, which
attempts to argue to the existence of God by various demonstrations.
This is an abortive attempt to gain knowledge of God apart from
faith.

Since faith is not primary in such a system, it must be

replaced by tha

~~~logy of faith. 6

Thus, for Barth (as for Kierkegaard), faith is primary.

The

proper approach to God is the acceptance of faith without trJing to
verify this belief by proofs.?

3

4

Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides uaerens Intellectum, translated by
Ian W. Robertson Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960).
Ibid., pp. 39-40, 101, 151.

5 Ibid., pp. 18-20, 80, 86 9 128: 152.
6

See Hans U:::-s von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, translated
by John Drury (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 148
and Herbert Hartwell, The Theolo~ of Karl Barth (London: Gerald
Duckworth and Company, Ltd., 1964)~ pp. 49, 56, 184.

7 Barth, Anselm, ou.cit., pp. 18-20, 128, 39-40; cf. von Balthasar,
Ibid.~

p. 125.
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When one endeavors to examine Barth's view of .' I.e resurrection
of Jesus, it is important to keep in mind his method, centering in
the analogy of faith.

~ecause

of

t~is

methodology, Barth (again

like Kierkegaard) therefore does not believe that it is possible
either to demonstrate this event or to use it as the reason why we
should believe in God.

This is because God can only be approached

by faith and not by demonstrations such as those from historical
events.
It is especially in the early period of Barth's thou6ht that
the dialectical emphasis in neo-orthodox theology8 played a.n
important role.

The approach taken to the resurrection is a good

example of how this dialectic might be applied to theology.

~arth

was, for instance, able to say "Yes" to Jesus' resurrection being
an actual event and llNo" to its being a. historical fact like other
occurrences which can be historically verified.
contradic~o~y,

This sounds

but it is affirmed nonetheless:

In the Resurrection the new world 'of the Roly Spirit, touches
the old world of the flesh, but touches it as a tangent
touches a circle, that is, without touching it ••• The
Resurrection is therefore an occurrence in history ••• But •••
the Resurrection is not an event in history at all.9

8

Among other facets, neo-orthodox theology (also termed dialectical
theology) affi~s that there is 2 vast gulf between God and man.
As a result, there exists a tension between the things of God and
the things of man. An answer of both "Yes" and "No" is therefore
given by these theologians to certain questions pertaining to this
relationship. A possible example of such a seemingly contradictory
position is that the Bible is both the Word of God and the word
of man. Thus one might answer both "Yes': and "No" to the question
of whether the zible is the work of human writers. See R~,A
Handbook of Contemnorary Theology, on.cit., pp. 35-36.
-

9

Barth, The Enistle to the Romans, on.cit., p. 30.
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We have here an illustration which presents
contradiction in terms.

~uite

In the example chosen by the

a seeming
autho~,

one

must hold either that the tangent touches the circle or that it
does not touch.

3ut 3arth affirms both.

This example serves to

illustrate a point in his theology, because in a similar

he

maa~er

also affirms that the resurrection both is and is not an historical
event.

To the question of whether the resurrection is an actual

event of'history, we therefore receive both a "Yes" and a "No"
answer.
Eut how is this possible?

Barth holds to the essential evil

character of the world, which is tainted by sin.
is opposed to God and Eis purposes.

As such the world

If Christ was really to enter

the actual history of the world, then he would likewise participate
' t h. 'J. S evJ.'1 • 10
:Ln

For Barth "if the Resurrection be brought ,;i thin

the context of' history, it must share in its obscurity and error and
t ' 1
essen:La

.,

' 1eness.
'
,,11

ques~:Lonao

The only possible conclusion is that the resurrection occurred
on ttthe frontier of all visible human history. ,,12

It is a historical

occurrence, but not in the normal sense of the word "histo:::-yll.

In

fact, it may be considered in some ways to be a nonhistorical
occurrence. 13
Earth continued a similar type of reasoning in other early works
as well.

In 1920 he taught that the resurrection of Jesus was tlnot in

10

See the penetrating analysis by Daniel Fuller, op.cit., pp. 82-84.

11

Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, op.cit., p. 204.

12

Ibid., p. 203.

13

~.,

cf. pp. 50, 195, 20;.
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time.

It is not one temporal thing among others. 1t

14

An i::!J.portant

distinction is made as follows:
The resurrection ~f Christ ••• is not a historical event •••
though it is the only real happening in is not a real
happening of history (Italics and ~ording are Earth's).15
Again we see the distinction between an event occurring and its
being a part of history.

The resurrection can really have occurred

and yet not happen like other events for this scholar.
~oes

Barth even

as far as to say that we should not ask whether it is

~istorical

or not, for this event is a good example of the nonhistorical and
the impossible.

lo

~ven

though it is an actual event, it

ca~ot

be

proven or demonstrated to have occurred. 17
In 1924 3arth published his work The Resurrection of the Dead. 18
Eerein is contained essentially the same view of the resurrection as
was present in his earlier works. 19

This event is again presented

as occurring on history's frontier (or boundary) in such a

~~~er

that it can only be u.nderstood as God's revelation and not proven
or demonstrated by history. 20
An additioual opinion is further given and clarified in this

14

Karl :Barth, The :."ord of God and the Word of ?:an, translated by
Dou~1as Eorton (New York: Earper and 3rothers, 1957), p. 89.
The essays in this book are dated 1916-1923.

15

Ibid., p. 90.

16

Ibid., p. 91-

17

Ibid., p. 92; cf. p. 120.

18

Karl :Barth, The 3.esurrection of the Dead, translated.
(New York: Fle!:lirL6 E. Revell Co:::par.y, 1933).

19

Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. 89-90.

20

Earth, The Resurrection of the Dead, on.cit., pp. 134, 138, 139.

0;)"

Z. J. Stenning
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work.

boldly asserts that alternate critical theorieS concern-

Eart~

ing the

~es~rrection ~ight

difference if
~crning.

~e

t~e

to~b

was closed or open that

accept Jesus'

any historical evic.ence.
or tested.

even be true, for it

~esurrection

~hus

fi~st

we~e

fi~st

morning, they

~es~~ection

by faith and not because of

this "occurrence cannot be invGsti;ated

It cannot be proven to have occurred.

there

no real

~akes

21

Therefore, if

news reporters present at the tomb of Christ on that
~ould

not have been able to verify this event.

This last interpretation has been confirmed by
Carl ?E. Henry, .ho

~uestioned

visited America S03e years ago.

A~erican

theologian

Barth on this very subject uhen he
When

correspondents caul:! have reported the

~enry

asked if our news

~esurrection

had. the:,:" been

there to investigate it, Earth responded by saying tha.t it ,",-as a
private event for the disciples alone.
of the

reporte~s

understood

re~arked

~arth's

answer.

As the

meetin~

to Henry that the other writers

of jesus.

~e

h~d

clearly

They knew that Barth was denyinG that

they coule have v.-itnessed or investigated this event.
Thus

broke up, one

22

perceive the view of the early Barth on the

While this event is surely believed to have

res~rrection

occ~red,

it

is not an event of real history that can be investigated and
demonstrated like other historical facts.

Rather, it is not an

event of history, but rather an occ~rrence of superhistory.2 3

21
22

23

Icid.~

pp. 135-138.

Carl F.2. Henry, editor, Jesus of Nazareth: Saviour an~ Lord
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1966),
p. 11.
Karl Barth, Theolor,v and C~urch: Shorter ~ritin~s 1920-1 0 28,
translated by Louise Pettibone Smith New York: Harper and Row,
?ublishe~s, 1962), p. 62~
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Therefore the resurrection also happened in a different kind of
history than has other events. 24
Did Barth's position change substantially after his new emphasis
on the analogy of faith in his work on Anselm?25

According to Daniel

Fuller, he did give more attention to the question of historicity,
but he continued to reject the resurrection as an event which can be

°fO~e d ~n
° any way_ 26

ver~

One does readily notice this change, however,

as it appears that more credence is given to the historical character
of this oocurrence.

The objectivity of the resurrection is even

stressed more, especially the fact that the disciples actually did
see Jesus. 27

But 3arth made it plain that he still did not hold that

the facts of the historical Jesus should be stressed.
In

spit~

28

of this new emphasis, however, it is still obvious that

Barth relegates the resurrection of Jesus to something other than the
history in which other events happen.

Sacred events like the resurrection

cannot be subjected to an already existing view of history.

Rather,

God's revelation through such. occurrences, dem'ands a particular type

24

See ].lontgomery, were is History Going?, 0-0. ci t., pp. 111-112;
cf. p. 115 and Charles C. Anderson, The Historical Jesus: A
Continuing Quest, o-o.cit., p. 157, footnote number 3 for instance.
We will return later to, Earth's conception of the resurrection
as having occurred in a history different from that of other events.

25

Concerning Barth's earlier primary interest in dialectics and his
later primary interest in the analogy of faith, see von Ealthasar,
o-o.cit., pp. 78-80, 90, 92-93.

26

Daniel fuller,

27

This greater eophasis on the reality of Jesus' resurrec~~on is
especially perceptible in Barth's Church DOgmatics, o-o.cit., vol.
IV, part 1, pp. 502, 309, 318, 336-337, 351-352, for instance.
See also Barth's Do~atics in Outline, translated by G.T. Tho~pson
(New York: Farper and Row, Publishers, 1959), pp. 122-123.
Cf. Hartwell, oo.cit., pp. 122-123.

28

Karl Barth, Eow I Changed My Mind (Ricrunond: John Knox Press, 1966),
see p. 69 for an example of his attitude.

0-0.

cit., pp. 147-148.
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of .history, a somewhat nonobjective, nondemonstrable variety.

For

Barth, there is such a definition of history which differs from the
modern understanding of this word, and it is in this "metahistory"
that Jesus is held to have risen from the dead.

This event is judged

to be nonhistorical by those who try to force the contempoarary
meaning of history upon it. 29
In Earth's chief 'work, Church Dogrga.tics, we can plainly perceive
the continuation of this stance.

The resurrection is said to have

occ'l;:.rred in a peculia.r kind of history.30

As "we pass fro:::l the

story of the passion to the story of Easter we are led into a
historical sphere of a different kind.,,3l

This is because the

"death of Jesus can certainly be thought of as history in -;;ne

~cde;;'~

sense, but not the resurrection ••• the history of the resurrection
.

~s

.
'h·
1132
no t h·~s t ory ~n
~.~s sense •••

Barth does give some vague indication as to the nature of the
history in which he believes that the resurrection occurrei.

He

relates several £acts which serve in helping one to understand this
peculia.r mode of ascertaining certain incidents of the past.

First,

since this event is part of God's revelation (and thus an act of God),
it is different from other occurrences from the very outset. 53

But

this is not the only reason we are given as to why the resurreotion
is perceived to occupy a different kind of history.

29

30

Ka.rl Barth, The Faith of the Church, edited by Jean-Louis Leuba,
translated by Gabriel Vahanian (New York: Meridian Books, Inc.,
1958), pp. 96-99.
Barth, Church Do~atics, op.cit., vol. IV, part 1, p. 335.

31

l£i£.,

p. 3340

32

~.,

p. 536.

33

We are told,

Ibid., pp. 500-301.
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second, th?t this event is
"saga" or a "legend".

,erha~s

.
or~ca

11y ~n
. th e mo d ern sense

Barth identifies his concept

othe~

viewed es oeing a

As such it is termed "prehistoryll because it

.
"h'~s t
canno t b e un d. erstooe
~ere

more properly

mo~e

closely.

~ ~~e
"
" 34
wore.

o~

There are elso

differences between this prehistory and the modern concept of
~or

histor:v.

instance, third (as we have remarked a.bove), the res-

urrection not only cannot be proven to have
proof should not even be attempted. 55

occu~red,

It is thus unlike other events

which can be verified by historical research.
announces that it

~akes

but such a

Fourth, 3arth boldly

no difference if Jesus'

tom~

was

o~en

or

closed on the first resurrection morning, for Ia±th can follow from
it nevertheless.
of this

ev~nt

In this way he asserts that the historical character

provides no foundation for faith. 36

~arth's unde~standing

be q"t;.i te an

eJ,usiv~

of the

resurre~tion

concept to grasp.

~;ot

therefore appears to

only the ini ti2.1 revelatory

character of this Event, but even the event itself is
llietahisto~y.

It cannot

b~

pre~istory

verified like other incidents and is

construed in such a way that faith in it can remain· even
v~rious

which

elements of the

ten~

to point away

or

nar~atives.
f~J~

~it~out

In spite of these characteristics

the historicity of this event and in

spite of the in~istence upon ~ ~ifferent kind of history, 37 Earth
still states that we cann0t therefore say that Jesus did not rise,
or t!1a t he did so only in a spiri tual sense.

1!le

must understand that

Ibid., p. 336; cf. Barth's The Faith of the Church, op.cit., p. 99.

35

Ibid., especially p. 335; see also pp. 300, 341.
Cf. 3art!1's ~ork The Resurrection of t!1e Dead, on.cit., p. 135
wit!". Ibid., p. 335.

37

Indeed, in The Faith of the Church, Earth notes that h~ is utilizing
a different definitio~ of history ~!1en !1e af!irns t!1at events
such as t!1e resurrection occurred (on.cit., pp. 98-~9).
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this scholar still believed that Jesus rose
and space in an objective way.

fro~

the dead in time

Jesus had a body and he could be

seen, heard and perceived to actually have risen from the dead. 3S
While this conception of the resurrection appears quite contradictory,39
it is another example of Earth's use of dialectic.

He answers both

"Yes ll and "Noll to the question of whether Je$us rose from the dead
in actual human history.
We have seen that, whether we speak of the early or of the late
Barth, we are dealing with a view of the resurrection that is
essentially the same.

Although a new stress is placed on the actual

occurrence of this event in the later stages of this scholar's work,
the belief that the resurrection is not history in the same sense
as other events, and therefore not provable, still persists.
noteworthy that Kierkegaard also
eni~a

I

acce~ted
-

this occurrence as an

for history, a paradox that cannot be understood or

by historical research.

It is

de~onstrated

It can only be embraced by faith and not

. . 11 ec".
~ 40
b y ~h
" e ~n"te

Earth's view of the resurrection has been discussed in

~epth,

with the emphasis being laid primarily upon his understanding of
this event as a type of prehistory which is not the old liberal
view of myth, but neither is it one of

com~lete

historical Objectivity.4l

3S

Earth, Church DOgmatiCS,
351- 352.

39

More will be said about this criticism later.

40

See especially Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
o~.oit., pp. l8S-l90 and the discussion above on Kierkegaard.
Cf. Brown, o~.cito, p. 59.

41

Cf. Barth's The

~ord

o~.cit.,

vol. IV, part 1, pp. 336-337,

of God and the Word of Man, on.cit., p. 90.
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It has been our endeavor to be fair in this presentativn, striving

-

to deal adequately with both sides of this emnhasis.
.

It now remains

for us to evaluate this approach.
Four major criticisms of Karl Earth's view of the resurrection
will now be offered.

The first, and one of the most comprehensive

criticisms, involves the belief that the resurrection occupies a
sort of parahistory which includes some aspects of objective history,
while other facets of history are abandoned.

Berein lies a main

problem of Barth's interpretation.
An event must either be some

k~nd

of a myth which never

literal~y

occurred in actual human history, or it must have occurred in this
same history.

But Earth

a~serts

that the resurrection is neither

myth nor actual history in the modern sense.
. some' sor t
occurs :l.n

0f

Rather, this event

~
t·:l.ve or re 1··
re\.O.emp
:l.g:l.OUS hO:l.S t ory. 42_
however,

history simply knows nothing of such an "inbetween" ground., ..hether
it is termed prehistory, saga, legend, or referred to as the bound.ary
or frontier of history.4 5 As Wand so perceptively points out:
History is concerned only with stich events as happen within
the space-time continuum. Events, real or imagined, which
occur in an eternal or spiritual sphere are not the proper
subject of history. The reason is that history has no tools
by which it can deal with such events.44

42

Earth, Church DOgmatics, OF.cit., vol. IV, part 1, pp. 500-301,

334, 536.
Barth uses these descrintive words to refex to his concent of
redemptive or spiritual-history~ See Ibid., p. 536 and The
Resurrection of the Dead, on.c~t., pp. 134, 139.
44

W'and, un. cit., p. 23.
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In other words, history can only be concerned with events which
occur in space and time in such a way that they can be investigated
by the tools of

~istorical

research.

Since there are no means

~hereby

events which occur in a spiritual "inbetween" sphere can be so
investigated, they are not actually within the scope of history.

As

Wand asserts, religious events which are perceived to have happened
only in such an elusive realm cannot be properly regarded as history,
whether

the~e

were real events or not.

Ristorical facts must there-

fore be open to verification and research.
Admittedly, the resurrection.' (if it is fmmd to have occurred)
would have a different origin from other events because as such it
would enter history as a direct act of God.
res~rrection

The fact that Jesus'

was not produced by any natural means, such as by

historical causation, should not be belittled.

Barth is correct

in asserting that it is possible for an event to have its cause in
Divine action and still be a part of history.

Thus the resurrection

would be unique in the sense that this event would have to

~ave

originated with God.
Eut there is an immense difference between saying that this
occurrence would be

a~ique

because of its being a direct result of

God's revelation and saying that as such it cannot be investigated.
This is where Barth's polemic fails quite noticeably.

The point here

is that once this occurrence enters the realm of history (even though
the actual entering is
investigation.

uniqu~),

it must be open to historical

To forego such verification means that it does not

become normal history at all.

Thus, to remove such an event from

investigation, as this scholar does, is not valid.
to also remove

".

~

... fro~

One

~ould

have

the scope of history as well in order to

isolate it from such historical procedures.
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Therefore, one cannot assert that certain events actually
occurred and then add that we cannot speak historically
or investigate

the~.

Either the resurrection really happened in

verifiable historJ" or it did not happen in
But let us not

e~ploy

abo~t the~

nor~al

history

fancy theological verbiage to

affi~

~t

all.

its

occurrence in a.n unverifiable, unc)bservable, contradictory :realm of
thought!
Pannenberg agrees in this cri tic,ism of Earth I s view.

;e

expressly states:
If we would forgo the concept of a historical event here,
then it is no longer possible at all to affirm that the
resurrection of Jesus or that the appearances of t~e
resurrected Jesus really happened at a definite time in
our world. There is no justification for affirmin~ Jesus'
resurrection as an event that really happened, if it is not
to be affirmed as a historical event as such. 71het:her or
not a particular event happened two thousand years ago is
not made certain by faith but only by historical research,
to the extent that certainty can be attained at ,all about
~uestions of this kind •••• The only method of achieving at
least approxi~ate certainty with regard to the eve~ts of a
~ast tise is historical research.45
As pointed

o~t

here, it is

i~possi~le

for a theologian like

Berth to say that an event occurred but not in the same objective
history as other events occur.

As Pannenberg adeptly points out,

it is incorrect to claim to be speaking of Jesus' resurrectioL as
a historical event if, as such, it can only be known by faith and
not by historical research.

If one asserts that somethin; is not

even able to be investigated, neither can one say that the event
still happened at a certain time in this

t

~rld.

We thus see that

it is impossible for Barth to affirm that the resurrectior:. really
occurred while still having the understanding that this occu:rrence
is not in objecti7e, verifiable history.
Pannenberg,

Je~us--God

and

~an,

Such an event is not really

on.cit., p. 99.
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histor~

also

because no such

i~~ossible

conce~t

of history exists.

Therefore it is

merely to claim that this event still ha?pened

just like other incider.ts in the past.
As a historian, :,:ontgo:nery also objects to Barth's use of
history.

~re-

The following illustration is introduced to demonstrate

the folly of such a concept:
I wonder ~hat you would say--what Barth would say--if I
claimed that in my-backyard there is a large green elephant
eating a raspberry ice crean cone, but that there is no way
o~~ empirical investigation to deter:line that he is there.
Konetheless, I maintain, as a matter of fact, that it is
there in every objective and factual sense. Now I have a
feelinz that you would either regard this as a clai~ that
the elephant is there and is subject to empirical Llvestigation,
or contend that it isn't there by the very fact that there
is no way of determining the fact. I ~onder if this dOesn't
point U? the proble~. To claim objectivity, but to remove
an~ possibility of determining it, is by definition to
destroy objectivity.46
Kontsomery:s criticism is well justified.

A historical event

must either be open to investigation or not claim to be history at
, 1
c:.._
~

for the very

re~son

that it cannot be investigated.

the concept of historical objectivity

~hen

this objectivity itself cannot be tested.

",',-e

destroy

we endeavor to rule that
Any claim to a historical

"middle gro'.lnd" of prehistory re:noved from such processes of
verification is about as accurate and acceptable as the claim concernin~

'
the existence of ...Lone

grea-~

elephant •

47

!;lontgo;:nery t':1.us a£rees

'!lith others t::'at the idea of parahistory is foreign both to history
"t se If'
::. an d even t

~

Other

'+7
48

...LoDe
,. ""°b1°
"48
~~
::.ca 1 recorc.s.

theologi~r.s

the concept of
46

0

Kontgomery,

have also noted Barth's tendency to

?reh~story

~istory

and the subsequent weaknesses

and Christianity, on.cit., pp.

i~

~ely

his

on
appro~ch

87-:8.

Ibid., cf. also pp. 106-107.
~i!ontgo:::Jery,

-7::ere is !:istor;v Going?, op.cit., pp. 111-112; cf. p.l15.
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to the resurrection which have resulted.

They realize both that

,

historians recognize no such realm of history and that the very
assertion that such a realm exists with both historical and nonhistorical characteristics is itself contradictory.49
The second major criticism of Barth is quite similar to one
of the main objections to Kierkegaard and will therefore not be
labored overly much here.

Even though Barth claims that the

resurrection literally occurred, we have seen how he denies any
possibility of verifying this event.
should not even be attempted.~O

In fact, such a procedure

Thus, in spite of his e3p~atic

assertions that the resurrection occurred, his view also falls
prey to the criticism that there is no way for one to ascertain if
the Christian faith is valid or not.

We have already seen that

faith cannot stand alone and be its own criteria and proof for belief.
These subjective, personal quaiities provide no reason why someone
else should believe this particular system or accept
over alternative views.

Christi~~ity

Faith simply is not a panacea for all

theological problems, because there is no reason to accept this faith
if there are no grounds upon which its claims may be based.

In spite

In addition to those listed above, see, for instance, ~enry, on.cit.,
pp. 11-12 and Eenry's own comments in the debate on the resurrection
(he was a participant) recorded in the appendix of Montgomery's
History and Christianity:, on.cit., pp. 85, 96, 105. The
contradictory aspect of Earth:s concept was also confir=ed by Clark
Pinnock in personal correspondence with this writer, dated July
19, 1971. See also Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. 82-84; cf. pp. 69,
71. Charles Anderson, in The Historical Jesus: A Continuin~ Quest,
op.cit., pp. 157-158, footnote number three and Ramm, in!
Handbook of Contemnorary Theology, op.cit., p. 90, also note Barth's
position.

50

For example, see especially Barth's Church
vole IV, part 1, p. 335.

DOgmatics~

on.cit.,
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of Barth's defense of faith as the only way (as opposed to any
historical research or other rational approach), it still remains
that this faith cannot verify itself or demonstrate its own validity.
This can only mean that one cannot know if the grounds for belief
are solid or not.

There is no logical reason to accept such a faith.

In other words, to say that Jesus really rose from the dead but
that this event can only be accepted by faith (without verification)
is to leave one's entire faith open to question.

Barth is of course

not inte::-ested in verifying the groundsfor Christianity.

But without

such objective criteria one can never know if one's faith is
completely in vain or not.
Montgomery also realized the strenght of such a criticism.
Appropriating a fa.ct by faith cannot make this belief factual.

Simply

by starting wi th faith we are not assured o,f .arriving at a truthful,
viable solution because the adinonition to "have faith" cannot
guarantee that one's beliefs are any more correct.

Therefore, if

faith does not have its starting point in objective, verifiable events,
there is no way that one may ascertain if Christianity is the
preferable faith-system in which to place one's trust. 5l
Therefore we perceive that which was stated earlier.

Faith

cannot create truth, no matter how intense it might be in the
individual.

Thus, faith cannot make itself valid by its intensity

or by the fervency with which it is exercised.

Because of this, it

is important for the individual to know if his faith is valid, and
objective criteria are best suited for this purpcseo
The last two criticisms of Barth are internal critiques.

51 Eontgomery, History ana. Christianity,

OPe

The

ci t., pp. 99-101, 106-107.
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third major criticism concerns Barth's understanding of God's
revelation in hUEan events.

It has been 5hown how this scholar

contends that God reveals Himself in certain revelatory acts which
occur in man's prehistory and not as an actual part of verifiable
history. 52

But if revelation is not given objectively in historical

facts which are open to historical research, then Jesus' death

can.~ot

be revelatory because even Barth believes that the crucifixion is
history in

th~

mcie:m sense of the word. 53

But Barth also hclds that

the crucifixion is part of God's revelation, since Jesus died a
substitutionary death to pay for the sins of those who surrender
their life to God in faith. 54

Here we find an internal

inconsiste~cy.

If one holds that the death of Jesus is part of God's revelation to
~an

(as Barth is correct in doing), then one must

abando~

the

previously held idea that God never acts meaningfully in this kind
of history.

And if we reject. this, it also means that the resurrection

could likewise be objective, verifiable

histo~y

and still'be a

revelatory event as well. 55
The fourth major criticism of Barth's treatment of the resurrection
is th2t this theologian holds that the New Testament itself does not
make any attempt to demonstrate or prove that the resurrection did
occur.

~e

holds, rather, that the earliest Christians were only

52 Ramm, A Handbook of Contemnorary Theolo~, ou.cit., p. 90.
53 Barth, Church Docmatics, o'O.cit., vol. IV, part 1, p. 336; cf.
'0 CJ

73/'
.J "T.

54

Ibid., 'Op. 248-254 for instance. See Ramm, A Handbook of
ccntemuorary TheolOgy, o'O.cit., pp. 16, 108.

55

See Henry, Jesus of Nazareth: Saviour and Lord, o'O.cit., p. 10
wher2 this criticism is also developed.
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interested in acce)ting this event by faith.

Thus Paul, for example,

was not trying to present a proof of this occurrence by citing the
witnesses in I Corinthians, chapter 15. 56
It has already been noted above that this portion makes it
quite plain that although Paul is speaking of the faith of the first
century Christians, he is also explaining how this faith has its
basis in objective, historical fact.

The text clea.rly sho,;s that

Paul does intend to cite proof here, especially in verse six, where
we are informed that most of the witnesses were still alive and could
thus provide testimony concerning these events.

This testimony

would, in turn, provide historical eyewitness corroboration for Paul's
claims.
Even Eultmann disagrees with Earth here, also noting that Paul
does mean to use the list of the appearances of Jesus as proof for
the resurrection. 57

Eultma.nn notes that there were two current proofs

for this event, both of which are found in I Cor. 15.

There nas-

the appeal to eyewitness testimony, as we have perceived here
(especially 15:5-8) and the appeal to the fulfillment of Old Testament
-8

prophecy (15:3-4).'
point

~ainly

3ultmann's testimony is valuable at this

because it is apparent that Barth is desiring to use

the Sc~ipture to reinforce his polemic,59 whereas Bultmann actually

This tendency to believe that the New Testament never intends
to demonstrate that the resurrection really did happen is evident
in both the early and in the late Barth. See his earlier work
The Resurrectio~ of the Dead, c~_cit., pp. 131-138 and his later
opus Church Do~atics, o~.cit., vol. IV, part 1, p. 335.
57

Eul tmann, "New Testament and
o~.cit., p. 39.

58

Eul tmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. I, p. 82.

59

See~arth's

1~ythology"

in KerYgma and :;:yth,

Cnurch Dogmatics, vol.: IV, 'part I, pp. 334-336.
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objects to Paul's using such a proof in spite of believing that
.
.... t'..
60
ne .Qoes JUS~
~1S.

that Earth is

This desire of course does not in itself mean

neces£~rily

wrong.

Eut it does appear that

3ult~ann

is more accurate in ascertaining Paul's obvious motives here.
~eginald

question.

Fuller is somewhat close to Barth in his vie-:-: on this

He holds that Paul's primary intention was to id.entify

his preaching of the resurrection with that of the earliest
eyewitnesses.

3ut he also believes that Paul intended to relate

the eyewitness accounts in ord.er to prove that Jesus actually
appeared to his followers.

He likewise agrees in citing I Cor.

as the main pointer to the fact that Paul is establishin; evidence
~
--h
61
to b e use d as prool~ lor
~. ese appearances.

But there are other portior.s of the New Testament '.-:hich also
establish the fact that other authors besides Paul

endeavo~ed

both

to prove the resurrection and to use this event as the basis for the
establis~ing

been

sho~n

of other beliefs, contrary to Barth's

above

ho~

~iew.

the gospels in particular sought to

It has
~e~o~strate

the reality of Jesus' resurrection by stressing that he appeared to
his disciples in bodily form.
so~e

Although the new body had

changes, it is reported that Jesus allowed his

exa~ine

and investigate this new body.

We are

evr~

tL~dergone

follo~ers

to

told that Jesus

was touched and. "held", thus demonstrating that he was a.live.

This

emphasis is especially evident in passages like Luke 24:36_43,62
where ample

60

evide~ce

3ul t::la:~m,

"~Tew

of this attempt to prove that Jesus had risen

Testament and Mythology" in KerYg!:la and Myth,

op.cit., p. 39.

61
62

?e~ir.a1d

?uller,

o~.cit.,

p. 29.

?esides this portion and I Cor. 15:4-8, see such pass2.!es as
Matt. 28:8-9; JL. 20:17 (in the Greek); 20:19-31; Acts 10:39-41.

217
is readily avai1ab1e. 63

We are even told in Acts 1:3 that Jesus

"presented himself a.1i ve after his passion by many proofs ••• " (p.sV).
In fact, the Greek word used here for "proof!! (tekmeriois) literally
means a

°to~ve or cer t a~n
° proo.
f 64

pos~

Thus we see t hat it was the

intention of several New Testament authors to prove that Jesus had
risen.
In addition, it should be mentioned that the resurrection is
also used in the Kew Testament as a proof for other Christian
doctrines.

For instance, Acts 17:30-31 shows that the earliest

church believed that God verified Jesus' earthly teachings by raising
him from the dead. 65

Acts 2:36 and

Rom~~s

1:4, are other examples

which point to Jesus' being accepted as the Lord, Messiah and the
Son of God, 'based upon the resurrection.' 66
Thus we see that neither can Barth rely on Scripture for support
of his thesis.

The claim that the New Testament does not seek to

prove or demonstrate that the resurrection actually occurred is
simply not supported by the facts.

Bultmann also bel~eves that the gospels and Paul endeavor to
prove that Jesus had appeared to the apostles. He likewise
recognizes tha.t I Cor. 15:3-8 and Luke 24:39-43 are good examples
of this tendency. See "The New Testament and ~thology" in
Kery,c;;ma and :',:yth, 0"0. ci t., p~ 39.
64

See W.E. Vine, An Ex"Oository Dictionary of New Testament Words,
(Four volumes in one; Old Tappan: Fleming~. Revell CC~P~~Y7 1966),
volume III, pp. 220-221. See also Robertson, o"O.cit., vol. III, p. 6.

65

This is admitted by both Bul tmann, "New Testament and Ifythology"
in KerY.Q;!Ila and Eyth, av. ci t., p. 39 and by Marxsen 7 0"0. ci t., p. 169.
Marxsen notes that the preaching of repentance and belief in
the Lordship of Jesus are both based on the proof that Jesus
rose from the dead, according to these verses.

66

See Eultmann, Theolosy of the New Testament, on.cit., vol. I, p. 27.
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For the reasons we have given above, it becomes evident that
Barth's thesis fails.

These four criticisms of his view on the

resurrection point

the key weaknesses to which this view is

o~t

,~

::lost vul~erable.

The:~,r also reveal the inadeq,uacies of this approach.!: (

3.

Other Related Views

As Kierkegaard ;reatly influenced the views of Barth, so did
Barth greatly influence the views of the :nany theologians ,;no follov;-ed
him.

This is eSPecially true on the question of the resurrection

of Jesus.

:,:any pro;:r;.inent neo-orthodox theologians in particular

accepted these
~or

vie~s.

instance,

S~iss

theologian

Brunner apparently

E~il

affir~s

belief in the resurrection of Jesus as having actually occurred. 68
3ut like Barth, he concludes that this occurrence is not part of
the realrr. of norr:al, verifiable history.
resurrec:ion is

an event which

~ot

eve~ts.

60/

~ith

other

can~o

h
. "h
t
Vo r::. s
t b e t '";le "h~as~s ..ro or ...vo,e

to stress his

0

vie~

I~

~an

~e

relates that the

be reported as is possible

addition we also learn that this occurrence
0

~an
0

f'
_a~
0

0
th
0•7

3rur..ner

~s
0

care.;.ro u 1

that the Christian's belief in Jesus l resurrection

is not based up:m any records contained in t!':.e New Testament,

67

These four cr~t;~c2S::lS will be briefly sum::J.arized at the conclusion
of the next ssction.
Emil :Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and 3ece~ntion,
volu!!le II of Josmatics, translated by Olive O,'iyon T!lree volumes;
'O"h°l
O t er _ress,
p
19-2)
7,"
:::ee
_0.2 a d e 1 p!l~a: m'
.L'n.e _.\,es t:ll.ns
J
p • .100.
...,
a 1 so
E:-unner's work The !,:ediator, translated by Olive 7lyon
"l - '"
Inh
'
......,
__ ~• 1 a_elpll~a:
Le ,..~es tm~nsver
.• ress, p. 15 3 •
( P"h
00

0

69

Srunner,

70

Brunner, Jo=:-r::atics, on.cit., vol. II, p. 369; cf. p. 153.

p.

573.
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including the testimony concerning the appearances.

We cannot

resort to historical or other means of verification of this event.
Faith comes apart from any demonstrations or proofs that Jesus is
•
a1 lve.

0ne slmp
. 1y

..

acce~~s

this

h~y _al~n.
f' ..... "

71

Dietrich Bonhoeffer likevrlse relegates the resurrection to a
realm other than normal histor'J.

He asserts:

The historicity of Jesus Cr~ist thus comes under the twofold aspect of history and faith. Both aspects are closely
associated. The Jeus of history humbled himself; the Jesus
who cannot be grasped by history is the subject of faith in
the resurrection.72
We are therefore to understand that Jesus' resurrection is not an
event which can be understood
or

prov~~,

~~storically.

but only accepted in faith.

It cannot be verified

Bonhoeffer thus believed that

the resurrection really occurred, but that it

r~d

to be

received by

faith, apart from any historical research. 73
Rein...1.o1c. Niebur..r rejected the resurrection of Jesus as an event
in his early years at Yale when he vras still under the influence of
liberal theology and it appears that he never

c~2nged

his mind.

The

physical resurrection of Jesus had to be ab~~doned as an actual
74
occurence.
!~everthe2-ess, he treated it as pazoahistory.
Speaki.."'1g"
of the death and resurrection narratives

concerni~~

Jesus, he concludes:

The ~t.r.~y of this triur:rph over death is thus shrouded in a
mystery which places it in a different order -·of history
tmu"'1 the storJ of the crucifixion.75

71

Ibid., pp. 366-372; cf. Daniel Fuller, op.cit., pp. 155-156.

72

Dietrich Bon.~oeffer, C~~ist the Center, translated by John Bowden
(New York: Harper and-!{ow, Publlshers, 1966), p. 76.

73

Ibid., pp. 74-77.

74

Ronald J. Stone, Reinhold Niebu.~: Prophet to Politicians
(Nashville; Abingdon Press, 1972), pp. 22-23, 82.

75

Reinhold ;Jieblli1r, Faith and History (Ne·,. . . York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1949), p. 147.
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Once again we find the belief

the resurrection did not nappen

in history in the same way that the crucifixion did.

It therefore

cannot be jemonstrated to have occurred.
Earth's influence extended even further than the neo-orthodox
theologians on tr.e question of the resurrection.

GUnther Bornkamm

sounds surprisingly like Earth in his belief that the resurrection
is not open to historical verification.

observed like other

eve~ts.

It can neither be proven or

Yet it is said to have occurred.

As

such it can be understood prope:l.'ly only by fai tho 76
Reginald Fuller speaks of the resurrection as a methahistorical
and eschatological event.
God.

Something occurred as revelation from

However, this event cannot be verified or otherwise proven

bec~u~e

it 58 comprehended only by faith, having taken place on the

boundary between this world's history and the methahistory of the
eschatological age that is coming. 77
Hans Grass also follows a line of thought somewhat
Earth!s.

si~ilar

to

For Grass, the historical method provides no basis for

investigating the resurrection.
by such methods of reason.

This occurrence cannot be approached

But he differs from Barth in postulating

that Jesus' appearances were spiritual and not physical at all. 78
Jllrgen Moltmann believes that the resurrection occurred, but
that it

caIL~ot

be historically demonstrated to have happened in the

76

Bornkamm, ou.cit., pp. 180, 183-184.

77

Reginald Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 2;, 48, 81.

78

See Daniel Fuller's treatment of Grass' position for additional
criticisms of it (on.cit., pp. 150-156).
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past.

The theologian's object should not be to examine such past

events, but to look to the future for the si£nificance of them.
A~~ays,

if we we=e to examine the resurrection by modern historical

standards, it would be found to be historically impossible and
. 1 esse 79
mean1.ng
1;:01 tmann'

of history.

s

answer is to look for a new for!Ilula tion of the concept

The resurrection is an eschatological event and a's

such it can be grasped historically at all only when it is -viewed
as t 0 1.. t

S

f
t·
U ure
S1.gnl.. f'l.cance. 80

Thus, while 1.:01 t!ll.ann seeningly

rejects the view of prehistory,81 he still holds that the resurrection
should be relegated to a different,
concept of history.

eschatolof~cally-oriented

Ee is quite specific in his belief that the

resurrection was not observable and that this event cannot be verified
a t presen .... . 82

Thus he also

t~~es

flight to a different sort of

.. ne resurrection
history in which past events such as .....

car~ot

be

historically proven to have occurred apart fro~,future vin~ication.83
Tie have already presented a critique of these theological
atti tudes while discussing Karl Barth's position.

Almost the e::>:act

sane criticis~also ap~ly to the others (at least to the neo-orthodox

79

80
81
82

83

Jurgen l[oltman.."l, Theology of Hone, translated by Ja::J.es 7:. Leitch
(New York: Harper a.nd Ro''''' Publishers, 1967), pp. 165-202. See
especially pp. 155, 172, 174, 177, 188-189, 197. Cf. Nelson ~.
Chamberlain, "Jurgen :lol tmann; Apostle of Christian Hope?",
Christia.nity Today, June 21, 1974, pp. 7, 8.
l~ol tmann,

Ibid., see especially pp. 178-182, 190, 202.

Ibid.., p. 176.
Jurgen 7Iol tmann, Reli ion. Revolution and the Future , translated
by ~. Douglas ~eeks New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969),
especially pp. 50-51.
Ir.oltmann 9 !'h<::oloN of E:o"Oe, o"O.cit., pp. 177-182, 190, 197. Cf.
Robert J. 31aikie, "Secular Christianity" and God ~ho Acts (Grand
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theologians w·hic!l "e have discussed.).

Perhaps the :::lain c:::-i ticism

involves placinb the resurrection in prehistory or parahistory.
~ile

d.etails as to ..hat realm this is may differ somewhat (we

have studied 3arth's view in depth above), sociologist of religion
Peter L. Berger's criticisms still apply.
has no

me~~ing

the data.

for a scholar who desires to empirically investigate

One who supports such a.view of parahistory has already

chosen to leave tne
is

first, this categor:·

~eaningless

e~pirical

realm of investigation.

in this context.

This concept

Second, this method is resigned

to the few who feel that they have already attained the proper
outlook v.-i th reg.::. ...·c:. to theology. 84
"tJi th a fe-:; variations, the following SU!IlI!lary of cri ticis~s
applies at least to Earth and scholars like

~runner

and

30~oeffer.

They are also wore-or-less applicable to the others coveret here,
at least in part.
prehistory.
real:n.

?irst~

history knows of no such concept as

:t is not possible to measure or investigate

can be investigated and examinet to determine if it is
car~ot

make the claim that an event is real history

not subject it to investigation.
~ere

a

In ao.1i tio!l, the inclusion of both historical ani non.."I}istorical

characteristics renders such a category contradictory.

One

s~ch

Real history
v~lid
~~

or not.
then

Even if a metahistorical event

possible, it must either be verifiable or not claim to be real

Rap~~8: ~7illia::l 3~

Eerdman' s :Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 129See the next chapter on Pannenberg for a criti~ue of a
posi tion some1'.-ba t similar to lllol tmann' s, one which also Ci yes
the future the place of priority. Many of the criticis~s offered
in the next chapter also apply to ;.:01 tmann.

134.

84

Berger, on.cit., pp. 39-40.
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history at all.

Therefore this concept must be rejected.

Second,

the stress on one's affirming the resuxrection by faith anQ the
refusal t:· demonstrate this event by any other method means that
this view is not objective enough to provide sufficient reason for
one to know if the Christian faith is valid.
cannot make this faith any more valid.

An intense belief

With no such methocs of

investigation we cannot know if such faith is simply in vain.
Third, neo-orthodox theology contends that God!s revelation
does not primarily occur in actual history in the modern sense of
t h~_e wor d • 85

Yet Barth, for instance, bases the xevelation in the

death of Christ on what he admits to be an actual historical fact,
while

re!~~i~e

to do this in the case of the resurrection.

He is

therefore internally inconsistent in holding that the resurrection
cannot liker.ise be based on actual historical fact.

Fourth, at

least 5arth contends that the New Testament does not attempt to
prove the resurrection.

The others at least agree that his event

cannot be demonstrated.

Eut Earth's contention is not based on

the available evidence.

Contrary assertions in the New Testament

invalidate these claims and thus cannot be used to support this
thesis.
For these

reaso~s,

it is our ccnclusion here that such an

approach to the resurrection is

~~tenable.

One cannot remove this

event and, subsequently, the entire Christian faith,

85

fro~

the realm

Ramm, A Handbook of Contemuorary Theology, ou.cit.,?p. 90,
108.
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of investigation.

~here

are simply too many difficulties for one

to hold to such a position.

But as with Kierkegaard's view, so

Barth's emphasis on faith and its importance can remain.

We have

mentionen above how that Barth conceived of the death of Christ as
being a substitutionary death to pay for
surrender their life to God in faith.
be retained.

86

t~e

sins of those

~ho

This view of faith must

As it was concluded earlier in chapter four, faith

must remain the

~ost

important element in a theological system.

This is even shown to be more true if there is an objective basis
on which to rest this faith.

86

Earth, Church
for example.

]o~atics,

on.cit., vol. IV, part 1, P9. 248-254

Chapter IX.

Possibility Number Three: That the Resurrection
Did Occur and That It Can Be Demonstrated
A.

Yiolfhart Pannenberg: An Introduction

The third major possibility to be dealt with in this
that Jesus'

res~r~ection

can be demonstrated.

l

is

really did occur and that this occurrence

We will begin by examining the position of

a very important scholar in contemporary theology today

this view.

~ork

w~o

holds

This theologian, Wolfhart Pannenberg (born 192~), is

without much doubt the best-known representative of this viewpoint
today.
Pannenberg has received much acclaim in recent years because
of his defense of the historicity of the resurrection.

In fact, he

has been viewed by many as "the theologian of the resurrection".2
It is this event which forms the basis for his polemic and which sets
.'
....ro or n:::.s
th e sage
t

'h eo_ogl.ca
1
.
1
't, •.

'
3
sys'tem.

Now it is by no mea.ns lL.'"lique

either to defend the historicity of the resurrection or to
the basis for one's theological system.

1

2

3

4

4

~se

it as

But Pannenberg is probably

When it is asserted that this eve~t can be demonstrated, reference
is being made to probabilities. These scholars hold that this
event can be demonstrated to Ci. high' probability by a reasonablG
approach'to the Christian faith which includes a historical
exaffiination of the known facts.
See ed.itor Richard John NeuhaLlsl introductory essay "?!olfhar"t
Pannenberg: Profile of a Theo1ogia.n" in Pannenberg's Theology and
the Kingdo::n of God, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969),
pp. 9-50. See especially pp. 10-11 for this statement.

Pannenberg, Revelation As

~is~~,

on.cit., pp. 142-144 for instance.

See this proclivity in such scnolars as Daniel Fuller, on.cit.~
p. 144; 1'.l:ontgo::lery, liistory a~d Christianity, on. cit., pp. 72-80 r
McNaugher, on.cit.~ pp. 144-185 and Smith, on.cit., pp. 187-228.
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The~efore

the theologian who is best known for these tendencies.

he

becomes the logical choice as the primary scholar to be Qealt with
here.
Wolfhart Pannenberg is often connected with a new school of
theology in Germany which is usually referred to as the "theology of
hope."

This generally optimistic understanding of theology was

~elcomed

in the United states in the late 1960's oy'some of the

leading newspapers and magazines.

These .publications seemed to be

more than willing to report the demise of the pessimistic and shortlived reign of the "death of God theology" and greet instead its
more hopeful and reassuring IIsuccessor ll • 5
The motif of hope in many ways presented quite a novel approach
to theology, being one of the first theological schools of thought
that was not a development of the earlier dialectic theoloG,JT of Karl
Barth and those wno followed him.

Among others, those usually

connected with the theology of hope are German theologians Pannenberg,
Jurgen

::,~ol tmann,

Johann Metz and sometimes Karl Rahner.

6

E:owever,

it is actually difficult to be overly suggestive when speaking of
those who

favo~

this approach, and it is

l'2~lly

only possible to

speak ra.ther generally of any group of "hope theologians. 1I7

5 Editor Neuhaus in

Pannenbe~g's

Theology and the Kil1gdcm of God,

op.cit., p. 9.

6

Ibid., pp. 10, 17.

7 For instance,

li. Douglas 1Ieeks deals primarily with :101 tmann in
his l'9"ork Ori .. ins of the Theolo· of Hope (Philadelphia: Fortress
P=ess, 1974. See p. 2 for his conviction that others like
?annenbe~g and I.:etz ca.nnot be connected 'completely wi th ~.:ol tmann.
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While Pannenberg was earning his doctorate at the University of
Heidelberg in the early 1950's, a group of graduate students began
meeting and exchanging ideas on the nature of Divir.e revelation.
Apparently in opposition to Pannenberg's own wishes, this ;roup began
to be referred to as the "Pannenberg circle".

The combined .. ork of

four of the "members "--Par....'1enberg, Rolf Rendtorff, Trutz Rendtorff
and Ulrich Wilkens--produced the volume Offenbarung als Ges~ichte8
in 1961.

It represented years of study and discussion together. 9

Although this work was not the first one of Pannenberg's to be
translated into English, it was still significant in that it helped
to bring this German scholar to the attention of other theologians.
Perhaps Pannenberg's most significant work to date, Jesus--God and
~,

was translated into English in 1968.

It was his first major

~ork

to appear in an English translation.

This ChristolooY has been

recognized by some theologians as one of the most signifioant to
appear

.

~n

many

It soon

yea~s.

bec~e

10

evident that Pannenberg's thesis was opposed to

many aspects of 3arth's and Eultmann's

theolo~J.

For instanCe,

Pannenberg was opposed to the subjectivism exercised by both of these
theologians. 11

He also objected to Barth's concept of revelation,

8

This work was edited by Pannenberg and published in English under
the title Revelation as History, translated by David Gr~'1skou
(New York: The I.:acmillan Company, 1968).

9

See editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg's Theology and the Kingdom of God,
on.cit., p. 16 and Daniel Fuller, on.cit.; p. 118.

10

Neuhaus, Ibid., p. 11.

11

ng.;

p.

15.
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especially with regard to Barth's view that certain events such as
the resurrection happened in a nondemonstrable, nonverifiable

t~~e

of history.

Pannenberg believed that such events both can ~~d should
12
be historically investigated, in opposition to Barth.
This, of
com

also means that Par.nenberg likewise objected to Bul tmann ' s
13
even more complete divorce of history from faith.
~,

With this introductory background, it is now advantageous to

turn to Pannenberg's argument concerning the resurrection of Jesus.
Both a presentation of these views and a critique of them will be
given.

It should be remarked that the following is not a

p~esentation

or discussion of the entire theology of hope, but only of

~annenberg's

views on these suqjects.

B.

Wolfhart

P~~~enberg's Argw~ent ~~d

a Critique

To put Pap.nenberg in proper perspective, it should be mentioned
that the theology of hope stresses

esc~2tological

coming Kingdom of God in particular.

theology and the

The coming of the Kingdom !'l2S

political and et:r.ical repercussions, as will as theological ones.

p.~so

stressed is the death and resurrection of Jesus as historical events
wp.ich set the stage

12

13

14

fo~'

thi-.s eschatology, as will be perceived below.

14

Ibid., p. 30 See the treatment of Barth above, :ncluding Pannenoerg's
view. See also P~T1I1enberg's Jesus--God and }Jan, op.cit., p. 99;
cf. his Revelation as History, op.cit., pp. 9-10. More mIl be
said later concerning his views of the resurrection as a demonstranle
event.
Neuhaus, Ibid., p. 37 and Da..Tlie1 Fuller, op.cit., p. 173.
See Meeks, OPe cit., p.

~O.
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One of

?ar~enberg's

chief aims is to restore to contemporary
1-

theology the concept of a functionally imminent Kingdom of God. '
110st of contemporary theology is perceived to have failed in its
approach to the Kingdom in that the eschatological centrality of
this concept has been lost.

But for Pannenberg, the teaching about
16
the Kingdom must be the central message in Christian theology.
The future Kingdom. of God holds a special interest ·for Pannenberg
,6 th regard to God's existence.

God is identified with the coming

Kingdom in such a way that, in a certain sense, God does not exist
as yet.

It is only with the arrival of the future Kingdon that the

existence of God isshown to be a definite reality.17
But this by no means signifies that God is not now present in
this age or that Ee

~as

not present in the past.

The idea that God's

existence is fully =evealed in the future therefore does not disqualify
Rim from present existence.

From Sis future existence God dominates

. t'h•. e pas t ana.- ~h
,, __ e presen t • 18
b otn

At first this concept of the existence of God appears contradictory.
But actually the "secret" is in understanding Pannenberg's ideas
abo~t

the retroactive power of history and the ability of the future to

reach backwards

i~to

the past.

God exists at present (and in antiquity)

in the sense that Eis future is reaching back into the past.

lie

~~us

15

Brian O. McDermott, S.J., "Pa.nnenberg's Resurrection Christclogy:
A Critique", Theological Studies, Voluoe 35, number 4, December,
1974, pp. "11-721. See also Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom
of God, on.cit., p. 55.

16

Pannenberg, Ibid.., pp. 51- 53, 75.

17

Ibid., pp. 56, 62, 111-112.

18

Ibid. , pp. 62-63, 71.
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exists at present as the par~ial arrival of the future. 19
According to Pannenberg's concept of theology, it is God who
will usher the Kingdom into human society.
future as well as in the present.

God thus works ill the

This Kingdom is not

sj~or~ous

with the church, and neither will it arrive by man!s power.

He

is quite emphatic that it will become part of history by the future
actions of God Himself, even though there are present ramifications
of the Kingdom as well. 20
Eut it is not only the existence of God which reaches into the
present from the future.
the future. 21

In fact, all occurrences eventuate from

~s Neuhaus explains, we therefore cannot only refer

to the future of an event simply as something which will happen, but
rather as something which reaches back into the present and
now in existence.
thing only in

~hich

is

Although one can perceive the final state of some22
future, the affects are present.

t~e

For instance, the authority of God was retroactively present in
the teachings of

?~

Jesus.-~

This is shown to be the case especially by

Jesus' resurrection from the dead.

24

In a similar way the Kingdom

ha3 also reachei back into this present time, although it has not
arrived in its ful1ness. 25

It is through such a stress on t~e

19 Ibid., pp. 68, 70-71.
20
21
22
23
24
.25

Ibid., pp. 76-77, 82.
Ibid., p. 70.
Editor

Ne~~aus

Pa~~enberg,

in

Pa~~enberg,

Ibid., p. 42.

Ibid., pp. 133-135, 142-143; see McDermott, on.cit., p.714.

Pannenberg, Revelation as History, on.cit., p. 127; see
Ibid., p. 711; 715-717 •
Editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 25; cf. p. 42.

~cDermott,
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fundamental importance and priority given to the future that Pannenberg
can speak of the end time having participated in the life of Jesus. 26
In

Revelatio~

as History Pannenberg wrote two key essays.

In

one, entitled "Dog;natic Thesis on the Doctrine of Revelation", he
postulated seven theses which are crucial to the understanding of
his thought.

This essay sets forth much of the foundation of

?annenberg's theological system and expands on the points raised
above.
the

These theses are especially instrumental in pointing out

extremel~r

Seeing

~nis

i:::portant pla.ce that the resurrection of Jesus plays.

event in the context of Pannenberg's theological enter-

prise will allow for a much better understanding of this scholar and
will also make the ensuing critique more accurate and meaningful.
Por these reasons the seven theses are presented below, with a short
discussion of each included.
Christologj~

3elated key thoughts of

and eschatology will also be presented

Pa~~enberg;s

on

appropriate

~n

places.
Pannenberg's first thesis is that God's

Self-~evelatio~

,....

.

direct, but indirect, being effected by God's u1stcr1cal

.

is not

ac~s.

27 After

a brief survey of some of the prominent views on Divine revelation,
Pannenberg asserts that God did not reveal Himself to man by the
announcement of Ris name to the

Isr~elites,

Scriptures, or by the giving of the law on
other direct means. 28

or by the inspiration of the
~ount

Sinai or by any

To the contrary, God revealed liimself indirectly

through historical acts in both the Old and New Testament.

26

See Pannenber b , Revelation as liistory, o~.cit.,
and Theology and the Kingdom of God, Ibid., pp.
Neuhaus, Ibid., p. 41.

lie made

139 for instance
54, 63. Cf.
~_

27

Pannenberg, Revelation as Eistory, Ibid., pp. 125-151.

28

Ibid., pp. 3-13.
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Himself known by means of a revelation which is grounded in history. 29
The chief purpose of Pannenberg's essay is to explore this indirect
revelation and to ascertain its value as God's chosen method of
revealing Himself. 50
An interestir.g aspect of this belief in the indirect selfmanifestation of God in human history is that Pannenberg conceives
of this revelation as permeating all of human history.

God therefore

does not simply reveal Himself in some small segments of history
exclusive of other areas.

Rather, the indirect revelation of God

occurs in all 'of man's history.

For this reason, Pannenberg relates

that there can be no such thing as "Supernatural events" or "miracles".
Since God works in history as a whole, this

me~~s

that we cannot

speak of Supernatural history versus natural history.
dichotomy exists.

~e

No such

are thus to perceive that God reveals Himself

in all of human history, and since He works in all of history we
are not to.think of separate miracles or Supernatural events apart

f=~~ t~e whole of historical revelation. 51 Pannenberg realizes that
as s;milar

this is not a new conCeption of

vie~s

were

expressed in German idealism. 52

29

Ibid., pp. 125-127; cf. Daniel Fuller, on.cit., p. 182 and
Blaikie, o~.cit., pp. 156, 162.

50

See Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 19.

31

Ibid., p?

32

7, 16; cf. Blaikie,

o~.cit.,

pp. 156-158, 162.

Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 16, 19. For instance, Schleiermacher's
view is that all events, even the most mundane ones, are miracles.
It is not simply the strange or unexplained event alone which is
Supernatural. See the discussion of Schleiermacher's view of
miracles above. See also Schleier~acher's work On Reli~on:
S~eeches to its Cultured Desuisers~ on.cit., pp. 88-89, 113-114,
explanation number 16 for instance.
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The key to
Himself directly.

.'.. neS1S.
A~y

.
one

is

t~us

that God does net reveal

understanding of the concept of revelation

that asserts otherwise is therefore not correct.

God only allows

3imself to be known indirectly, and that is through His acts in
the whole of human history.
Pannenberg's second thesis is that God's revelation is not known
totally at the beginning, but rather at the conclusion of revelatory
history.33

Since God only reveals gimsel! indirectly, Pa~~enberg

believes that it is therefore correct to link this
the end of history. 34

revela~ion

with

Thus the early events in the history of Israel

whereby they learned of Yahweh were not the final or the most
important of God's acts.

The most important revelation will occur

only at the end of history.35
Some of the logic of this position has been presented above.
has

bee~

It

stated that Pannenberg conceived of tha end of history in

such a way that the future can have a retroactive affect upon both
the past and the present.
the future.

As such, all occurrences eventuaie from

According to this understanding, God. Cali. be r:lore-or-less

identified with the coming Kingdom and still have existed so as to
have dominated the past and the present.

In a similar way, the

resurrection is the sign that God's activity was also retroactively
present in the life of Jesus. 36

33

Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 131-135.

34

The logic of this assertion will be challenged below.

35

Pannenberg, Revelation as Hist"ory, on.cit., pp. 132-154.
Ibid., p. 127; see also Pannenberg's Theology and the Kingdom
or-God, on.cit., pp. 62-63, 68, 70-71.

Pannenberg thus accepts the priority of the future.
present the future is

~ore

important~

This is seen, for

3ven at
i~stancef

by this scholar's belief that all events reach into the past and the
present from the future. 37

Since these postulates are believed to

be valid, one can therefore perceive how Pannenberg further held that
the final txuth and result of an event is determined by the future
of that event and not only by its present appearances. 3S
The natural outworking of this concept is that in the resurrection
of Jesus the future already participated in the past.
event one can

gai~

a

previe~

of the

futuTe~

Through this

Through this event the

God of the coming Y-ingdom retroactively acted in the life of Jesus.
It is an event such as this that illustrates the second thesis
concerning how God's indirect revelation will be accomplished primarily
at the end of revelatory history rather than at the begin.~ing.39
Another pointer to this second thesis is Pannenberg's belief that it
is only with the arl'ival of the end of history that God will prove
5imself to be a definite reality.

Again revelation is perceived to

be complete at the end of revelatory history.40
The third

t~esis

which is presented by Pannenoerg is that God's

historical revelatioL is not restricted to special or private situations,

37

Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, Ibid., pp. 54, 63,70.

38

Ne~~aus

39

Pan.~enberg,
~cDermott,

40

in

Pan.~enberg, ~.,

p. 42.

Revelation as History, on.cit., pp. 141-143.
on.cit., pp. 713-714.

See

Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 134 and Pannenberg's Theology and the
Kin~dom of G~on.cit., p. 62.
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~ open f or a 11 men t 0 see.
but .s

In tho:lS sense, reve 1 a t·:lon :lS
. un:lversa
.
1 • 41

Thus one is not to understand revelation as something secret or
mysterious.

It is n.ot an entity which is known only to those who

have been initiated into the life of faith.

In fact, an individual

need not even have faith first in order to see God's revelation.
This is because one's faith is inspired by seeing the revelatory
events.

In other words, faith need not precede the perception of

revelatory events, but arises after the recognition of

the~.

As to the nature of the revelatory events in question,

42
P~~enberg

asserts that God has acted throughout the history of Israel all the
way to Jesus' resurrection.

These events

who perceive and appropriate them.

co~unicate

meaning to those

They are comprehended by reason

and are open to the examination of all. 4;
By postulating that God's revelation is open for all to see and
examine, ?annenberg is further giving
Christianity is a rational faith.

e~~lanation

to this belief that

One is not required to make a leap

of faith so that one might be able to believe in God.
has no place in the Christian faith.

Such irrationality

One believes because the facts

are found to be reliable and trustworthy.

44

Pannenberg realizes that there is a subjective factor involved
when one speaks of a historical verification of one's faith and that
one therefore cannot reach absolute results when studying history.
y~t

41

history is the proper method to use in exan:ining the claims of

Pannenberg,

~evelation

Ibid., pp. 135-137.
Ibid., p. 137.
Ibid., pp. 138-139.

as History,

~.,

pp. 135-139.
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Christian revelation, as it is capable of leading one to highly

4-

probable conclusions. '

Therefore, historical examination of events

such as the

is needed to ascertain whether the reports

are

t~ue

~esurrection

or not.

46 One thing which Pannenberg insists upon in this

research is that the investigator must be open to the results of the
research and not have made up his mind in advance as to what did or
did not happen. 47
Pannenberg's fourth thesis is that

God~s

universal revelation of

Bis deity is not yet known in Israel's history.

Rather, it was first

revealed in Jesus' fate in that the end of history is already
anticipated in this event.
Pan.~enberg

48

In the ancient history of the Jews,

is convicted that God did not show Eimself to be the God

of all mankind.

l!.9
Rather, Be was seen as the God of Israel.'

But in

the New Testament, God was shown to be the God of all of mankind by
Ris act of

~aising

Jesus from the dead.

Through this

can look to the God of Israel as the only true Goa.

~ct

all men

Through the

life and teachings of Jesus, the offer of the Kingdom is extended

- - peop:;.e.
~
50
to a.LJ..
It is obvious that the resurrection holas a place of great
importance in Pannenberg's theological enterprise.

Indeed t this

scholar's works reflect the Pauline conviction that if Christ had

45

Cf. Pannenberg's Jesus--God and Man, o~.cit., p. 99 with editor
Neuhaus in.?annenberg's Theology and the Kingdom of God, on.cit.,
pp. 20, 38, 46.

46 See Neuhaus, Ibid., pp. 20-21 and Daniel Fuller,

~~., pp. 180181 for some of Pannenberg's techniques in investigating evidence.

47

Fuller,

48

Pannenberg, Revelation as History, on.cit., pp. 139-145.

49

Ibid., pp. 139-141.

50

~.,

rbi~.,

p. 180.

pp. 141-143 •. On the universal aspect of the offer of the
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not risen, all faith would be in vain. 5l

It is therefore important

for one to know if this occurrence is a historical fact which can
be demonstrated.

Pannenberg advocates examining the sources to see

if any alternate explanations could account for the rise of the
resurrection faith. 52

He entertains such hypotheses as the subjective

vision theory,53 the legend or myth theOry,54 and Berth's view of
the resurrection happening in prehistory.55

After a careful look

at such theories, Pannenberg concludes that the resurrection of
Jesus from the dead is the only adequate explanation for the
subsequent faith of the
reality of this event
explanation.
that

th~

disciples~

~ust

ThOSe ;;-ho seek to deny the

be prepared to provide a more adequate

Pannenberg believes that the inevitable conclusion is

resurrection can be verified as having occurred in human

history. 56

Kingdom, see ?ar~~enberg's Theolo&r and the
pp. 73, 76, 851 88 for example.

Kin~dom

of God, on.cit.,

Editor Neuhaus in Pa~~enberg's Theology and the Kingdom of God,
Ibid., p. 41; cf. p. 10. For the apostle Paul's stance, see
I Cor. 15:13-19.
52

Pannenberg, Revelation as History,. on.cit., p. 13(; cf. Daniel
Fuller, on.cit., pp. 181-182.

53" Pannenberg, Jesus--God and 1lan, on. ci t., pp. 95-97.
Ibid., pp. 90-91.
55

56

See Ibid., p. 99 and Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology,
on.cit., vol. I, pp. 15-16. Cf. editor Neuha~s in Pannenberg's
Theology and the Kingdom of God, op.cit., p. 30 and Blaikie,
on.cit., pp. 156, 206.
Par~enberg,

Ibid., pp. 145-148.
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The fifth thesis which ?annenberg presents is that the deity
of God is not revealed in the Christ event as an independent or
isolated fact, but only as the event is part of Israel's history.57
The Christ event cannot be separated from Israel's history because
the God of Christ is also the God of the Old Testament.

Jesus:

mission and fate must therefore be understood from within the
framework and context of Israel's history.5

8

As such the resurrection

remains the revelation of God whereby the end times have retroactively
taken part in Jesus' fate. 59
Pannenberg's sixth thesis is that the universality of God's
eschatological participation in Jesus' fate fOll."'ld its actual ..
expression in the Gen~ile Christian church's non-Jewish understanding
60
of revelation.
The coming of the gospel to the Gentiles ~as a
natural and necessary consequence of the eschatological significance
of Christ.

But Pannenberg asserts that there were differences

between the Gentile and the Jewish conceptions of revelation.

influence of gnosticism

is~id

The

to have brought some non-Jewish

elements into the Gentile undzrstanding of God's revelation.
instance,

gnosticis~

For

taught that revelation was direct and that it

was imparted by means of secret initiation and knowledge, thus
meaning that it was not available to the.scrutiny of all men.
has already been pointed out how

Pa~enberg

57

Pannenberg, Ibid. , pp. 145-148.

58

Ibid. , p. 145.

59

60
61

Ibid.~

p.

1l;.t:.

• 1"""'_

Ibid., pp. 149-152.
Ibid., pp. 149-150.

61

conceived of Jewish

It
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revelation as beins both indirect (by means of God's historical
acts) and ogen for all to perceive.
?annenberg believes that
existe~

ev~n

though these im90rtant

~ifferences

between the Jewish and Gentile ideas of revelation, the

Christian conception of God's acting in Jesus in a final and

~iversal

manner still made its way extensively into the Gentile-gnostic
concept of revelation.
of the Rew

Test~ent

But one should not attempt to rule out portions

r.hich reveal a gnostically inclined view of

revelation, for these portions still served to make
to both Gentiles and to Jews.

Go~ u-~derstandable

In other words, even though Pannenberg

believes that s.nosticisc influenced portions of the New Testament
teaching on the revelation of God in a wsy opposed to the Jewish
concept, it must be realized that this still helped in causing the
Gentiles to know that God was the God of the Gentiles as well as of
the Jews.

God's actions in Jesus' fate therefore were

shc~n

to be

universal in scope in that the Gentiles responded to this revelation
an~

accepted it as having been extended to them as well.

62

The seventh thesis presented by Pannenberg asserts that the
i~;arting

of God's

~ord

is related to revelation by its foretelling,

forthtelling and report. 63

Par~enberg understands that

Even though

any reference to the Eiblical word of God as the direct revelation
of God is influenced by gnosticism,64

there is still a threefold

relationship between these two concepts.

First, the indirect

revelation through historical acts confirms the promises which God

62

Ibid., pp. 150-151.

63

Ibid., pp. 152-155.

64

Ibid. , see pp. 10-12.
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had given

befc~ehand.

Here the word sets the stage for the

revelatory actions by foretelling the promises of God which are
then fulfilled in the revelatory future.

Second, the words of

God confirm nis acts in history in the sense that they follow the
revelation as forthtelling.

In this sense, the actions of God

establish the words that follow, such as with the Law or other
commandments which were given to the people after they had seen God
act.

Third,

acts as a

emergi~s

repo~t

of

in the New Testament one finds that the kerygma

~hat

historical acts God has already performed.

There can be no universal significance of God's revelation apart
from some proclamation of these events.

Thus this third relationship

between word and revelation points to a spoken proclamation regarding
..

~ne

precee d"~nG reve 1 a t"~on. 65
None of these relationships between revelation and word give

any revelatory nature to the word.

The word of God, either spoken

or written, is therefore conceived by Pannenberg as supplementing
the actual revelation without being the revelation itself.
word may precede the indirect revelation in the form of a

The
pro~ise

as

to what God will do in the future (foretelling), or the word may
follow the revelation, having been established by the acts of God
(forthtelling).

Yet again, the word may be a proclamation of the

revelation (report).

Thus the word may serve to explicate or proclaim

revelation, or else the word may itself be expanded, verified or
established by the revelation.

At any rate, the word is therefore

related to the revelation without being the revelation itself.

65

Ibid., pp. 153-155.

66

Ibid.

66
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From Pannenberg's presentation of these seven theses one

c~~

perceive how the past revelatory acts of God (both in Israel's
history and in the life of Jesus) and the future revelation of God
are believed to be intricately interwoven.

This scholar has indeed

developed a theological system which seeks to explain the 3iblical
concept of God's indirect Self-revelation through Ris actions in
history.

However, Pannenberg fails noticeably in at least four

key areas of his

which will be investigated here.

~ork,

The first major criticism of Pannenberg concerns his concept of
God.

This criticism is

~irected

against the aforementioned understand-

ing of God as reaching from a future existence into the past.
Pannenberg believes that this view of God is confirmed by the Scriptures
and especially by the preaching of Jesus.

In the view of this scholar,

Jesus conceived of God's claim to this world exclusively in
futuristic terms.

God is said to be in a process of coming to exist

a4d so in a certain sense does not exist at present. 67
In order to make the assertion that the !{ew Testament also
expounds this futuristic view of the existence of God, it appears
that Pannenberg has to ride roughshod over the Scriptural evidence
to the contrary.
teaching is on the

It is agreed that the main emphasis in Jesus'
co~ing

faith-obedience to God.
require God's
future.

pri~ary

68

Kingdom of God

a~d

the resulting present

But this is far from sufficient proof

to

existence as issuing into the present from the

In fact, Jesus seems to indicate the origin of God's

67

Pannenberg, TheoloGY and the Kingdom of God, on.cit., p?

68

See Ibid., nne 50, 53, 73, 81, 133.

-

--

56, 68.
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existence as beL~g different than Pannenberg asserts. 69
For instance, when Jesus refers to the eschatological judgment
of the futuxe, he likens it to the past judgment that God meted
out both in the days of Lot and in the days of Noah (Luke 17:26-30,

32; cf. ?,{att. 24:37-39).

Vi"hen on another occasion Jesus was asked

for a sign, he did not point

fo~vard

to any events in the future:

but bacbvards to the prophet Jonah, who was to be a sign of his
resurrection form the dead (Matt. 22:39; cf. ?,fatt. 16:4, Luke 11:29-

30).

P2so, when questioned about divorce, Jesus infcrmed the

questioner that God has acted out of the past in making provision
for rnarriage.

Jesus refers his listeners to the mighty act of the

creation of God for their answer concerning the seriousness of
divorce (Mk. 10:6-8; Matt. 19:4-6).
Therefore it is obvious that Parillenberg is not correct in his
statement that Jesus spoke exclusively of God in terms of Ris future
To the contrary, several portions of the gospels indicate
rather that Jesus also looked into the past for the unveiling of
power.

C~d's

Jesus thus does not speak of God exclusively in futuristic

terms, unless one has already

ass~~ed

in advance that God works from

the future into the past.
NowP~~enberg c~~

admittedly explain these verses in

w~ich

refers to God's power as also being demonstrated in the past.
were not supposed to be verses which he could not explai..Tl.

Jesus

These

They

siruply sho'.'! that Jesus looked to the past as well as to the future
in order to reveal the

69

70

work~gs

of Ged.

T~Ere

are admittedly many

In the use of the New' Testarlent Scriptures which are to follow, the
issue is not to defend these words cu~d argue if they were actually
spoken by Jesus or not. Rather, we are primarily concerned at this
point With what the Scriptures teach about the nature and existence
of C~d, not about who said which words.
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, op.cit., p. 56.

verses which do indeed refer to future acts of God, but the:::-e are
also ones dealing with His past actions.

However, the significant

point here is that Pannenberg can inte:::-pret the past actions of God
accordin~

to his system

onl~

by utilizing the prior presupposition

that God is already in the future, working into the

re~ote

past.

His view that Goe reveals Himself only from the future is an unsupported
assertion, and it is shown to be

so~mply

by the fact

t~at

it must

be assumed to be true before it can be accepted, as will be shown
in the third criticism of

?a~~enberg

below.

He cannot point to these

verses as ones which support his ideas, for ·they do not.

Ee can

only interpret them according to already existing assumptions.
Eut from whence does the
in the future arise?

ac~ual

idea that God exists primarily

One might stress verses on the other end of

the spectrum and build a case around the thesis that God e:-:ists
primarily in the East and is revealed particularly through Zis
crea tion.
t~e

Fro:l this past existence Be would then reveal ::linself in

present and in the future.

Verses

pertainin~

to

th~

future

Kingdom of God would then be applied to the final and conplete
revelation of God.

As clever as such systems can be made to sound,

they appear to be based more upon philosophical speculation than
upon theological revelation •
. The point here is therefore not that Pannenberg cannot deal with
these preceding verses, but rather that he must assume the primary
importance of the future in order to do so.

Both his thesis and the

contrived one that perceives God to have acted mainly from the past
through the creation-event thus have the same problem.
lack of proof.

There is a

Both views have inadequate reasoning to justify such

a view of revelation.

For instance, there is no suppo:::-t in the New
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Testament accounts of Jesus' teachings to justify the position that
God does not yet exist, in whatever sense this may be taken.
d oes J esus t eac_
h t -na t ,..~o d

°
~s

It is plain that in other

si~ilar

°
~n

a process

0f

°
com~ng

ways as well,

°
~n

Neither

t0 o
t ence. 71
ex~s

Pa~~enberg's

overall

conception of God a?pears to be based more upon philosophical
speculation than upon revelation.

There is a decided lack of evidence

for his view.
The second major criticism of Pannenberg concerns his hypothesis

that God reveals Himself indirectly only through His actions in human
history.

Por this scholar, God did not reveal Himself through any

direct means, such as by the inspiration of the Scriptures, but only
"
72
indirectly through the events of hum~~ history.
1-:any theologians are of the persuasion that God acts in history
and that this is one means of revelation. 73

But fewer are convinced

that this is the only means of God's reve1atio"n.
shortcoming of

Pa~~enberg's

Certainly anothe:t'

is in not recognizing the

self-~itness

of the Scriptures as being another revelation of God, especially in
°
port~ons

wh ~c.h
O

Call Id

no t ,-nave b een

°
~n

f1 uence d -oy gnos t ~c~s~.
""
74

71

For Pannenberg's connection of these ideas ~ith Jesus' teachings,
see Ibid., p. 56. Eut he strangely gives no references for these
assertions.

72

For Pannenbe::rg's assertions against the "direct" views of inspiration,
see Revelation as Histo::ry, op.cit., pp.-9-13, 152. ?or his own
view see pp. 125ff.

73

For example, see Ladd, o~.cit., pp. 17, 144; cf. Daniel Fuller,
on.cit.~ pp. 186, 230, Z37; cf. p. 234.
At this point, Pannenbers's
contention of revelation in history is correct.
There is no attempt here to employ any kind of circular reasoning
concernins the inspir~tion of Scripture by first asking what the
self-witness of the Scriptures is and then assuming that this is
true. This would not be a correct procedure. It is not our
purpose here to even discuss whether this self-witness to inspiration
is valid. Rather, the concern "is that Pa~~enberg does not accept
the New Testament's claim to revelation in the Scriptures because

/,1::
2"TJ

Pannenberg contends that the New Testament witness to the direct
revelation of God in the Scriptures reflects the early influence of
gnosticism, as already shown above.

This direct Scriptural revelation

is held to be contrary to the Jewish understanding of Godls indirect
revelation in history.

To be sure, he does allow a close connection

between the written words and this revelation. 15

Eut it appears that

Pannenberg ignores the Old Testament witness to God's revelation in
Scripture and through the prophets.

This attestation would of course

be removed from the influence of first century gnosticism.
A very clear reference to God's speaking through the Old Testament
prophets is found in Kumbers 12:6, 8.

Here we are specifically told

that God used this means to make Himself known to the. Jewish nation.
This is both an early and quite clear reference to the Jewish belief
that God did reveal Himself to the Jews through the prophets.
ments such as this one in

state-

~umbers could be multiplied considerably.1 6

In fact, hundreds of times in the Old Testa:nent

·~he

phrase "thus

said the Lord" serves to introduce a revelation of God for t~e peoplew 77
The Jews were even responsible for distinguishing between the
prophet who spoke the words of the Lord and one who did not.

The

sign that the prophet was relaying a revelation from God

~as

that the

prophecy would occur in history.

~as

one who

Thus, the true propbet

of what he feels is the influence of gnosticism (see Revelation
as Ristory, o~~cit., pp. 10-12, 152). It is this claim which
must be examined, especially as regards the clearly non-gnostic
portions of Scripture. This examination is very i~portant, since
Pan.~enberg is interested in developing an understanding of what
the Jewish conception of revelation consisted. This will be our
endeavor here as well.
15

Ibid., pp. 152-155.

16

cr.

77

for example Rum. 22:38; 23:12, 16, 26: Jer. 1:6-9, 26:2;
Ezek. 3: 10-llOne such instance is Jer. 15:19-21.
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correctly receiveQ revelation directly from the Lord and then
proclaimed it to the people with his word being confirmed DY history
(see Deuteronomy 18:20-22).
te~ches

that

Go~'s

The Old Testament therefore not only

indirect revelation is manifested in history, in

this instance by the

fulfill~ent

of prophecy, but also that God's

direct revelation is given to the 'Dro'Ohets, through whom God makes
Himself known. 78
Eowever, the Old Testament witnesses report that God not only
revealed

~L~self t~rough

the preaching of the prophets, but also

through the written Scriptures.

There is even a

relations~ip

the revelation given to the prophets to speak and the
this revelation in

~ritten

words, as the prophets

1:oses

80

was

of

quite often

For instance,

the words of God, but also
81
to write the words ..hich had beer. revealed to him.
~his ~eans that
co~anded

not only to

r~cording

wer~

required to record t~e words of their proPhecies. 79

between

spe~~

God's revelation also comes thro1.,;.gh the '.n:'itten words of the Scriptures. 82

78

See G. Ernest ~::::'i;ht' s exegesis of !jThe :Book of Numbersll in
The Inter~reter's Bible, edited by George Arthur Euttrick, o'D.cii.,
vol. II, pp. 450-451.

79

A ge~eral reference to the written words of the prophets occurs in
Zech. 7:12. The "cras here would probably be the written ones 1
since the reference is to prophets of former ti~es whose writings
were in existence.

80
81
82

~\Coses

is referred to as a prophet in Deut. 34: 10.

See Ex. 17:24; 24:4; 34:27-28; Deut. 31:9, 24-26.
As with the other Old Testament ver'ses listed in this section, it
is not our purpose here to debate who is the author of these words.
It is rather our concern to ascertain what the Jewish view of
revelation YlaS, especially as spoken and written D;:"- chosen men
of ~od. Thes~ ve:ses are therefore very valuable in reflecting
this belief.
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other prophets besides !Joses are also commanded to write the
revelation which was communicated to them by God.

This is found to

be the case with Isaiah (Is. 8:1; 30:8), Jeremiah (Jer. 36:2) and
Habbakuk (Rab. 2:2).

It is recorded that David also both spoke and

wrote God's revelations to him.
It is

~ow

83

plain from this preceding brief survey that Parwenberg!s

limitation of revelation to God's acts in human history is only
presenting a part of the whole.

In spite of this scholar's claim

that his view faithfully represents that of ancient Judaism, it has
been shown here that this is not the case.

84

The Jewish concept of

revelation also includes at least the revelation given to prophets
to speak the worn of God and the revelation which is written in the
form of the

S~;J"'iptures.

It is true that the Jews believed that God

revealed Himself indirectly

throu~~

historical acts.

But it is also

true that the Jews belicvzd that God revealed Himself directly through
the prophets and through the written word in the Scriptures.

A proper

view of Jewish revelation must include all of these factors and not
just the first, as ?annenberg does.

83

Cf. 1~. 12:36; Matt. 22:43-46; Luke 20:42 with II Sam. 23:2. One
cannot object to the use of the l\"ew Testament verses her-e, because
the Old Testanent verse also confirms that the Lord spoke through
David. ~oth express the direct revelation of God to him.

84 Rolf Rendtorff, in his essay, liThe Concept of Revelation in Ancient
Israel" (in Pannenberg's Revelation as History, o~.cit., pp. 46-47),
also recognizes a close relationship between word and r-evelation.
However, like ?annenberg, he insists that the wo~d is not really
revelation. His view likewise falls prey to the same criticisms
raised here. For instance, in order for a prophet to foretell an
act of God in history, he must have receivtnl su(;h wurd from the
Lord. This is the whole point of Deut. 18:20-22. This word is
God's revealinb the future through the prophet before the event
in history occurs. Pannenberg especially misses this point in
his expositio~ of the similarities between word and revelation
(Ibid.~ 152-155). Without such revelation through the prophet
there would be no foretelling of the event.
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It is Pannenberg's opinion that only gnosticism teaches such
direct revelation,8 5yet it has been shown that even in the earlier
Old Testament writings this view is found.

To claim the influence

of gnosticism here is ther-efore clearly impossible.

Rolf Rendtorff

also asserts that God never revealed Himself in the prophetic word,86
yet it has also been shown that several Old Testament
the contrary view.

Especially

note~ort~here

passa~es

teach

is Rum. 12:6:

If there is a prophet among you, I the LORD make myself known
to him. in a vision, I speak with him in a dream UIum. 12: 6,
RSV, italics added).
As if to say that this Self-revelation of God was not direct

e~ough

in soree insta.nces, !:.un. 12: 8 adds concerning 1:oses that:
With him I speak mouth to mouth, clearly, and not in dark
speech; and he beholds the form of the Lord (Num. 12:8, RSV).
There can be no question about the intention of these
God made

Ei~self k~o ..n

more directly to :;:oses.
necessarily involve

t~o

verses.

to the prophets, but ne revealed Einself even
The Lord's "making Himself known" :iZlust

Self-revelatio~.

also assert these beliefs.

Other verses

po~nted

]y making known Ris present

out above

a~onitions

for holy living by exhorting the Jews to keep the Law and by revealing
the future by Ris prophets, it was believed that God was revealing
Eimself directly to the people.

This was done by God's

c~osen

messengers thro'llgh both the spoken and the written word. 87

85
86

87

Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 12; cf. p. 152.
Rendtorff in Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 46.
!'':any scholars also believe that the :Biblical witness provides
written revelation of God. For this view see, for instance,
Norweigan theologian Sigmund Mowinckel's work The Old Testament
as Word of God, translated by Reidar E. Ejornard (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1959), pp. 10-12, 23-26. See also Charles C.
Anderson, The Vistorical Jesus: A Continuing Quest, o~.cit.,
pp. 9-51 and Bernard Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences, op.cit.,
pp. 224- 249.
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Pannenberg's view of revelation therefore fails in its attempt
to present the only revelation of God as being
God's acts in

h~an

history.

indir~ct

by =eans of

This is just a part of the

Je~ish

concept, which also includes direct revelation through the oral
proclamation

an~ throu~~

the written wore,

The third major criticism of Pannenberg is one which recurs
throughout much of his work and is especially obvious in his
presentation of his seven

theses~

Pannenbergfs Yiew of revelation

in its relation to the future contains several inadeouatelv
..
...
statements.

3is theological system does include many
SS
alluring points, some of which are certainly valid.

--

su~~orted

intri~~ing

and

Eut the overall

framework for this system, especially concerning God's revelation
of Himself from the future, sometimes appears to be composed of
assumptions

~hich

lack proper evidence.

so:ne extent in the first objection above.
hs~e

that

a future

Pan~enber~
~hich

is sometimes

~ilty

This has been perceived to
Thus IiIcDer'!l1ott notes'
of inserting reality into

has obviously not yet arrived, and that he has done

o""0
so without the ~roper clarification and evidence. /
Instances of this lack of evidence are readily availacle, and
clearly affect the framework of Pannenberg's theological system.
Pannenberg admits that his work rests upon two presuppositions, these
being the reality of the future;s power and. the single future which

qo

exists for every event.'

88

To be sure, there are some strong, carefully reasoned points in
Pannenberg's ~ork. The strongest part of his theolo~- ~ill be
discussed later.

89 !.:cDermott, on. cit. ,
90

- ~uite apparent

These two presuppositions are

714.
Pannenberg, Theolo.y' and the Kin.;-dom of God, on. ci t. , p. ,-0.....
p.
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in his seven theses, but strangely without supportive evidence in
many cases.
For instance, the second thesis calls for a relationship between
revelation ana the end of all history.
be the result of

t~e

This relationship is said to

indirect nature of this aforementioned revelation.

In fact, the cOr'_"lection of

revelatio~l

with history's end'is said to

be the direct result of the indirectness of revelation. 9l

3ut even

if or.e were to [;rant the indirect nature of God's reve'lation in
" t ory, 92 h ow d oes .l-h"
_~s
~ ~s
cause reve 1 a t"~on
h

the end of history?

.I~o

b e k nown

" " 1y a t

pr~~ar~

Pan.."lenberg never succeeds in de:nonstrating how

indirect revelation auto:natically means that this revelation must be
connected with the end of history.
acting indirectly in history

fro~

God could quite conceivably be
out of the nresent.

In other words,

Pannenberg has not shown why futurity must follow from indirect
revelation.

One must assume that his view of God is the definitive

one to even begin to arrive at this conclusion, and we have already
seen that this
Anot~er

vie~

is quite arbitrary and problematical as well.

example of

Par~enberg's

arbitrary theology occurs in the

fourth thesis, wnere Jesus' fate is also connected with the end of
3ecause of this formulation, Pannenberg asserts that there
"ill be no further Self-revelation of God after the resurrection of
Jesus. 93

91

?annenber;, Revelation as History, on.cit., p. 131.

92

..l..s we have already noted, many would perhaps be more willing to
~rant that one of God's methods of revelation is His acting in
history, in-addition to other modes of revelation. See Ladd,
on.cit., pp. 17, 144; Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. Is6, 237.

93

Pannenberg,

~8velation

as History, on.cit., pp. 142, l43w
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But this thesis also lacks conclusive
raises several problems of its own.
~ediated

in

~

evide~ce.

Indeed, it

For instance, if revelation is

of history as Pannenberg claims, why should the

indirect Self-revelation of God then end with the fate of Christ?
Why should revelation not extend beyond this point?

One could still

hold that the supreme Se1£-reve1ation of God occurred in the Christ
event, but that this revelation still progresses beyond this point.
Is not

Par~enberg's

abrupt halt at the fate of Jesus a rather arbitrary

termination of revelation?
disired stopping point.

Indeed~

it does appear to be

si~ply

a

But there is obviously a need for a logical

reason to suP?ort such an abrupt halt.

Pannenberg entertains this

same objection at the end of his introductory essay,
hopes this problem will be answered 1ater. 94

stati~b

But he never

that he

~uite

seems to come back to it with an appropriate answer.
Even if Panrlenberg were successful in showing why revelation
should end here, would it not then demand an adjustment in his
previous concept of this revelation?

It would appear that the previous

notion that God's indirect Self-disclosure occurs in all of history--in
everything that happens 9'--must be revised.

How can one assert that

everything which occu.rs is revelation and then later arbitrarily drop
this notion after the Christ event becomes past history?

Logically,

according to Pannenberg's system, revelation should continue past
point.

A closely related problem with this fourth thesis is that if God's
revelation occurs in all events of human history, why sincle out one

Ibid., pp. 17-19.

95

Ibid., p. 16; cf. p.

7.
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strand, namely Jewish history, in which to concentrate
attention?

To do so favors the Biblical witness, to be surG, but

what is the rationale behind such an assertion if one
Pannenberg's presuppositions?
Pa~~enberg

all

a~ost

must deal

~ith

the

with

beGi.:~s

As Daniel Fuller aptly points out,
of how God reveals

proble~

all of history and yet all of the most

~i~self

i~portant revelatio~

in

occurs

especially to a select group of Jews and Christians. 96
Also, since God is said to act in all of history, how can one
ascertain when Ee acts ill

~

special way in just

~

event like the

fate of Jesus?

SO:::J.e

may look at an event and see.God working, others

~ay

sa~e

event and not notice this at all. 97

look at the

Perhaps these

points indicate that Fannenberg's view of revelation occurring in
all of

~istory

needs

a~justment.

It is tierefore possible to perceive areas of
theologi~al

assertions.

SystE2

~hich

Pannenbe~b's

contain several inadequately supported

These problems seem especially related to his view of

the future and

~oy;

it affects the present;

are not self-authenticating. 98

?annenberg's statements

Yet he often fafls to provide

reascnable facts to back his claims.

As a result, his theology

remains quite proclematical in that the logical demonstration in
key areas is often lacking.
The fourth major criticism of Pannenberg concerns both his view
of the nature of the resurrection appearances of Jesus and his
treat~ent

of the naturalistic alternative

96

Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. 18 4-18 6 •

97

See

98

S~e

~laikie,

views~

During a discussion

on.cit., p. 159.

editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg, Theolosy and the Kin.:;dom of Goel,
on.cit., p. 42.
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of the historicity of this event, to which we will return briefly
below, Pannenberg introduces his conception of the appearances of
Jesus to the disciplss and to Paul.

For this scholar,

appearances involve1 several elements.

t~e

resurrection

Those who sar. the resurrected

Jesus saw a spiritual body, not a natural, earthly one.

This

appearance was acc02panied by an audition and, at least in the case
of Paul, a phenomenon of light.

These were appearances

fro~

heaven

and were recognized by all as the risen Lord. 99
However, ?annenberg asserts that these appearances of Jesus were
not very palpable one~.

The nature of these occurrences were more

similar to "objective visions", or visions which were not produced
by the subjective consciousness of those perceiving the phenomena.
In other words, the appearances of the resurrected Jesus ~ere
realities outside of the apostles in spite of a lack of cor~oreal
l00

qualitie3.
.

theory,

101

disciples

Pannenberg specifically opposes the subjective vision

which

wi~h

~akes

the resurrection a concept in the

no objective reality.

view were presented above;

~is

~inds

of the

contentions against this

The resurrection was rather an objective

reality showing the disciples that Jesus was alive.

sue;';. it was

. ~ event • 102
an ac t ua 1 h ~s t or~cal
o

In spite of ?annenberg's more than adequate defense of the
historicity of the resurrection, his stance against more objective
appearances of

99

~esus

u.~warranted,

Pannenberg, 2'esus--God and I:!an,

100

Ibid., pp. 93-95.

101

Ibid., pp. 95-97.

102

is

Ibid., pp. 98-99, 105.

?annenberg appears to feel that

0'0.

cit., pp. 92-93.

it is essential to choose between Paul and the gospels when discussing
the nature of the resurrection body.

Since he conceives of all the

appearances being of a similar nature, Jesus must have

alw~ys

appeared

as he did to Paul. 103
It has been shown above that both the gospels and Paul maintain
that Jesus' resurrected body was both similar to and diffel'ent from
his natural body:

The emphasis in the gospels on the disciples'

ability to touch Jesus' body and to otherwise verify his appearances
to them has also

bee~

discussed above.

'~l th ere f ore no t -De s t u d-~e d .ere
h

W~L

reveal the

convic~iun

"
new qua 1 ~t~es

-

an~

This evidence in the gospels
-

aga~n.

104

But the gospels also

that Jesus' body was somehow changed, having

powers~

105

Paul's testimony is likewise that the res"..!rrection body is a
"spiri t1.1al bodylt different from one t s physical body.106

Nevertheless,

it is the resurrection of a spiritual body and not simply the
resuscitation of a spirit.

~his

is recognized by most theologians

103

Ibid., p. 92.

104

The key passages teaching the objective nature of Jesus'
appearances include sucn portions as Matt. 28:9; Luke 24:36-43;
John 20:17 (in the Greek); 20:20, 26-29; Acts 1:3.

105

instance, the gospels assert that Jesus was already gone
the grave before the stone was rolled away, implying that he
evacuated by means other than the dco=way (l(:att. 28:2-6). It is
also reported that Jesus left the graveclothes behind, undisturbed,
showing that he passed through them rather than havinG to unravel
them (John 20:6-9; cf. Luke 24:12). He was also able to appea=
and disappear at will, even into locked rooms (Luke 2~:30-3l, 36;
John 20:19; 26). See Ladd, on.cit., pp. 84-96, 126.
~or

fr~m

106

See especially I Cor. 15:42-50.
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tod.ay.107

As ':iilliam H. Johnson correctly contends, theological

justice must be done to both wOJ:'ds in the Pauline phrase "spiritual
body".

Neither v.-ord must be over-stressed at the expense of the

other.

Thus, Jesus did not risE? as. a spirit or in a physical body,
. .
lOa
but as a sp~r~tual body.
Yet, it is not recognized as often that Paul also gives some
evidence for objective appearances of Jesus.

Although he possessed a

new body, the Jesus who appeared to the disciples and Paul was the
same Jesus who had died on the cross and was afterw~rds buried. 109
Another indicator of the objectivity of Jesus' appearances was that
he appeared to nany on different occasions (see I Cor. 15:5-8).

It

is especially Jesus' appearance to the 500 people at once (verse six)
which helps us to determine how objective these experiences were for
the diSCiples.

It is this appearance in particular which points to

an objective manifesta.tion.

Paul's conception of Jesus' resurrection

body v:as such that it could be seen by a group this size.

It won.lei

therefore appear to require more than just a my.stifying libht and

107

For instance, see Pan..'"lenberg, Jesus--God and 1.:1an, on.cit., p. 92;
Ladd, ou.cit., pp. 111, 114-118; Brown, The Virginal Concention
and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, ou.cit., pp. 85-89 and Brown's
"The Resurrection and Biblical Criticism",ou.cit., p. 2;6;
Reginald Fuller, ouocit., p. 179. See footnote number 113 below
for others who also recognize this.

108

William 3:allock Johnson, "The Keystone of the Arch::, Theology
Today, edited. by Joh..'"l ~. :.racX~y, ~'..:..!!lbe!" 1; A:?!'il~ 1949-January
1950, p. 20.

109

See I Cor. 15:3~4. For the reality of the empty tomb, see Pannenberg,
Jesus--God and llian, ~~.cit., pp. 100-104; Reginald Fuller, on.cit.,
pp. 69-70, 179; Brown~ The Virginal Cc~cention and 30dily
Resurrection of Jesus, on.cit., p. 122, footnote n~ber 204 and.
p. 126; see also ErOW'!l'S article "The Resurrection and :Biblical
Criticism", on.cit., p. 235. For the view that Paul also implied
the empty to=b in I Cor. 15:4, see Reginald Fuller, Ibid., pp.
48-49, 69; Ramsey, on.cit., p. 44. In addition, see Robert M.
Grant, A Historical Introduction to the New Testament, ou.cit.,
p. 369 and Clark H. Pinnock, "On the Third Day"in Henry, on.cit., "0.15
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auditory phenomen~n, along with an objective vision. 110
Ladd also disaGrees with

?an-~enberg's

conception of "objective

visions", which pattern all of Jesus' appearances after the one to
Paul.

The evidence shows that the gospels were written under the

influence and control of various eyewitnesses of these events.

There

must be an underlying factual traditio!'l behind these reports as well.
3esides, once it is granted that Jesu.s actually rose from. t:le dead,
there is no reason
"

var~ous

he could not have appeared various

~hy

~ays

to

"d"""
1 III
~v~aua s.

~n

To reinforce this last statement, one must remember that, in
the books of

the author Luke does not seem to be aware of

L~~e-Acts,

any contradiction in recording both the more objective appearances to
the disciples and tb.e more ,"'spiritual" conversion appearance to Paul.

112

Sin:.il'arly, many theologians also feel that the witness of the gospels
is essentially cO:.1pati "ole wi th that of Paul, in spite of tl:e different
stresses in each.

~he

conclusion often is therefore that Jesus

appeared in an objective

~ay

that could be verified, but in a new

S"::l:lr:l
oay. 113
- " "t ua_1 b"
~

It is

so~ewhat

surprising that Pannenberg does not

p~~ce

even

stress than !le does on the objectivity of Jesus I appearances.

110
111
112

113

Cf. Ladd, on.cit., p. 105; see also p. 138 and Brown, The Virginal
Concention a!ld Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, ,Qp.cit., p. 91.
Ladd, Ibid., pp. 126, 136-139.
Luke records t~e rr;ore objective appearances to the disciples
(see Luke 24:;6-43; Acts I:;; 10:40-41) right along with the three
pas3ages fihich narrate Paul's conversion (Acts 9:1-9; 22:6-11;
26:12-18).
See La.dd, ot).cit., pp. 126, 137-138; Brown, "The Resu::rection and.
Eiblical Criticism": ou.cit.: p. 236; cf. Grant, Miracles and
Natural La.w, ou.cit., pp. 229-230; see also Charles C. Anderson,
The Historical Jesus: A Continuing Quest, on.cit., pp. 163-166;
J.!~.D. Imc.erson, on.cit., p. 99; McNaugher, on.cit., pp. 164-165;
Smith, o"::l.cit., pp. 194-195.
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For the reasons just outlined here, it is therefore with good evidence
that this fourth major criticism of Pannenberg remains

Eye-

vali~.

witness testimony witnessed to these objective appearances through
such men as Luke (cf. Luke 1:1-4 with Luke 24:36-45; Acts 1:3).
Such eyewitness testicony which has already been shown to exist
behind the gospel traditions therefore reflects valid witness to
the objectiveness of Jesus' appearances to the disciples.
refers to the original
ap~earances

(I

Cor~

thus compatible

disci~lesi

15:11-15).

~ith

Even Paul

testimony of the resurrection

The

tes~imony o~

the gospels is

Paul.

The second part of this fourth criticism concerns Pannenberg's
treatment of the naturalistic theories which have been proposed against
the resurrection.

Apart

fro~

his criticism of the subjective vision

theory, his overall treatment of the
not entirely complete.

vt~ar

alternative theories is

Be is still successful in refuting the other

hypotheses, but he fails to disprove them as sufficiently as is
possible.

This is an

i~portant

point, for since all of Christianity

rests upon the validity of the resurrection, as was

determine~

earlier,

then refutations of rival views must be as comnlete as uossible in
order to more clearly ascertain if this event actually occurred.
It is especially important to the validity of this third solution to
the resurrection (that this event can be demonstrated) that there are
no probable solutions other than Jesus' resurrection from the dead.
This therefore yuints to the need for as thorough an investigation
and refutation of the major naturalistic theories as is possibleo
In addition, it is true that the more thorough such a refutation
of the alternate

vie~s

is, the more convincing the resulting

probability of the resurrection of Jesus is made.
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Wolfhart Pannenberg has built a theological system
many intriguing

a~d

interesting

ideas~

~~ich

contains

Bowever, his work has been

shown to fall prey to four major criticisms.

First, his view of God

as being fully revealed ollly in the future is an arbitrary one which
lacks the proper evidence.

The Scriptures, including Jesus, do not

unanimously refer to God this way at all.

Second, Pannenberg's view

of God's indirect Self-revelation as occurring only in historical
acts is only a part of the Biblical presentation of revelation.

It

was found that God also revealed Himself directly through the
prophets and through the written word of God.
Third, the overall theological system of this scholar lacked
conclusive evidence in several places.
regard to Pannenberg's seven theses.

This is especially true with
There was a decided lack of

evidence needed to demonstrate such' items as the futurity of revelation
and the end
event.

o~

all Self-revelation of God occurring in the Christ-

Fourth, it was shown that Pan.'1.enberg's concept of the nature

of the resurrection appearances

WuS

not

object~ve

allow properly for the evidence for more objective

enough and did not
m~'1.ifestations

of

In addition, his refutation of the naturalistic theories
.
114
against the resurrection was ~ot as cGmplete as ~t should have been.
Jesus.
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There are other substantial criticisms of Pannenberg's thought
which have not been mentioned here. For instance, Heu.h.a.us has
pointed o~t that Pannenberg's concept of the Kingdom of God as
a possibility to be worked for in human society is perilously
close to so~e of the ideas of the social gospel move~e~t of the
nineteenth century. The view that the Kingdom of G·od coule.
become established in the social order through the effort of men
failed. See Neuhaus in Pannenberg's Theology and the Kingdom
of God, o~.cit., pp. ,1-33. Cf. Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 77, 79,
80, 84.

It is easily perceived that the resurrection of Jesus is one
of the central concepts in ?annenberg's theological syste3.

The

examination of the resurrection is also the strongest aspect of his
theolo5J.

Eis

treat~ent

of this event

but a few comrr.ents are in order here.

h~s

been dealt

Pannenberg

the resurrection with regard to its historicity.

logicall~~

and dispelled, even though such procedures are not

rose from the

dea~

above,
investi:;ates

Rival theories

which seek to explain this event naturalistically are

they should have been.115

wit~

ente~tained

as

asco~plete

Anyone who disputes the claim t~at Jesus

is welcome--in fact, required--to arrive at an

alternative theo:::-;? >;"hich is adequate enough to account for the facts.
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It is Pannenberg's conviction that when one conducts such an
investigation of the facts, one arrives at the probability that the
resurrection
examinatio~

di~,

of

t~e

indeed, occur in actual

~uman

history.

facts reveals the probable conclusion

did rise from the dead after the crucifixion.

~he

0

Jesus

resurrection is

....
.,
' t0 'uE: an ac t ua 1'"
. 1 even.
t 117
"....us d eJ:;:!ons-:;:rB.
c;ec.
n~s'tor~ca
.,.,
.
.,h
.
. .. ~&'.
It t
.
cone 1 us~on
rannenoe:::-g
~s 't.orougn ana. Q~l~~CU

t~at

In tl:is

'
116
re fu'te.

His

own refutation of alternate views is valid and does indeed show that
the resurrection is the most probable solution.

Therefore, this

conclusion a"O"Oears to be q,'.1i te valj,d.

115

Pannenberg, Jesus--God and ?.ian,

116

Pannenberg, Revelation as History,

117
118

Pannenberg, Jesus--God and ilian,
on p. 105.

0"0.

ci t., pp. 88-106.
o~.cit.,

....".,

0'0. c~

p. 147.

see this conclusion

Even those who do not accept Par_~enberg's view of the resurrection
find his defense of this event to be quite sophisticated.
See for instance, Reginald Fuller, on.cit., pp. 22-23.

Chapter X.

Possibility Number Three: Other Similar Views

PaIL~enberg

Other scholars besides

also hold that Jesus rose

literally from the dead and that this can be demonstrated to be the

~ost probable conclusion in this issue. l

This is surely not to

affirm that these scholars followed Pannenberg in these conclusions,
for most have not derived their
consider

the~selves

ins~iration

from him, nor do they

part of the "theology of hope" school of thought.

Therefore one finds that the

tec~~iques

vary here, but the final

result is similar.
One such theologian who believes that Jesus' literal resurrection
fro~

the

~ead

can be demonstrated to be the most probable conclusion

is Daniel Fuller.

In his work Easter Faith and History, Fuller

surveys most of the major theological approaches to the question of
the relationship between faith and history.

As the title of this

work suggests, this question is surveyed particularly by examining
the various views of the resurrection.
Beginning

~ith

Enlightenment rationalism and continuinG through

present contemporary theology, this scholar investigates

~ost

of the

major theologians and their views of the historical and rational
content of faith.

After viewing the attempts of the major theological

schools of thought down to the present, Fuller turns his attention to
attempts to accept the resurrection as fact from three different

1

The word "demonstrated", once again, is not used here in the sense
of absolute proof, but rather as it is related to probabilities.
Thus, this section deals with the conviction that the factual
evidence is such that the resurrection of Jesus is "the ~ost
probable conclusion.
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standpoints.

Atte~~ts

to hold belief in this event anart from

historical reasoning, by

~artial

historical reasoning and totally by

historical reasoning are then investigated.

Fuller's

concl~sion

is

that none of these views are entirely acceptable, as each falls prey
to various

criticis~s

which he presents.

2

It should be noted that

Fuller does agree with the principle of historical verification of
the resurrection, as will be shown below.

But he objects here to

these methods by ..hich such attempts are made.
Fuller's solution is to

exami~e

the first century approach to

the resurrection of Jesus which is taken by Luke in the

Ne~

Testament

wo~k Luke-Acts. 3 After reviewing seve~al key hypotheses concerning
the theme of Luke-Acts,4 Fuller sets forth

~hat

he believes is the

maj o~ t-"eme of these two books. 5
The

L~~an

prologue (Luke 1:1-4) sets forth some key information

concerning the intentions of the author.
~eceived

Eere

claims that he

L~~e

the information in this work from the original eyewitnesses

(Luke 1:2).

~~ller

points out that while Luke was thus not himself

an eyewitness of Jesus' ministry, he received the

info~ation

,

those who did originally participate in the events.o
did

sha~e

from

However, L~~e

first hand in the fulfillment of the resurrection event,

2

Daniel Fuller~ 0"0. oi t •.. The examination of these various schools
of thought and the subsequent evaluation of these three positions
with regard to history is fo~~d on pp. 27-187.

3

Preliminary questions such as the authorship and date for Luke-Acts
are discussed by Fulle~, Ibid., pp. 190-199.

4

Ibid. , pp. 199-208.

5 Ibid.,
6

pp. 208-229.

Ibid., pp. 188-190.
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namely, the mission of the Christian church to the Gentiles.

Luke

therefore experie!"!.ced the result of the resurrection fai tl1 firsthand. 7
Fuller finds that an

i~port~~t

writing so that his readers

8

emphasis in Luke-Acts is Luke's

could know the certainty of W~&t had

transpired in the life of Christ and especially in his

res~rrection.

In fact, Luke's purpose in writing to these early believers was to
inform them that they could be sure of what had been reported to
them pertaining to the Christ event.

This certainty which was

available to each reader applied in particul&r to the surety that
Jesus was raised from the dead (see L~ke 1:4).9
Upon what "as such certainty based?

Fuller explains

t~at

for

Luke, the early Christian mission to the Gentiles was the fulfillmeni
of the resurrection of Jesus.

Wit:hout the appearances to the

disciples end the others and later to Paul, there could
no such Gentile mission.

h~ve

been

In other words, the existence and continuance

of the effort to evangelize the Gentiles depended upon the Einistry
of Paul &nd upon the authority and action of the other apostles.
B·ut Paul's invo1ve:nent in such a 'Work cannot be explained by anything
other than the appearance of the risen Jesus to
Acts.

7

hi~,

as recorded in

Paul, the enemy and persecutor of the chu.rch in earlier years,

Ibid., pp. 190-191, 220.

8

Luke-Acts is addressed to Theophilus in particular (L~~e 1:;; Acts
1:1), but there may have been other indirect recipients &S well.

9

Daniel Fuller,

o~.cit.,

pp. 189-190, 223 for instance.
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othe~

would have no

impetus for such behavior.

Likewise, the

disciples were not very accustomed to the idea of taking the gospel
to the Ge!ltiles (at least in the form of a !!linistry) until they
received just
to

t~em

s~cn

a commission from the risen Lord who appeared

after his death.

Only such an appearance could account for

their realizing that the offer of the Kingdom of God had also been
extended to the Gentiles.

10

In a sense, Luke taught that there were therefore tV[O key points
in the present

~hich

pointed backwards to the resurrection.

First,

?aul's conversion could be explained no other way than his having
seen the risen

Ko other conclusion is sufficient to account

Jes~s.

for this cbange in the life of a non-believing enemy of the early
chu~ch.

11

Second, the outreach of the early Jews to the Gentiles,

spearheaded by thQ

~isciples,

exclusivis:::l of ,"judaism.
12 .
'.'
Jesus,
~nere 15 no

pointed to a directive beyond the

Apart from the directives issued. 'by the risen

.h

o~.er

. . 1 e reason f or th
. . mlssl0n
.
.
prooao
_e J'eWlsn

to the Gentiles, since the Jews considered themselves as the sole
heirs of God's blessings. 13
une~uivocally

to

~he

Therefore, these two events poi~t

historical resurrection of Jesus.

14

10

Ibid., pp. 223-225, 229, 235.

11

Ibid., see especially pp. 217, 219, 226.

12

Commands s~ch as those recorded in Luke 24:47-48 and Acts 1:8.

13
14

Daniel Fuller,
246-247.
Ibid., p. 220.

o~.cit.,

see, for example; pp. 223, 226-229,

264
For these reasons, Luke stood at a critical point in that he was
both able to receive knowledge of the Christ event of the past via the
eyewitnesses and also to participate in the present and future fulfillment of this event.

From his vantage point ne realized that the

resurrection was the only logical explanation for occurrences such as
the conversion of Paul and the Jewish' outreach to the Gentiles with
the gospel.

Thus he encouraged Theophi1us and his other readers to

reason from these two events in the present to the resurrection of
Jesus in the past, realizing that the present reality

coul~

only be

explained by the factualness of the past event. 15
After presenting Luke's position here, Fuller is careful to
point out that the resurrection is the solution to these

t~o

present

events only if the objections against the resurrection have been
a4swered.

16

Earlier he entertained various alternate theories

the historical and verifiable nature of this event. 17
after a presentation of Luke's attempts

~o

a~inst

At this point,

show 'that the resurrection

was verifiab1e,lSFuller turns to the question of Pa~l',s co~version.
Alternate theories to explain this event are also investigated and

15

16

Ibid., see especially pp. 190, 223, 235.

Ibid., pp.

242~

245.

17

For instance, see Fuller's discussion and refutation 0: ~aulus:
swoon theory (Ibid., pp. 38-39), Lessing's and Kierkegaard's
attempts to remove this event from all verification (Ibid., pp~ 35,
255-256) and Earth's modification of this approach (Ibid., pp. 8384, 88-90, 155-156). Luke's proofs for the resurrection also
serve as a refutation of Strauss' vision theory (Ibid., cf. 45-49
with pp. 231-232).
----

18

l£i£.• pp. 231-232.
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refuted. 19
Fuller's final investigation deals ,,,i th Luke IS arsu::.el1"ts for the
historicity of the resurrection.

For Luke, history is viewed as

having two sections, an "upper" and a "lower".

In the first or 10wel'

section, all historical events are "natural" ones,
from other historical events.

the;r originate

3.S

But Supernatural events

second, or hisher section, do enter the first.

These

fro~

the
could

eve~ts

never be the results of occurrences in the first section, but do
enter the first from the second "layer".

Here they do not c.isturb

other events, but also follow the patterns of history in
section after they enter.

Thus, for

L~~e,

t~E

first

the resurrection car. have

a Supernatural origin anc. still be a historical event, k ..."loi7!'l by
..
t
n~s

.

or~ca

1

.

reason~n6.

20

Luke's approach is found to be quite satisfying, according to
?nller.
verified.

Ee agrees with

1~~e

that the resurrection of Jesus can be

Given the possibility of believin; in this event apart

from historical reasoning or in holding that it is

base~ ~pon

evidences that can be historically verified, Fuller opts for the
latter.

The resurrection can be shown t.-

oe

a. historical e-.rent,

both by the investigation of the original eyewitness

testi~or.y

concerning the appearances and oy viewing the fulfillment of this
event in history in the conversion of Paul and in the Gentile mission.
. f' in t h'~s even t '~s +'~nus
t...
b
' upon
Be11e_
ase~

19

Ibid., pp. 247-250.

20

Ibid., pp. 252-261.

21

. . 1
emp~r1ca

'
21
c la1ms.

See especially pp. 252-253.

Ibid., especially pp. 255-259.

See also pp.

220~

231-252.
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Fuller's

app~oach

to the resurrection sometimes appears to reach

overly easy conclusions.

This is most evident in his refutation of

alternate views both with regard to Jesus' resurrection and in the
appear~~ce

t 0 Pa
ul.

- t 0 exp_ore
1
. er aesJ.res
suc h"'"h'
_ l.. eorJ.es22
Full

d.oes refute the major alternatives: as shown above.

a:.~

d

But the various

refutations often appear irresolute and are generally, as ,dth
Pannenberg, not as thorough

~~d

strong as should be expected.

As

noted above, it is imperative that the alternative views are refuted
as completely as possible in order to reveal if there is a probable
~aturalistic

answer to the resurrection faith, which

is

rightly

viewed as the central tenet of Christianity.

It follows that the

more

are refuted, the more

thoroughly these alternative

~?otheses

probable the resurrection becomes.
It is also possible that Fuller depends too much on the
mssion as demonstrating the
could

st~~d

resurrectio~,

C~ntile

almost as if tills (;cnclusion

apart from any other investigation of the facts and

alternate theories.

It must be stressed once again that the Gentile

mission can be a pointer to the resurrection
to this event are completely answered.

o~ly

if other oo.jections

Fuller does recognize this,

but seems to neglect the conclusion that if a valid alternate theory
~o

the resurrection is found, a valid alternate

have to be applied to the Ger..tile mission.

~heory

would also

We once again perceive

the need to refute alternative theories as completel:r as possible.

22

Ibid., pp. 242,245.
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In spite of these criticisms, however, it is most difficult to
annul Fuller's

co~te~tion

that the resurrection can be demonstrated.

He does provide enough evidence to establish this

eve~as

probableQ

In so doing he avoids the pitfalls of Pannenberg's theological system
and still succeeds in showing hew the literal resurrection of Jesus
can be verified as a historical event.
Another theologian who likewise concludes that Jesus' resurrection
is the best explanation for the facts is New Testament scholar George
E. Ladd. 23

This scholar realizes that the modern concept of historical

methodology argues for a reality in which God does not act irr human
I

history.

Ever since the Enlightenment, the prevailing

vie~

has been

that historic&l events must have origins which are grounded in history.
Therefore, miracles

• t•
OUvse

~ith Superna~ura~

ori,gins are ruled out from the

24

In opposition to this view, Ladd proposes the use of the inductive
method of historical inquiry,
best fits the facts.

~hich

allows for the conclusion which

Eistorical events which claim

Super~atural

intervention must be investigated to perceive if they are the best
explanations for what is known to have occurred.

Possible alternative

theories must also be examined to see if these hypotheses are able
to better account fer the factual evidence. 25

23
24

25

See Ladd's book, I Believe in the Resur=ection of Jesus, ou.cit.
Ibid., pp. 12-13; cf. p. 23.
Ibid., pp. 13-14. Concerning the need specifically to examine
the resurrection, see pp. 27-28 f 132-133.
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In the case of the resurrection of Jesus, Ladd points out that
even if this occurrence were

est~blished

as an actual event, it must

still be counted as "nonhistorical" with regards to its origin.

Since

such an event would require a Supernatural origin, it could not be
said to be historical in the sense that other events ares
point is history itself.

26

~hose

starting

Therefore, when judged by modern historical

methodology, the resurrection is not a historical event.

It is

unlike other events in its unique entrance into history. 27
However, looking at the resurrection only from ·the standpoint
of its origin yields only a portion of the overall picture.
historical inquiry

ca~~ot

For

La~d,

Drove the resurrection, but it can establish

it as the most probable explanation for what occurred.

In fact, it

is asserted that this event is the only explanation of the facts which
adequately explains ~hat is known to have happened.
m"1.._

.J."U,C:

belief "that this zvent

c~n

be

de!!!onstr~te(l

28
to be the only

possible solution which accounts for all of the facts is based upon
the idea that there must be an adeauate expla.nation for any event

" In
"h"'
29
occurrlng
ls~ory~

To this

end~

Ladd enumerates the core

historical facts surrounding the resurrection which are knovm to be
credible. 30

26
27
28

29
30

Later he investigates the major alternative theories

Ibid., pp. 21, 25.
Ibid., pp. 25, 132.
Ibid., cf. p. 27 with pp. 13, 27, 139-141.
above.

See footnote number one

Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., pp. 13, 91-940 Ladd does not simply enumerate facts just
because they are recorded in the New Testament. Rathar, he lists
those which are known to be historically plausible.
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which seek to account for these facts by naturalistic
is examined. and. critiqued.

me~~s.

Each

Ladd concludes that each theo:::-y fails

to explain these :::-esurrection facts. 31
It should briefly be noted however, that one of the sawe problems
which appears in Pannenberg and Daniel Fuller is also
Ladd with regard

appa:::-e~t

in

to the naturalistic theories of the resurrectiono

Although Ladd. provides a good critique of the subjective and objective
vision theories and generally does a better overall job here than
Fuller, his treatment of the other theories is not developeQ thoroughly
enough.

In fact, the other theories are said to need very little

refutation. 52
i~portant

This lack of a more complete refutation is very

in that it must be ascertained as thoroughly as possible

if the resurrection actually happened--if this Supernatural event is
more probable than other explanations.
to be

~ore

sho~n

to be less so.

The resurrection can be shown

probable when other alternate theories are morG thoroughly

As pointe:: out a-!)ove, the explanation which best accou...."1ts for the
historical facts is the one which is given the status of p:::-obability.
3ere Ladd arrives at the conclusion that jesus' resurrection from
the dead is the most probable explanation.
explanation to the available facts.

It gives the 20st adequate

The only reason to xeject this

conclusion is that one has a closed mind to the occurrence of the
Supernatural. 53

31

Ibid., see pp. 133-139, where ladd discusses five majo:::- alternative
theories concerr-ing ths resurrection.

32

Ibid., see especially p. 136.

33

Ibid., pp. 139-141.
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ThUS, ~hile the resurrection differs from other occurre~ces in

that it has a different origin into the historical processes, it is
nevertheless an event in history.

It therefore achieves the status

of entering the historical process by means of a u0nhistorical,
Supernatural orioin but still

beco~ing

a historical event. 54

Ladd offers a logical approach to the resurrection which seeks
to examine the most probable conclusion to this issue.
comes perilously close to making some of the same

he

Eo~ever,

~istakes

as did

Karl Earth.
It has been stated that Ladd explains the resurrection as being
nonhistorical in that it enters history Supernaturally.

3ecause of

this origin, this event is not historical in the same sense as other
events.

Therefore, if

evaluate~

in terms of the modern

co~cept

of

history, the resurrection is not a historical fact. 55
But Ladd :::Loves even closer to Ea.rth's position at other points.
?cr instance, he concludes that even though the resurrection can be
shown to be the best historical explanation for what occurred, it is
still primarily perceptible to the "eye of faith".

Thus, a historian

looking at this event can only ascertain that something wonderful
happened.
faith.

The conclusion that Jesus was riss:, ;,.:elil£.L":..s a tenet of

In fact, it is Ladd's :;pinion that even having actually seen

the risen Jesus would still not prove the facticity of this event. 56

34

Ibid. , p-p. 25, 58.

55

"lli· ,

36

pp. 21,

25, 132.

Ibid., pp. 101-102, 139-140.
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The appearances thus speak of the need for faith to

approac~

t'

3

event. 37
Admittedly, LaQd:s position does differ from Barth's in other
major facets.
°

ev~

Unlike Earth, Ladd opts for investigo.ting the historical

dence lor
'"
tone resurrec to~on. 38

There is therefore an interaction

between history and faith, as faith is logical and not
in the dark. 39

si~ply

a leap

Also unlike Earth, Ladd admits that his faith would

be seriously affected if an alternate theory were found to be
plausible.

Thus he takes considerable effort to refute the leading

alternate theories against the resurrection.

40

Probably the biggest difference with Barth is Ladd's contention
that the resurrection can be
explanation for the facts.
actually rose

fro~

~~~ons~r~~ed

~roba~l~

The only logical conclusion is tr-at Jesus

the dead in history.

are found to be unacceptable.

37

to be the most

~ere

Other naturalistic theories

one finds that faith is reinforced

Ibid
•• -u. 140.
_
0
Ladd is not due
knO\'tn by fa:' tr:.,

It must be noted here that the objection against
to his position that the,resurrection is primarily
'Oer see It has already been pointed out above
(Chapter four) that faith is more important than reasor., and so
it is nith the res~rrection. But to remove the resurrec~ion to
any type 0: metahistory is to begin to re~ove it fro~ certain
types of reaso~able verification. This is to be guarded against.
The problem is therefore in Ladd's tendencies to begin to remove
the resurrection away frc~ the grasp of history (see Ibid., pp.

101-102, 139-140).
38 Ibid., un. 26-27, 29, 132-133.
--39 Ibid., '0'0. 12, 27, 140. It will be recalled that Barth opposed
all such-historical investigation of the resurrection and other
modes of interaction between history and faith. As an example,
see Barth's Church DOgmatics, o'O.cit., vol. IV, part 1, pp. 335, 341.
40

Ladd, Ibid., p~. 27, 132-142. As mentioned above, Barth asserts
that it makes no siGnificant difference if the tomb ..as opened or
closed. In fact, sometimes a naturalistic theory is preferable to
one's trying to treat the resurrection as actual, fully objective
history. See Earth's The Resurrection of the Dead, on.cit., P?
135-138 and The ~ord of God and the Word of ~an, ou.cit., p. 90.
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by studying the evidences. 4l

Earth opposed all such historical
42
reasoning as an assistance to faith.
In spite of the differences between these two theoloGians (especially

Ladd's emphasis on the ability to demonstrate that the resurrection
is the most probable conclusion), Ladd is still guilty of retreating
to the concept of metahistory when confronted. by modern historiography.
In so doing, history is split into two divisions--the secular and the

4,
"
d l.Vl.ne.

As mentioned with regards to :Barth, history knoi'rs of no

such differentiation and no such concept of prehistory.

~ontgomery

points out that by making the resurrection 'a part of this questionable
realm of history and by asserting that it can be known primarily by
faith, Ladd makes this event only perceptible in any meaningful way
to the believer.

Thus the non-Christian is not able to benefit from
the evidence in favor of this event. 44
Ladd's concern with pointing out that the resurrection would
require a Divine origin has b'een noted above.
that the origin of this event is
the concept of metahistory.

41

Superriat~ral

:But one can recognize
and still not resort to

Daniel Fuller 45 and C.S. Lewis,46 for

Ladd, ~., pp. 13, 27, 139-141. It is because of Ladd's emphasis
on the ability of the resurrection to be demonstrated as the. only
adequate solution and because of the efforts to refute other alternate,
theories that he is included in this section and not with Earth in
the former section. Laddls entire emphasis on the ability of faith
to be investigated and reinforced by positive findings was the
deciding factor here.
42 See the discussion of Earth above. Compare his Church DOgmatics,
op.cit., vol. IV, part 1, p. 335.
This is Blaikiels criticism of Ladd's position, op.cit., pp. 128-129,134
44 Montgomery, Where is History Going?, on.cit., pp. 114-116. However,
Montgomery does not seem to be aware of Ladd's belief that investigation
of the resurrection is still possible even if it can primarily
be known only by ~aith.
45 Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. 252-261 in particular.
46
Lewis, Miracles, op.cit., see especially pp. 56-63.
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instance, have both done creditable jobs in showing how an event can
have a Supernatural origin and still be normally
once it enters

t~e

causation should

historical process.

~ot

co~~ected ~ith

history

Thus, the matter of Divine

automatically determine that the event must be

metahistorical and that it must be known only by the processes of
faith.

Once it enters history, this event could partake of the

historical pattern without impeding other natural events.

Therefore,

in spite of the origin of a Supernatural miracle, it would oecome a
historically verifiable event upon entering history.
To agree i':i th 3arth (and others) in holding that a Supernatural
event remains netahistorical even after it enters the historical
process is, once acain, to divide history into the two component
parts of the secular and the divine.
in the critique of 3arth in chapter
The criticisms
it has been

directe~

s~fficiently

Eut, as has been pointed out
ei~ht,

this formulation is faulty.

against Earth will not be repeated here, as
shown that such a concept is not valid.

To be sure, Laid accepts critical examinations of the Christian
faith.

He believes that the inductive histo:dc'al annroach 'which

--

,

accepts the event ".7hich best fits the evidence will demonstrate that

4-

the resurrection actually did occur~ {
:5ut where Lade. does adopt Barth's

47
48

Here he differs fro~ 3arth.

m~tahistorical

,

48

concept,· it must

Ladd, oo.cit., pp. 12-13, 27, 139-141.
It is actually difficult to ascertain how much Ladd does agree
with Barth here. See ine.ications of a partial acceptance of Earth's
understanding of the resurrection in Ladd, Ibid., pp. 21, 25,
101-102, 140. See also Montgomery, Where is History Going?, on.cit.,
p. 115.
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be agreed that he errs iL committing some of the same mistakes as
Barth.

If the Supernatural is found to occur it must happen in

historically verifiable history and not in metahistory.

This is
lJ.'-"

recognized by Pannenberg, Daniel Fuller, Lewis, and others •. /

Ladd does not retreat completely into the realm of metahistory
as does Barth.

Ris emphasis on being able to demonstrate the

resurrection is therefore, like the attempts of Pannenberg and
Fuller, a positive aspect of his theology.

All three theologians

have succeeded in investigating the facts before arriving at a final
solution and all three scholars have found the resurrection to be
the most probable explanation of what occurred.

These findiLgs are

further"strenghtened by the failure of any naturalistic theories
to adequately account for what happened.
However, it is not only certain theologians who are convinced of
this conclusion.

Paul Kaier is an ancient historian who also oelieves

that the resurrection is the most prob~~le answer for what occurred. 50
Although Mai~r is not the only historian to reach such conclusions,5

49

50

1

By histcrically ve~ifiable we are referring to the approach to
history which accepts the event which best supports the known
facts. To this Ladd, Panrienberg, Daniel Fuller and C.S. Lewis
all agree. In chapters two and three of this work this same
conclusion of ascertaining historical events was also found to
be the correct procedure~ But we are also speaking here of the
need to realize that God's raising Jesus from the dead is therefore a theological and historical explanation of a historical
event. Thus we must not resort to any type of metahistory to
explain the resurrection. With this Ladd see::ns to disaGree
(Ibid~; pp. 101-102, 139-140).
l1aier's chief work 'on the resurrection is his book First Easter,
on. cit. See also "The Empty Tomb as !listory" in Christianity
Today, on.cit.

51 We have discussed above the position of theologian/historian

Jo~

Warwick i.:ontgomery and ancient historian Ed.win Yamauchi, both of
whom also believe that the resurrection can be demonstrated to
have occurred.
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llis approach is probably the most thorough from the
hi s t

.

1

or~ca

... ".

s~ua~es.

stand~oint

of

52

For Uaier, the discipline of history is very valuable in helping
to ascertai..'1. what occurred on the first Easter morning.

While many

ancient historical events are based upon only one source,

~~d

sources often render an event !!infalliblel!, there are several
sources which point to the event of the resurrection of Jesus.
Even outside of the New Testament sources, there is

import~~t

twu
~~cient

53
extra-

biblical evidence especially for the empty tomb, and thus also for
the resurrection. 54
Iviaier points to such early historians as Tacitus and Josephus, who
either infer or specifically mention the belief in the resurrection on
the part of the disciples and the early church.

Tacitus' reference

to f'irst century Christia."'1.ity in Rome a.."'ld to the l:superstitiontr v;hich

broke out in ·Ju.d~a a.fteY' the death of Jesus 55

is perceived to imply
56
the Christi2..n teaching of the resurrection of Jesus.
Niaier also
deals with the problem of a possible interpo2.ation in Josephus' more
. f·~c re f erence ...,,0 th
.
__ e resurrec ...,,::..on
o!,,-Jesus 57

spec~

52
53
54

56
57

finds that there

IfLontgomery, for inst~~ce, more often como::..nes hi.story and theology,
being quite adept in both disciplines.
l':iaier, First Easter, op.cit., p. 114.
Ibid., and

~·.~aier's

~

55

~~d

See Tacitus,

HThe Empty Tomb as History!!, op.cit., pp.4,

~~~uals,

15.44.

lJaier, nThe Empty Tomb as HistoryH, op.'cit.,
concurs in this position, cp.cit., p. 19.
See Josephus, lmtiquities, 13.3.

D.

4.J. N. D..Anderson

276
is very good reason to believe that Josephus did compqse this statement concerning Christ minus a few of the more "Christianized tl
phrases.

Thus

W~

see that. in all

probability~

Josephus reported

the early Christian belief in the resurrection and thereby acknowledged
that the to~b was empty.5 8
The evidence presented by Josephus and implied by Tacitus,is
further corroborated by a few other sources.

In the first century

it was reported tnat the Jews spread the story that the disciples
stole the body of Jesus in order to proclaim his resurrection from
the dead.

It is related that this story was still being voiced in

58 1.Iaier, First Easter,

0'0. ci t., p. 114=
Other scholars also agree
that Josephus did write this portion of Jesus (or at least one
very similar tc it), except for several nChristian" words. This
pos~tion is held for at least three major reasons.
First, there
is no textual evidence against this section in spite of various
readings in other places. Second, there is very good ~anuscript
evidence for these statements about Jesus and it is therefore
difficult to ignore it. Third, this portion is written in Josephus'
o~ sty~e of writing.
It is thus a warranted conclusion that
there are several good reasons for accepting at least that Josephus
did write of Jesus, mentioning several facets or his career. It
is also a justified conclusion to say that, in all probability,
Josephus at least recorded the belief in the resurrection without
actually acknowledging that he accepted such a fact. ?or these
three rea.sons a.nd the concluding facts given here~ see, in ad.dition
to };:aier, J.E.D. Anderson, o'O.cit., p. 20. See especially F.F.
Bruce's two works; Jesus and Christian Origins Outside the New
Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company,
1974), pp. 32-41, especially pp. 36-41 and The New Testament
Documents: Are They Reliable? (Fifth Revised Edition; Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdr!J.an's Publishing Company, 1967}, pp. 102-112.
Bruce, the 1J:anchester scholar of Biblical cri ticisrn, ha.s done
much work o~ Josephus' reference to Jesus aud comes to a conclusion
quite similar to ~aier's.
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the second half of the first century.59
inadequate

vie~,

In formulating this totally

the Jews not only did not succeed in offering a

substantial objection to the resurrection, but in so doing they also
admitted the empty tomb.
T~is

Scriptural report is confirmed by second century scholar

Justin :,Iartyr, who reports in his Dialogue with Try-oho (about 150 A.:i).)
,

tha t the Jews sent specially taught men across the Medi terrar..ectiL Sea
in order to counter the Christian claims of the resurrection.

The

explanation spread abroad by the Jews, once again, was that the
disciples stole thei:::- dead
to admit the empty

59

J~aster'

s body.

The Jews therefore continued

to~b.60

See 7':a tt. 28: 11-15 for this report. It has already been shown
above that t~e theory of the stolen body (or other such fraud
on the part of the disciples) fails miserably in its attempt to
explain the res~rrection of Jesus (see chapter 7, footnote numbers
163, 154 and the discussion corresponding to these re~arks).
Eriefly, this t~eory i~ores at least five key objections. First,
men do not die ~illingly for what they know to be si~ply a falsehood. Sec~r..d, the treme::1.dous psychological tra...'1sformation of the
disciples fro~ backward fishermen to bold preachers can~ot be
explained by any fraudulent action, or else there would not have
been this change. Third and closely related, none of the disciples
ever recant<:c eve!':. at the threat of losing his life, ',7h:"ch i'iould
be the nor::;).al thing to do rather than die for a lie. =:this ..... as
totally opposed to their actions before the resurrec~ion, such as
in fleeing .....hen Jesus was taken captive and by Peter's subsequent
denials. ?o~rth, the quality of the ethical teachings promulgated
by the disciples precludes such actions. Fifth, it is admitted by
all that the disciples at least believed that Jesus h~d rise~ frore
the dead. They would of course not believed that this event had
actually occurred if they were the ones who had perpetrated the
fraud. For these reasons (see also footnote numbe~ 61 and 62
below), no reputable scholar holds this view today. Tnere is little
doubt that this is one of the '.veakest theories ever formulated
against the rssurrection, yet it was the one chosen by the early
Jewish leaders.

60 Maier,

o~.cit.,

?p. 116-117_
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As pointed out by

1~aier,

the book of Acts gives further evidence

that the tomb was ewpty on the first Easter morning.

As the disciples

and early Christians first began to proclaim the resurrection of
Jesus

fro~

the dead, the Jewish authorities objected

streIT~ously.

Eut in several confrontations with the disciples, the Jewish

~lders

never did what mig-ht have been most expected--they never led the
disciples to the tomb for an investigation.

Discovering the body

of Jesus would of course have destroyed Christianity, as the Jewish
leaders desired to do anyway.

The obvious reason that they did not

try to locate the body is because they knew that the

to~b ~~s

empty.

Haier asserts that even the impartial historian must admit this
".~

historical evidence for the empty to~b. O~

This implicit a~~ission

further pointed to the empty tomb mentioned by Josephus, ::a tthew,
Justin ?:artyr and also i::np1ied by Tacitus.
:r.:aier also utilizes circu:!lstantia1 evidence of two kinds.

First,

Christianity could not have had its beginnings at Jerusale2, as it
did, if Jesus: grave was still occupied just outside the gates of
the city.

This is the last place that the church could have begun

if Jesus' body was still in the tomb.

61

Sere an

investigatio~

of the

Ibid., pp. 114-115. In addition to the point made here by ].~aier,
it should also be noted that the behavior of the Jewish leaders
in Acts also constitutes another objection to the stolen body
(fraud) theory. If the Jewish rulers really believed that the
disciples stole the body, they would not simply have co:m.:::anded
the disciples not to preach about Jesus (such as Acts 4:18, 21;
5:28, 40), but they would have forced them to ad:::lit a.nd re0ant
of their actions.
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grave would have revealed the body and Christianity
destroyed before it realy began.

~ould

have been

The birth of the church in

Jersusalem can only be explained by the fact that Jesus'

to~b

was

indeed empty.62
Second, the spread of Christianity around the
region all the way to

Ro~e

Mediterr~ean

itself by slightly after the first half

of the first century is simply an astonishing feat to have been
accomplished in so short a period of time.

Approximately thirty

years after the death of Jesus this amazing eypansicn had taken place.
It is

~aier's

view

t~at

such expansion of any teaching or philosophy

is unparalleled in ancient times.

Could the preaching of and belief

in the resurrection have provided the impetus for such growth, as
the New Testament attests?63
Another piece of evidence has only apossibleconneci;ion directly
with Jesus' resurrection.

A valuable archaeological discovery revealed

a marble slab fo . . . nc. in :Nazareth which contained. a warning froI;4

Caesar to all who
such

Ro~an

~ere

caught robbing graves in Palestine.

Other

edicts against grave robbing prescribed a fine as-ainst

the offender, whereas this edict condemns the offender to capital
punishment.

l',:ost scholars believed that the inscription was the

command of emperor Tiberius or emperor Claudius.

Why was the punishment

62

l1aier, "The Empty Tomb as History", on.cit., p.

63

Ibid., p. 4.

5.

280
to be so great in Palestine?
by the

Je~ish

..

th
•e

Could this

cc~and

bave been

pro~pted

report of Jesus' stolen body or by the preaching of

?64

resurrec't~on.

Theological evidence is also cited by Maier in his effort to
deal historically riith the resurrection.

This historian points to

at least three other factors which lead to the final conclusion.
First, the aforementioned change in the disciples caused
believe that Jesus had risen
must

fro~

the dead.

the~

to

Such a radical difference

be based upon sOwe real experience and points to an actual

encounter with the risen Lord, just as the New Testament claims,
Second, the very existence of the Church points to
is worthy of such an enterprise.
event was the resurrection.

The New

Testa~ent

so~e

claims tr.is

Third, there must have been a reason

for the early church to have changed the day of meeting
the Jewish Sabbath, to Sunday, the Lord's day.
~esta!!lent

event >ohich

fro~

Saturday,

Again, the New

claims that the resurrection caused this change in order

to commemorate the day on which Jesus

h~d

rizen.

65

The last type of evidence employed by Maier is of
historical and. theological nature.

bot~

a

l1aier entertains the objections

raised. by eight different naturalistic theories which are aimed
at disprovinrr the resurrection of Jesus.

Each is then investigated

and refuted by the available historical data.

He finds that all of

64 Maier, First Easter, on.cit., pp. 119-120.

65

Ibid., pp. 115, 121-122; "The Empty Tomb as History", on.cit., p.

5.
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these naturalistic theories fail to provide a valid historical answer
to what happened on

~he

first Easter day.

strictly on the basis of historical
.

I'eason~ng.

They must be rejected

in~uiry,

as well as by theological

66

As for the question of discrepancies in the resurrection accounts,
~aier

admits that they do exist, as in the rest of the gospels.

However, he holds that it is illogical to conclude that this event
did not occur because of these variations.

Other historical reports

also contain similar discrepancies and there is no question about
the events they report.

For instance, the reports of

th~

zxeat fire

of 30me offer even greater conflicts than do the resurrection accounts.
Some reports

clai~

that the entire city was affected by the burning

flames while others claim that only three sectors of the city were
destroyed.
started.

There

~re

also differences of opinion as to ho .. the fire

In spite of these

~roblems,

unquestionably a historical fact.

the great fire of Rome is

In a similar way the resurrection

of Jesus is also a historical fact.

The various sources simply point

to the different traditions, all of which provide evidence that Jesus
actually rose from

~he dead. 67

Maier concludes that the will not to believe has kept wany from
accepting the historica 1 evidence on the
The empty tomb is

fo~d

.

quest~on

0f
the

t '~on. 68
resurrec

definitely to be a datum of history according

66 I;Iaier, First Easter, Ibid., pp. 105-113, 122; cf. also pp. 77-80
and "The Empty
67

68

Tomb as History",

~.,

p. 5.

Kaier, First Easter, Ibid., pp. 94, 96.
Ibid., p. 105 and "The Empty Tomb as History", on.cit., pn 5.
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to the laws of

histo~ical research. 69 This conclusioll is even

strenghtened -by the "hostile evidence" which has been presented here.
The

stro~gest

about an

eve~t

type of historical evidence is facts which are stated
by a source which is hostile to that event.

~Jlen

such

a source claims that an event is factual when it is not advantageous
to de so, this fact is in all probability a genuine one.

The empty

tomb is attested. directly or ind.irectly by Josephus, Tacitus and by
the witness of l':atthew, Luke (Acts) and Justin l:artyr as to Jewish
practice with regards to the resurrection.
evidence is hostile 8vidence, for it was not
the Jews or to the Romans to
histo~ical

h~s

acknowled~e

and. tneological evidence,

also pointed. ~o this fact.

Such Jewish and
advantageo~s

the empty tomb.

circ~stantial

~oman

to either
Other

and otherwise,

Therefore it can be asserted that

the empty tomb is historical fact. JO
From the empty tomb Haier then argues to the probability of
the resurrection.

~~i~~nce

such as that presented above (especially

the threefold theological proof and the refutation of the naturalistic
theories) points to the resurrection of Jesus.

The

historic~l

evidence is not as strong as that for the empty tomb, but

t~e

evidence

on the periphery of this event points to the probability that the
event itself is historical. 71

69 !'1aier, First Easter, Ibid., this conclusion is stated. 0:'1 p.
70 I'.iaier, "The Empty Tomb as History", 0-0. cit. , pp. 5-6.
71 Ibid., pp. 4- 5 and First 3a.ste:r; 0"0. ci t., pp. 120-122.

120.

283
I'·ia.ier has added a very valuable dimension to the study of the
resurrection of Jesu3 in that he has
standpoint of history.

pur~~ed

tIlls subject from the

He thus approaches this question from the

standpoint of the historian looking at theology.

In his works, then,

Uaier certainly does not look at t:r..is question as one for theolog,f
only.

Yet he arrives at the conclusion that tho empty tomb and

resurrection are historical events according to all probability.
Admittedly,

r~s

treatment of the naturalistic theories and

refutation of them could have been developed more.

It has already

been shO"lm above how important a complete refutatil')n of al terna ti ve
theories is in order to more fully determine how probable +.he
resurrection is in actUality.
in

t~..is

respect, but

s~ill

Maier cioes a fairly creditable job

does not treat these naturalistic

~vpotheses

as thoroughly as is possible.
Perhaps some '.rill object that his treatment of the theological
question did not deal with theology enough.

Yet this letter criticism

does not rightfully apply since his whole purpose is to approach
this event as a h:i.Sl;O:r::La1'l

8.!ld

not as a theologian.

Thus he cannot

be judged for this second point.
Therefore, his overall effort has been a ver,f successful one.
He has logically and historically shown that naturalistic theories
do not solve the historical needs
,
. +
•
1
mSuorlca

72

. t ers ~o
. the
pOln

Oll

•.

the one hand a.T1d that valid

resurrec~lon

, eXlS
. t on ~. he
ao

."

o~ner

"na.T}.
d 72 . T"~s
~~

Maier, First Easter, Ibid., especially pp. 105-113, 120-122.
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combination ~akes a strong case for the historicity of the ~esurrection.73

After

inve~tif,ating

the claims of three scholars

~hc

believe

that the resurrection can be demonstrated, it must be concluded that the
positions of Daniel Fuller, Ladd and Kaier are positive in their
overall approaches and conclusions.
also present

difficulties.

so~e

is both historical

~d

We have found that these three

However, a logical approach that

theological reveals that these positions are

better supported. by thG evidence than the others
earlier.

It yet

possibility of

re~ains

v;hich~re

for us to finally ascertain if

de~o~strating

the resurrection is

th~

one

discussed

t~is
t~at

third
best

fits the facts.

73

?or a very positiye review of Maier's work First Easter and one
which recobnizes the excellent job done by ~aier in his historical
d.e:nonstrati::r,~ of Jesils' resurrection, see Lawrence E. l.iartin,
liThe B.isen Christ", The (:hristian Century, li:ay 16, 1973, p. 577.

P~T

3

An 3valuation-of the Solutions to the
~uestion

of the Resurrection of Jesus

Chapter XI.

An Evaluation of Possibility Number One

Chapters five and six investigated the possibility
resurrection of Jesus did not actually occur.
was shown that the

~ost

t~at

the

In chapte= five it

influential position here was held by histo=ian

and philosopher David Eume.

His essay ItOf :.liracles" set

for other views which also rejected the resurrection as

t~;.e
a~

stage

event,

usually because it was held that such events were iffipossible from
the outset because they contra.dicted. the laws of nature.
It was apparent especially in chapter six that Protestant
liberalism followed 2ume in this position.
Randall, Jr.

ex~lains

Eume in this line of

In fact, Jo:hl1 S:en.an

that Protestant liberalism as a
reaso~ing.

Hume's influence

w~ole

extende~

to t:he nineteenth century liberals, but also on to this

followed
not only

prese~t

day

7.':"l.ere r:en of this theological persuasion have often continued to

other scholars also note t:hat Hume's essay

beca~e

stance for liberalism with regards to all miracles.
..
2
.;I.an d a 11·::l.n""'b·
.::l.S asser"t:Lcn.

on

t~e

~efinitive

S:nith agrees with

:Jontgomery likewise affir4ls th.e fact

'that ooth nint:tE:8ilth a:::.d t;;zr.tieth century theology deri vee.. its
belief in the impossibility of oiracles from Eume. 3

Randall, on.cit., pp. 293, 553-554.
2

Smith, ou.cit., un. 142-143.

3 Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian

37-38.
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0-;:'.

cit., pp. 28,

287
It is interesting

t~at

tnese liberal

t~eologians t~e~selves

also acknowledged that their views were based upon
by

~ume.

t~e

stance taken

For instance, in nineteenth century liberalism, David strauss

was explicitly willing to acknowledge this dependence.

For this

scholar, Rume's essay had forever settled the question of the miraculous.
Supernatural, nature-contradicting miracles simply do not occur.
Ot~er

4

liberals also followed the position taken by Strauss in

that they also favored Eume's position against miracles.
Schleiermacher, like Eume, asserted that miracles are
there is little knowledge of the laws of nature.

Friedrich

foun~ ~~ere

~iracles

actually

oppose nature and the idea of the miraculous must be abandoned. 5
Heinrich Paulus likewise followed Eume in believing that

~i~acles

are usually said to ha-ve occurred where there is a deficiGnt knowledge
of nature.

Scripture is mistaken in claiming that miracles did

occur and when the 7.orkings of nature are revealed, this mistake
becomes even clearer. 6

Bruno Baur also affirmed that no events like

~iracles occur ~~ic~ break the laws of nature. 7 For Ernst ?enan,
Jesus believed that miracles were common,not because they actually
~ere,

but because he was unfamiliar with the uniformity of nature's

4 Strauss, The rew Life of Jesus, on.cit., vol. I, pp. 199-201.
The Christian Faith. op.cit., see especially vol. I,
pp. 179, ISl, 183. Cf. also vol. I, pp. 71, 178-184; vol. II,
pp. 448-449 and Schleiermacher's On Religion: Sneeches to its
Cultured Desnisers, on.cit., pp. 88-89, 113-114 note n~ber 16.

Schleiermac~er,

6

Schweitzer, op.cit., pp.

7 Ibid., p. 154.

51-53.
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laws.

8

Later in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, liberal
theologians were still following Hume and his reasons for rejecting
~iracles.

Otto Pfleiderer held a notion that was very

especially

co~o~,

since Eume--that the events of nature follow an unchanging regularity
and order. 9

Adolf vo~ Harnack added his voice to the grOF.inC ~ist of

scholars who accepted, along with E:'.!Ile, the belief that ancient
peoples believed the miraculous because they did not
laws of nature.

~~derst2nd

the

They did not realize that events which interrupt

nature never occur.

Thus, miracles cannot be believed. lO

In the twentieth century, as mentioned above, liberal theologians
continued to accept Zume's position on miracles as the definitive
Rudolf

~ultmann

accepts the view that the modern conceptions of

nature and science do not allow for miracles.

of the natural

Eecau3~

laws, the universe is closed to Supernatural workings.
are no longer acceptable in today's world.

11

Thus

th~t

the Biblical

~irac1es

John A.T.

are myths because natural

processes cannot be interupted by God's interventi on.

The

8

Renan, Life of Jesus, £p.cit., pp. 147-155.

9

Pfleide:cer, Tn\~ Phi10sonhy and :Development of Re1ib'ion,
vol. I, pp. 5- 6..

10

Harnack, -.'That is Christianity?, op.cit., pp. 25-31.

11

Bu1 tmann, "l-;ew Testament and
pp. 4-5.

12

Tillich,

Syste~atic

~;!ythology"

~iracles

For Paul Tillich, no

events such as miracles can break the laws of nature. 12
Robinson holds

one~

~:ei'i"

0"0.

Testament

ci t. ,

in Kerygma and IJyth, 0-0. ci t. ,

Theology, on.cit., vol. I, pp. 115-117.
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cosmology must therefore be abandoned. 13
It is

~uite

obvious from this foregoing survey that both nineteenth

and twentieth century liberal theologians have follorred 3:u::le in
rejecting all possibility for the miraculous.

That Eume ivas the

primary inspiration for this viewpoint is also plain.
Yet it has beer.. shown above that Eume's thesis failed to provide
an adequate prohibitive against the

occ~rrence

maj or objections were raised against his view.
discovered that

~~e

of mi=acles.

Four

Eriefly, it was fiz'st

utilized a series of logical errors, especially

circular reasoning and begging the question.

~his

is especially

noticeable in his defini tior.. of miracle a..."ld. in his assumption of the
negative value of all experience of miracles, when just such an
investigation of this experience might demonstrate the probability
of a miracle.

Second, Eume arbitrarily rejects miracles even where

he recognizes a high credibility for the Supernatural event described.
Third, Eume rejects miracles because of a faulty view of the uniformity
of nature which he hi2self had rejected in other works.

This

incorrect view of nature is the center of his polemic and. must therefore
be rejected.

?ourth, in spite of 5ume'sagreements with modern thought

in several aspects of his work, he reverted to a pre-mode=n stance
with respect to his view'of miracles.

Although he rejected the then-

popular view of a closed universe and opted for the use of probabilities,
he inconsistent1;>" rejected miracles froill. the ou.tset because the;:r were
believed to be impossible.

He also ignored any probabilities for

13 Robinson, Eonest to God, on.cit., pp. 11-18, 64-68.
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~iracles

and

th~s r~led

them out in a way which is not consistent

with the above modern concepts which he accepted.

,

_ .

mocern anc

~n

error.

nere he is pre-

14

All ten of tne theologians just surveyed also agree in accepting
the view that the
miracles.

u~iverse

is closed to all occurrences of Supernatural

These events are generally conceived of as being impossible

because they oppose the workings of natu.=e.

Ancient peoples who

accepted such reports as true were often said to have done so because
they did not U!lderstand nature pro y erly.15

It is therefore more

possible to verify the contention of Randall,

~ontgomery

and Smith

given above that all of liberalisffi as a whole followed Huoe in these
conclusions. 16

J. Gresham Machen concurs with these scholars that

liberalism did indeed agree in abandoning belief in the ~iraculous.17
Eecause both nineteenth and twentieth century liberalism followed
Eume's reasoning in its rejection of the miraculous, it is thus
possible to ascertain that these theologians were, like
in error

concer~ing

these views.

::"''"'':1l':l.
-~-,

also

For these reasons it is not surprising

to find that almost the same criticisrr.s of Hume which

~ere

related in

14 ::his

s1m:D.ar~~ of tr..e criticisms of ~ume is necessarily a brief one
and thus the l~gic for these four criticisms cannot be properly
analyzed fro~ this presentation. For a com~lete analysis of the
reasoning behind these statements, see chapter five.

15

, I'
.J,.t,;

See thE: above refere!2(\I?B to these ten theologians for tl:ese beliefs
(to varying ezte~ts) on the part of each of the~. In order to
ascertain how siEilar the beliefs of these theologians are to Hume's
stance against miracles, compare chapter five.
See footnote n:umbers one through three above and the corresponding
discussion.

17 J. Greshan Machen, Christianity and Liberalism

(Gran~ ~~pids:

~il1ia~ B. Eerd2an's Publishing Co~pany, 1923), pp. 107-109.
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c~a?ter

five

wit~

regard to the use of improper presuppositions and

an incorrect methodology and concerning the use of a faulty view of
the uniformity of nature also apply to these other scholars.

As

~~e

was found to be in error in these concepts, so also is liberal theology
likewise in error here.
A second
liberalis~

theories

!\~iracles

that the method employed by theoloGical

indic~tion

since

~hic~

resurrection of

E~ue's

cannot be ruled out by such anapproach.

ti~e

is in error coneens the naturalistic

have been suggested in order to account for the
Jesus~

Such hypotheses were necessary in order to

explain an event which had alr~ady been rejected ~ la ~Uhle.

The

lI:.ajor theories vihich have been formulated against the resur::'ection
""
18
have been discussed above and refuwed.
de~onstrated

An investigation of each

that tLey could not properly account for what is known

to have occurred.

~ach

can be adequately refuted historically,

logically and theologically.l9
That none of the naturalistic theories

ade~uately

accounts for

the resurrection of Jesus is indeed an extremely acute point against
theological

liberalis~'s

stance on the resurrection.

Our

~~deavor

has been to find the historical conclusion which is most probable-the one which best accounts for what is known to have occurred.

Yet,

none of even the "strongest" alternative theories is even persuasive,
let alone being
18

19

proba~le.

A more

ade~~ate

solution is

defi~itely

The major th€0:ri.8::1 c::.,lve:.nced to explain the resurrec"t~o~-;. have been
discussed earlier. It was found that formulations baseQ UTIon a
swoon, subjective or .ob jecti ve visions (including the "tel~gra!Il
theory" and ideas of the continuing spiritual presence of Jesus'
personality in the 7Linds of the disciples), the influence 0f other
ancient myths, the growt~ of legen1s or fraud (including the stolen
body theory) all failed to account for the known facta. See
especially chapter six above.
See the conclusions a6ainst each of these theories, es?ecially in
chapter six. Cf. for exa:nple, l!aier, ?irst Easter, on. cit., p.113
and L2dd, ~it., pp. 139-141.
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needed here.
! third indication that the liberal theological positiou on the

resurrection is incorrect is the fact that even those who formulated
naturalistic theories against this event joined in the
other "rival" theories.

deci~ation

of

Thus it was shown earlier how strauss and

Renan (among others) were both strongly opposed to Paulus' swoOu
theory.

In fact, it is usually believed that Strauss himself gave

the final death-blow to the

t~eory,

which destroyed it for good.

However, Strauss' vision theory was opposed strenuously by such
scholars as Schleiermacher, Paulus and

Kei~.

Once again it was a

liberal theologian, Keim, who is generally considered to be
whose logical ar£"'X!lents disposed of stra.uss' theory.

th~

one

20

While such opposition by thcse of a similar theologica.l stance
surely does not

auto~atically

indications are
were in error.

each felt that the other naturalistic theories
This points to a real dissatisfaction with such theories

on the part of these scholars.
his own

20

21

prove these theories to be wrong, the

theolo~ical

None could convince

~ t~ose

of

nersuasion that his view was the most probable one.

See the discussion of these facets in chapter six above.
Admittedly, no one is able to convince everyone that his view is
right. However, if there was a naturalistic theory ~hich was
probable, one ;:ould t~.i!l_1c that those who otherwise objected to the
facticity of the resurrection would be able to agree on that
theory. However, the point being stressed here is not so much
that the liberal scholars could not agree on anyone theory, but
rather that the inherent weaknesses in each were pOinted out.
In other words, these scholars provided adequate refutations of
each of the theories and thus revealed that they were not capable
of accounting for the facts.

21
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There are thus three verJT

import~it

the 8..:.iSWer to the resurrection v!hich is

reasons for holding that
sug~ested

by IIume and by all

of theological liberalism fails to accou.."'1t adequately for what is
known to have occurred.

First, much of the criticism

directed

against Rume in chapter five also applies to liberalism's approach
to this event.

Thus the entire methodology and the yresuppositions

which are used are invalid, as is the faulty view of the uniformity
of nature.

The resurrection fuid other miracles

negated b:r these methods.
positions.

caru~ot

peoperly be

Trois point alone is devastating to these

Second, the fact that no

r~turalistic

theory adequately

accounts for what occurred is 8..:.! even stronger point against Eume
~"'1d

liberalism.

7hat no probability can be estaclished for

alternative theory derrDnstrates

tr~t

none of these

~~Y

~~~otheses

such

can

be accepted as the probable solution.

Third, not even those wno

reject the

theory adequately accounts

resurrectio~

for the evidence.
the

2rune~ts

agree that

a.~y

Rather, several scholars were content to destroy

for theories

w~ic~

opposed their

O\~,

clearly

reveali~~

tbe irulerent weakrlesses of each.

It is popular in contemporary theolog-,f to den;:r Jesus' literal

resurrectio::1

a...~d

at the saIne time to affirm that in some way he can

still·DB said to be alive today.

For instance, 3ultma.L!D contends

that although Jesus did not actually rise from the dead,22

he still

neets us through the words of preaching as the risen Lord.

Thus~

22

Bultman."'1, "lJev; Testament and :.IytholoGY" in Kerygma and J.t{th,
op.cit., pp. 33, 42 for example.

while Jesus

hi~self

did not actually rise

fro~

the dead as the New Testament affirms,

we can still encounter the risen Lord tod?y by faith in the 'words
which are preached.

In fact it is only by this mode that the

resurrection becomes present and it thereby becomes possible to meet
the risen Jesus. 23
~arxsen

likewise accepts such a formulation.

Althou~~

Jesus is

,,},

dead, his :;~~er of f~it~ has not losi;: its validity~'" because Jesus
lives today in the content of Christian preaching.
activity continues beyond the

grave~

~e

Thus Jesus'

shows himself to be alive

because men still continue to respond to him in faith.25
Earxsen,

Jes~s'

res~Trection

For

is thus not the raising of a dead man

from the grave ~ but rather the cruci fi.ed and dead Jesus still
influencing men to believe even today.

26

The purpose behind such theological maneuvers is obvious.

The

desire is to be able to continue to teach that the Christian faith
is still valid fo:: modern man even though many are still Llclined
to reject the resurrection as an actual event in history.

In this

way trac.itional beliefs which in the lIew Test2.!!lent are a result of
the resurrectio!;. can be confirmed

23

24
25

26

i::-~

a way that· is more har:J.onious

Ibid., pp. 41-43. R. Lofton Hudson reaches a similar conclusion
concernin b Jesus' being alive in the preaching of the church.
See R. Lofton Eudson, n",rna t One Easter Meant to 1.~e", Christian
Century, April 18, 1913, pp. 450-452, especially p. 451.
~~rxsen,

o~.cit.,

p. 141.

., 1.1,
Ibid., pp. 11, 11J, 128, 141, .1.."''''.

Ibid., cf. pp. 128-129 with p. 141.
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wi th modern thoilb"11t.
Eowever, this position is quite o'bviously laden with several
incredibilities.

There are at least two valid reasons for rejecting

such a theological stance.
First, such an

~~derstanding

of Jesus' resurrection, whereby

he is said to be alive even though he did not literally rise from the
dead, is contrary to the earliest Christian understanding of this
event,

The Jewish conception of resurrection involved the raising

of the body.

The first century Christians likewise believed in the

resurrection of a sniritual body as clearly shown above, and Jesus
was believed to have literally risen in this way.

Therefore, to

assert that this modern view is close to the New Testamer.t is ridiculous. 27
For the earliest believers, Jesus was said to be alive at present,
but because he had literally risen from
influence had

si~~ly

~he

dead, not

bec~use h~6

continued beyond the grave in spite of being dead.

As asserted by :':aier, the !!lodern concept that the Christian
faith wonld still be valid even if Jesus had never risen bodily
would be nothin~ but nonsense to Paul and other first century Christians. 28
Brown agrees, adding that formulations such as llarxsen's are of
little value if they do not do justice to the New
which allows only one interpretation of the
resuscitation. 29

Testa~ent

stance,

resurrection-~a

literal

Ladd states this well:

The Xew Testa::lent know.s nothing about the persistence of Jesus'
personality apart from the resurrection of the body_ Neither

27

Ksrxsen does sU6~est just this (0'0. ci t., pp. 144-145).

28

l:aier, tiThe Smpty Tomb as History",
First Easter, on.cit., p. 115.

29

0"0.

ci t., p. 5 and :.:aier' s

Brown, The Vir~nal Concention and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus,
on.cit., p. 75, footnote number 128.
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does the New Testament know the 'resurrection of the spirit'
to heaven ••• If his body is !!lol1lderinr:; in a Palestinian tomb,
he cannot be the exalted Lord ••• 30
Admittedly, the New Testament concept of Jesus' resurrection is
not self-vindicating.

But the point here is a crucial one.

The

testimony of Paul is that if Jesus did not rise literally in a spiritual
body in such a way that he could appear to others, then he did not rise
at all ( I -'£or. 15: 1-19). This is the choice T.'7hich is open to us.
Either Jesus rose literally or he carillot be said to be alive in any
other than in a spiritual sense.

To take a

IT~ddle

ground which claims

that Jesus is alive but that he did not rise from the dead is not
open to us.

The earliest Christians in particular would not recognize

such a comprocising belief.
could not be true at all.
theolo~J

faith.

dead~

If Jesus was

Christian theology

If Jesus is dead, neither

hold to the other affirr.ations

~~d

c~~ contemDOraIJ~

doctrines of the

C~ristifu~

They all starHl or fall together.
Second, logic alone dictates that

resurrection is invalid.

As Ladd

fi~y

.
"""1
, 'h~'
,
•
!'lse
Doal y f ro~ t'ne tom~,
vnen ne
lS

conceTlt of the

t~is

.

states, if Jesus did not

·'l deaa.
.31 It is plain that

Stl~_

if a person is dead he cannot still be alive

lli~less

one is 8peaking

of spiritual immortality or of the continuation of one's personality
as he is remembered by others or some such

~~derstanding.

Apart from

.just such a resu:rrection as the New TestaIT'.ent ?roclaims, Jesus

ca..~ot

said to be

Apart

any

more ali ve

tha..~

a..'"1yone else who h5.5 ever died.

from a literal resurrection, he could still be influencing people
todaJ~

only in the S2nse of the continued af:ect of his life a..'1d

teaci,1ings upon others.

30
31

B~~t

to say that Jesus is risen because of

Ladd, op.cit., pp. 146-147.
Ibid., pp. 152-153, footnote number five.

be
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su.c~:,

spiritual immortality cr influe:Qce is plainly illogical and

l...'1accu.:'ate.

It also D:..,·olves a gross i,::'sappropriation of words.

The early

Cr~istian

belief in Jesus' resurrection could not

have survived if Jesus' body was still rotting in the grave. 32

In

fc.;,c ~: n.v part of the Chri s+ 'i<L'"l faith could. be consi dered true if
Jesus had never risen fr0lli

th~

dead.

Ladd states this fact quite

well:
But if Jesus is dead. 33 his entire message is negated. If
he is dead, he cannot come in his Kingdom •.•• Furthermore
Jesus' te2.ching about the yresence of the Kingdom and its
blessings is also a delusion, for the presence of the Kingdomblessip~s was but an anticipation of the eschatological
Kingdom to be established by the heavenly Son of ~;ra.Tl •••. If
Jesus is dead, his entire message about the Kingdom of God is
o. delllsion, If .Jes'!.!s is dead, the heart of the New Testament
Christology is' also a delusion. 34
whereb~'"

For these reasons,

it is held

that Jesus is alive even though he did not literally rise from the
dead cannot be valid.
the

Such an interyretation does not coincide with

Ne~ Testa~ent ~Tlderstanding

understood as such.

of this event

~'1d

so caTlllot be

The New Testarr:eilt presents a lIdo or die:! attitude

as regards the literal resur:t.'ection of Jesus.

Only if it occurred

l i terally can we hold Christia.'1 theoJ.ogy to be valid.

Any otner

understa.'1ding of this event is therefore not possible if one still
desires to embrace Christian doctrine.

32
At t:i.s point in the abov-2 gt:.ote, Ladd supplies a footnote in
y{r:.ich he states his view tl:'1..at those who believe that Jesus is
still aliVe but '~ho insist that ~e did not rise bodily from the
tomb are voicing all illogical ODl!llOn. Jesus either arose or
he is dead (Ladd, op.cit., pp. 152-153, footnote number 5).
34

35

Ibid., pp. 145-146.
notes that ""~i.s interp::-etation was also prevalent in the
older liberalism of t:1E:; niilcteentr. and early twentieth centuries
(op.cit., pp.108-109).

~".a~hen
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In addition, this modern formulation is quite illogical.
~an

A dead

who did not rise from the dead is no more alive tnan any other

dead individual.
ins~iration

of his

Such a man could only influence people by the
~

life and teachings.

But such a person has

not "risen" and is not alive any more than any other person.
present spiritual existence would therefore not be

uni~ue.

His
Only by

a literal resurrection can an individual be proclaimed as being risen •.

Thus we must

cor.c~ude

that David Eume and theological liberalism

as a whole (both nineteenth and twentieth century) do not offer a
valjd approach to the resurrection of Jesus.
/"

The methodologJr and

presuppositions which are used have been shown to be in error, as
is the incorrect conception of the uniformity of nature.
these

faul~y

premises the

against the resurrection

subse~uent

~~st

~ithout

conclusions which were postulated

assuredly cannot be

h~ld.

the

~lso,

naturalistic theories which were proposed as alternate suggestions
to account for the belief in the resurrection were shown to be
inadequate to account :or the known facts.

These theories fall short

historically, logically and theologically.

In addition, liberal

theologians themselves showed that the alternate theories uere not
valid by demonstrating the inadequacies of each one.
It was likewise determined that the popular modern understanding
of Jesus as beinb "risen" and "alive" today in spite of his having never
risen from the dead is also a totally inadequate conception.

It must

be rejectea, as shown above, in that it violates the earliest Christian
understanding of this event and because it is quite illogical.
It is therefore necessary that the answer given by Hume and by
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contemporary liberal theology since his time be rejected as an
inade~uate

solution to the

~uestion

of the

resurrectio~.

None of

the naturalistic theories are even historically plausible, let alone
probable, and must therefore be abandoned.
resurrection did
being able to

n~t

This theory that the

occur thus fails at the crucial point of not

for~ulete

a probable alternate theory or othe=wise to

properly rule out the resurrection.

Any alternative theory such as

these which have been examined and refuted here must therefore be
rejected. 36
The questions

disc~ssed

in this chapter are very

i~portar.t

ones.

All of Christian theology relies on the validity of the resurrection
and it is therefore imperative to understand if this event is an
actual

occurre~ce.

To say that Jesus is riser. or alive, but that he

did not literally rise from the dead just cO:lpou.."lds the dile::-zra.
is

inade~uate

rose.

as an answer to the

~uestion

of whether Jesus really

It is our desire to evaluate the other possibilities in order

to ascertain if they can come any closer to a probable anSi·:er.

Such theories ";;o1l1d of cO'J.rse be re jected regardless of whether
a theologian, historian, philosopher or other such scholar
formulated the hypotheses. The field of specialty ma~:es :::0
difference here, as the alternative theory would still be forced
to answer the sa~e objections as were raised above.

Chapter XII.

An Evaluation of Possibility Nucber TriO

In chapte]Sseven and eight the possibility

~as

investigated

that the resurrection of Jesus actually occurred, but that it cannot
be demonstrated as such.

It was shown in chapter seven that the most

influential position here was that of theologian and philosopher
s~ren Kierkegaard.

It also beca~e obvious, especially in chapter

eight, that man;)" others have followed him in this belief.
It has just been found that the conclusion that the resurrection
did not occur fails in that it can neither provide a probable
solution to the facts or otherwise properly negate this event.

Thus

an answer must be found elsewhere.
Kierkegaard popularized the conclusion that the resurrection
(and other miracles) actually happened, but that this event cannot
be proven to have occurred.

It can only be accepted by faith.

is solely by faith and not by any type of deoonstration

that we

co~e

It

wn~tsoever

to know God.

This position 7.as further developed by Karl Barth, :7ho clearly
accepted the resurrection as a historical event which

actu~lly

occurred.

But like Kierkegaard, this event cannot be proven to have occurred
at all.

However, Barth followed earlier theologians like !:artin

~,II'!.o."
•
!\.8;:;,LJ.er
::.n
relegatin; the resurrection to other than totally

history.

objec~ive

This event was believed to have occurred in a nonvzrifiable

type of history which is removed

fro~

objective tests such as

historical investigation.
Many theologians followed Barth in these views.
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Today it is
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quite popular to conceive of the resurrecticr.

a real event, but

one which is not verifiable.
The rationale behind such a theory is apparently to be able to
affirm the resurrection as a real event for faith but at the same
time to

re~ove

this event from the critical eye of modern historiography.

Thus it appears that Barth's intention (and those who agree with him)
is to remove the Christian faith from this realm of modern historical
methodology and thus to keep Christianity from any possibility of
being critically investigated. l

Such methods of verification'are

viewed as being opposed to the New Testament presentation of
fai tho 2
In spite of 3arth i s seeming desire to !lpreserve" Christianity
from all such critical investigations, his formulation is still quite
problematical.

It has already been found in chapter three above that

history is required to investigate all. possible facts surroll..""lding an
event in order to find the !!lost probable conclusion..
tha~

It

7'8.S

neither science or history can rule out tnemiraculous a

concluded
~riori.

Rather, all of the facts must be thoroughly investigated with the

-

conclusion which best SUDuorts the facts being viewed as the probable
one.

--

Therefore a miracle such as the resurrection might be found to

1

See Elaikie, ou.cit., pp. 122-136 and Montgomery's History and
Christianity, ou.cit., pp. 87-89. an~ Where is History Going?,
op.cit., pp. 115-116.

2

Barth makes this claim, for instance, in his Church DOgmatics,
ou.cit., vol. IV, part 1, pp. 335-336.
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be the probable conclusion and thus be viewed as an actual historical
event.

For this reasor., Earth need not feel that the facts of

Christianity must be preserved from historical or other types of
investigation.

If these facts are found to be probable they will

thereby defend themselves.
the faith which the

l~ew

Otherwise such an event would not merit

Testament asserts is dependent upon it.

Barth is therefore in error in

recom~ending

such a

proced~re

as

being essential.
This last criticism of Earth's method is in addition to the other
major problems which have been pointed out in chapters seven and eight
with regards to both ?:ierkegaard' s and Barth' s position (an::: also
concerning those scholars who follow them).

Briefly, there

three major criticisms directed against Kierkegaard.
Zierkegaard

hi~self

instance, his polemic for
~akes

use of both logic and reason.

for~ulated

foun~ation.

Even his convictions were

In fact, his entire system could not

apart from reason.

Thus it is shown to be impossible

to have faith apart from some sort of rational basis.
faith is construed as being

For

and subjectivity is somewhat rational,

fait~

shown to be rationally-based.
be

First, even

is not successful in buildinb a theological

system that is not first built on some reasonable

as he

~ere

te~porally

Second, since

first and reason is civen no

real place by this scholar, it is not possible to know if such faith
is valid.
exa~ine

Since there would be no objective criteria by which to

the

Christi~~

beliefs or not.
deter~ine

faith, we cannot know if it is correct in its

Faith must therefore be testable ill orQer to

if it is valid.

Otherwise one never ascertain whether he

30;
was right in this faith and whether his belief was

and

trust~orthy

:actual, or if it was 5i~ply spurious.;
From the :irst two criticisms of Kierkecaard it beco29s apparent
that 1) reason is te~porally first and 2) faith needs an objective
foun~ation

so that it can be verified.

naturally follows from these first two.

A third criticism of Kierkegaard
Since some reasonable

verification is therefore needed upon which faith can be
historical

exa~ination

likely procedure.

a

b~ilt,

of the claims of Christianity is the most

At any rate, such a reasonable method could not

be opposed since just such an objective basis is needed. 4
From this treatnent of Kierkegaard, some of the
this proposec ap?roach to the

resurrect~on

of

wea~:nesses

can be more

seen.

clc~rly

There is definitely a need for a more objective approach to this event.
In addition to the one given above, four major

criticis~s

were

also presented co~cerning Barth's modification of this method. 5
Eriefly, the first criticism concerns Earth's development of the
idea that Jesus' resurrection occurred in prehistory or
It involves a

t~ofold

critique.

History knows

3 ?or the reasoninG for these first two

0:

parahisto!~~y.

no such concept

criticis~s,

see chapter four

above.

4 The logical steps for these three criticisms of Kierkegaard cannot
be completely ascertained from this brief summary.
seven for an indepth study of this critique.

5 These four

See chapter

criticis~s of Earth were later altered in chapter eight
so that they also applied to the scholars who followed hi~.
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where events ca.n occur on the boundary or

out2~~irts

of history.

realm cannot be measured by historical methods and is

th~s

This

invalid.

Additionally, Barth allows no verification for events in prehistory,
but still insists that they are actually
history can -be examinee. ana. inv13stigated.

his~~:ical.

If the resurrection occurred

in history it must be open to such investigation or it
referred to as objective history.

50wever, actual

be

car~ot

Second, like Kierkegaard, ]arth's

method allows no :leans whereby the Christia.n faith can be examined.
Thus, once again, it cannot be determined if this faith is valid or
not.

To

re~ove

Cnristianity

f=~= ~~J

investigation is to make it so

subjective that no one could actually ascertain its trustworthiness.
One could not be sure whether his belief was factual.
Third, Barth accepts the death of Jesus as an event which
occurred in real history in the modern sense of the word,
resurrection is relecated to prehistory.
believed to be revelatory.

~hile

the

Yet both events are

Earth is therp-fore illogical to Qeclare

that God does n0t reveal Eimself in objective, verifiable events.
Since !3:e did so at the cross, 3e could also do so with the ::-esu::-::-ectioll.
Thus the resurrection could also logically be history in
verifiable, objective sense.

t~e

modern

The fourth criticism of Barth is that

he has clearly been shown to be wrong in his belief that the New
Testament does not ever try to deoonstrate the resurrection.
contrary, such a procedure occurs several times.

6

To the

Thus he cannot claim

6 For example, see I Cor~nthians 15:4-8, especially verse 6; L~~e
24:36-43; John 20:24-28; Acts 1:;; 10:40-41. Christian doctrines
are also sai~ to be true because of the resurrection (see Acts
.. ,
17 •=3~v-./~,.

_~~ma~s
.. v_._

'·4)
- •
•
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Scriptural backing for his method. 7

For the reasom stated here, this second possible solution
to the resurrectior. also fails to account properly for the facts
which are

kno~~

to be true.

problems that the first

Admittedly, it is laden with fewer

~ethod

discussed in the last chapter.

For

instance, this solution is not required to offer any naturalistic
alternative views concerning the resurrection.
taken by Kierkegaard, Earth and others

c~~not

But the approach
adequately deal with

all of the criticisms raised here and must therefore be rejected as
an incorrect
As

treat~ent

co~cluded

of Jesus' resurrection.

in chapters seven and eight, Kierke;aard and

Barth both agree that faith in Christ is the most important element
of Christianity.

Thz same was also found to be true in this study
,

in

~ha?ter

four above, with faith as the more crucial elenent being

built upon a reasonable look at the facts.

Therefore, their

conception of faith can remain valid even though the methodology by
which they reach this conolusion is faulty'.

This is because the

same conclusion, namely the importance of faith, can also be reached

objecti~ely.8
For both Xierkegaard and Barth, the center of
salvation by faith and

co~itment

Christi~nity

to Jesus as the Christ.

is

Salvation

7 As with Rierkegaard, the reasons for these four criticisns cannot
be fully gleaned from this brief survey.
eight for the rationale here.
8

See especially chapter

This was the result of the logical study of faith and
chapter four.

re~son

in
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is achieved

~nen

ex~eriences

a

an individual is

co~plete

convicte~

that he is a

change in his life by repentance.

si~ner

and

~~is

spiri tua1 experie!lce consists of the individual trusting t;le death
of Christ on thG cross as a subsitutionary death to pay for his
sins and surrendering his life to God in faith as a result.
of these theologians also stress the subsequent

loth

com~itment ~d

the

changed life which ~ill result from a genuine conversion. 9
Because of the afore~entioned s~udy of the reason-faith relationship, these cO!lc1usio!ls concerning the primary importance of faith
must therefore be accepted as valid.
~ew

Testament position on this subject

They faithfully represent the
an~

will be found to be

even more trustworthy if the resurrection is found to be an actual
histcrica1 event because a firm, objective grounding will then
have been give!l tc this concept of faith.

9

For Kierkegaard is view, see especJ.a.!.i.;)r Attack Upon II Christendom" ,
on.cit q p]. 149, 210, 213, 280, 267; cf. Heinecken's "S¢ren
Kie!'kegaard", in r'::arty and Pee!'man, q,p.cit., pp. l3!.. , 153, 134.
For Earth's vieu, see in part:cu1ar his Church uOgmatics, on.cit.,
vol. IV, ~art 1, pp. 248-254.

Chapter XIII.

Evaluation of Possibility Number Three

The third possible solution to the resurrection of Jesus was
investigated in chapters nine and ten, a solution which

?ost~lated

that the resurrection actually occurred and that it can be demonstrated
to be a historical event.

It was determined in chapter nine that

Wolfhart Pannenberg is probably the best kno\vn representative of
this viewpoint.
witho~t

Several other scholars likewise hold this view

followine

Par~enberg

in these conclusions.

In chapter ten

the views of three other key scholars who also believe that the
res~rrection

can be demonstrated to have occurred in history were

also enumerated.
Generally speaking, each of these four scholars holds that history
:r;.ust be investigatec3

ifl

order to ascertain if the resurrection occurred.

All agree that one Dust not be prejudiced concerning what is
possible or inpossible in such an investigation.

The

onl:.~

TIay to

ascertain if a Supernatural event such as the resurrection has
act:.:a.lly occurred is to exar:line the facts and then decide ,.hich
concl:.:sion best fits these facts.
as the nost

~robable

This conclusion is to be accepted

one and is thus to be viewed as a historical

fact, even if it is a miracleo
After an exa=ination of the available evidence, each of these
four scholars arrives at the conclusion that the resurrection is the
event that best explains what happened.
be:ween each of

t:-~ese

The method varies a little

!:len, but the primary result is the same.

The

facts are best explainec by the resurrection and as this is the most

;07
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probable solution, it is regarded as histo=ical fact. l
In spite of the logical approach taken by these scholars,
SO:::le difficulties ,',ere detected in their work.
true of ?annenbere's thesis.

This was especially

First, his concept of God was discovered

to be quite arbitrary, lacking a sufficient amount of

de~onstration.

Contrary to Pannenberg's belief, Jesus does not speak exclusively
of God's working from the future.

To hold such a position one

must already have

~orks

ass~ed

that God

in this way in order to

interpret all verses in light of this idea.
difficult

~ith

This would be especially

the verses which W8re shown to teach the opposite vier..

Second, in spite of Pannenberg's conception of the indirect Selfrevelation of God, it was shown that the Jews also viewed revelation
as occurring directly through beth the spoken word of the prophets
an~

the written

~ord

of Scripture.

Thus it cannot be held that the

indi=ect revelation of God in history was the only means of revelation
accented by the

Je~s.

Third, it "lias found tb.at Pa:nnenberg's overall system lacks proof
at several crucial points.

It is especially in the formulation of

his seven theses that there is a decided lack of evidence for his
views.

This proclivity is perhaps best evidenced by the

co~~ection

both revelation and the fate of Jesus with the end of history.

1

of

Several

Ladd's conception of the resurrection occurring in history does
differ somewhat from the others, and this has already been considered
above. All four scholars agree that this event is the best
explanation of the historical facts and thus they also agree in·
accepting it as the most probable conclusion.
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proble~s

r.hich arise as a result of these

out above.
althuugh

for~ulations

!n fact, ?annenberg's theological

interesti~G,

establish it

beyon~

sometimes lacks the

were pointed

fra~ework

as a

~hole,

de~onstration nee~ed

the realm of philosophical speculation.

to

Fourth,

Pannenberg's treatment of the =esurrection fails in two respects.
First, he

fir~ly

accepts this occurrence as a historical event, but

rejects any stronsly objective appearances of Jesus eve!l ',"in,m the
evidence indicates otherwise.

But it was shown that s1lch conclusions

are unwarranted and that the witness of the
contrary.

1~?ertheless,

actually did rise

fro~

~ew Testa~ent

is to the

this scholar does indeed believe that Jesus

the dead and appear to his disciples.

The second part of th:s fourth

criticis~

concerns

?a~~enberg's

treatment of the naturalistic theories which have been co=posed in
With the exception of

opposition to the resurrection.

s~bjective

vision theory, his critique of these alternate theories is not as
strong as it could have been.
naturalistic vierrs be

refut~d

Yet it is imperative that these
as conclusively

~s

possible.

resurrection is the central elewent in the Christian
essential to ascertain if this
a

co~plete

a

~ore accu~ate

refut~tion

eve~t

•
...c: J..nce

fait~,

actually occurred.

..."
u.r~e

it is

~herefore,

of the naturalistic hypotheses would allow

d~cision

on the probability of the resurrection.

the more thorough the refutation of these alternate

vie~sis,

Also,

the

easier it is both to conclude that there are no views which are

~ore

probable than Jesus' resurrection as a historical event and the more
probable the

resurre~tion

is shown to be.

It was likei';ise found that Daniel Fuller, Ladd and :':aier also
fell prey to

t~is

last

criticis~.

Like Pannenberg, these

scholars were also successful in refuting the major

tr~ee

alter~ative

theories.
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But also like Pannenberg, seldom was a

c~mplete refutatio~

Given.

Once again, a ::nore thorou::;h and entire negation of the rival views
on the part of all

fo~r

scholars nould reveal even

~ore

~ositively

if there were any probable solutions other thar the literal
resurrection of
refutati0u is,

Jes~s.
t~e

The more complete this

investigatio~

easier it is the verify that the

resurr~ction

the East probable answer and the !!lore probabacle this
becomes.
0: 't!'::!.s

and

eve~t

is

itself

Since all four scholars endeavor to establish t::'2 probability
event~

th8 c'-eject should of course be to do so as 2.ccu=a.tely

and thoroughly as possib1e.

2

In addition to this one
these scholars

co~c6rning

com~on

criticism made of all four of

their inco::np1ete treatuents of the

alternate theories, other more individual criticisms were pointed out
above.

3ut ir. all cases, these critiques did not annul

of the resurrection
fact, it is qUitE

~hich

t~e

Q€fense

was presented by each of the four.

~ifficult

In

to annul these approaches when it is

realized that to successfully abrogate the::n, one would have to
propose a more probable naturalistic solution to the resurrection. 3
it ~as not only negative evidence (suc~ as that
which was present:=d against the alternate theories) i7hic~ -:;as ascertained
to favor the resurrection as an actual even in history.
sho~n

2

It was also

that there were positive facts and pointers which also indicate

The sign~l~cance of this criticism against all four of tnese
scholars ~il1 be ~ore fully eyplained in the last cha]ter.

3 See, for

exa~ple, ?annenberg, Revelation as ~istory, o~.cit., p.
and Eaier, Fi:::-st Easter, op.cit., p. 120.

147
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~ost

that this is the
example, Daniel

~ller

probable explanation of the facts.

Por

points to the conversion of Paul and the

existence of the 3entile mission.

Maier presented historical

evidence of various types to corroborate his position.
It is for these reasons that the third possible approach to
the resurrection, which proposes that this event actually occurred
and that it can be demonstrated, presents itself as' the best solution
to the question of Jesus' resurrection.

As will no.. be shown, the

conclusion whic!l 'best fits the facts is that the literal resurrection
of Jesus from the dead can be demonstrated to have occurred as a
historical event.

fo:lv"i~g

discussion in the last cnapter is

not dependent upon the work of these four scholars discussed here,
but still arrives at a

oi~ilar

conclusion.

Chapter XIV.

A Concluding Demonstration

It has been ascertained that the
fro~

lite~al resurre~tion

of

Jes~s

the dead is the historical event which best accounts for the

kilov;n facts sur::-o"J.!:dinC this occurrence.
chapter is to present one final

The objective

de~onstration

this event is the 20st probable.

by this

i~;,

tl:.is

~riter

that

As explained earlier in this work,

the ,"ore. "desonstr.s.tion" is used here not in the sense of "a-:::;solute
proof", but rat!ler as a reference to probabilities.

Thus, it is

asse::-te0 that the; factual evidence is strong enough to 7I"arr:;.nt the
conviction
l\~e. t

t~at

t~e

resurrection is the oost probable conclusion for

occurrei~

A.

The Historical Method

!~odern !;,is-:;orio~raphy

miraculous a

urio~i.

usually rules out the possibi1:'".;y of the

AccordinG to this method, history is

close~

the Supernatural workings of God in events such as miracles.
of the popularity

0=

to

In spite

this procedure, it ~ust be recc;nized that such

a position is a historical presupposition.
This modern

co~cept

of history emerGed

fro~

the intellectual

enyiro:rl.nent -oe::;inninc il1. the :Snlighten:nent and continued on to
nineteenth century historical Positivism.

::iracles such as the

resurrection ,;,,-e::-e ruled out frc:::l the outset, often because of a
supposed conflict '.,:i th the concept of

history~

The result ..as an

.
t~on
" '~n t 0 .
..
1
a -oriori::-ejecticn of a 1 1 Supernatura 1 ~nter'ven
n:Ls~ory.

One misht wender how historical this approach ::-ea11y is in

1

See Montgomery, History and Christianity, on.cit., pp. 88-89 ~nd
Where is Rist8r;v' Gsing'?, o-o.cit., pp. 115-116; :Slaikie, 0-'::. cit. ,
p. 135; ]aniel Fuller, on.cit., p. 188; Ladd, 0-0. cit. , pp. 12-13;
Maier, "The Empty TOI!l.b·· as. Eistory", 0-0. ci t., p. 5.
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actuality.
is to

In the case of a miracle-claim, the preyailing technique

dis~iss t~e

possibility of it even

befor~

any investiGation

of the facts.
::fowever, such 'ITas found to be an incor':oect procedure
t~o

and three aboye.

Science cannot rule out tne

i~

chapters

miraculo~s

a uriori

because the universe is no longer conceived of in terms of a closed
system in which all events happen by means of a prescribed regularity.
Science therefore cannot know beforehand that such
occur.

~iracles

ca~~ot

There can thus be no rejection of miracles such as the

resurrection

si~ply

by referring to a modern .. orld in which such

Supernatura}

~vents

do not

occur~

In fact, modern science is quite limited as to what it can say
about the resurrection.
with

~easurable

The scientific method is obviously concerned

quantities.

Concepts

s~lch

as peace, freedo= or love

cannot, of course, be measurec in a test tube.
counter be used to verify the

existe~ce

Neither

ca~

of julius Caesar.

In other

words, empirical science has no instruments or 'other means
history can be investifated.

a Geiger

~hereby

past

In addition, history is nonrepeatable,

which is also requi:oed in order for science to make a proper judgment.
~herefore,

all

~hat

can be ascertained via empirical science is that

the resurrection cannot be negated because of the scientific world
view.

Rather, an iillpartial historical investigation of the facts

is needed to see if this event actually occurred.
This is where the science of history
~ethod

to be used in this instance.

shown that neither can history
rule out miracles a '!:)riori.

e~erges

as the

~ore

proper

As with scienoe, it was also

e~ploy

the scientific world view to

Y;e are thus faced once again "\-:i th the
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need to historically investigate all of the facts to fini
n:'cbable solution.
as

~.

(as

Eost

Eodern historiography cannot negate the> resurrection

historical event Iii thout such an examination.

i~possible

t~e

sho~n

It is clearly

in chapters troo and three) to properly dismiss

such a miracle-claim beforehand.
In this work, the historical method which is employed is therefore
one which investisates the facts first before a decision is made as
to

~hat

can or did occur.

The status of probability is given to the

event which is the best explanation for the known facts.

Such an

inductive approach is actually more "scientific" in its end.eavor to
base the final

c~nclusion

upon a thorough historical investigation

of what is known to have occurred.

E.

The Historical Facts

Throuehout this T.ork, many references have been =ade to the
knonn historical facts and how the resurrection is the best explanation
fo:, these events.
circ1l!ristances

T.hic~

',',11 a t are these facts?

What are the e-vents and

are known to have happened in conju!1ction with

the belief that Jesus rose from the dead?
Sur:'ounding the .resurrection event are many facts which are
usually recognized as being historical by most scholars who deal
with this subject.
he was buried.

It is known that Jesus actually died

2

~~d that

Also historical is the fact that, after the death

of their Master, the disciples were extremely depressed and disillusioned.

2

There are very few (if any) reputable theolosians today -..,ho doubt
t~at Jesus actually died on the cross.
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~inistry

For them, Jesus'
cross.

had been ended prematurely by the

~oman

It is unani:::ously agreed that. they were thus qu.ite ciscouragec

and downcast.

Afterwards, as

c~nfounding

as it was, the tomb in

which Jesus was laid was later found to be "empty. 3
Very soon afterwards, history relates that the disciples had
several experiences which they believed were appearances of the risen
Jesus.

After these experiences there was a drastic qhange in their

disposition--a transformation which made them bold preachers even in
the very city where Jesus was crucified and bu.ried:

The result of

this preaching was the birth of the Christian church, which began
to meet on Sunday
Lastly, it is an

rat~er

than on the Jewish Sabbath (Saturday).

un~uestionable

historical fact that one of the most

avid persecutors of the Christian church, Saul of Tarsus,

~as

converted

to Christianity by what he. also believed was an appearance of the
.
J esus. 4
rJ.sen

From this S1lm3ary, a minimum of ten historical facts can be
gleaned which are held as being historical by the majority of
theologians 010,-oa.ay.

buried in a tonb.

1) Jesus actually c.ied on the cross ana. 2) was
3) The disciples were extremely disillusioned and

disconcerted by the death of Jesus, being bereft of all hope.

4) The

same tomb in which Jesus was buried was found empty just a few days
later, probably with the graveclothes still inside.

5) The disciples

3 Ladd adds here the historicity of

~he account of the graveclothes
being found in the empty tomb (on.cit., p. 94), since the description
of them bears the marks of eyewitness testimony.

4

For similar

lis~s,

see Ladd,

12i£.s

pp~

13: 91-94, 132-133.
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;rere the recipients of several eX:;leriences which they believed were
resurrection

appe~rances

of Jesus.

6) Afterwards, the disciples

experienced a complete transformation, being willing to die for

7) The resultant-preaching often took place in

their new faith.

JerllsalelJ:. 7 the e::act place where Jesus w?.s killed and buried.

8) This

preaching led to the birth of the church, 9) featuring Sunday as the
most important day of worship, instead of Saturday.

10) Later, Paul

was converted to Christianity by means of an experience which he
also believed was an appearance of the risen Jesus.
These, then, are the historical facts which !!lust be d.eal t \vi th
and explained.

The gospels and New Testament as a whole ag=ee with

all ten of these either explicitly or implicitly.
denied in any of

t~e

Kone of them is

writings of the New Testament.

In addition,

as we have seen at various points in this work, the majority of
theologians accept these as historical facts as well.

It is therefore

evident that the e:i:planation which is given to the resurrection must
also account for these events.

The answer that is postulated in

these early writin;s is that Jesus literally rose from the dead.
Any alternate explanation must explain all of these facts adequately
and still

C?OSS

t~e

hardest hurdle by proposing a probable

theory for the appearances to the disciples.

Thus, one

~aturalistic

~ho

would

deny the resurrection must both ac.equately explain all of these facts
and offer a nrobable alternate view to

~he

appearances.

~ut

as we

have seen, no such probable alternative views exist, as even the more
popular naturalistic theories fail to properly account for the facts
occurred. 5

5 We will return to a final evaluation of these alternate theories later.

~h~~h
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The enumerating of these facts also makes it evident that
there are

~ositive

historical facts which support a belief in the

resurrection as well.

This event therefore does not only depend

lJ!,on "hhat Ladd refers to as
all

natu~alistic

resurrection.

II

anti-criticism ll ,6 or the dis:::n.issal of

theories which have been formulated against the

In other words, it is not only the evidence from the

elimination of all altErnate theories which makes the resurrection
plausible, but there are actual "p,?sitive" facts which also demonstrate
that this event is the most probable.
There are at least seven strong facts which indicate that Jesus
actually rose from the dead.

The first and by far the strongest

fact is the positive New Testament claim that the disciples
see the risen Jesus.

There is not only the eyewitness

~id

testi~ony

Paul to this fact, but the gospels are at least close tc

indeed
of

~~d inclu~e

thE Eyewitness testi~ony of the ~isciples (see Luke 1:1-4 as an
exa~ple),

as discussed above.

Paul also records the extre2ely

important fact the.4: the original disciples were also preac;:ing

_1... _ .......

c:.uu""w

the appearances of the risen Jesus to them (I Cor. 15:11-15).
The power of this New Testament testi!!lony is twofold..

First9

no alternative theory is sufficient enough to explain these
and the subsequent conviction of their reality.

sppea~ances

But it is not only

the rejection of these theories that makes this claim so important.
Second, the known facts surrounding

6

~his

event tenQ to corroborate

Ladd, o~.cit., pp. 27, 140-141, in reference to He1wut
name for this evidence.

7~ie1ickels
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it and make

t~e

came to believe

claim highly credible.
fir~ly

the disciples

in the resurrection despite their overwhelming

disillusionment and disbelief.
of themselves.

i~stance,

For

Thus, they came to believe in spite

Other facts are also left unexplained apart from

the literal resurrection of Jesus.
other events in addition to the actual appearances are also
positive evidence for Jesus' resurrection.
change in
t~e

liyes of the disciples fro:n dejected !!len

arrEst of Jesus to bold preachers.

tta life,
o~n

t~e

Second, the incredible

deat~

a~d

~!10

have been
belief

resurrection of Jesus even in the face of their
~~n

firmly believed that

Such elation is usually not the action of 2en who

deceive~

evE~

fleG. at

asserted the te;:;..c2::'ngs of

death indicates unequivocally that these

Jesus had risen.

-::;!10

by any

ki~d

of falsehood, either.

Such

~~doubting

to the point of dying for their faith is not the mark of

::len who hc:.d even

t~1e

faintest ::lisgivings about this event.

transformation of the disciples is best

~ccounted

The

for by actual

appearances of the risen Jesus.
Third, the evidence of the empty tomb? while not in itself
providing proof of

t~e

resurrection, is a positive point in favor

of those who accept this event as historical.

At the

s~e

tiLe it

requires a probable explanation by those who reject this event.{

Even

core in favor of the resurrection is the discovery of the CT2veclothes
inside the

tomb~

still unraveled wi t:-. -the body

5i~pl~r

lllissing.

7 As was shown earlier, even those who do not accept overly objective
appearances of Jesus often accept the belief in t~e e~pty tomb.
See Reginald Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 48-49, 69-70, 179-180 and
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and J.::an, ou. ci t., pp. 100-104.

;19

The attitude of the Jewish leaders in the book of Acts reveals
a fourth set of historical circumstances strongly in favor of Jesus'
literal resurrection.
Jewish elders

o~

When the disciples were confronted by the

various occasions in the early chapters of this

book (see especially Acts

4-5), these followers of Jesus

~ere

not

charged with spreading false tales about Jesus' resurrection.
did the Jews go to Jesus;

Neither

reveal his body and so crush the

to~b,

central belief of Christianity.8
Fifth, the very "birth of the Christian church d.epends 1.::.pon the
message of Jesus i resurrection.

This event forms the very center

of Christianity and of the earliest Christian message.
to the earliest

testi~ony,

According

there would have been no church today

apart from this event. 9
~

sixth fact pointing to the resurrection is the

com~e~orating

of this event in the

Ghri~JlJjs.n

worship on Sunday instead of Sc:.. turday,

the Jewish Sabbath.

The first day of the week was referred to as

"the Lord's day" because .Tesus was believed to have risen on a
Sunday (see Rev. 1:10; cf. In. 20:19, 26).

Early Jewish Cr:istians

apparently still oathered at the local synagogue for

~orship

on

Saturday, but for tl'le Christia-"'l believer, Sunday was t!le day for such
important practices as partaking of the Lord's supper (Acts 20:7) and

8

ohen speakinG ;.i th an "agnostic" on the subject of Jesus' re!5urrection
a fe~ years ago s this writer was told that the stance t~:en by
the Jewish leaders in the boo~ of Acts was the strongest
~emonstrati8n of the reality of this event.

9

See Acts 1:21, 22; 2:24, 32; ;:15, 26; 4:10; 5:;0, etc.
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the gathering of one's of~ering (I Cor. 16:2).
the day of pre-er:rinence for the

Chris~ians.

Soon Sun~ay became

But sc:.ethint; zust aCCOll.."lt

for this day of war-ship since it was not the usual day.
Testament witnesses that the change was due to Jesus'

A seventh historical fact which makes the
probable is the conversion of Paul.

':::he

l~ew

resurrectic~.

resurrecti~~

even more

This enemy of the Christian

church was suddenly converted to the faith which ne had so avidly
opposed.

As Daniel Fuller shows, other naturalistic views

-~:hich

would account for this conversion are not convincing anQ 2USt be
rejected.

Paul c1<::.1.::(;:1 his turnabout was due to an appea:!.'allce of

the risen Jesus and it is this view which still fits the fr;,cts .ces .."" 10
These seven facts are therefore "positive" evidence for the
resurrection of Jesus in add.i tien to the "negative"
oy a relU t a t'10n

•

L'

01~.l.h
~e

... .
a It erna",1ve

.

v1e~s.

11

eviie::~cG

supplied.

The appearances of the

risen Jesus to his followers, the complete chanse in the d.isciples,
the empty to=b, the attitude of the
existence of the

cLu~ch,

Je~ish

leaders in Acts, the

the Christian worship day of Sunday and.

Faul1s conversion are strong facts in favor of the resurrection.
Earlier other historical evidence was also given, such as Janiel
Fuller's thesis about the existence of the Gentile
d.ependent on the resurrection

missio~

being

12 and Paul Maier's 2resentation of

10

Daniel Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 242-250.

11

"Positive" eyidence is a refer'ence to events which .?oi.:t directly
to the res-.:rrection, ";7hile "negative" evidence is that ';:-hich is
received fro~ refuting the naturalistic theories. Of co~rse, ~
are positive as far as the r0ality of the resurrection is concerned.

12

Daniel Fuller,

o~.cit.,

p~.

:_9-261.
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both specific and circumstantial nistorical evidence for this event. 13
However, contemporary theology has provided additional evidence
foy· the resurrection which reinfo::-ces

evidence.
criticis~

ea~l1

of these other points of

As eXylaineQ in chapter one, the application of form
to the sospel records was thought to be nelpful in ascertaining

what the earliest cbu.rch believed. about Jesus.
expecta tions

tf.SS

later additions

One of the J:;:lain

to uncover how the miraculous element was due to
an~

was not actually a part of the life of Jesus.

But such was not to be the case.
Contrary to 7:n:::.t may have been expected if the origin of
everything niraculous in the New Testament was the faith of the early
church rather than being a real part of Jesus' life, scholars cannot
react a form critical layer of tradition in whicn the resurrection
belief is not present.

In other words, form criticism has ceDonstrated

tha t t!1.e resur=ection belief is in the earliest strata of Ci.lristian
belief.

As Carl

~raatc~

cAplains these ::-esults:

The form-c::-i tical study of the earlie.st Christia:l traditions
nas established beyond reasonable doubt .that faith in the
risen Christ is the point of departure and the essential content
of the kery~a. Without the Easter faith there ~o~ld have
been no Christian church and the New Testament would not have
been written. The belief that God raised Jesus from the dead
on the third day is as old as the Christian faith and is now,
as ever cefore, the a::-ticle by ~hich the church stands or
falls •••• it may be refreshing to know that even the more scepticaJ
historian: ag:ree that for primative Christianity .... the
resurrection of Jesus from the dead was a real eVe~t in history,
the very ioun~a~~on of faith, and net a ~ythical idea arising
out of the creative imagination of believers.14

13

14

2~aier,

First :3aster, 0"0. ci t., pp. 114-122 and liThe 3m.pt3" Tomb as
History", on.cit., pp. 4-6.
Carl 3raaten, History and Her~eneu.tics, Volume II of New Directions
in Theolo;~r Today, edited by William liordern (Seven vol~es;
Philadel?hia: The Westminster Press, 1966) p. 78.
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Other

schola~s

likewise concur with Braaten in this view.

Reginald Fuller ag=ees that there was no time in which the
was not tne center of Christian preaching. 15
most important

pu~?ose

~esurrection

Ramm asserts that the

served by form criticism has been to show

that the miracles, and the resurrection in

have been
_ . .
16
embedded in Christian belief from the very oegl.r...n~:n.g ..
7i"anc. notes
particula~

the. t the further bad: tba t the texts are studied, the more clear it
becomes that the risen Christ is the same as the Jesus of history.17
Thus form criticism only served to strenghten the belief that the
resurrection is the historical basis of the Christian faith.

It

likewise confirmei the fact that this event occupied this very important
position in theology since the very begin.'1ingsof Christianity.
!n

en~erating

it becomes

but

the~e

that this event is the best explanation for what

apparen~

has occurred.

these historical facts surrounding the resurrection,

Eowever, tnere is not only the evidence of these facts,

is also the evidence from the refuted naturalistic theories.

In ad.dition, it lias also found that t!1ere are at least seven major
historical facts in favor of the resurrection besides those listed
by such scholars as iYlaier and. Daniel Fuller.

These consid.erations

therefore show that the literal resurrection of Jesus is

~b.e

most

probable conclusion to this historical ,!uestion, especially "hen it is
recognized

tha~

no

alter~ate

theories or other facts

~ilit~te

this event.

15 Reginald Fuller, on.cit.,
16

Rar:L"'!l,

17

Wand, on. cit., p. 122.

?~ctest8.:nt

p.

48.

Christian Evidences, o"J.cit., p. 194.

against
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c.

The Theological 1.1ethod

It becomes especially apparent from the material presented in
this chapter (as ~ell as in the rest of this work) that the pivotal
point in this discussion is the experiences of the earliest followers
of Jesus.

All admit that these witnesses really believed that Jesus

actually rose from the dead.
whethe~

these

eX?eri~llCes

lS

But the focal point here concerns

were actually appearances of the risen

Jesus~

Naturalistic theories of these experiences have been proposed
ever since tl1e earliest proclamation of these beliefs.

Of -:11e

several alternative views which were refuted here, there Toere three
major hypotheses.

These were the swoon theory popularized by Heinrich

Paulus, the subjecti-:€ vision theory formulated by David strauss
and the legend or ::::l:lth theory taught by Otto pfleid.erer and. others. 19
It has

bee~

a very important emphasis in this work to provide a

detailed and conplete refutation of each of·the

naturalis~ic

especially these

~ay

t~~ee

major ones.

Although it

be

the te!'ldency was to "overkill" each of the theories by
::::lore evid.ence than

18

19

~as

theories,

tho~cht

that

pre~enting

necessary to dispose of them, it =ust be

Even critical theology ~ccepts this belief on the part of the
disciples. For instance, 5ee Bul t:nann, "New Testament a."ld hlythology"
in Kery~a and Myth, ou.cit., p. 42.
Other naturalistic theories refuted here in addition to th~se
three include the objective vision theory (including t~e telegram
theory), the hypothesis of the continuing spiritual presence of
Jesus' personality in his disciples' minds, and the fraud theory
(including the stolen body hypothesis). See especially chapter
siT- for these refutations.
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strenuously objected that such was the exact intention of this
writer and for good

re~son.

The need for a complete refutation of the

alternative theories is too often overlooked in the works of those
who also opt for the belief that the resurrection can be
It is apparently not

r~alized

is, the more nrobable the

de~onstrated.

that the more thorough such a refutation

resurrectio~

becomes.

The reason for t1:is assertion is acute.

There are several very

important facts V:'hich point to the factici ty of the resurrc.c·tion; the
main one being the appearances to the disciples.
I

alternate theory

re~ains

A~

long as a key

unrefuted (in whole or in part), these

facts which point to the resurrection
impact which they warrant.

-:~.nnot

be accorded the full

3ut the more the alternate theories are

refuted, the :nore outstanding ihe facts favoring the disciples'
claims

become~

probabl~.

thus leaving the resurrection as still even more

Then it follows that the Dore completely such

nat~ralistic

theories are rejected, the higher the probab'ili ty for the resurrection
beco:n.es as the facts which demonstrate the reality of this event are
thereby shown to be valid.

This is especially so when no other alternate

theories are shown to be probable.

Therefore we perceive

t~e

importance

of complete refutations of these other views.
In examininG tne approaches of Pannenberg, Daniel
and

}~aier,

~~ller,

Ladd

it was found that each was not complete in 'his :oefuta tion

of alternate views (to varying degrees).
different respects.

This is true in

t1'IO

First, many of the main reasons for rejecting

each of the major theories were not presented.

In other ...-o:,c,s, seldom

v;as a theory rejected as thoroughly or strongly as it might have been.
Second~ eac~ of these scholars neglected completely (or almost so)
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one or more of the: "t::'ree major theories.

In Pannen"berb"s secti0Il

dealing with a defense of the resurrection against the alternate
theories in his
· 20
neg1 ec t ea.

Yoli.:~.ine

Jesus--God and "':.an, the swoon theory is

Fuller's treatise omits any specific refutation of

strauss' vision tneory or of the legend or
are cited as alternate hypotheses.

~yth

theory,

alt~ough

both

Also, the swoon theory is quickly

passed over ,vi th very little disproof. 21

Ladd. also ignores the legend.

or :a:.yt::' theory ir.. his treatment of the naturalis·tic theories~ 22 as
d.oes !Eaier. 23

<i.l t::'ough it has been ascertained t~at these scholars

were generally successful in their overall treatments of
one cannot help but
the probability of

t~ink

~~e

t~e

that since it was their desire to

resurrection, a more complete

resurrection,
de~onstrate

re!ut~tion

would

have been desirable.
Since a more adequate refutation of the alternate
the

reE:~rrection

more probable, the

treat~~nt

t~eo:ries

makes

of the three Dajor

theories and several lesser ones in this work has end.eavorec. to be
complete.

In fact, the desire was specifically to present

than ",ras necessary in order to dismiss each one.

~ore

evidence

The New Testament

states that Jesus rose from the dead and demonstrated this by appearing
to his followers.

20

21
22

23

Other facts also corroborate this event.

Pannenberg, Jesus--God a...'>'ld Man,
Daniel Fuller,
of this.

o~.cit.,

0"0.

ci t., pp. 88-106.

see pp. 38-39, 45-49, 67-68 for examples

Ladd, ou.cit., pp. 132-142.
~aier,

First

~aster,

Uith these

o"O.cit., pp. 105-113.
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naturalistic theories thus shown to be

~uite

inadequate to properly

explain whet occurred, the facts for the resurrection are sbown to
be hlghly probable.

If one believes that it is still difficult to

accept such a Supernatural event, it is even more difficult to
formulete an alternative view which logically, historically and
theologically

accou.~ts

for the known facts.

the highly probeble historical fact

~hich

The resurrection is

best accounts fo= what

occurred.

D.

One

interesti~~

Convinced by the Facts

point with regard to the facts of the resurrection

is that, after an examination of the evidence, many scholars who had
once rejected

t~is

to have occu=red.

ever.t

ca~e

to believe that it could be

They were convinced by the weight of

this event was historical.

de~onstrated

~ne

facts

t~~t

This is not to say thet no one ,';"no had

been taUGht that the resurrection occurred has ever rejected such
inf0rmetion leter.

~ut

this writer knows of no instance

~~e=e

the

resurrection was rejected after en examination of the facts, as was
the case with these

~ho

accepted the reelity of this event afte= just

such an examinetion, against their former views.
Frar.k I:!orison, a lawyer, is surely one of the best exa::::ples of
a scholar who

~ec~me

convinced against his earlier. convictions after

studyin6 the evidence for the resurrection.

As a young

ma~,

l:orison

began a serious study of the life of Jesus, being much influenced by
the works of G-er:r.en liberal scholarship.

He did not accept the miracles
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in Jp,sus' life

a~d.

was G.ete:,oined to remove what he felt ".7ere mythical

outgrow-ths.
Ten years afta:' his first studies he received the
study the life of
Jesus' life

i~

Jes~s

in depth.

OP?o~t~~ity

to

An examination of the last week of

particular brought him to a study of the resurrection.

3:owever, in endeavoring to write a book exposil:g these !:lyths which he
thought he would fi.nd, he was compelled by the factual evidence to
Tori te 'lui te a differ'ent book in favor of the resurrection.

This

work, entitled \Tho ];loved the Stone?, became a defense of the
resurrection

again~t

himself.

explains that it was because of his investigation of the

~e

the theological views formerly held by

l~orison

fa.cts that he reversed his former views a.nd that caused hi::: to realize
not only

~hat

the resurrection occurred, but that it could be

,
tra"e
' " d • 24
c.eZlons

'!Ihe late

Sim~)l: G~eenleaf,

p8.:::-: Barvard professor of la.r; and one

of the sreatest legal minds that America· has ever produced,
religious skeptic.

~as

a

Challenged by hiB students to apply the techniques

of his legal !:lasti:rpiece .A Treatise on the Law of EV'idence tv the
resurrection of

Jes~s,

Greenleaf became a believer.

~e

later wrote a

book, the long title of which is An Examination 'of the Testi:::nony of
the Four 3van5el;sts by the Rules of Evidence Administered in the
Cou::::·ts of Justice. 25

24

In this work he defends the resurrec';;icn and

See ;.:orison' s -book Who :,:ov~'; the stone?, 0"0. ci t., espscially the
and pp. 9-12; cf. pp. 8o-l02 for instance. Tne first cha~ter
appropriatel:,r tells of the original book that could !':oot be writte~
against the res-..::.rrection and life of Jesus because of the facts.
?ref~ce

25

r,,'
.!.n~s

- . d ~n
- ,J.;;v~
t:: ~ (G"'a.
.:l
".:;>
-;
wor k wa.s reprl.n-r;e
-_ nl,,;,
_.ap
... d s: Eaker 300k House).
t'\
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explains how, when judged by the laws of legal evidence, this event
can be demonstrated to have actually occurred. 26
Another scholar
evidence is

~edical

~ho

was convinced by an examination of the

doctor Viggo Olsen.

Be described hiillself as an

agnostic who did not believe in the Supernatural elements of Christianity.
But more than this, he

const~.tly ~uestioned

attempted to disprove it.

the Christian :aith and

Through the process of trying tc expose

these beliefs, he studied the resurrection and other

evide~ces.

Later he became convinced that God tUd exist e.nd tha.t there
more than a sufficient amount of

de~onstration

for the

"~as

res~rrection.

He realized that this event actually occurred and that as such it was
the center of the Christian faith.

It is noteworthy that Simon

Greenleaf's book on the Christian evidences was a key influence on
Olsen. 27
Other scholars who have looked impartially at the facts have
often likewise concluc..ed that the evidence for the resurrection
establishes it as a historical event.

For· instance, such i.as the

cO!lclusion of lawyer Sir Biward Clarke, K.C., who also investigated
the resurrection in terms of the evidential aspect.

He renarked that

this factual suP?ort was conclusive, as he had often

secure~

verdict in courts of law with less evidence.

26

28

a positive

McDo~ell lists numerous

See Josh !.:cDowell, Evidence that Demands A Verdict (San Bernadino:
Published by Campus Crusade for Christ International, no date),
especially pp. 199-200. See also the tape by McDowell distributed
by this sa~e organization, entitled "Resurrection: Fact or Fallacy?"

27

ViggoOlsen, The A~osti~ Who Dared to Search (Chicago: Keody
Press, 1974). For Olsen's discussion of the resurrection, see
pp. 36-37, 39, 46-47 of this booklet.

28

Stott records a letter '.'1'ri tten by Clarke with the a.bove affirma tions~
See John R. ".7. stott Basic Christianity (Chicago: Inter-Varsi ty
Press, 1965), p~ 46.
j
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other instances where other scholars came to similar conclusions
after an impartial examination of the facts. 29
~hen speakin~

of such examples, the New Testament instances of

similar results should not be ignored.

It is known, for instance,

that Jesus' brother James was almost assuredly not a believe:r' before
the resurrection (J~. 7:5; cf. !dk. 3:21, 31-34).
appearance

fro~ Jes~s

he became a

Christi~~

Eut after an

and the leader of the

Jerusalem church (I Cor. 15:7; cf. Gal. 2:1-10).

The ex~ple of

Paul changing fro~ a persecutor of the church (Acts 7:57-59; 9:1-2)
to an ardent follower of Christ has already been mentioned above
(see I Cor. 15: 8-9).

Agair.. it was an appearance of the risen Je=,~s

that caused this change of heart.
thecl~gical

scholarship that

~cth

It is the opinion of

co~te~porary

of these men became Christians

in spite of their former beliefs because of an appearance of the
risen Lord. 30
This brief pr2sentation has shown that many have accepted the
resurrection as a historical eYent after a'careful investiga.tion-of
'the data, even when formerly opposed to .this belief.

Also extremely

interesting is the stance taken by two "God-is-dead" or secillar
theologians, Willia3 Hamilton and

Jo~~

A.T. Robinson:

In spite of

the secular theological positions of these two men, they also
recognize the strong evidence fer the resurrection.
For
pro-oa.ble.

~amilton,

the resurrection and empty tomb are hiShly

In fact, he believes that the resurrection may be affirmed

29 MeDowell, op.cit., pp. 196-202.
30

See Reginald Puller, on.cit., pp. 37, 177-178; Raymond 3rown,
The Virginal Concention and Bodily ?esurrection of Jes~s, on~cit.,
p. 94, footnote number 160 and p. 95; Ladd, on.cit., pp. 104-106
for a few examples of this belief.
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31 Robinson admits that the empty
as a regular historical event.
tomb is very dif:icu1t to

because of the good evidence for

dis~iss

this event. 32
T~is

survey of several scholars was presented in

orde~

to

sho~

ho~ strong the evide~ce for the resurrection is for the o~e ~ho looks
Seve~al

irr.partially at the facts.
this belief

~ere

scholars who were once

convinced othernise after

~n

op~osed

to

investigation of the

evidence, as were others who studied the data ir. favor of this event.
The New Testament also records two exa::lp1es of men who were convinced
by resurrection appearances of Jesus against their former views.

Even two secular theo1oginas were able to grant a high credibility to
the resurrection, as one accepted it as a historical event While
t~e

other ad!:litted that it Vlould be hard to reject the st=':;;lg' evidence

in favor of it.
Suc~

Crxist.

is the convincing evidence for the resurrection of Jesus

As church historian Wand re!:linds us about

t~is

event:

the strictl~' historical evidence we· have is i!"J. fa~!or
of it, and those schol~r? who reject it ouzht to recocnize
that they do so on some other ground than that of scis~tific
v • ./
-'::3
..."';sto-II'
.IUJ.

~...

:'~is

accept the

serves <".s a good reminder about our earlier conclusion
to the

ans~er

fits the facts.

~9nd

~uestion

of the resurrection which best

notes that if naturalistic theories are unable

to account for an event '.V!1ich clai:ls that a miracle has taken place,
then a Supernatural alternative
It is

unscie~tific

to oegin

~ith

~ust

t!1e

not be viewed as impossible.
pres~pposition

that

~iraculous

31

Willia:!! ?:e.::J.ilto~, The Wew Essence of C!1ristianity (New York:
Association Press, 1961), p. 116, note.

32

John A.T. ROJinson, Ex~lor2tio!l. Into God (Stanford: Stanford
Universit3 Fress, 1967), p. 113.

33

Wand,

o~.cit.,

pp. 93-94.

331
events

ca~~ot

occur.

Rather, a critical historian can only examine

the facts involved in the situation before
basis of this evidence.

hi~

and decide on the

If the probable event is a

Supernat~ral

then it must be accepted as such, as with the resurrection.

one.

~odern

science and history cannot refute this event, as we have seen. 34
Therefore, in accordance with this historical
literal resurrection of Jesus Christ
as an actual

histo~ical

fro~

princi~le,

the

the dead·must be accepted

eventaccor.ding to its high degree of plausibility.

Once again, those who find it difficult to accept this conclusion
will have an even wore difficult time endeavoring to formulate
alternative theory "hieh is historically probable.

~~

It is not only

possible to conpletely refute all of the naturalistic alternate
theories which oppose a literal resurrection, as shown above, but
there are several
most

i~,ortant

appeared

i=port~nt

facts in favor of this event.

of these facts is that, in all probability,

e~pirically

The
Je91~S

to his followers after his death on thc cross

and no other thesis apart from the literal

r~surrection

of properly explaining these appearances.

The resurrection of Jesus

is thereby

hi~~ly

is capable

probable.

E.

The Center of Christianity

It must be concluded that the knowledge that Jesus' resurrection
is a historical fact is one of ultimate importance to the Christian
faith.

As was

sho~n

in chapter eleven, one cannot hold that Jesus

is dead and that he never rose from the tomb and still hold that

34

Ibid., pp. 30, 51-52, 70-71, 101.
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Jesus is alive today in any
doctrines as

suc~

uni~ue

Christolo~'

sense.

Neither can one hold that

and subsequent beliefs concerning

salvation can have the same validity if the one around

who~

such

beliefs revolve is dead, not even being able to conquer death himself.
If such were the case, there would thus be no

reaso~

Christians will receive such blessings either.
apart

fro~

the

res~rrection

(I Cor. 15:12-19).

to sus?ect that

As Paul asserts,

there is no Christian faith at all

For this reason, the reality of the resurrec~ion

is absolutely esse:::tial for Christian faith. 35
There~ore,

rose

fro~

the conclusion which asserts that Jesus actually

the dead is no meaningless

assertion~

of simply

affir~i!lG

the resurrection.

i~portant

to

this

re~ainder

of the Christian faith is

acce~t

eve~t

It is not a

~atter

To the contrary, it is very

as historical, for in so doing the
de~onstrated

to be valid.

This is also o;;hy it wa:- asser'Ced earlie:.'" tbat t::'e concept of
faith as defined PH Kierke;a.,.rd a.nd 3a:::,th could :::,e::nain valid in
spite of the critiques of these two

theologians~

Each of these

scholars agrees with the New Testament in recognizing that every
individual man is a sinner In need of repentance, or a total change
in one's life.

A total surrender to God in faith, trustins Jesus'

substitutionary death on the cross to forgive these sins, is needed
for salvation.
com~itment

35

The result is a total change in one's life, a total

based upon the death of Jesus.

In these principles,

Even secular theologian 7>'"illiam Hamilton opposes ihe contemporary
view which gives e7.ist~ntial i~portance to the concept that Jesus
is alive but denies that he literally rose from the de~d. ~amilton
also asserts that wit~out the historical event of the resurrection,
Christian faith loses all meaning (on.cit., p. 116, note). Here
he perceiveS t~8 ~ase quite well.
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Kierkegaard and 3arth both follow the New Testament
salvation.

Jes~s

clai~ed

defi~ition

of

to have come to this world chiefly to die

a substitutionary death in order to procure such salvation for those
who com=it their lives in faith to God through

~is

Son (see

~ark

10:

45; John 1:12-13; I Cor. l5:l-4)a
Such teachinGs

~~o

~--

ancient superstitions.

often ignored today as outmoded and due to
But in light of our conclusions concerning

Jesus' resurrection, such tendencies to dismiss the New Testament
teaching on salvation are unwarranted.
accepted as a Supernatural

event~

to ffiankind was for a reason.
Super~atural

It

Since the resurrection is

as showr. here, then Jesus'
~ould

~inistry

be illogical to accept the

demonstration of Jesus' mission and then reject the

message which is corroborated by it.

As the resurrection evsnt cannot

be denied, neither can the resurreqtion message of the subsequent
availability of this salvation.
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